

INVITATION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN



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Dedicated

**with deep devotion and respectful regards
to**

His Holiness

**Jagadguru Śrī Chandraśekharendra Sarasvati
Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya of Kāñchī Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha
who is a personification of
all that is great and noble
in Indian Philosophy**

PREFACE

To an alert mind aspiring for wisdom, there could be nothing so inviting as sound philosophy. India, with its long tradition in the things of the mind and spirit, offers a rich field in philosophical perspectives—a veritable paradise of gorgeously endowed metaphysical mansions. Both in regard to time and variety, Indian thought presents a fascinating vista: it has the longest history to its credit going back to the Veda; it has a varied and vibrant range of standpoints, from many grades of materialism to all the possible shades of spiritualistic manism and non-dualism.

What is attempted in the present study is an introduction to the major metaphysical traditions. Not an historical treatment but doctrinal exposition is what is sought to be accomplished. Apart from implicit internal criticism, the reader will not find here critical estimates of the philosophical systems. Each system is allowed to speak for itself as best as it can. It is open to the reader to find satisfaction where he will. Even where he does not agree, it is hoped, he will find enough food for reflection which will contribute to a better appreciation of the standpoint he chooses to adopt.

After a brief account of the essential characteristics of Indian thought, the teachings of the *Vedas*, the

Upaniṣads, and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, are given in a concise manner. Then follow expositions of Indian Materialism, Jainism, and Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools. These systems are considered to be heterodox in the sense that they formally reject the authority of the *Veda*. The orthodox systems are counted as six, but there are sub-divisions in some of them. After presenting the philosophical doctrines associated with Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga, the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā philosophy is explained. The last three chapters are concerned with what may be called the living traditions in Indian philosophy, the various standpoints in theistic Vedānta, the Śaiva and Śākta schools, and the non-dualistic Vedānta. As an appendix is given a brief survey of the contemporary situation in Indian philosophy. The aim of the present work is to invite the attention of interested scholars to the fascinating domain of Indian thought through a descriptive account which attempts to achieve clarity without sacrificing depth, and conciseness without omitting the essentials.

It was the United States Educational Resources Centre, New Delhi, that first invited me, in 1968, to undertake this work. I am grateful to the Centre for giving me this opportunity of participating in this essential enterprise for promoting East-West understanding. With the consent of the Educational Resources Centre, Messrs. Arnold Heinemann have undertaken to publish this book. I am happy that the publication is sponsored by a House which has international reputation. Sri B. S. Prakash, scholar attached to

the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, has helped in the preparation of the glossary and the index.

My respectful salutations to His Holiness Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekharendra Sarasvatī, Sri Sankarācharya of Kāñchi, for His gracious consent for dedicating this book to Him.

Madras,
July 21, 1974.

T.M.P. Mahadevan

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The transliteration of Sanskrit words follows the current usage of Orientalists.

The approximate sound-equivalents of the letters are as follows·

a	as	u	in	hut
ā	as	a	in	psalm
i	as	i	in	knit
ī	as	ee	in	meet
u	as	u	in	full
ū	as	u	in	rule
r	as	r	in	fiery (sound between ri and ri).
e	as	e	in	they (always long in Sanskrit).
o	as	o	in	note (always long in Sanskrit)
ai	as	ai	in	aisle
au	as	ow	in	fowl.
ṁ	<i>anusvāra</i> (a nasal sound which accompanies a vowel)			

as	m	in	sun
----	---	----	-----

h *visarga* (sound like light breathing), pronun-
 ciation varies according to the pre-
 ceding vowel

apostrophe stands for elided a

k	as	k	in	kite.
---	----	---	----	-------

kh	as	kh	in	inkhorn
----	----	----	----	---------

g	as	g	in	gate
---	----	---	----	------

gh	as	gh	in	springhead
----	----	----	----	------------

ñ	as	ng	in	sing
---	----	----	----	------

c	as	ch	in	church.
---	----	----	----	---------

ch	as	ch h	in	church-history.
----	----	------	----	-----------------

j	as	j	in	jelly
---	----	---	----	-------

jh	as	ge h	in	bridge house
----	----	------	----	--------------

ñ	as	n	in	new
---	----	---	----	-----

t	as	t	in	task
---	----	---	----	------

th	as	th	in	anthill
----	----	----	----	---------

d	as	d	in	dark.
---	----	---	----	-------

dh	as	dh	in	Godhead
n	as	n	in	Monday (labial articulation)
t	as	th	in	panther
th	as	th	in	thought
d	as	th	in	they
dh	as	dh	in	adhere (but more dental)
n	as	n	in	note
p	as	p	in	pan
ph	as	ph	in	topheavy.
b	as	b	in	bed.
bh	as	bh	in	clubhouse.
m	as	m	in	mill.
v	as	y	in	yet
r	as	r	in	race
l	as	l	in	lake.
v	as	v	in	live

MAHADEVAN

s	(palatal sibilant)	as	s in	sure.
ʃ	(cerebral sibilant)	as	sh in	bush.
s	as	s	in	save
h	as	h	in	hall
l	as	l	in	curl.
ks	as	ksh	in	baksheesh.

Chapter One

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY : WHAT IS IT ?

1. COMPLEX TEXTURE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Indian Philosophy is at least as old as the *Rg-veda* whose date is still indefinite. In extent, it covers not only India but also a large portion of Asia and many land-areas of the Indian Ocean. In content, it is rich and varied including such contrasted standpoints as those of materialism and spiritualism, pluralism and monism, realism and idealism, theism and absolutism. It is not possible, therefore, to characterize Indian philosophy in a rough and ready fashion; what may be true of one aspect of it may not be true of other aspects; what may justifiably be asserted of a stage in its development may not be so asserted of other stages. Many of the critics of Indian philosophy thus go wrong in their summary pronouncements regarding its nature, content, and scope. When they say that Indian philosophy is indistinguishable from religion, or that it takes a gloomy view of life and things, or that it is other-worldly, or unprogressive, etc., they mistake what is only a part for the whole of Indian philosophy. Even as Western philosophy is not one philosophy, Indian philosophy is not a single philosophy. Even as it may be legitimately said that there has been a development of thought in the West, it may be rightly claimed that there has been a movement in the realm

of Indian metaphysics. So long has the world believed in the myth of Oriental staticity, that the sooner the myth is given up the better it will be for an East-West understanding. Thanks to the coming of the West to India, there is in India, among those who study philosophy, a fairly intimate acquaintance with the major thought-systems of Europe and of the West. But there has not been a corresponding appreciation on the part of the West of the significance of Indian philosophy. For more than a hundred years the Orientalists of the West, it is true, have been studying Sanskrit. But a major part of this study has been linguistic and philological. The discovery of Indian philosophy by the West is quite recent. There is urgent need for the philosophies of India to be better known in the West. It is knowledge that will dispel ignorance and ignorance-bred prejudices. If there should be One-World—as there must be—the achievements of India for over five thousand years in the sphere of thought ought to be integrated with those of the rest of the world. Only then will there be a fair chance of global thinking which is what mankind must increasingly strive after.

The first thing one should be aware of in connection with Indian philosophy is its complex texture. The various shades of philosophy appear in Indian thought many times over. Several types of realism and idealism, for instance, arose in Buddhism of the heterodox tradition, and in Vedānta of the orthodox tradition. It is usual to classify the schools of Indian philosophy into two groups, the orthodox and the heterodox. These names, however, are relative, for what is ortho-

dox to one may be heterodox to another. As applied to the schools of Indian philosophy, 'orthodox' means 'acceptance of the authority of the Veda' and 'heterodox' indicates 'non-acceptance of that authority'. Very often the distinction between the orthodox and the heterodox is nominal. Many of the so-called orthodox schools accept the Vedic authority only in name. And, some of those schools which are called heterodox are profoundly influenced by the Upaniṣads most of which constitute the concluding portions of the Veda. The orthodox systems are usually numbered as six, and the heterodox systems as three. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta are the orthodox systems, Cārvāka, Jainism and Buddhism are the heterodox systems. These are only broad divisions of Indian philosophy, and are by no means exhaustive. Philosophy in India did not begin with these systems. For a long stretch of time before the rise of the systems, there was intense philosophic activity. The poets of the Vedas, the seers of the Upaniṣads, the sages who composed the Epics and the Purāṇas, and other thinkers, conformist as well as non-conformist, whose names are legion—all contributed in the early millennia of Indian history to the growth of a rich philosophical heritage. In this heritage the various metaphysical schools that appeared later share many things in common, the only exception being the Cārvāka materialism. This exception itself is indicative of an important feature of Indian philosophy as a whole. And that is, that there is something in the Indian climate of thought which is not hospitable to the growth of materialism and naturalism.

Cārvāka was never a popular system; it can hardly be styled a system. There was no concerted attempt on the part of any group to stifle it. From the evidence available we can say that the Cārvāka had great freedom in the matter of its opinions and their propagation. Yet no strong school could be built for it. The Cārvāka materialism is to be regarded more as a mood of the mind in its evolution than as the mind's resting place. Barring Cārvāka, all the other schools of thought, both orthodox and heterodox, reveal certain fundamental identities in spite of doctrinal divergences. It is in virtue of these identities that they may be called Indian. I shall refer to three areas where such identities may be discerned, viz., methodology, metaphysics, and practical teaching.

2. METHODOLOGY

The modern Western philosopher is suspicious of any method other than that of reason. A well-known European thinker defines philosophy as a thinking consideration of things. Very rarely has the philosopher in the West recognized the limitations of the intellect. In India, however, it was very early realized that the total reality which is the content of philosophy cannot be adequately known through intellection. Analysis is the main function of the intellect. But by cold analysis we shall not be able to catch or experience the living reality. Logical reasoning can yield only mediate knowledge. The aim of philosophy is not to stop with a theoretic understanding of the real but to have an immediate awareness of it. And so, a method which is

higher than reasoning and takes the thread where the latter drops it is necessary. That method is usually referred to as that of intuition. The knowledge that one gets through intuition is immediate and indubitable. It is not infra-rational but supra-rational. It is self-certifying and self-established. Not only do the systems directly based on the Upanisads adopt this method, but also the rationalistic schools such as Nyāya and Buddhism feel the need for it. The very fact that this is so shows that intuition cannot be an irrational instrument of knowledge. The Indian philosopher does admit that the intuitive experience of reality must be made intelligible. And, this is the special function of reasoning. What is more cannot be less. What goes beyond reason cannot fail to satisfy the demands of reason. Logical inquiry is certainly of great consequence. As Śankara, the best known classical philosopher of India, observes, that which is accepted or believed in without sufficient inquiry is not only bad philosophy, but also prevents one from reaching the goal of perfection and results in evil. So, there must be intelligent inquiry; but the philosopher's ultimate objective is not mediate knowledge of reality; it is the immediate experience thereof.

3. METAPHYSICS

In the area of metaphysics, the most prominent doctrine that one finds in every system of philosophy is the distinction between spirit and matter. Various terms are used in the different systems of philosophy to

indicate these two categories: *ātman* (self) and *anātman* (not-self), *jīva* (soul) and *ajīva* (non-soul), *puruṣa* (spirit) and *prakṛti* (primal nature), etc. What distinguishes spirit from matter is consciousness, *caitanya*. Even Buddhism, which dismisses the self in the sense of an abiding entity, recognizes a sort of fluid self which transmigrates and finally attains *nirvāṇa* (perfection). The spirit or self is not to be identified with the mind. The mind, according to all the systems of thought, is a material and not a spiritual principle. The self is different from the mind-body complex which it occupies during transmigration. The mind is only an instrument of knowledge, and is not of the nature of knowledge which the self alone is. Of the two categories, spirit and matter, the more primary is the spirit. Even in an out-and-out dualistic system like the Sāṅkhya, the evolution of *prakṛti* (the matrix or prius of creation) is said to be for the sake of the *puruṣa* (spirit). In Jainism, for instance, the very terminology of the classification of reality into *jīva* (soul) and *ajīva* (non-soul) shows the importance of the spiritual principle. There will be no drama of the universe, if its hero, the spirit, is removed. But for the principle of consciousness, as it is stated in many a philosophical work, the entire world will be blind, will become unintelligible.

Another metaphysical tendency that is to be observed in Indian philosophy is the strong urge towards the unification of reality. That the fundamental reality is one or non-dual, and that it is of the nature of the unconditioned spirit is the teaching of many a system of philosophy, and the implication of several

others. It is true that there are pluralistic schools. But even they make a distinction between the independent reality and dependent realities. The former is one and is spiritual by nature. Some philosophers call it God, others the absolute Experience. The many finite realities are dependent on the one infinite reality. They are related to it either as modifications or as appearances. The final reality is not only the supreme ground of existence, it is also the ultimate value. It may be described as truth, beauty, and goodness. But here again it must be remembered that the ultimate value is one, and not many. The spirit as freedom is the supreme value, in it are synthesized and transmuted even truth, beauty, and goodness.

4. PRACTICAL TEACHING

We have already seen that the aim of Indian philosophy is not a mere intellectual apprehension of reality but an intuitive realization of it. And so it is that insistence is laid in every system of philosophy on the need for practical discipline. An aspirant for philosophic wisdom should be not only intellectually alert but also morally pure. Metaphysical contemplation is possible only for one who has cultivated such qualities as equanimity, self-control, and contentment. All the schools of philosophy, orthodox, as well as heterodox, are agreed on this, viz., that a seeker after metaphysical truth should cease from harbouring a thirst for the fleeting goods of this world, and turn to the eternal reality for ultimate succour and satisfaction. When a candidate is morally and emotionally ready, he enters on

the enterprise called philosophizing. Guided study, rational reflection, and continued meditation on content studied and reflected upon constitute the technique of philosophizing in India. This process has to go on till the metaphysical truth is realized. That such realization can come to one even in this very life is the teaching of many schools of Indian philosophy. Even those others which believe that the final realization comes only after death do nevertheless teach that he who has received philosophic knowledge leads thenceforward a transformed life.

5 ALLIANCE OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

It is the practical teaching that is associated with the philosophical traditions in India which is responsible for keeping philosophy and religion in close mutual alliance. This alliance has puzzled many a western student of Indian thought. It is true that philosophy and religion began as one in India, as is the case everywhere. But soon they came to be distinguished, though this distinction never resulted in a divorce. One can easily see the difference, for instance, between the *Bhāgavata* which is one of the Purāṇas and the basic work on Vedānta, the *Brahma-sūtra* with its diverse commentaries. While the principal aim of the former is to induce *devotion* in one's heart for the Deity, the main object of the latter is to enable one to *understand* the nature of Reality. But the reason why the two, philosophy and religion, have been closely associated with each other in India is that the final objective of both is the same, viz., to make man realize his supreme

end which is release from the cycle of birth and death which is called *samsāra*. The purpose of religion is not only to refine man's emotions, but also to sublimate them and transform his entire life. Similarly, the task of philosophy is to bring light to the understanding and thereby help man realize his true nature.

The fact that in India philosophy has been essentially a quest for values seems to be the reason why Indian philosophy has maintained a close alliance with religion. Not intellectual curiosity or wonder, but the desire to realize the highest value in life was the principal spur for the philosopher's search. Man's supreme end was generally regarded as *mokṣa*, spiritual freedom; and this was the fulcrum on which both philosophy and religion turned. The logical methods of enquiry were, no doubt, adopted by the philosopher, but these were found to be not enough for realizing the goal of life. Similarly, it was discovered that, though a life lived in accordance with moral principles was absolutely essential, one cannot 'stay put' in the moral realm of claims and counter-claims, but should go beyond to the higher region of distinctionless, transcendent experience from which morality derives its sanction and value. Thus philosophy aimed at an ideal which was both trans-logical and supra-moral. Each value was accorded its proper place. It is therefore wrong to say that Indian philosophy is unethical in character. No one who has sufficient acquaintance with the systems of Indian thought will ever say that the importance of morality was minimized in any of them. If the aim is more than morality, it is uncharitable to think of it as

immorality. The Indian philosopher recognized that even the lower ends like wealth (*artha*) and pleasure (*kāma*) should be not opposed to righteousness (*dharma*),¹ not to speak of *moksa*, the *summum bonum*.²

It is the quest for *moksa*, then, that has kept Indian philosophy and religion together, and if philosophy has not become barren and religion blind in India, it must be due to their reciprocal influence. We can trace this influence right from the hymns of the *Rg-veda* and the *Upanisads*, through the literature of the classical age, down to modern expositions of Indian culture. From the side of religion, the conception of a philosophic monotheism was formulated even as early as the Vedic hymns. And from the side of philosophy, a monistic or non-dualistic view was enunciated by the ancient seers. These two currents, philosophic monotheism and spiritualistic monism, have run on together, each influencing and enriching the other and thus contributing, in a profound way, to the rich cultural heritage that is India's.

6. PLAN OF THE PRESENT WORK

It is not possible to write a history of Indian philosophy on the model of the history of Western philosophy. Very little is known about the philosophers of India. And, it is not possible to say which philosophy came earlier and which later. In fact, the philosophies in India did not appear one after another; they developed alongside one another. And so, we shall not attempt to give a chronological account of Indian philosophy. The plan that we shall follow will be this:

The *Vedas*, the *Upanisads*, and the *Bhagavad-gītā* will occupy our attention first. And then we shall consider the doctrines of the three heterodox schools: Cārvāka, Jainism, and Buddhism. Thereafter will follow the chapters dealing with the orthodox systems Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sankhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta. There are several schools of Vedānta. We shall study three of them, viz., Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Dvaita. The last two belong to the Vaisnava tradition. There are variant philosophical schools in the Śaiva tradition too. Of these, we shall consider the Southern school of Śaivism known as Śaiva-siddhānta as also Kashmir Śaivism. We shall end this study by taking note of the leading trends in contemporary Indian philosophy.

NOTES

1. *Dharma* is a comprehensive term which includes law, religion, morality, righteousness, duty, benevolence, etc. It is defined as that which sustains society (cf. *Mahābhārata*, VIII. 69, 59, Calcutta edn.; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I, iv, 14; *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, 79.7), and is regarded as the highest social value on which are to be based the other two social values of *artha* (wealth) and *kāma* (pleasure) and the trans-social value of *mokṣa*. Cf. Vyāsa's statement in the *Mahābhārata*, *dharmād-arthaśca kāmāśca* (XVIII. 5. 62). Śrī Kṛṣṇa declares in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (VII. 11): '*dharmāviruddho bhuteṣu kāmo'smi*'—I am pleasure unopposed to *dharma*.
2. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (II, 24) declares: 'Not he who has not ceased from bad conduct, not he who is not tranquil, not he who is not composed, not he who is not of peaceful mind can obtain Him by (mere) intelligence (*prajñāna*).'

Chapter Two

THE BEGINNINGS OF INDIAN THOUGHT

1. VEDIC LITERATURE

When Indian thought began, it is not possible to say. Even in the earliest literature—the *Veda*—we have references to thinkers of the remote past. The date of what has come to be called the Indus Valley Civilization is stated to be the fourth and third millennia B C. The remains unearthed at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa reveal the prevalence there of a sophisticated urban civilization. Later discoveries have shown that this civilization was not confined to the Indus Valley. One has to surmise about the religio-philosophic ideas of the people of the Indus Valley from the seals and objects of cult-worship which are among the finds at these sites. There is some evidence to show that a deity who was probably the prototype of the historic Śiva was an object of worship. Another deity who formed the centre of a cult was the Mother Goddess. But what were the ideas connected with these cults; what were the beliefs, and practices associated with them, no one can say, with the knowledge that has been made available so far. Moreover, the chronological relation of the Indus Valley Civilization to the *Vedas* is still a matter of dispute. So, we are compelled to begin our story of Indian philosophy with the *Vedas* which constitute the earliest documents of human thought, the “undoubtedly oldest

literary monument of the Indo-European languages.”¹

The *Vedas* are referred to in the Hindu tradition as *Śruti*, which means ‘the heard’. These basic scriptures are believed to be what were heard by the seer-poets (*ṛṣis*) of yore. These poets were the media for the transmission to posterity of the insights they received. They were no more the inventors of the *Veda* than was Newton the generator of the law of gravitation. The Vedic truths were discovered and not produced, revealed to the poets and not composed by them. And so, the *Vedas* are held to be impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) and eternal (*nitya*). The term *Veda*, derived from the root *vid* (cognate with the old English word ‘wit’) means ‘the book of knowledge’. The seer-poets of the *Veda* spoke from knowledge, from a first-hand acquaintance with the reality of things. ‘Like joyous streams bursting from the mountains’—a simile taken from the *Veda*—the songs of the sages came forth spontaneously, as revelations of the Real. Hence, *Veda* is a significant name: it means revealed wisdom, metaphysical knowledge.

There are four *Vedas*—*Rg-veda*, *Yajur-veda*, *Sāma-veda*, and *Atharva-veda*. Of these, the most important is the *Rg-veda*, which is the *Veda* of hymns. The *Yajur-veda*, which has a liturgical purpose, consists of hymns taken from the *Rg-veda* together with prose-formulas for the performance of sacrifices. The *Sāma-veda* is also a liturgical collection of hymns mostly selected from the *Rg-veda*, and arranged solely with reference to their place in what is known as the *Soma* sacrifice. The *Atharva-veda*, which was the last to be added, combines Vedic religion and philosophy with popular cults and

practices. A later tradition which started with the age of the rituals relates the four *Vedas* to the four priestly functionaries at the sacrifice. The *R̥g-veda* is for the priest whose function is to recite the hymns inviting the gods to the sacrificial place. The *Yajur-veda* is for the *Adhvaryu* priest who performs the sacrifice according to rule. The *Sāma-veda* is for the *Udgātr* priest who sings the hymns. And the *Atharva-veda* is for the *Brahma* priest who is the general supervisor of the sacrifice. The total number of stanzas constituting the four Vedas is 20,500. The *R̥g-veda* alone accounts for more than half of this number, as it consists of 10,552 *mantras*.

As meaning collections of hymns, *Samhitās*, the term 'Veda' is used in its narrower sense. In its wider sense, each *Veda* is composed of *Mantra*, *Brahmana*, *Āranyaka* and *Upanisad*. The *Mantras* are holy hymns, poetic expressions of perceived truths. The *Brāhmanas* are guide books for the performance of sacrificial rites. The *Āranyakas*, which are 'forest-books', give philosophical interpretations of the rituals by allegorizing them, and prescribe various modes of meditation. And the *Upanisads*, which are the concluding portions of the *Veda* and are therefore called *Vedānta*, contain metaphysical teachings about the ultimate Reality and the means to realize it. By a set of fortuitous circumstances the *Mantras* came to be attached to the sacrifices. But more properly they are the preludes to the *Upanisads*. The religio-philosophic truths that are for the most part implicit in the *Mantras* are made explicit in the *Upanisads*. The close connection between the two is evident from the fact that the

Upanisads themselves cite the *mantra*-texts to give authority to what they teach.

In the present chapter we shall discuss the leading philosophical ideas that are to be found in the Vedic hymns. In the next chapter, we shall give an account of the philosophy of the *Upanisads*.

2. THE ESSENTIAL TEACHINGS OF THE HYMNS

To the superficial reader of the Vedic hymns, they may appear to be simple praises of the gods who are personifications of natural phenomena. But a deeper study will reveal that the religion of the Veda is neither a crude naturalism nor an unphilosophical polytheism. It is true that the Vedic seers marvelled at the manifestations of nature. But they did not stop there. They succeeded in getting behind those manifestations and discerning there a divinity that knows no decay or diminution. Agni, for instance, means fire. It also stands for the fire of spiritual discipline, and the divine fire of life and illumination. Addressing Agni, a seer of the *Yajur-veda* sings :

“Agni, Lord of *Vrata* ! I will observe the
Vrata : here I approach truth across untruth.”²

Savitṛ, a solar deity, is said to have his power in truth, and is implored to ‘send far away all evil’, and ‘send what is good’ The well-known Gāyatrī mantra addressed to Savitṛ asks for the illumination of the intellect. Varuṇa who represents cosmic order is also the guardian of the moral law. Indra, who is invoked alone is about

one-fourth of the hymns of the *Rg-veda*, is the god who vanquishes evil. One of the Indra-hymns says .

“Without whom men do not conquer, whom they when fighting call on for help ; who has been a match for every one, who moves the immovable . he O men, is Indra ”³

We meet with the names of many gods in the Vedic hymns. Supreme powers and the highest attributes are ascribed to all of them. The deity that is adored in a particular hymn is the greatest, according to that hymn. Max Muller calls this tendency henotheism. In explanation of it, it has been said : ‘every god takes hold of the sceptre, and none keeps it’ And henotheism has been described as ‘opportunist monotheism’ But if one looks at it from the philosophical standpoint, one would realize that only subtle minds could have arrived at the truth, that all the gods are one in spirit, and that it is a matter of indifference as to which god is promoted to the first place in any given circumstance. The *Vedas* clearly state this principle of the unity of Godhead in several contexts. Sometimes it is said that all gods are one in Indra or in Agni. Sometimes the one Godhead is described as All-Gods, *Viśve-devāh*. One of the texts of the *Rg-veda* declares : *ekam santam bahudhākalpayanti*, ‘the One Being the sages contemplate in many ways.’⁴ Another proclaims : *ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti agnim yamam mātrīśvānam āhuh*. ‘the One Being the wise call by many names, as Agni, Yama, Mātarśvan.’⁵

How philosophy and religion are inextricably combined in Indian life and thought will be evident to those

who make an unbiased study of the Vedic hymns. The seers of these hymns were not satisfied with any anthropomorphic conception of the Godhead. The limitations of the human mind make it necessary, it is true, that Divinity should be conceived after the human model. But the aim should nevertheless be to transcend these limitations. The seer-poets of the *Veda* adopt several techniques to outgrow the limitations of the mind. First, the differences of sex, age, etc., are regarded as irrelevant so far as the Divine is concerned. A *ṛsi* of the *Rg-veda* sings:

“Agni I deem my Father, my Kinsman;
I deem Him my Brother, my Friend for ever.”⁶

In the *Atharva-veda* there is a verse which addresses the Godhead thus

“Thou art woman. Thou art man.
Thou art the youth and the maiden too.
Thou as an old man totterest with a staff
Being born, thou becomest facing in every
direction.”⁷

Secondly, the divine Person is not pictured in the ordinary way as a God dwelling in a far-off Heaven, from where he is supposed to rule the world. God is said to be everywhere, even in the heart of man. Thirdly, certain abstract divinities were fashioned out of functions and attributes of the Godhead. For example Dhātr (Protector), Viśvakarman (All-creator), Prajāpati (Lord of creatures). Brhaspati (Lord of speech), etc. Finally, the moral and spiritual law itself

came to be regarded as the governing principle of all the gods. Speaking of *Rta*, the eternal order, a verse of the *Rg-veda* says :

“Firm seated are Eternal Law’s Foundations.

In its fair form are many splendid beauties.”⁸

Rta is said to be the source of even the gods. It is the father of all. “The Maruts come from afar from the seat of *Rta*”⁹ “The Dawn follows the path of *Rta*, the right path, as if she knew them before. She never oversteps the regions. The sun follows the path of *Rta*.”¹⁰

3 THE TWO APPROACHES THEISTIC AND ABSOLUTISTIC

The highest spiritual truth is expressed in two forms in the Vedic hymns as in the later Vedānta. The two forms may be described, for the sake of convenience, as theism and absolutism. Theism means belief in a personal Deity, whereas absolutism is the philosophy which says that there is an absolute impersonal Reality which is the ground of all existence and the goal of all endeavour. Indian theism has certain features which are peculiar to it. Though the conception of God as an extra-cosmic agent responsible for creation is not altogether absent from Indian thought, the more pronounced view is that God is immanent in the world and also transcendent of it. Speaking of Aditi, one of the hymns of the *Rg-veda* says . “Aditi is the sky. Aditi is the intermediate region, Aditi is father, mother, son. Aditi is all the gods and the five tribes. Aditi is whatever has

been born, Aditi is whatever shall be born¹¹ The well-known *Purusa-sūkta* describes the primal *Puruṣa* as immanent as well as transcendent. 'Thousand-headed was *Puruṣa*, thousand-eyed, thousand-footed He having covered the earth on all sides, extended beyond it the length of ten fingers *Puruṣa* is this all, that has been and that will be. And he is the lord of immortality, which he grows beyond through food Such is his greatness, and more than that is *Puruṣa* One-fourth of him is all beings, three-fourths of him are what is immortal in Heaven.' Another feature of Vedic theism is that there is no insistence on any one form of God as the only form admissible in religion Such an outlook makes for freedom from fanaticism and for a spirit of comprehensive sympathy for forms of worship other than one's own

The Vedic seers did not stop with a personalist view of Reality It may be said that they did not rest content until they had a vision of the unlimited Absolute which cannot be characterized in terms of the categories known to us. The hymn where Absolutism appears in all its splendour is the *Nāsadīya-sūkta* which has been praised as containing 'the flower of Indian thought' 'In its noble simplicity, in the loftiness of its philosophic vision,' says Deussen, 'it is possibly the most admirable bit of philosophy of old times' Here is the hymn

"Then there was neither Aught nor Nought,
no air nor sky beyond.

What covered all? Where rested all?
In watery gulf profound?

Nor death was there, nor deathlessness,
nor change of night and day.

That one breathed calmly, self-sustained,
nought else beyond it lay.

Gloom hid in gloom existed first—
one sea, eluding view.

That One, a void in chaos wrapt,
by inward fervour grew.

Within it first arose desire,
the primal germ of mind,

Which nothing with existence links,
as sages searching find.

The kindling ray that shot across
the dark and drear abyss—

Was it beneath ? Or high aloft ?
What bard can answer this ?

There fecundating powers were found,
and mighty forces strove—

A self-supporting mass beneath,
and energy above.

Who knows, who ever told, from whence
this vast creation rose ?

No gods had then been born—who then
can e'er the truth disclose ?

Whence sprang this world and whether
framed by hand divine or no—

Its Lord in heaven alone can tell,
if even he can show.”¹²

In this hymn may be discerned the quintessence of non-dualism. All things are traced to one principle. Opposites like being and non-being, life and death, night and day, are shown to be the self-unfoldment of this One. How from the distinctionless principle which is ‘neither ought nor nought’ the world of opposites and distinctions arose no one can tell. ‘That One’ (*tad ekam*) which the hymn does not name is the ground of the universe. Because it is devoid of differences, it is referred to as a void. It is ‘nothing’ as it were. The world-process is an appearance in and of it. How the One appears as the many is a mystery. Thus we may note in the *Nāsadīya* hymn the foundations of Advaita—the doctrine that ultimate reality is One and that the world is an appearance, a result of *māyā*.

4 PRACTICAL TEACHING

In the *Vedas* we have not only religious and metaphysical ideas about the ultimate Reality but also directions for so moulding one's life that one may attain that Reality. Insistence is laid on the cultivation of the twin-virtues—Truth and Rectitude, *Satya* and *Rta*. An Upanisadic sage recapitulates the Vedic teaching when he says :

“By truth is the divine path laid out
By which sages, having obtained what they desire.
Ascend the supreme abode of truth ”

The Vedic quest itself is a search for truth. One sage asks, 'To which God shall we offer oblation?' (*kasmai devāya havisā vidhema*). 'By truth is the earth upheld', says the *Rg-veda*. 'The Deity has truth as the law of his being,' declares the *Atharva-veda*. Similarly, *rta* (rectitude) is what makes life divine. It is certainly difficult to keep to the narrow and straight path. But one has to accomplish this task in order to reach the goal. A Vedic seer says *ṛtam vadisyāmi, satyam vadisyāmi* : I shall speak what is right, I shall speak what is true. Whatever one does, whatever one speaks and whatever one thinks must be right and true. All other virtues such as austerity, piety, etc., are based on *rta* and *satya*. It is only on the basis of truth and rectitude that all should meet, understand one another and live with one another. It is wrong to say that the Vedic Indian was an individualist without a social instinct. The final Reality is the goal of all beings. Each one has to progress towards it by helping in every way the rest to march on. It is significant that the very last hymn of the *Rg-veda* should be of the nature of a call to unity and universal understanding :

'Assemble, speak together let your minds be of
one accord

As ancient Gods unanimous sit down to their
appointed share.

The place is common, common the assembly,
common the mind, so be their thoughts

united

A common purpose do I lay before you,
and worship with your general oblations.

One and the same be your resolve, and be
your minds of one accord.

United be the thoughts of all that all may
happily agree.'¹³

NOTES

1. A. A. Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader for Students* (Oxford University Press, 1951), p. xi
2. *Yajur-veda, Vājasaneyā-saṃhitā*, 1, 5
3. A. A. Macdonell, *op. cit*, p. 51
4. *Rg-veda*, X, 114, 5,
5. *Rg-veda*, I, 164, 46.
6. *Rg-veda*, VII, 7, 3.
7. *Atharva-veda*, X, 8, 27.
8. *Rg-veda*, IV, 23, 9
9. *Rg-veda*, IV, 21, 3
10. *Rgveda*, I, 24, 8
11. *Rg-veda*, I, 89, 10
12. J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, Vol 5, p 356
13. *Rg-veda*, X, 191, 2-3.

Chapter Three

HIMALAYAS OF THE SOUL

1. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE UPANISADS

The *Upaniṣads* constitute the concluding portions of the *Vedas*. They are the summits of early Indian thought, and have been aptly described as the 'Himalayas of the Soul'¹. To vary the metaphor, the *Upaniṣads* form the basic springs of Indian philosophy; and they provide the inspiration not only for the orthodox systems but also for the so-called heterodox schools. Everytime there was a renaissance in India, the call of the leaders, in essence, has been "Back to the *Upaniṣads*!" Every reformer and captain of thought has striven to recapture the spirit of these immortal texts. Speaking, for instance, of the opening passage of the first of the *Upaniṣads*, *Mahātmā* Gandhi once said: "I have now come to the final conclusion that if all the *Upaniṣads* and all the other scriptures happened all of a sudden to be reduced to ashes and if only the first verse in the *Īśopaniṣad* were left intact in the memory of the Hindus, Hinduism would live for ever."²

Everyone who has had a genuine acquaintance with the *Upaniṣads* has showered on them unstinted praise. Schopenhauer who read the Latin translation of a Persian rendering of the *Upaniṣads* felt so exalted by the thoughts found therein that he always had a copy of it on his table, and 'was in the habit, before going

to bed, of performing his devotions from its pages' His words of adoration have been often quoted and will bear repetition. "That incomparable book," he says, "stirs the spirit to the very depths of the soul. From every sentence deep, original and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit . . . In the whole world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupnekhat (i.e. *Upanisad*). It has been the solace of my life, and it will be the solace of my death."³ In almost identical terms, Paul Deussen speaks of the philosophy of the *Upanisads* as 'the strongest support of pure morality, the greatest consolation in the sufferings of life and death.'⁴ To quote only one other Orientalist Max Muller, the *Upanisads* are to him 'like the light of the morning, like the pure air of the mountains—so simple, so true, if once understood.'⁵

The secret of the charm of the *Upanisads* lies both in the philosophy of spiritual monism or non-dualism which they teach and the manner in which this teaching is given. Reality is declared to be non-dual, one without a second, and this Reality is identified with Spirit or Self higher than which there is nothing. Not only is the non-duality of Self affirmed, but also the plurality of things is denied ultimate reality. 'From death to death he goes who sees plurality here as it were'⁶ There is something fascinating about this non-duality philosophy. As William James was forced to admit, '*An Absolute One, and I that One*, . . . surely we have here a religion which, emotionally considered, has

a high pragmatic value.’⁷ This is, of course, the least that can be said of the Upaniṣadic monism.

The *Upaniṣads* are not systematic treatises on philosophy, they are not the works of any single author. The sages whose intuitions are recorded in the *Upaniṣads* are more mystic seers than mere investigators of metaphysics. There is a directness about their teachings, and an authenticity born of first-hand experience of the highest reality. They pour forth their findings in the form of stories and parables, informal discussions and intimate dialogues. The method they adopt is ‘more poetic than philosophic’. Even where the language used is prose, the poetic quality is only too evident. It is true that in many places symbolic expressions are employed which hide the meaning rather than make it patent. Sometimes there are puns on words and mystic explanations of certain abstruse terms. Even these, it may be noted, add to the charm of the *Upaniṣads*. Charles Johnston compares these books of wisdom to ‘the deep still mountain tarns, fed from the pure water of the everlasting snows, lit by clear sunshine, or, by night, mirroring the high serenity of the stars,’ and he finds in them, ‘besides high intuition, a quaint and delightful flavour, a charm of child-like simplicity, yet of a child who is older than all age, a child of the eternal and the infinite, whose simplicity is better than the wisdom of the wise’⁸

The *Upaniṣads*, as we have noted, form the concluding portions of the *Veda*. So they are called *Īedānta* (*Veda*+*anta*; end of *Veda*). The expression is significant also in the sense that the teaching of the

Upanisads represents the aim or goal of the *Veda*. The Sanskrit word *anta*, like the English *and*, may be used to mean both 'terminus' and 'aim'. The later Vedāntic schools derive their name from the fact that they claim to interpret the *Upanisads*. The etymological meaning of the term '*Upanisad*' is 'to sit (*sad*) close by (*upa*) devotedly (*ni*)', and is indicative of the manner in which the doctrines embodied in the *Upanisads* were learnt at first by pupils in small conclaves sitting near their respective teachers. The expression which thus means 'a session' came to be applied in course of time to what was taught at such sessions. As the *Upanisads* are regarded as teaching the highest truth, they could be imparted only to those who were competent to receive and benefit by them, and such competent pupils could be only a few at any given time. So, the meaning 'secret' came to be attached to the term '*Upanisad*', and it is in this sense that we find the expression used in the *Upanisads* themselves. When, for instance, some important formula is given in the *Upanisads*, it is characterized as the *Upanisad*. Thus in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the formula 'The Real of the real' (*satyasva satyam*) is described as the *Upanisad* of the universal Soul. We come across also such expressions as 'the secret teaching' (*guhya ādeśah*), 'the supreme secret' (*paramam guhyam*) applied to what may be considered to be the key-passages in the *Upanisads*. Commentators like Śaṅkara interpret the expression '*Upanisad*' to mean what 'destroys' ignorance or what 'leads' to Brahman, a meaning which correctly defines the scope and aim of the *Upanisads*.

The texts that bear the name '*Upanisad*' are now

known to be more than two hundred. One of the *Upanisads*, *Muktikā*, gives the names of one hundred and eight *Upanisads*. Many of these texts, however, are late compositions, distant imitations of the ancient canonical *Upanisads*. One of the criteria by which the canonical nature of an *Upanisad* may be judged is by asking the question whether it has been commented upon or is quoted from by a thinker like Śaṅkara. Judged by this test, the first ten *Upanisads* mentioned in the *Muktikā* along with a few from the rest may be regarded as ancient and genuine. They are *Īśāvāsya*, *Kena*, *Katha*, *Praśna*, *Mundaka*, *Māndūkya*, *Taittirīya*, *Aitareya*, *Chāndogya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Kausītakī*, *Maitrāyaṇīya*, and *Śvetāśvatara*. Even of these, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* are the most important, as they are not only old and comprehensive texts, but also represent the two main traditions of thought in the *Upanisads*, the acosmic (*nīsprapañca*) and the cosmic (*saprapañca*) respectively.

2. TWO KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE

The *Upanisads* make a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, the higher (*para*) and the lower (*apara*). The lower knowledge consists of all the empirical sciences and arts as also of such sacred knowledge as relates to things and enjoyments that perish. It is interesting to note that even the four *Vedas* are included in the category of lower knowledge. A great scholar, Nārada, in spite of his encyclopaedic learning, both secular and sacred, finds that he is sorrow-stricken, and so seeks enlightenment from a sage, Sanatkumāra.

The sage asks Nārada to state his credentials. Nārada reels off a long list of the arts and the sciences which he had mastered. The sage characterizes the knowledge that is represented by all these disciplines as mere name (*nāma eva*), and declares that that alone is the supreme knowledge which relates to the Imperishable (*aksara*). This higher knowledge is described as that whereby what has not been heard of becomes heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of, what has not been understood becomes understood. This is further explained as the knowledge of the ground which is more than and inclusive of the knowledge of the various expressions or manifestations of the ground. 'Just as by one piece of clay all that is made of clay may be known

the modification being only a name depending on a word; the truth being that it is just clay. so is that teaching.'⁹ Compared with the knowledge of the ultimate ground which is the absolute Self, the lower knowledge is nescience or false knowledge (*avidyā*). 'Widely contrasted and different are these two,' says the *Katha-upanisad*, 'nescience (*avidyā*) and what is known as knowledge (*vidyā*).'¹⁰ The *Śvetāśvatara* refers to knowledge and ignorance that are placed hidden in the imperishable, infinite supreme *Brahman*, and characterizes ignorance as a thing perishable and knowledge as a thing immortal.¹¹

The supreme wisdom, then, is knowledge of the Self. But this knowledge is not to be confused with what we ordinarily refer to as knowledge. In this sense, it may be said that the Self is unknowable. How, then, can one speak intelligibly of Self-knowledge? The most

prominent sage in the *Brhadānanyaka-upanīśad*, Yājñavalkya, teaches the significance of the term *knowledge* with reference to the Self thus: "Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another, one smells another, one hears another, one thinks of another, one understands another. Where, however, everything has become just one's own self, there whereby and whom would one smell, see, hear, speak to, think of, or understand?"¹² This, then, is the answer to the question about the unknowability of the self. The self is unknowable, not because it is unknown, but because it is the basis of all knowledge, nay, knowledge *per se*. In short, it cannot be known as objects are known. 'You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the understander of understanding. He is your soul, which is in all things.'¹³ The *Kena-upanīśad* teaches the same doctrine when it says that thither, i.e., to the self, the eye goes not, nor speech nor mind, and that it is other than the known and above the unknown.¹⁴ The *Taittirīya-upanīśad* declares that words and mind turn back, not being able to attain it.¹⁵ Our words and thoughts are adequate only to the realm of plurality, they fail with reference to the non-dual Spirit. Yet, we have to make use of them as indicators or sign-posts, and not as vehicles taking us to the very end. 'As a unity the self is to be looked upon: this unknowable, constant Being, free from blemishes, beyond space, the unborn self, great, permanent.'¹⁶ The self is to be comprehended as "It is."¹⁷ This is the supreme knowledge, *parā vidyā*,

true wisdom. The *Upaniṣads* ask us to seek this knowledge from a competent teacher who is not only learned but also in possession of the plenary experience. It is true that such a teacher is difficult to get; but so is a competent pupil. All good things are rare and hard to accomplish. 'Wonderful is the declarer, proficient the obtainer of Him ! Wonderful the knower, proficiently taught !'¹⁸

3 BRAHMAN-ĀTMAN

The supreme knowledge, as we have seen, is knowledge of the Self, which is referred to in the *Upaniṣads* as *Brahman* and *Ātman*. These two words are central to the Upaniṣadic philosophy, and their meaning, therefore, should be rightly understood. The word '*Brahman*' probably meant at first 'prayer' or 'speech', from the root *brh*, 'to burst forth' or 'to grow'. Eventually, it came to signify the ground of the universe or the source of all existence, that which has burst forth into the universe, or that from which the universe has grown. The other word '*Ātman*' might have meant 'breath', but, then, it soon came to be the expression for the soul or self of a living being, especially of man. And, the remarkable discovery which the Upaniṣadic sages made was that the two are one and same - the *Ātman* is *Brahman*. This doctrine of unity is the greatest contribution which the *Upaniṣads* have made to the thought of the world. As Deussen says, "It will be found to possess a significance reaching far beyond the *Upaniṣads*, their time and country; nay, we claim for it an inestimable value for the whole race of mankind."¹⁹

The two terms '*Brahman*' and '*Ātman*' are used as synonyms in the *Upanisads*. The *Chāndogya-upanīśad*, for instance, frames the central metaphysical question thus: 'Which is the *Ātman*? What is *Brahman*?'²⁰ Here, obviously, *Ātman* and *Brahman* appear as interchangeable terms. In some contexts where the inquiry is into the source of the universe, the expression '*Atman*' is employed, and in some other contexts where the topic discussed is the true self of man the term '*Brahman*' is used. In the *Chāndogya-upanīśad*, a king, while describing the Reality which is the source of the universe, refers to it as the cosmic *Ātman*. In the *Taittirīya-upanīśad*, a young seeker, Bhrigu, makes an analysis of the sheaths that cover the self, while the term of reference is *Brahman*. Thus, to the *Upanisads*, *Brahman* and *Ātman* mean the same Reality. That which is without is identical with that which is within. Through the inquiry into the source of the universe and through the quest after the true self, the discovery was made that it is the one non-dual Reality that appears as the manifold world and as the plurality of individual souls. This result was rendered possible because of the unique method of the *Upanisads* which is a synthesis of the objective and the subjective ways of approach to Reality.

The quest is the same whether the aim is to find out the ground of the universe, or to determine the true nature of the Self. The technique of pursuing the quest is also the same: one has to go from the grosser manifestations to the subtler ones. The *Upanisads* are replete with illustrations which exploit this technique

and exhibit the truth of non-duality. Let us look at a few cases :

(1) In the philosophical contest that was held at the court of king Janaka, Gārgī, a woman-sage, questions Yājñavalkya about the support of all things. The precise form in which the question is put is 'On what is all this woven, warp and woof ?' In a series of answers, Yājñavalkya leads the inquirer to higher and higher worlds; and lastly, when the lady asks him, on what is space woven, warp and woof he replies that it is the Imperishable (*akṣara*) which is the support of space. Another questioner, Uddālaka, enquires about the inner controller of all things. In a set of beautiful passages, Yājñavalkya explains that the principle that lies behind all things, cosmic as well as individual, the principle which these things do not know but which controls them from within, is the inner ruler; and this ruler, says Yājñavalkya addressing Uddālaka, is your own immortal self. 'He who dwelling in all things, yet is other than all things, whom all things do not know, whose body all things are, who controls all things from within... He is your self, the inner ruler, immortal.'²¹

(2) Bhrgu approaches his father Varuṇa with the request for instruction about the nature of *Brahman*. Varuṇa gives his son a formula which is indicative of the general nature of reality, and asks him to discover for himself the truth through austere inquiry (*tapas*). 'That, verily, whence these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which on departing they enter—that be desirous of knowing. That is *Brahman*.'²² Bhrgu makes of this formula the base of

his operations and enters upon the quest after the real. The first discovery that he makes is that food (*anna*, i.e. matter) is essential for existence. But soon he realizes that food is only the outer shell of what animates it, i.e. life (*prāṇa*). Even this knowledge does not satisfy him; for upon further inquiry he finds that mind (*manas*) is the substratum of life. Subsequent analysis reveals to Bhṛgu that mind too is a product and cannot answer to the definition of *Brahman* given by his father. He now thinks that intellectual awareness (*vijñāna*) is the final reality. Just as materialism, vitalism and mentalism were found wanting on closer scrutiny, intellectualism too is seen to be inadequate. And at last Bhṛgu arrives at the final truth that Bliss (*ānanda*) is *Brahman*. In this delight which is the Absolute there is no distinction of the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. In the Infinite there is no division.

(3) The Indra-Virocana myth related in the *Chāṇdogya* is illustrative of the fact that both competence and persistent inquiry are required for understanding the nature of the self. Prajāpati, the lord of creatures, said, 'The self which is free from sin, free from old age, free from death and sorrow, hunger and thirst, whose desire is the real, whose conception is the real—that should be sought, that one should desire to know.'²³ The gods (*devas*) and the demons (*asuras*) heard this, and they desired to know more about the self. Indra, the sovereign of the gods, and Virocana, the chief of the demons, were sent as envoys on the mission of learning from Prajāpati knowledge of the Self. The two approached Prajāpati, dwelt with him for thirty-two years as his

pupils, and then asked him about the self. Prajāpati said to them: 'The Person that is seen in the eye, that is the self. That is the immortal, the fearless. That is *Brahman*' The implication of this teaching is that the principle responsible for seeing and knowledge is the self. But the pupils misunderstood Prajāpati's teaching. They thought that the image of a person which is seen formed in the eye of the one who sees is the self. The corollary they drew was that the reflection of the body that is observed in media like water and mirror is the self. When they conveyed this inference of theirs to Prajāpati, he simply said, 'Look at yourselves in a pan of water, and whatever you do not understand of the self, tell me.' Indra and Virocana looked at their own reflections in water, and reported to their teacher that they saw themselves in the water 'to the very hairs and nails'. Prajāpati asked them to look again in a pan of water after adorning themselves, putting on their best clothes and cleaning themselves. They did as they were told, and perfectly satisfied with their fine reflections, went away thinking that the reflection and the body that was reflected constituted the self. Prajāpati did not correct them at that stage, for he wanted to test their competence and give the true doctrine only to him that had proved his fitness. Virocana returned to his clan and spread among the demons the philosophy which he thought he had learnt. 'The body is the self,' he said, 'it alone is to be worshipped; it alone is to be served.' Though at first this doctrine seemed to satisfy Indra, very soon he discovered a serious defect in it. When the body is well adorned, dressed

and cleaned, the reflection appears well adorned, dressed and cleaned. But how would the reflection be if the body were blind, lame or crippled? It too would certainly be blind, lame or crippled. And if that were the self, it would perish when the body perished. Indra saw no good in such a doctrine. Without returning to his tribe, he went back to Prajāpati and expressed to him his difficulty. After a second period of studentship for thirty-two years, Indra was led a step higher. Prajāpati now said to him, 'He who moves about happy in a dream—he is the self. That is immortal, the fearless. That is *Brahman*.' Indra pondered over the implications of this new teaching. It is true that the self of the dream-state is not affected by the defects of the physical body. Yet it is not all happiness that is experienced in dreams. There are also bad dreams and nightmares in which the self appears afflicted, is chased, becomes conscious of pain, and weeps. So, for the third time Indra went to Prajāpati; and at the end of a further period of apprenticeship for thirty-two years, he was instructed by Prajāpati thus: 'When one is sound asleep, composed, restful, and sees no dream, that is the self. That is the immortal, the fearless. That is *Brahman*.' In sleep the self is not afflicted, there is no sorrow. But, reflected Indra, there is ignorance, annihilation of consciousness as it were, in so far as one does not know oneself. So, he returned to his teacher once more for further light on his problem. This time he had to wait only for five years, at the end of which period Prajāpati gave him the final doctrine. What the teacher said was that the self should be distinguished from the body

which is its temporary abode, and the various states of experience. So long as one identifies oneself with the body, one is tossed between pleasure and pain. When one is freed from this wrong identification, there is for him neither pleasure nor pain. When the true knowledge is gained, the self realizes its nature as bliss and consciousness. Indra received this doctrine and carried it to the gods

(4) In the *Māndūkya-upanīṣad* we have a lucid analysis of the three states of experience : waking, dream, and deep sleep. The *Upanīṣad* begins by identifying the mystic sound *Om* with all-that-which-is. *Om* is all this—what was, what is, and what will be. It is also what is beyond the three divisions of time, i.e., the unmanifest ground of the manifest universe. All this is *Brahman*, of which *Om* is the sound-symbol. The self is *Brahman*. Then, our text goes on to show how corresponding to the three modes (*mātrās*) of *Om* (*a u m*) and the fourth modeless (*amātra*) part there are the three forms in which the self appears in the states of waking, dream and sleep respectively, and the fourth which is the natural estate of the self, the unchanging and unconditioned *Turiya*. In the state of waking, the self consorts with the objects of sense which are external, and its enjoyments are gross. In dreams it revels in a world of images, and its experience is subtle. In sleep there are no desires, nor dreams, the self becomes one, without the distinction of seer and seen object; it remains then as a mass sentience, as bliss enjoying bliss. The self of the three states is designated respectively as *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. The fourth, *caturtha* (or

turiya), which is the real self is beyond the changing modes of existence. It is not caught in the triple stream of waking, dream and sleep, though it is the underlying substrate of these states. It is invisible; it is not the content of empirical usage; it cannot be grasped. it does not have identifying marks, it is unthinkable and unnamable, it is the one self which is the essence of consciousness; it is that into which the universe gets resolved; it is tranquil bliss which is non-dual. Thus does the *Māṇḍūkya* teach the real nature of the self.

(5) The ultimate reality, according to the *Upaniṣads*, is not a subject set over against objects, nor an object, a *being* there; it is that which underlies both subject and object, and transcends them. This truth could be realized only when the apparent distinction between the cosmic and the individual forms of the self is discarded, when the identity between *Brahman* and *Ātman* is recognized. In the *Chāndogya* we find this teaching of identity given in an elaborate manner to Śvetaketu by his father Uddālaka. After twelve years of study under a teacher, Śvetaketu returns home, conceited, thinking himself learned, proud. Uddālaka notices this, and at once concludes that his son has not received the only true knowledge that is worth having, i.e. the knowledge of ultimate reality. He thereupon undertakes to teach his son and thus complete his education. He begins with a description of the Being (*sat*) which alone was in the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, 'May I become many!' From it fire came into being, from fire water was born; and from water food. These three are the rudiments of the universe. Having created

them, the *sat* entered into them and manifested names and forms (*nāma-rūpa*) by a process of triplication (*trivrttkarana*), i.e. by mixing the three elements, fire, water and food, in different proportions. All things and beings are made of these elements, including mind, breath and speech. In sleep all these are resolved, and one returns to the *sat*, the real self, one becomes one's self. The *sat* is the root of all creatures, they have the *sat* as their home and support. Having shown in this way that the one reality is the ground of all existence and the source of all being, Uddālaka, 'suddenly and with a dramatic swiftness of transformation' identifies this reality with the self of Śvetaketu. 'That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is reality. That is the *Ātman*. That thou art, O *Śvetaketu* !'²⁴ This declaration of non-difference is repeated nine times, thereby indicating that it constitutes the central teaching of Uddālaka. It must be noted, however, that it is not the individual soul that is stated here to be the ground of all being. The philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* is not a variety of subjective idealism. It is true that the individual soul is non-different from the universal Spirit. But it is the universal Spirit that explains the whole world and the individual souls as individuals.

4. COSMIC AND ACOSMIC MODES

The *Upaniṣads* conceive of *Brahman-Ātman* in two modes. (i) as the all-inclusive ground of the universe, and (ii) as the reality of which the universe is but an appearance. The former is the cosmic view (*sapra-*

pañca) of the Absolute, while the latter is the acosmic view (*nisprapañca*). It is the difference between these two views that made possible divergence later on between the theistic and the absolutistic schools of Vedānta. We shall illustrate the two standpoints by citing a few texts from the *Upanisads*. The cosmic view of reality may be discerned in the following passages. 'He who consists of mind, whose body is life, whose form is light, whose conception is truth, whose soul is space, containing all works, all desires, all odours and all tastes, encompassing the whole world, the speechless and the calm—this soul of mine within the heart is smaller than a grain of rice, or a barley-corn, or a mustard-seed, or a grain of millet, or the kernel of a grain of millet; this soul of mine within the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the mid-region, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds.'²⁵ 'The self, indeed, is below. The self is above. The self is to the west. The self is to the east. The self is to the south. The self is to the north. The self, indeed, is this whole world.'²⁶ 'He is Brahmā; he is Indra, he is Prajāpati; he is all these gods, and these five great elements, namely earth, air, ether, water, and fire; these things and those which are mingled of the fine, as it were; seeds of one sort or another; those born from eggs, those born from wombs, those born from sweat, and those born from sprouts; horses, cattle, men, elephants; whatever creature there is here whether moving or flying, and what is stationary.'²⁷ As typical of the texts that teach the acosmic view, the following may be considered: 'This is imperishable, O Gārgi, which the wise men

adore—not gross, not subtle, not short, not long, not red, not adhesive, without shadow, without darkness, without air, without space, without attachment, without taste, without smell, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without mouth, without measure, and without either inside or outside. Not that does anything eat, nor that does eat anything²⁸ Devoid of sound, of touch, of form, without decay, and likewise devoid of taste, eternal, and devoid of odour, beginningless, endless, superior to the Great (*Mahat*) and firm; realizing that, one is released from the jaws of death²⁹

The negative description of *Brahman-Ātman* should not be taken to mean that the ultimate reality is a blank, a mere nothing. It only signifies that the Absolute cannot be delimited by the categories known to human thought. In order to understand the implications of the negative texts, one must construe them along with other texts which are positive in form—the texts, for instance, which refer to *Brahman* as existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*), and bliss (*ānanda*). These expressions, it is true, are not to be understood in their ordinary signification. But they represent the highest concepts the mind of man has been able to evolve to indicate the nature of the supreme Spirit. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* describes *Brahman* as 'the Real of the real' (*satyasya satyam*),³⁰ and splitting the word *satyam* into three syllables, *sa-ti-yam*, the *Upaniṣad* says that the first syllable and the third mean truth, while the second syllable signifies untruth, and that the whole word implies the enclosement of untruth on both sides by truth. That the self

is consciousness (*caitanya*) is declared in several texts. One of the modes in which this is taught is to say that the self is the light of all lights, that it is self-luminous 'Not there does the sun shine, nor the moon and the stars, nor do these lightnings shine, much less this fire. Aiter Him, as He shines, does everything shine, by His lustre is the whole world illumined'³¹ *Brahman* is not only unconditioned existence and self-luminous intelligence, but also unexcellable bliss (*ānanda*). In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Taittirīya*, a calculus of bliss is given, taking the highest human bliss as the unit measure. According to the former *Upaniṣad*, the bliss that is *Brahman* is a billion times that of the human bliss; and according to the latter, it is a hundred trillion times superior to the highest bliss of man. The implication of such teaching is that *Brahman*-bliss is unlimited and measureless. The *Chāndogya* describes *Brahman* as the infinite (*bhūman*) which alone is bliss (*sukham*), and declares that there is no bliss in the small (*alpa*). In later Vedāntic literature, *Brahman* is referred to as *sac-cid-ānanda*, a formula coined out of the texts such as the ones we have considered. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* defines *Brahman* as consciousness and bliss (*viññānam ānandam 'brahma*).³² The *Taittirīya* says, '*Brahman* is reality, consciousness and infinitude (*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*).'³³

5. WORLD-EVOLUTION AND WORLD-APPEARANCE

Even as there are two modes of envisaging the nature of *Brahman*, there are two standpoints from which the world may be viewed. The two views are :

(i) that the world is an emanation from *Brahman*, and (ii) that it is an appearance of *Brahman*. These views came to be referred to later on as the theory of transformation (*pariṇāmanavāda*) and the theory of transfiguration (*vivarta-vāda*), respectively. But, whether the world is a modification or an appearance, the ground thereof, according to the *Upaniṣads*, it must be noted, is *Brahman*. The source of the universe is not a category of matter, but the supreme Spirit. The *Śvetaśvatara* begins with such questions as 'What is the cause? whence are we born? Whereby do we live? On what are we established? And by whom supervised do we experience our pains and pleasures? It finds that an adequate answer to these questions cannot be given in terms of any material or finite principle. Time (*kāla*), nature (*Svabhāva*), necessity (*niyati*), chance (*yadṛcchā*), the elements (*bhūta*), the womb (*yoni*) or the male (*puruṣa*) cannot serve as the first cause. The *Upaniṣad* discovers that over all these, which may be regarded only as the secondary causes, there rules the self-power (*ātmaśakti*) of God (*deva*), hidden in His own qualities (*guṇa*). A second point on which most of the creation-texts of the *Upaniṣads* are agreed is that *Brahman* does not create the universe out of an extraneous matter, but that the universe is a manifestation of an aspect of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is immanent as well as transcendent. In the terminology of later Vedānta, it is the material as also the efficient cause of the world (*abhinna-nimitto-'pādāna-kāraṇa*). In the *Chāndogya* text 'All this, verily, is *Brahman*. Tranquil, let one worship it as *tajjalān*,'⁸⁴ the expression *tajjalān* is interpreted by Sañ-

kara to mean that (*tat*) which gave rise to (*ja*) the world, reabsorbs (*lt*) it and supports (*an*) it. The *Taittirīya* explicitly says that *Brahman* is the cause of the origination, sustentation and destruction of the universe. The *Īśa* and the *Kena Upaniṣads* together seek to establish the causality of *Brahman* in relation to the world. The *Īśa* opens with the statement that all this, meaning the universe, is enveloped by God. That is, the universe derives its substance from God. The *Kena* teaches that *Brahman* is the prime mover of all things. The very first word *kena* (*by whom* ?), from which the *Upaniṣad* gets its name, is cast in the instrumental case, showing thereby that the Scripture is concerned with the teaching about the efficient cause of the universe.

From the relevant texts it is clear that *Brahman* is the whole cause of the universe. That out of which the universe is made is the same as that which makes it. For the world, *Brahman* is both the material cause and the efficient cause. Let us illustrate. In the *Taittirīya* it is said : 'He desired, "My I procreate myself." He performed austerity. Having performed austerity, he created all this, whatever there is here. Having created, into it, indeed, he entered.'³⁵ The *Chāndogya*, similarly, declares, 'It thought . "Would that I were many ! Let me procreate myself !", and then proceeds to describe the emergence of fire, water and food in succession.³⁶ The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* describes how the world was at first unmanifest, and how later it was made manifest through names (*nāma*) and forms (*rūpa*). Having manifested the world, the self, in the words of the *Upaniṣad*, entered it, even to the nail-tips, as a razor would be hidden

in a razor-case, or fire in a fire-holder.³⁷ The manifestation of the world out of *Brahman* is likened to the ejection of the thread from a spider, or the scattering of sparks from fire, to the sprouting of herbs from the earth, and the growth of the hairs of the head and body on a living person. Though the world of plurality has emerged out of the one inner self (*antarātman*), the latter is not affected by the defects of the former. After mentioning the analogies of the one fire and the one wind assuming different forms, the *Kaṭha* says, 'As the sun, the eye of all the world, is not sullied by the external defects of the eyes, so the one inner self of all things is not sullied by the misery of the world, being external to it.'³⁸

From the acosmic standpoint, there is no real creation, the world is an appearance, it is not real. Such a view naturally involves the notion of *māyā*, the principle which accounts for the apparent conditioning of the unconditioned Absolute. It is true that the doctrine of *māyā* is not to be found in the *Upanisads* in its full-fledged form. But the thought itself is not unknown to some of the seers of the *Upanisads*. The teachings of Yājñavalkya, for instance, imply such a notion. The sage declares that where there is duality *as it were* (*iva*), there one sees another, one smells another, one hears another, and so forth; but where there is no duality, there is no scope for all such empirical usage³⁹. Here the expression 'as it were' implies that the world of duality is not real, that it is illusory, *māyā*. The *Chāndogya* characterizes all modifications to be mere names, verbal expressions (*uācārambhaṇam*,

nāmadheyam).⁴⁰ In the *Maitrāyaṇīya*, the Absolute is compared to a wheel of fire, an analogy which was developed later by Gauḍapāda to explain the illusory nature of the world. The term '*māyā*' itself can be traced to the *Rg-veda* where the assumption of many shapes by Indra through his illusions (*māyās*) is mentioned.⁴¹ And, it is significant that this text is quoted in the *Brhadāranyaka* in a context where real difference is denied.⁴² When we come to the *Śvetāśvatara*, we find the term *māyā* used in the sense of illusion, and the Lord of all beings is described as *māyin*.⁴³ As for the term *avidyā* which is an equivalent of *māyā*, it occurs in quite a few of the *Upaniṣad* texts. That the manifestation of the world is a marvel is what terms like *māyā* and *avidyā* tell us. The production of the pluralistic universe does in no way affect the integrity and absoluteness of *Brahman*. 'That is full; this is full. The full comes out of the full. Taking the full from the full, the full itself remains.'

6 THE SOUL AND ITS DESTINY

The individual soul is called *jīva*. The word is derived from the root *jīv*, 'to live'. According to both the cosmic and the acosmic views, the soul is non-different, in essence, from *Brahman*. It is the psycho-physical outfit with which it is associated during the transmigratory process that makes it appear different as it were; when shorn of this limitation, it will be realized that the soul is the same as the non-dual Spirit.

In the *Taittirīya-upanīṣad*, there is an analysis of the five sheaths in which the soul is enveloped, as it

were. The envelopes are *annarasamaya* which is the outermost sheath made of food, i.e. the physical body; *prāṇamaya*, the sheath of vital air, *manomaya*, the sheath of mind; *Vijñāna-maya*, the sheath of intellect; and *ānandamaya*, the sheath of bliss. In later Vedānta, the first is also known as the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*), the next three constitute the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*), and the last is called the causal body (*kāraṇa-śarīra*), i.e. ignorance or nescience (*avidyā*). These together constitute 'the empirical home' of the soul. Being conditioned by these, the soul becomes the subject of experience and enjoyment. The *Kathopanīśad* compares the self to the lord of the chariot, the body to the chariot, the intellect to the charioteer, the mind to the reins, the senses to the horses, and the sense-objects to the roads; and it adds that the individual soul as associated with the body, the senses, and the mind, is the experient or enjoyer (*bhoktā*).⁴⁴

In all experience the mind or *manas*, of course, is the central factor. The *Brhadāraṇyaka* enumerates the main functions of the mind—desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, intellection, fear—and says that all these are *manas* only.⁴⁵ The mind functions through the sense-organs which are ten in number—five of cognition, viz., the organs of sight (*cakṣus*), hearing (*śrotra*), touch (*tvak*), taste (*rasana*) and smell (*ghrāṇa*); and five of action, viz., the organs of speech (*vāk*), grasping (*pāṇi*), moving (*pāda*), excretion (*pāyu*) and generation (*upastha*). *Manas*, as the central organ of consciousness, gathers knowledge through the cognitive sense-organs, integrates the pieces

of information thus gathered, and acts with the aid of one or more of the organs of action

The soul, in the view of the *Upanisads*, is not born with the body, nor does it perish therewith. 'The wise one (i.e. the soul) is not born; nor does it die. This one has not come from anywhere; nor has it become anyone. Unborn, constant, eternal, primeval, this one is not slain when the body is slain'⁴⁶ What happens at death is only the decease of the physical body. The soul migrates from life to life, being conditioned by the cause of such migration, i.e. ignorance, and by the instrument which enables it to migrate, i.e. the subtle body. We first meet with a clear reference to the transmigration-doctrine in the *Brhadāranyaka*. Asked as to what happens to a dead man after the different components of his body are resolved into the elements like fire, etc., Yājñavalkya is reported to have taken the questioner aside and discoursed on transmigration to him in private. Giving the gist of the discourse, the *Upanisad* says, 'What they said was *karma*. What they praised was *karma*. Verily, one becomes good by good works, and evil by evil.'⁴⁷ In a later context, the same sage explains more fully his view of transmigration. On death, the soul shuffles off its present body and enters a new one, as a caterpillar, having come to the end of a blade of grass, draws itself together and takes a leap to another blade. The process is also comparable to a goldsmith making a newer and more beautiful form like that of the fathers, or of the celestial nymphs, or of the gods, or of Prajāpati, or of Brahmā, or of other beings. The kind of form that the soul takes would

depend on its previous *karma* 'As is a man's desire, such is his resolve; as is his resolve, such is the action he performs; what action he performs, that he procures for himself'⁴⁸ The transmigration of human soul into the sub-human species is also held to be possible. The *Kathopanishad*, for instance, says : 'Some go into a womb for the embodiment of a corporeal being Others go into what is stationary, according to their deeds, according to their knowledge'⁴⁹ The view is also held that when a person dies, he may go to other regions before he takes another birth in this world. Referring to those who are attached to sacrificial forms, the *Mundaka* says, 'Having had enjoyment on the top of the heaven won by good works, they re-enter this world, or even a lower region.'⁵⁰

Anticipations of the *karma*-doctrine are to be found in the Vedic concept of *ṛta* which meant not only the ordered course of things but the moral order as well. The principle of *karma* is the counterpart in the moral realm of the physical law of causality. But what is worthy of note here is that the philosophy of the *Upanishads* postulates the possibility of the soul's release from the cycle of *karma*

Moksa or release is the goal of every soul, and release consists in the soul's freedom from the need to be re-born. There are two views in the *Upanishads* regarding the nature of the goal. According to one of them, *moksa* is attainable only after death; and according to the other, it can be attained here in this very life. The former of these views is, in effect, an inheritance from the eschatological doctrines of the *Mantras* and

the *Brāhmaṇas*, according to which heaven is a far-off place which could be reached by the soul only after it has cast off its physical body. But this view undergoes a great transformation as it appears in the *Upanisads*. The ideal is no longer a becoming something which one is not, but attaining *Brahman* with which the soul is identical in essence. 'Into⁷ *Brahman* which is the soul of mine,' says the seer of the *Upanisad*, 'I shall enter on departing hence'⁵¹ The soul which thus realizes its identity with *Brahman* is said to go by the path of the gods (*devayyāna*), which is different from the path of the fathers (*pitryāna*) which is for the bound soul still in the course of transmigration. The other view of the goal, which is in accord with the acosmic conception of the Absolute, is that release is not a state to be newly attained, as it is the eternal nature of the self. When ignorance which is the cause of bondage is dispelled by wisdom, the soul realizes its non-difference from *Brahman*, and this is release which, therefore, need not wait till the decease of the body. 'When all the desires that abide in one's heart are cast away, then a mortal becomes immortal; he attains *Brahman* here.'⁵² 'His *prāṇas* do not depart. Being *Brahman*, he attains *Brahman*'⁵³ So far as the content of release is concerned, it is to be noted, there is no difference between the two views. *Moksa* is release from bondage, freedom from *saṃsāra*. It is not a mere negative state of absence of sorrow; it is absolute bliss, undisturbed peace.

The course of life that a man should adopt in order to be able to attain *moksa* is outlined in several of the

Upaniṣad texts Generally, the *Upaniṣads* assume on the part of the aspirant a high grade of ethical culture. Because the moral life is assumed as a condition precedent for inquiry into *Brahman-Ātman*, the *Upaniṣads* do not elaborate on ethical codes. But even as it is, there are many texts where, in unmistakable terms, good life is insisted upon. In view of this, it is understandable how it could be maintained, as does Keith, that 'in comparison with the intellectual activity of the Brahmans the ethical content of the *Upaniṣads* must be said to be negligible and valueless',⁵⁴ and that 'the aims of the Brahmans were bent on things which are not ethical at all'. In *Upaniṣads* like the *Taittirīya*, instructions are to be found even as regards the most ordinary rules that an individual should adopt in his dealings with others. In the *Brhadāraṇyaka*, an entire philosophy of ethics is given in the form of the *da-da-da* sound of thunder. The three *da*'s stand for the three imperatives : *dāmyata*, *datta*, and *dayadhvam*, meaning 'Cultivate self-control', 'Be generous,' and 'Have compassion.' The three classes of beings, gods, men, and demons, according to the Upaniṣadic episode, understood the sound *da* to signify one of the three commands in the order mentioned. But this does not mean, as Śaṅkara takes care to point out, that the humans have to practise generosity alone and not the other virtues. All the three commands are meant for them; for there are no gods or demons other than men. It will be of some interest to note that T. S. Eliot makes 'What the Thunder said' the theme of the last section of his poem *The Wasteland* whose last few lines read as follows :

'These fragments I have shored against my ruins
 Why then Ile fit you. Hieronymo's mad againe.
 Datta, Dayadhvam, Dāmyata
 Shantih Shantih Shantih.'

Forgetfulness of the true nature of the self is, according to the *Upaniṣads*, the foundation of bondage. This brings about the soul's wrong identification with the ego, mind and body; and in consequence thereof, the soul is caught in the wheel of birth and death. The path to release must naturally be a reverse process. The soul has first to withdraw itself from the narrow limitations of empirical existence, by breaking the walls of finitude. This has to be accomplished by the cultivation of the spirit of renunciation (*vairāgya* or *tyāga*). But renunciation could be complete only with the dawn of knowledge. It is through knowledge of *Brahman* that ignorance is finally overcome. The knowledge that is referred to here is not to be identified with discursive thought or theoretical appreciation of the non-duality of the self. *Brahman* is to be known by *being* it. The process of realizing *Brahman* is through three stages *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. The first stands for the study of the *Upaniṣads* under a proper guide. The second requires an intellectual conviction in what the *Upaniṣads* teach obtained through untiring reflection and logical analysis. The third stage which is continued meditation leads to the final wisdom. As aids to contemplation, many modes of meditation known as *vidyā* are taught in the *Upaniṣads*. The aim of all

such discipline is to lead the aspirant to the knowledge of the non-dual reality. 'If a person knew the self as "I am He", then, with what desire, for love of what would he cling to the body ?'⁵⁵

NOTES

1. The title of J. Mascaro's translations from the Sanskrit of the Principal Upanisads (John Murray, London, 1938).
2. *Harijan*, March 2, 1940, p. 23.
3. See Maurice Bloomfield *The Religion of the Veda* (1908), p. 55.
4. Paul Deussen, *The Elements of Metaphysics*, tr. by C. M. Duff (Macmillan & Co. Ltd, London, 1894), p. 337.
5. See *The Upanishads*, with English translation by T. M. P. Mahadevan (G. A. Natesan & Co., Madras), p. xxx.
6. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV, iv, 19.
7. *Pragmatism*, p. 153.
8. See S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *Sankaracharya* (G. A. Natesan & Co., Madras), p. iv.
9. *Chāndogya*, VI, i, 4.
10. *Katha*, ii, 4.
11. *Śvetāśvatara*, V, 1.
12. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II, iv, 12-14.
13. *Ibid.*, III, iv, 2.
14. *Kena*, i, 3.
15. *Taittirīya*, ii, 4.
16. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV, iv, 20.
17. *Katha*, vi, 13.
18. *Ibid.*, ii, 7.
19. Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1919), p. 39.
20. *Chāndogya*, V, xi, 1.
21. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III, vii, 15.

22. *Taittirīya*, III, i, 1.
23. *Chāndogya*, VIII, i, 5.
24. *Chāndogya*, VI, viii, 7.
25. *Ibid.*, III, xiv, 2-3.
26. *Ibid.*, VII, xxv, 2.
27. *Atāreya*, V, 3.
28. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III, vii, 8.
29. *Kauṣītaki*, iii, 15.
30. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II, i, 20.
31. *Kauṣītaki*, iii, 15.
32. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III, ix, 28.
33. *Taittirīya*, ii, 1.
34. *Chāndogya*, III, xiv, 1.
35. *Taittirīya*, ii, 6.
36. *Chāndogya*, VI, ii, 3-4.
37. *Brhadāraṇyaka*, I, iv, 7
38. *Kaṭha*, V, 9-11.
39. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II, iv, 14.
40. *Chāndogya*, VI, i, 3f
41. *Ṛg-veda*, VI, 47, 48.
42. *Brhadāraṇyaka*, II, v, 19.
43. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I, v, 3.
44. *Kaṭha*, iii, 3-4.
45. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I, v, 3.
46. *Kaṭha*, ii, 18.
47. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III, ii, 13.
48. *Ibid.*, IV, iv, 3-5.
49. *Kaṭha*, v, 7.
50. *Mundaka*, I, ii, 10

51. *Chāndogya*, III, xiv, 4.
52. *Kaṭha*, vi, 14.
53. *Brhadāranyaka*, IV, iv, 6
54. A. B. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanisads* (Harvard Oriental Series, 1925), p. 584.
55. *Bṛhadāranyaka*, IV, iv, 12.

Chapter Four

THE SONG OF THE LORD

1 AN EPISODE IN THE MAHĀBHĀRATA

The *Bhagavad-gītā* is the most popular religiophilosophic song in Sanskrit. It occurs as part of the well-known Indian epic, the *Mahābhārata*¹ which relates the story of the rivalries between two sets of cousins, the one-hundred sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra, representing evil, and the five sons of Pāṇḍu, Dhṛtarāṣṭra's brother, symbolizing virtue. Dhṛtarāṣṭra was blind, and Pāṇḍu died. Duryodhana, the eldest son of Dhṛtarāṣṭra sent the sons of Pāṇḍu into exile by practising deceit on them, and, according to an understanding that was arrived at, the Pāṇḍavas (sons of Pāṇḍu) could come back after thirteen years and the kingdom would be restored to them. The Pāṇḍavas fulfilled their part of the agreement; but Duryodhana would not keep his promise in spite of the efforts at mediation which Śrī Kṛṣṇa, incarnation of God, made. And so, a war became inevitable, and Arjuna, the most valiant of the Pāṇḍava heroes had as his charioteer Śrī Kṛṣṇa himself.

2 ARJUNA'S PREDICAMENT

The *Bhagavad-gītā* opens with the battle-scene on the first day of the war. The fight had all but begun; the two armies had been drawn up in battle array. At

this crucial moment, Arjuna expressed to Śrī Kṛṣṇa a desire to see the enemy hordes at close range, and asked his chariot to be stationed between the two armies. When the chariot was stationed, as he desired, betwixt the armies, Arjuna surveyed the front ranks of his enemy forces and saw there his own kith and kin, elders and preceptors, grandsires and sires uncles, brothers, sons, grandsons, and companions. Pity overtook him, a tremor passed through his frame, and he addressed himself to Śrī Kṛṣṇa as follows

‘As I see my own people assembled, eager to fight, my limbs fail, my mouth is parched, my body trembles, and my hair stands on end; my bow slips from my hand, and my skin burns all over. Incapable am I even to stand, and my mind is in a whirl. I see portents that bode evil ’²

After describing thus his physical state of helplessness and mental perturbation, Arjuna argues . ‘I do not see any good in killing my own people in this war. I do not desire victory, nor kingdom, nor pleasures. Of what use is a kingdom, of what use are pleasures, or even life, when they for whose sake these become desirable stand here in battle, forsaking life and wealth ?’³

It was at this point that Śrī Kṛṣṇa commenced expounding to Arjuna his message. But before we turn to the message itself, let us pause awhile and analyse Arjuna’s argument and the mental mood he was in when he advanced it.

The one reason which the Pāṇḍava hero repeatedly gives in the course of his argument is that it is a sin to kill one’s own kin. His attachment to his relations,

friends and preceptors is so great that the very idea of life without them seems to him despicable.

The nerve of Arjuna's argument, then, is that it is wrong to kill one's own people. And by a process of rationalization the Pāṇḍava Prince also thinks of the evil consequences of war on society. He feels that the laws of family and clan would perish with the destruction of the clan and thinks that these laws are eternal and abiding. Alas! he does not know that there is a greater law which alone is eternal (*śāśvata-dharma*) and that God is its keeper (*goptā*). Arjuna, it is true, was most humane, but he had to be lifted above even that level. And so, Śrī Kṛṣṇa rebuked him for his narrowness of outlook and his inordinate love for his clan. In his argument Arjuna turns out to be of the earth, earthy. The Lord unfolds to him the vaster region of divinity, the real home of all being.

It is essential, therefore, to realize at the outset that Arjuna was no *pacifist* in the abstract sense of the term. He was not against war as such. He was opposed only to a war with his kinsmen. When he said that he thought it better for him to die in the battle, unresisting and unarmed, than to kill his beloved enemy, it was not at the altar of Truth that he was prepared to lay down his life, but only at the shrine of the small god of family and clannish affections.

Śrī Kṛṣṇa undertook to remove his ignorance by giving him the light of knowledge. The teaching was not for Arjuna alone. Treating Arjuna's grief as an occasion, the Lord taught the *Bhagavad-gītā* for the sake of the good of all beings.

3. ŚRĪ KṚṢṆA'S TEACHING

The *Bhagavad-gītā* consists of eighteen chapters, amounting to seven hundred couplets on the whole. The first chapter and the opening verses of the second chapter pertain to the episode we have already referred to. Śrī Kṛṣṇa's teaching begins with verse eleven in chapter two. The text is in the form of a dialogue between the teacher, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, and the disciple, Arjuna. It is mostly the teacher that speaks. Now and then, the disciple expresses his doubts, and asks questions.

The central teaching of the *Bhagavad-gītā* is the same as that of the *Upaniṣads*. A popular verse compares the *Upaniṣads* to the cows, Śrī Kṛṣṇa to the milkman, Arjuna to the calf, the *Gītā* to the milk, and all the good people to the partakers of the milk. Śaṅkara, whose commentary on the *Gītā* is the earliest available to us, describes this text as containing the quintessence of all the Vedic teaching. In the colophon at the end of each chapter, the descriptive tags 'the science of *Brahman*' and 'the teaching of *Yoga*' are to be found; and each of the eighteen chapters is styled as an *Upaniṣad*.

In the introductory part of his commentary Śaṅkara says thus—The *dharma* (duty) taught in the *Veda* is two-fold—of the form of active involvement in the world-process (*pravṛtti*) and of the form of turning away from activity (*nivṛtti*). The *Veda* teaches one how to live well in the world and also how to gain release (*mokṣa*) from the cycle of birth and death. By following the path of activity as set forth in the *Veda*, one could gain all that is good in this world and also in the world to come. By following the path of turning away from

activity, i.e. renunciation, one will gain the highest goal which is release. God who is the source of all creation taught this two-fold path through the *Veda* so that all people might derive benefit according to their ability. But on account of a long lapse of time, the teaching fell into oblivion. And so, God incarnated himself as Śrī Kṛṣṇa and imparted the teaching anew to Arjuna.

Although there are two paths taught in the *Veda*—activity and renunciation—there is a technique by means of which activity may be made a stepping-stone to renunciation. If one performs one's actions unselfishly, without desiring any reward, then, one's heart will get purified thereby, and one will become eligible for the path of renunciation and enlightenment. This is what our text calls *skill in action* which is *yoga*.⁴ The path of works, as interpreted by Śaṅkara, is not of itself the instrument for attaining the human goal, which is *mokṣa*; it is so only through serving as an auxiliary to the path of knowledge. The two disciplines are but two stages in the path to perfection. Though they are not identical, and cannot be combined, they are not discontinuous. And in between the two disciplines comes the method of devotion (*bhakti*) to God. It serves the purpose of sublimating the emotions by turning them away from the finite objects and making them flow in the direction of the infinite Reality which is God.

We may roughly equate the spheres of knowledge (*jñāna*), devotion (*bhakti*), and action (*karma*), with those of metaphysics, religion, and ethics. We shall briefly consider the teaching of the *Bhagavad-gītā* under these three heads.

4. METAPHYSICS

The metaphysics of the *Bhagavad-gītā* is the same as that of the *Upanisads*. The basic truth of the perennial philosophy is formulated by Śrī Kṛṣṇa thus of the unreal there is no existence, nor is there non-existence of the real⁵ All our sorrow is due to a wrong perspective. We see the real as non-existing and the unreal as existing. Missing the permanent reality which is the Spirit, we think that the passing world will ever abide. The very first lesson that the *Gītā* teaches is that the Self is eternal, unchanging, and the same in all the bodies that are born and die. The Self cannot be denied because it is the very nature of him who denies. That the Self is, we explicitly or implicitly admit. But what it is, most of us do not know. We usually identify the Self with the body, mind, and their accessories. The Vedānta tell us that the Self is the ultimate reality called *Ātman* or *Brahman*. Words cannot define it, nor thoughts comprehend it. Yet we have to approach it through these very instruments. In order to awaken us from our ordinary ways of thinking and expression which amount to ignorance, Scripture gives an account of *Brahman* in apparently contradictory terms. It is far, and yet near; great, and yet small. Though it creates the world, it does nothing, and is unaffected by its creation. The teaching about creation is not an end in itself. *Māyā* is said to create the world. But how from the One the Many appear is a mystery. *Māyā* is there to be transcended, and not to be clung on to. My *Māyā* is difficult to cross,⁶ says Śrī Kṛṣṇa. But true heroism consists in crossing it.

The *Gītā* sings the praise, on more than one occasion, of those who have crossed *Māyā*. It calls them men of steady wisdom, those who have transcended Nature. They are the *jīvanmuktas*, liberated while yet living. They are free from the petty desires that bind the soul. They have neither the sense of agency, nor that of enjoyership, for they have ceased to identify themselves with the body-mind organism. - The extremes of life such as praise and blame, heat and cold, do not trouble them. Their happiness is not derived from the objects of sense. Their revelry, if revelry it may be called, is in the Self. They do good to society, but without any sense of egoity. Their actions are not born out of constraint, they are the spontaneous expressions of their innate goodness. The very existence of such persons is a blessing to the world. The goal they have attained is *Brahmanirvāna*, the Freedom that is the Absolute. Having attained this final goal, one is not born again. The means by which one attains it is *jñāna*, true wisdom.

This wisdom is not easy to get. It is at the end of many lives, says Śrī Kṛṣṇa, that one gains the goal through *jñāna*.⁷ The path to the Unmanifest is hard to tread. To those who are body-conscious, the absolute *Brahman* is baffling. In order to get to that stage where duality disappears, one has necessarily to conceive of *Brahman* as a personal deity and offer worship to him. It is here that religion comes to be of immense use. The worshipper-worshipped relation has, no doubt, to be transcended. But, unless one passes through that relation, one cannot find salvation from the narrow bonds that bind and constrict the soul.

5. RELIGION

Religion involves an intimate relation between man and God. All the World-Faiths insist on a reverential attitude towards a superior principle, either named or unnamed. Usually this principle is called God, and the belief in such a God is known as theism. Though there are certain fundamentals which are common to all religions, Indian theism is peculiar in certain respects.⁸ I shall proceed to explain this from a study of the *Bhagavad-gītā*.

In the first place, Indian theism is not fanatical and narrow in its outlook, for it provides for a variety of conceptions of the Godhead. No one has a right to say that his view of God is the only right view. As the *Mahābhārata* puts it, there is no sage without a view of his own.⁹ This is as it should be. As no two minds are identical, the form of faith that suits one may not suit another. Śrī Kṛṣṇa expressly declares that there are different ways to God, and that even those who worship other gods reach him alone. What one finds in the *Gītā* is, thus, a philosophical theism, which is often mistaken for polytheism. The principle of Divinity according to this standpoint, is the same in all the gods. This is one important feature of Indian theism.

A second feature of Indian theism is that it openly recognizes the need for anthropomorphism. So long as we are human, we have necessarily to conceive of God as a person. Worship is not possible without image-making. To think of God as the Father in Heaven is as much an image as the idol carved out of stone or made out of metal. And, within human limita-

tions we may think of God in any form as Father, Mother, Son, etc. The purpose of religious devotion is to transfer our emotions from the perishable objects to the imperishable Reality.

It is true that we have to take a human view of God. But we have also to overcome this limitation. So, one has to bear in mind that God is omnipresent, i.e. present in every form that we see. Śrī Kṛṣṇa declares in the *Gītā* that he resides in the heart of every being, and that Vāsudeva (a name of Śrī Kṛṣṇa) is everything. He is in the good and bad, in beauty and ugliness, in construction and destruction, in life and death. To demonstrate this vividly and in a dramatic manner, Śrī Kṛṣṇa manifests to Arjuna in the eleventh chapter his cosmic form (*viśva-rūpa*), a form which is divine and awful at the same time, with many mouths and eyes, presenting many a wonderful sight, decked beautifully, and having faces on all sides. This, however, is a form the sight of which all cannot stand. Even Arjuna could not bear to behold it for long, in spite of the Eye-Divine granted him by Śrī Kṛṣṇa, and so he had to implore him to assume back his human shape. To those who do not have the power to see God everywhere, Śrī Kṛṣṇa says, 'See Me as the topmost member in each species.' After enumerating some of his superior manifestations, he sums up by saying, 'Whatever is glorious, brilliant or powerful, know that to be a manifestation of a portion of My splendour.'¹⁰

The doctrine of incarnation also is an important feature. Śrī Kṛṣṇa says that, whenever virtue subsides and vice prevails, he incarnates himself in order to pro-

tect the good and punish the wicked.¹¹ Cosmic balance has to be preserved; and for this purpose God comes in a tangible form, half concealing and half manifesting his divinity. He comes as the saviour of the world, and even the punishment he metes out to the transgressors proves to be for their good. Truly speaking, there is neither friend nor foe to the Lord, because all are the same to him. Each person benefits, according to his eligibility, when the waters of Heaven descend to the earth and flow along human channels. Such descents are the Incarnations or *Avatāras*.

Devotion to any of the forms of God is called *bhakti*. The external accessories of worship are not important. What is essential is that we should offer ourselves to Him. The offering of a flower or a fruit is only symbolic. The ideal devotee is one who leads a dedicated life. "Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever oblation you place in the sacred fire, whatever you bestow as a gift, whatever you do by way of penance, offer it to Me,"¹² says Śrī Kṛṣṇa. When one's love of God becomes constant and complete, one attains wisdom through his grace, the wisdom which liberates the soul from the bonds.

As an aid to the discipline of taking the mind off the finite particulars and placing it in the eternal Godhead, the *yoga* of meditation is also taught. Detailed instructions are given in regard to the meditation-technique. One should choose a clean place for the practice of meditation. The seat should be neither too high nor too low. One should place a mat made of *kuśa* grass, spread over it a deerskin, and over that again a

piece of cloth. Seating oneself thereon, one should control one's thoughts, senses and movements, and endeavour to make one's mind one-pointed. One should maintain a steady posture, hold one's spine, neck and head erect and still, and gaze on the tip of one's nose, without looking around. One should not swerve from one's vow of celibacy and should direct one's thoughts Godward. The *yoga* is not for him, says the *Gītā*, who eats too much, nor for him who eats not at all; it is not for him who sleeps too long, nor for him who keeps vigil all night. The way of *yoga* is the Middle Path of judicious moderation.¹³

The practice of meditation renders one's devotion to God complete and undivided.

6. ETHICS

To realize the non-dual Spirit and thus reach the goal of *mokṣa* is difficult. To be devoted constantly and completely in the service of God is also difficult. What stands as a bar in our way is the attachment we have for the objects of sense. *Kāma* or lust for things is the cause of our slide on the downward slopes to sorrow. Yet, the motive that we have in all our actions is happiness. We desire some particular result and engage ourselves in a course of action which, we think, will bring that about. But even when we succeed and gain the end we sought, we are not happy. So, from desire to fulfilment and from fulfilment to desire, again, we go, being involved in a vicious circle. What, then, are we to do to break this chain? The answer given in the *Gītā* is that we should renounce our attachment to

the results of action. This is *anāsakti-yoga*, the way of non-attachment, as Mahatma Gandhi described it.

It is not action that binds us so much as our attachment to the fruit of our action. So, desirelessness or freedom from attachment is what we should first achieve. By mere inaction it is not possible to have this. We may be inactive outside but intensely active inside. Action does not mean mere bodily movement. It is the soul's sense of agency by a wrong identification with its body. Freedom from the sense of agency cannot be gained by making the body motionless. The desire for inactivity is as much harmful as that for the fruit of action. So, the principle of *karma-yoga* is: Let not the desire for fruit be your motive for action. do not long for inaction too.¹⁴

Is it possible to act without motive, it may be asked. The reply of the *Gītā* is this. It is true that there cannot be endeavour without motive. But instead of having a different motive for each action, have one and the same motive for all action. Each action will, no doubt, bring in its own result. Regard that as a consequence and not as the end sought for. What, then, is the one end of all action? The *Gītā* formulates it in two ways. For those who aim at the realization of the non-dual *Brahman*, the end of action is inner purification. Unless the mind is thoroughly cleansed, the sun of wisdom will not rise. For those who are theistically inclined, the goal of action is realizing God. As Śrī Kṛṣṇa puts it, man attains perfection by worshipping God through the performance of his allotted work.¹⁵

By such a life of dedication led by an individual,

is there any gain to society? The actions of a *karma-yogī* result in some good or other to his fellow-beings. The world gains enormously by his dedicated life. Only, even the good of society cannot be the ultimate end of realization. For, society is not the *whole* and cannot take the place of *Brahman* or God. The spiritual aspirant performs his duties without attachment to anything that is finite and imperfect. Because his actions are free from any narrow motive, they tend to promote world-welfare. As for the man who has realized the goal, he has no agency at all. The actions that we see in him are all of such a nature that they exalt the world.

Thus, we have in the *Bhagavad-gītā* a concise and clear account of the pilgrim's road to perfection—dedicated action, cleansing of the heart, devotion to God, concentration and meditation, inquiry into the truth of Being, realization of that Being as one's Self, release from bondage.

7. IN PRAISE OF THE BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ

The highest praise has rightly been showered on the *Bhagavad-gītā*. It has been translated into several of the world's languages, and is one of the earliest Indian texts to be rendered into English. In 1785 Charles Wilkins' translation appeared, along with Warren Hastings' letter to Nathaniel Smith, First Member of the Court of Directors, East India Company, commending its publication. In that letter, the first Governor General of India says that "works like *Bhagavad Gītā* will survive when the British dominion in India shall have

long ceased to exist and when the sources which it once yielded of wealth and power are lost to remembrance.” Edwin Arnold’s *The Song Celestial* was first published in 1885. Arnold speaks of the text as “this famous and marvellous Sanskrit poem”—“a poetical and philosophical work so dear to India”. In Aldous Huxley’s words, “The *Gītā* is one of the clearest and most comprehensive summaries of the Perennial Philosophy ever to have been made. Hence its enduring value, not only for Indians, but for all mankind.” Franklin Edgerton characterizes this book as “one of the great religious books of the world, the most important and influential Bible of India”. For William von Humbolt, the *Bhagavad-gītā* is “the most beautiful, perhaps the only true philosophical song existing in any known tongue.” J W Hauer, a German missionary who worked in India, refers to the *Gītā* as “a work of imperishable significance,” and says that it “gives us not only profound insights that are valid for all times and for all religious life, but it contains as well the classical presentation of one of the most significant phases of Indo-German religious history”. Schlegel and Lassen have spoken of the sublime heights to which the reader of this text is taken and the rapture which results as a consequence.

Some of the great leaders of India, who are responsible for the present renaissance in the country, drew their inspiration from the *Bhagavad-gītā*. To Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the *Gītā* is “the most luminous and priceless gem,” “the immortal fruit of the tree of Eternal Vedic religion.” Śrī Aurobindo characterizes it as “the richest synthesis of Indian culture”. Mahatma

Gandhi calls it his “spiritual reference book”. “When doubts haunt me, when disappointments stare me in the face, and I see not one ray of hope on the horizon,” says Gandhi, “I turn to the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and find a verse to comfort me, and I immediately begin to smile in the midst of overwhelming sorrow.”

NOTES

- 1 The *Mahābhārata*, Bhīṣmaparvā, chapters 25-42.
2. *Bhagavad-gītā*, i, 29-31.
3. *Ibid* , i, 32-33.
4. *Ibid* , ii, 50.
- 5 *Ibid* , ii, 16.
6. *Ibid* , vii, 14.
7. *Ibid* , vii, 19
8. *Supra*, p 23 *et seq.*
- 9 *Mahābhārata*, Āraṇya, ch. 312, v 111
10. *Bhagavad-gītā*, x, 41.
11. *Ibid* , iv, 7.
12. *Ibid* , ix, 27.
13. *Ibid* , vi, 10ff.
- 14 *Ibid* , ii, 47
- 15 *Ibid.*, xvii, 46.

Chapter Five

MATTER IS ALL

1. THE SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

We had occasion to see that schools of Indian philosophy are usually classified into two groups . the orthodox and the heterodox, that the heterodox systems are three : Gārvāka, Jainism, and Buddhism, and the orthodox systems six : Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta. It is not possible to say when exactly these systems arose. The rise of each one of these systems, however, presupposes a long stretch of philosophical thinking. Some of these early intuitions and speculations are to be found in the texts we have so far discussed: the *Vedas*, the *Upaniṣads*, and the *Bhagavad-gītā*. Although these texts constitute the basis of the orthodox systems, they have inspired some of the thought-patterns of the heterodox schools as well. The critical attitude which is central to philosophical speculations is to be discerned even in the early texts which we have surveyed. This must have given rise to heretical tendencies and heterodox standpoints. In seeking to meet the new challenges the orthodox schools should have become self-conscious and critically reflective. Emphasis came to be placed on epistemology which is concerned with the methods of knowledge. Each philosophical school sought to define its tools of knowing before constructing its particular metaphysical system. The tools of knowing or the means of valid

knowledge are called *pramāṇas* (literally, instruments of true knowledge). The philosopher now becomes a *prāmāṇika*, i.e. one who bases his conclusions on the evidence of *pramāṇas*. It may be noted in passing that ancient Greeks refer to the Indian philosopher as a *prāmāṇika*.

A term by which every system of philosophy would like to be called is *siddhānta*. This term means 'settled conclusion', and signifies in the present context that each system considers its own view to be the conclusive standpoint arrived at through means of valid knowledge. Another term which is a synonym of 'philosophy' is *darśana*, meaning 'sight', 'vision'. It stands for a philosophical perspective, a *Weltanschauung*. It also indicates the aim of philosophy in India which is to gain an intuitive apprehension of reality. *Darśana* would, then, mean 'direct knowledge', 'intuitive experience'.

A feature which characterizes the history of philosophy in the West, we shall sadly miss in regard to the development of Indian philosophy. Biographical details of many a Western philosopher are available. The philosophers can be dated; their doings have been recorded. Anecdotes connected with their lives are known. This makes the narrative interesting. But very little can be said about the Indian thinkers. When they lived, what they did, etc., it is difficult to ascertain in regard to most of the philosophers—even the more recent ones among them. What Cowell says about a philosopher of the Nyāya school, Udayana, may be said about all the classical thinkers, in general. This is what Cowell says of Udayana: "He shines like one of the

fixed stars in India's literary firmament, but no telescope can discover any appreciable diameter, his name is a *point* of light, but we can detect therein nothing that belongs to our earth or material existence."¹ The paucity of details regarding the personal lives of the philosophers, however, should not be attributed to what is alleged against India, that she lacks a sense of history. The real reason seems to be that the philosophers do not speak about themselves in their works because they rightly feel that truth should speak for itself. As individual thinkers they consider themselves to be insignificant before the truth which they expound, and which is impersonal. Even the most original philosophers disclaim any originality for the doctrines that they teach—they declare that they are but the transmitters of a hoary tradition—a tradition or traditions, however, which require repeated testing and constant refinement.

Another distinctive feature of Indian philosophy, as has already been mentioned, is that the systems do not succeed each other, but develop alongside one another. The works of each school refer to the doctrines of several others. In any systematic exposition of a particular school, there will be found cross-reference to, and critical consideration of, the teachings of the other schools. The method of exposition adopted by the philosopher is to establish his own view through a progressive criticism of the rival views. The rival theories that are rejected are the *prima facie* views (*pūrvā-pakṣa*). They are usually examined in sequence, beginning with the least acceptable view. The more remote view is criticized in the light of the less remote. And, finally the

philosopher, in question, rejects even the most proximate view, since it too fails to come up to the standard of truth which he adopts, and thus establishes his own standpoint which is the *siddhānta* (settled conclusion) for him. Thus, in every philosophical classic, what we have is a dialectical march towards the truth as its author sees it, through a progressive criticism of the other perspectives. Thus, in almost every major philosophical treatise, one gets a conspectus of the entire range of Indian philosophy, although from the particular perspective which that treatise holds as its own.

Belonging to each school of philosophy, there are three types of texts: (i) The basic text for a philosophical system is what is called a *Sūtra*, which consists of a set of aphorisms setting forth, in an ordered manner, the leading concepts and doctrines of the system concerned. The aphorisms which are cryptic read like paragraph headings, they are not expository statements, but aids to memory. Since they are brief, they admit, very often, of divergent interpretations. And so, within each philosophical tradition there came into being various sub-schools. (ii) The brevity of each *Sūtra* work necessitated the composition of commentaries (*bhāsyas*). The commentators seek to explicate the meanings of the *Sūtras*. And in so doing, they allow themselves the freedom to expound their own philosophical perspective, systematically and consistently. It is not only the *Sūtras* but also the commentaries that have been interpreted diversely. Some of the major commentaries have, each of them, sub-commentaries in the form of glosses, annotations, notes,

etc. Thus, there arose schools within schools, accommodating doctrinal variations. (iii) The third type of works consists of manuals, expository treatises, dialectical classics and critiques. In them we have the doctrines expounded either for the purpose of instructing those who belong to the tradition, or for combating the criticisms levelled by those who are opposed to the tradition concerned. Following the plan outlined at the end of the first chapter, we shall begin our study of the schools with the Cārvāka.

2 MATERIALISM, AN OLD DOCTRINE

Cārvāka or Lokāyata is the school of Indian Materialism. Even in the earliest text, the *Rg-veda*, there are references to heretics, non-conformists, skeptics, agnostics, and revilers of the *Veda*. Some characters in the *Epics* belong to these categories. In the *Bhagavad-gītā*, Śrī-Kṛṣṇa deprecates the attitude of those who are boastful of their material prosperity, and who maintain that creation could be accounted for purely in terms of natural inclinations and desire.² The early Jaina and Buddhist works refer to the teachings of one Ajita-keśakambalin which resemble the Cārvāka doctrines. Mention is also made, in the classical texts, of other materialists such as Purandara.

Cārvāka' and 'Lokāyata' are the terms pervasively used for indicating the materialistic outlook. The expression 'Cārvāka' is of uncertain origin. Some think that it was the name of the first disciple to whom the teaching was given. As meaning 'sweet-tongued', the term may also be taken as an appropriate name for the'

philosophy of pleasure which it teaches. The other expression 'Lokāyata' indicates the this-worldliness of the system. It is not necessary to interpret the term to mean the 'people's philosophy', for people as such do not hold any determinate philosophical view. Common-sense, as is well-known, is not the same as 'common-sense view'. Śaṅkara identifies the Lokāyata (or Lokāyatika) as the view which regards the body as the self.³ Kṛṣṇa Miśra, the author of a philosophical drama, summarises the materialistic position thus "Lokāyata is the only *śāstra* (philosophical teaching), perception is the only means of valid knowledge, earth, water, fire, and air are the only realities; wealth and pleasure are the human goals, there is no other world"⁴

Brhaspati is considered to be the founder of the Cārvāka school. A *Sūtra* is ascribed to him. Aphorisms from this work are cited by critics while criticizing the system. There are citations also from another *sūtra* work which was composed probably by Purandara. Another early philosopher of this school was Kambalāśvatara. Echoes of materialistic doctrines are to be found in the works on politics and erotics. The central teaching of the Cārvāka seems to be that the ultimate reality is matter, that 'matter is all'.

3 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

In the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, which is a digest of the various systems of Indian philosophy, its author, Mādhavācārya, describes the Cārvāka philosopher as the follower of the school of Brhaspati, and as the crest-jewel of heterodoxy. He also adds that the other name

of the school, Lokāyata, is appropriately significant, because of its doctrine of this-worldliness. This is a philosophical doctrine, we repeat, and not a popular belief or people's view. One of the first requirements of a philosophical standpoint is that it must be based on a theory of knowledge, and the Cārvāka has its own epistemology. The Lokāyata is a *prāmāṇika*, i.e. a philosopher who constructs his world-view on epistemological foundations.

The only means of valid knowledge for the Cārvāka is perception (*pratyaksa*). This is how the critics of the school understood its epistemology. An aphorism quoted from a Cārvāka work says 'perception is the only *prāmāṇa*.⁵ Another aphorism declares : inference (*anumāna*) is not a *pramāṇa*.⁶ Perceptual evidence is what is to be relied upon . there is no other valid evidence. Inference cannot be regarded as a means of valid knowledge because universal relation which should serve as its ground is impossible. In the typical instance of an inference in Indian logic,

Whatever has smoke has fire,
The hill has smoke,
Therefore The hill has fire,

the universal relation is between smoke and fire. But, asks the Cārvāka, how is the knowledge of this relation arrived at? No one could possibly have observed all cases of smoke being co-present with fire. If one has seen the co-presence of the two in the hearth, one cannot on that ground universalize the relation. The observation of any number of such instances will not be

enough to establish a necessary relation. Even if all the present cases have been observed, what about the past and what about the future instances? So, one can never be certain about any relation. The most pervasive relation is said to be the causal relation. But, has any one seen a causal relation between, say, A and B? All that we have seen may be that A is followed by B. This induces in us the belief that such will be the case in the future also. Thus causation is but a belief, and nothing more. From the observed cases we cannot infer anything about the unobserved ones. Inference, thus, is impossible. It is not a means of valid knowledge.

Critics of the Cārvāka system have pointed out that the rejection of inference is self-stultifying, and indefensible. That all inferences are invalid is itself an inference, the Cārvāka must admit. Moreover, when the Cārvāka seeks to establish his own position as against the views of his opponents, how does he get to know those views? It cannot be through perception, for the thoughts of others are not sense-perceived. It is through inference that he knows what the doctrines of the opponents are. It is again through inference that he hopes to convince others of the soundness of his world-view.

Probably, the Cārvāka did not altogether reject inference, as is alleged by his critics. What he did not favour was the use of inference to establish metaphysical categories. Also, he believed that through inference we can guess only probabilities, and never acquire indubitable knowledge. A distinction is made between naive (*dūrta*) and instructed (*su-śikṣita*) materialists. The latter at least seem to have admitted the usefulness of

inference within limits. Inference relating to the past phenomena, they admitted, but not that which refers to the future as also that which is about what has never been perceived.

Testimony (*śabda*) is not accepted by the Cārvāka as an evidence. The testimony of others has no value. The *Veda* is no authority. It consists of statements that are meaningless and misleading. Those who composed it were out to confound and confuse the common people in order to achieve their own selfish purposes. The sayings of the authors of the *Veda* are but prattle. No confidence should be placed in what they teach.

4. PHILOSOPHY OF MATTER

Since perception is the only reliable source of knowledge, what is known through it alone is real. Sense-perception does not reveal any metaphysical entity. What it conveys is only matter in its four-fold form: earth, water, fire, and air.⁷ The fifth element, ether, usually recognized in the other systems of Indian philosophy is not admitted as real in the Cārvāka-darśana, because it is not an object of perception. The four elements, earth, water, fire, and air, too are real, not as super-sensible atoms, but in their gross particle-form. There is no reality other than these four elements and their combinations.

Now, it may be asked: how is the phenomenon of consciousness to be accounted for? The Cārvāka does not deny consciousness, but only that it is real independent of the body. When the elements come together in a particular mode to form an organism, consciousness

(mind or soul) appears in it. Consciousness, thus, is an epiphenomenon, an after-glow of matter, it is a function of the body. Agreeing with the modern behaviourist, the Cārvāka would say the brain throws out consciousness even as the liver secretes bile. It is true that none of the elements that constitute the physical body is characterized by consciousness. But what the Cārvāka holds is that when the elements combine to form an organismic pattern, consciousness emerges, even as the intoxicating quality appears in a mixture of certain ingredients, none of which, taken separately, possesses it, or as the red colour is produced from the combination of betel leaf, areca nut, and lime, none of which is red. That there is no soul apart from the body is evidenced by the fact, says the Cārvāka, that consciousness perishes with the body. When the body is dead and reduced to ashes, how can it come back again? 'Dust thou art, to dust thou returnest' applies literally to the soul.

Among the later Cārvākas, there were some who believed in the sense-organs (*indriya*), or the vital principle (*prāṇa*), or the mind (*manas*), as being different from the body. But they also held that these are dependent on the body. In the last analysis, the body is the self; the body is a product of material elements.

5. ETHICS OF PLEASURE

If there is no metaphysical reality at all, it follows that the traditional concepts of God, soul, and immortality are pure fictions, sheer imaginations of fevered brains. There is no survival, no otherworld, no God as the creator of the universe. Since this is the only

life for the individual, the part of wisdom will be to make the best of it. The 'best' of life is to enjoy pleasure. The desire of every creature is to gain pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure in this life is the sole end of man⁸. It is true that unmixed pleasure is not to be had. Pleasure goes with pain. But, on account of this, one should not run away from pleasure. On the contrary, he should have of it as much as possible. The Cārvāka cites several analogies to drive in this point. One does not throw away rice-grains because they are covered with husk, or refrain from cooking them for the fear of beggars. Roses are not discarded because there are thorns, one does not refrain from eating fish because there are bones and scales. The aim should really be to minimise pain and maximise pleasure. Make hay while the sun shines. Do not ignore a present pleasure in the hope of gaining some greater pleasure in the future. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. A pigeon of today is worth more than a peacock of tomorrow. Enjoy as long as you live; even by borrowing, drink ghee.

Thus, the Cārvāka combines sensationalism and materialism with hedonism. In the mind's march to metaphysical truth, it marks a preliminary stage, and not the destination. Negatively, the Cārvāka enabled philosophy in general to become self-critical and vigilant. It served as a clearing agent, to a limited extent, and removed from the mansions of philosophy some unwanted and useless lumber.

NOTES

1. *Kusun.āñjali* (English translation), Introduction, pp. v-vi.
2. *Bhagavad-gītā*, xvi, 8.
3. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, III, iii, 53.
4. *Prabodha-candrodaya*, Act ii.
5. *Pratyakṣam evaikam pramāṇam*. Quoted as from a Cār āka work in the commentary on *Sammatī Tarkapralarāna*, called *Tattvabodha-vidhāyinī* of Abhaya-devasūri.
6. *Anumānam apramāṇam*. *Ibid.*
7. *Pṛṇvy-ap-tejo-vāyur iti tattvāni* Quoted by Bhāskara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*.
8. *Kāma evaikah puruṣārthah*. Quoted by Nīlakaṇṭha in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*.

Chapter Six

THE TEACHINGS OF THE FORD-MAKERS

1. JAINA TRADITION AND LITERATURE

Jainism is both philosophy and religion. It belongs to the heterodox group of traditions which do not accept the authority of the *Veda*. The name of the greatest teacher associated with this school is Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. Vardhamāna, however, was not the founder of Jainism. The Jaina tradition believes that Vardhamāna was the last in the line of twenty-four teachers known as *Tīrthankaras* (ford-makers). They are called *tīrthankaras* because they serve as the ferry-men across the river of transmigration. They are the saviours of souls, the perfected ones who lead the way to redemption.

Not much is known about the early teachers of Jainism. The first twenty-two *tīrthankaras* belong to mythological ages. Rṣabha-deva who heads the list of teachers is referred to even in the Vedic lore. But no historical evidence is available till we come to the twenty-third preceptor, Pārśvanātha. The date assigned to this *tīrthankara* is C.872-772 B.C. Born of King Aśvasena and Queen Vāmā, Pārśvanāthā renounced the world when he was thirty-two years old, and after practising austerities for eighty-three days, gained omniscience which characterizes the perfected ones. Thereafter he moved about in the world preaching the truth, and when

he had fulfilled his mission, he departed as a centenarian.

The twenty-fourth *tīrthaṅkara* was Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. He was born in a princely clan called *jñāta*, in Kuṇḍagrāma, a suburb of Vaiśali in the northeastern state of Bihar. His parents, Siddhārtha and Triśalā, were pious Jainas and followers of Pārśvanātha. Vardhamāna married Princess Yaśodā when he came of age, and had a daughter by her. After the death of his parents when he was thirty years old he became a renunciate, and after twelve years of severe austerities, he became a perfected soul, a *kevalin* (one who has achieved the state of purity and isolation). The rest of his life he spent, even as Pārśvanātha had done before him, in propagating the Jain teachings. He was seventy-two when he died.

Vardhamāna, reverentially referred to as Mahāvīra (great hero) and Jina (victor) by his followers, was an elder contemporary of the Buddha. In the Buddhist canonical works, he is named as *Jñāta-putra* (a son of the *Jñāta* clan: Nātaputta, in Pāli), and the Jainas are called Nirgranthas (literally, the unfettered ones, Nigaṇthas, in Pāli). Vardhamāna introduced some measure of reform in the teachings of his predecessor, Pārśvanātha, to suit the exigencies of the changed times. Pārśvanātha seems to have recognized only four vows, Vardhamāna added the vow of chastity as the fifth. For the ascetics, Pārśvanātha had allowed the use of clothing consisting of an under and an upper garment; Vardhamāna forbade clothing. Some of Vardhamāna's followers adopted his reforms completely: they came to be known as *Digambaras* (sky-clad); other accepted the

fifth vow, but continued to wear white clothes, and are designated as *Śvetāmbaras* (white-robed). The Dīgambaras regard 509 B C as the date of the passing away of Vardhamāna, according to the Śvetāmbaras, the date is 527 B C.

The canonical works of Jainism are called *Angas*. Three councils of monks met successively at long intervals, and collected and edited the canon. The first was held at Pāṭalīputra (the modern Patna) one hundred and sixty years after the passing away of Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, and the last nearly a thousand years after the Master's time. The language in which the canonical works are written is Ardhamagadhi, a Prākṛt language. The later Jaina writers came to use Saṁskṛit also to expound the tenets of their philosophy.

2 GENERAL OUTLOOK

The philosophical outlook of Jainism is that of a pluralistic realism, since it recognizes a plurality of reals, spiritual as well as material. It steers clear of the absolutism of Spirit and the absolutism of Matter. Neither bare identity nor mere difference, according to Jainism, is true of reality. The Jaina world-view accommodates both unity and diversity. To take, for example, two issues: (1) Are souls eternal or non-eternal? The Jaina answer is that they are both. The souls are eternal in some respects, i.e. as substances, and non-eternal in some respects, i.e. as modes, (2) How are soul and body related? Are the two identical, or are they different? The answer is that the relation of body and soul is one of identity-and-difference. As identical with the

body, the soul suffers from the injuries of the body; and as different from the body, the soul does not become extinct with the extinction of the body. Thus, the distinctive feature of Jainism is to accord, in its philosophical scheme, a place for every possible standpoint.

3. KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE

The comprehensiveness and sweep of the Jaina outlook may be clearly seen in its theory of knowledge. Five kinds of knowledge are distinguished. They are. (1) perceptual knowledge (*mati-jñāna*), (2) scriptural knowledge (*śruta-jñāna*); (3) clairvoyance (*avadhi-jñāna*), (4) telepathy (*manahparyāya-jñāna*); and (5) perfect knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*). It will be seen that in this scheme are included all varieties of knowledge: mediate and immediate, normal and supernormal, imperfect and perfect, etc. Commencing with the most limited knowledge, the perceptual, the grades rise to the most complete knowledge which is *kevala-jñāna*.

(1) *Mati-jñāna*. This is knowledge caused by the senses and mind, i.e., perceptual knowledge. Knowledge which results from the operation of the senses is called *indriya-jñāna* (sensory knowledge); knowledge which involves the activity of the mind alone is *anindriya-jñāna* (non-sensory knowledge). Different stages in *mati-jñāna* are distinguished, viz., perception, speculation, perceptual judgment, and retention thereof.

The Jaina canon considers *mati-jñāna* to be mediate knowledge (*parokṣa*). It is mediate because the soul knows here not directly, but through the mediation of

the sense organs and the mind. Later writers on Jainism, however, were inclined to regard sensory knowledge as immediate cognition, but only as a concession to the prevalent view in Indian philosophy which defined perception as sense-generated knowledge. Even then, *mati-jñāna* that is produced by sense-organs was described as empirical perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*), and not as direct knowledge in the strict sense.

(2) *Śrūta-jñāna*. This is scriptural knowledge, literally 'knowledge from what is heard'. According to the Jainas, their scriptures contain all truth, and are thus authoritative. The use of words leading to knowledge is what distinguishes *śrūta-jñāna* from *mati-jñāna*. Scriptural or verbal knowledge is always mediate (*parokṣa*).

(3) *Avadhī-jñāna*. This is knowledge through clairvoyance. It is only as obstructed by *karma* which veils knowledge (*jñānāvaranīya-karma*) that the soul is not able to see into the past or future and into long distances. But the soul inherently has the power to know all things irrespective of time and distance. *Avadhī-jñāna* stands for the intuitive knowledge of things having shape, far into temporal or spatial distances. The degree of this ability will vary from person to person. The greater the freedom from the obstructing veil, the more will be the soul's clairvoyant ability.

Clairvoyance as well as the next two kinds of knowledge are stages in supernormal perception which, however, is natural to the soul.

(4) *Manahparyāya-jñāna*. This is the direct apprehension of the modes of mind, i.e. telepathic knowledge. The one who has this knowledge has access directly to

the contents and operations of other minds. The scope of this variety of knowledge is confined to humans. *Manahpariyāya* is the intuition of a human being into the objective contents of the minds of other humans. Like *avadhi*, this also is of varying grades.

(5) *Kevala-jñāna*. This is omniscience, the summit of all knowledge. When all the limiting conditions have been removed, the soul is in possession of complete knowledge. All substances with all their modes are directly known by it. On the rise of omniscience, the lower grades of knowledge are overpowered, even as the other luminaries of the sky are overpowered, on the appearance of the sun. Omniscience is not conditioned by space, time, or object. It is independent of the senses, and is the characteristic of freed souls. It is uncontaminated by doubt (*samśaya*), error (*vimoha*), and delusion (*vibhrama*). Rid of the dirt of *karma*, the soul gains its true nature which is omniscience.

A distinction is made between knowledge (*jñāna*) and insight (*darśana*). Consciousness is called *knowledge* when it is of the not-self, and *insight* when it is of the self. The general Jaina view is that two acts of consciousness in one and the same soul cannot be simultaneous. And so, knowledge and insight can occur only successively or alternately. But is this the case in regard to the omniscience of the perfected soul? On this question, the Jaina writers are divided. Some say 'yes', and others 'no'.

4 LOGIC

The doctrine of standpoints (*naya*) is a distinctive

feature of Jaina logic. *Naya* means a standpoint from which a thing is known, as contrasted from *pramāna* which is knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. There are many standpoints, and there are many ways in which they may be classified. One mode of classifying them is into those that relate to generality or identity (*dravyāstika*), and those that relate to particularity or difference (*paryāvāstika*). The *nayas* of the former group are three, those of the latter four. Thus, according to this mode of classification there are seven *nayas*:

- (1) *Naigama-naya*. This is a standpoint which regards a thing as having both generic and specific qualities.
- (2) *Saṅgraha-naya*. Here, a thing is viewed in its general aspect.
- (3) *Vyavahāra-naya*. This is the conventional point of view which is the result of empirical knowledge.
- (4) *Rjūsūtra-naya*. This takes into account only the present aspect of a thing, ignoring the past and the future.
- (5) *Śabda-naya*. This takes synonymous words as having the same sense, without considering the shades of difference in meaning.
- (6) *Samābhīnūḍha-naya*. According to this, when there are several words denoting the same object, each word, by virtue of its root, signifies a different aspect of that object.
- (7) *Evāṁbhūta-naya*. This holds that a word denotes an object only when the object is in the state of fulfilling the function which is conveyed by the derivative meaning of that word.

The doctrine of *nayas* wants us to take into account the standpoint from which an object is understood. If this is ignored, confusion and error will result, i.e. there will be *nayābhāsa* (fallacy of *naya*).

It is the principle of standpoints that is employed in what is known as maybeism (*syād-vāda*),¹ with its formulation of the seven-fold judgment (*saptabhangī*). Judgments are of two types, as is well known: affirmative and negative—it is A, it is not A. These statements would become contradictories only if they are made with reference to the same substance, place, time, or mode, and not otherwise. And so, every statement, affirmative, negative, both, and neither, is meaningful provided the standpoint from which it is made is taken into account. This is indicated by adding the expression *may be* to judgments 'May be, it is A'; 'May be, it is not A'. It must be noted, however, that 'may be' does not mean doubt. It stands for an aspect or standpoint, relative to which the statement is made. Taking 'is' and 'is not' as the primary terms, a scheme of seven-fold predication is formulated in Jaina logic. The seven forms are:

- (1) May be, it is (*syāt asti*)
- (2) May be, it is not (*syāt nāsti*).
- (3) May be, it is and is not (*syāt asti nāsti*).
- (4) May be, it is indescribable (*syāt avaktavyah*).
- (5) May be, it is and is indescribable (*syāt asti ca avaktavyah*).
- (6) May be, it is not and is indescribable (*syāt nāsti ca avaktavyah*).
- (7) May be, it is, is not, and is indescribable (*syāt asti ca nāsti ca avaktavyah*)

The significance of the seven-fold predication is that our knowledge regarding anything is relative. To con-

sider relative knowledge to be absolute would be delusion. All our knowledge, thus, is conditional. A pot, for instance, exists from a particular point of view. From another point of view, it does not exist. The pot in question *exists* from the point of view of its substance, clay, its place, the room in which it is, its time, the present moment, and its mode which is its particular shape, having narrow neck, broad belly, etc. The pot *does not exist* from the point of view of another substance, say gold, another place, i.e., some other room, another time, i.e., the past and the future, and another mode, i.e., having a wide neck, etc. Both the statements 'exists' and 'does not exist' may be made if the points of view are successive. If they are made together, the pot becomes indescribable. The other three forms of the judgment are combinations of 'indescribable' with 'is', 'is not', and 'is and is not', respectively. These seven are the only possible forms of predication, with 'is' and 'is not' as the basic predicates.

The real, according to Jainism, is complex, and not simple. Each entity is a one-in-many, as substance it is one; as modes it is many. Those who ignore this truth make simple and unqualified statements about reality—these statements are partially, and not absolutely, true. The story of the blind men and the elephant is narrated as an analogous case.² The blind men gave different accounts of the elephant because their knowledge was derived from feeling with their hands the different parts of its body. They were right in what they affirmed, and wrong in what they denied. The view that every object has a multiplicity of aspects is

known as *anekānta-vāda*. Because of this complex nature of reality, different formulations in regard to it become possible.

5 THE CATEGORIES

The realism and the relativism of Jainism are reflected in its scheme of categories. The two main categories are soul (*jīva*) and non-soul (*ajīva*). Soul is characterized by consciousness and life; non-soul by the opposite of these. As substance (*dravya*) they are one; but as modes they are different. Consciousness is the essential nature of soul, non-consciousness is the common feature of non-soul. The category of non-soul is subdivided into five reals: time (*kāla*), space (*ākāśa*), medium of motion (*dharmā*), medium of rest (*adharma*), and matter (*pudgala*). These, together with soul, constitute the six categories of Jainism. Of these, the substances other than time are extended reals, i.e., they have constituent parts (*asti-kāya*), time has no parts (*anasti-kāya*). Except matter, the others are immaterial substances (*amūṛta-dravyas*). Thus, soul is conscious, immaterial, and extended substance. Medium of motion, medium of rest, and space are non-conscious, immaterial, and extended substances. Time is non-conscious, immaterial, and non-extended substance. Matter is non-conscious extended substance. Thus, the Jaina categorial scheme is a complex one involving a wide range of permutations and combinations. We shall briefly consider the nature of each one of these categories.

(1) *Soul (jīva)*. Consciousness, as we have seen, is the characteristic mark of soul. It is *cetana-dravya* (conscious substance). Consciousness consists of knowledge (*jñāna*) and insight (*darśana*). Besides these, the soul has bliss and power. In itself, the soul possesses these four characteristics in their infinite degree. But in its empirical state, as bound by *kaṁma*, its faculties become limited. We have already referred to the *kaṁma* that limits or veils the soul's knowledge (*jñānāvaranīya-kaṁma*). The *kaṁma* that conditions the faculty of insight is *darśanāvaranīya*. That which limits the soul's blissful nature is called *mohanīya* (what deludes). And that which restricts the soul's power is *antaraya* (i.e. obstacle). The difference between the liberated souls and the bound ones is that while the former are perfect and unconditioned by *kaṁma*, the latter are imperfect and fettered by *kaṁma*.

We noted above that the soul is an extended substance. This is a peculiar doctrine of Jainism. The extent of a soul is the same as that of its body. As the soul is capable of expansion and contraction, it takes on the size of the body it occupies at any given time. The soul of an ant is of the size of the ant-body. Were it to migrate into an elephant-body, it would expand to that dimension. This is explained with the help of the analogy of a lamp. The flame of a lamp illumines the room in which the lamp is kept. If the lamp is moved into a large hall, its light expands and pervades that hall. Association with matter affects the nature of the soul, the soul's knowledge, etc., are abbreviated, similarly, its non-spatial character also is changed.

Jainism subscribes to the view of plurality of souls. Since there are many bodies, there are many souls. While there may be more than one soul in a single body, one soul cannot occupy more than one body. The souls are of different grades. There are two broad divisions. the stationary (*sthāvāra*) and the mobile (*trāsa*). Among the mobile souls, there are two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed, and five-sensed *jīvas*. It is the mixing with matter in the form of *karma*-particles that makes for the different conditions in which the souls find themselves.

(2) *Time (kāla)* Time is the auxiliary cause of change. It consists of units which do not mix with one another. Each unit is indivisible and eternal. The universe is filled with time-units. There is no space-unit which is devoid of time-unit.

(3) *Space (ākāśa)* Space is that in which all things exist. It is eternal and all-pervasive, and without form. It is a single substance consisting of infinite units called *pradeśas*. Space is in two parts. one in which movement is possible, and the other in which there is no movement. The former is *lokākāśa*, space in which the things of the world exist. The other is *alokākāśa*, pure transcendent space.

(4) *Medium of Motion (dharma)* This is the substance which makes the motion of souls and matter possible. While it itself does not move, it provides the movement-medium for substances which have the capacity of moving.

(5) *Medium of Rest (adharma)*. This is the counterpart of *dharma*. It serves as the auxiliary cause

of rest Together, *dharma* and *adharma* pervade the entire universe, as oil pervades the sesamum seed. The conception that *dharma* and *adharma* are substances which are auxiliary causes, respectively, of movement and rest is peculiar to Jaina thought

(6) *Matter (pudgala)* The realism that Jaina is, it believes in the independent existence of matter '*Pudgala*', which is the term used in Jainism for matter, means the substance which gets modified through aggregation and dissociation. Matter has two forms: indivisible elementary particles (*anu*) and their different combinations (*skandha*). Each particle of matter has the characteristics of touch, taste, smell and colour. The Jaina view of atoms is that they are all of the same kind Earth, water, fire and air are only derivative distincts, each having its special characteristic. In other words, these distinctions appear when there are compounds of atoms Out of these compounds are the things that constitute the world formed.

6. BONDAGE AND RELEASE

We have seen above how matter mixes with soul and affects its nature even to the extent of spatializing it. The subtle particles of matter which flow into the soul and cause its bondage are called *karma* The soul's passions (*kleśa*) and activity (*yoga*) attract the *karma*-matter and the soul, as a result, gets constricted. In its intrinsic nature, as we had occasion to note, the soul is pure and perfect On account of association with matter, it becomes sullied and finite. The influx of *karma*-matter changes the nature of the soul and subjects

it to modifications. The passions condition the type of *karma*, and *karma* in turn conditions the passions. This reciprocal conditioning is intelligible because the soul's involvement in the empirical process (*samsāra*) is beginningless. The mixture of soul and *karma* is like the mixture of milk and water. There are several kinds of *karma*. Some of them we have mentioned above, such as that which veils knowledge, that which obscures insight, etc. These *karmanas* fill the space that is occupied by souls and they flow into the souls incessantly, drawn by the passions and activities of the latter. Weighed down by *karma*, the soul travels from life to life on the mundane level. This constitutes its bondage.

The process of release is the reverse of that which makes for bondage. Since *karma* is that which binds the soul, release will be gained when the soul is dissociated from *karma*. At first, the influx of fresh *karma* is to be stopped, and then the *karma* that is already there sticking to the soul is to be removed. What results from this is the liberation of the soul from the stranglehold of matter.

The influx of *karma*-particles is *āśrava*; the bondage caused by it is *bandha*, the stoppage of further flow of *karma* is *saṃvara*; the shedding of the *karma* that is in stock is *nirjara*; the state of perfection that results is *mokṣa*. When this end is achieved the age-old partnership between soul and matter is dissolved. Freed of the deadweight of *karma*, the soul flies up to the summit of *lokākāśa*, and remains there ever after.

7 THE THREE GEMS

What is the discipline that one should follow in order to get freedom from *karma*? Three are said to be the ingredients of the discipline that leads to *moksa*—right faith (*śamyag-darśana*), right knowledge (*śamyag-jñāna*), and right conduct (*śamyak-cāritra*).² These three together are described as the three gems (*tri-ratna*), i.e. precious principles that exalt life. Right faith is faith in the Jaina scriptures. Right knowledge is knowledge of the truths as taught in Jainism. Right conduct is making one's life conform to the truths learnt. The analogy of curing illness is given in this context. A patient who is afflicted with a disease must have unquestioning confidence in the physician, he must know the nature of the medicine prescribed, and he must actually take the medicine as directed by the physician. He who cherishes the three gems, and thereby gets rid of his impurity and imperfection, gains release.

Right faith in the Jaina scriptures may come to one either naturally or through the instruction of a preceptor. Right knowledge is the proper understanding of the nature of the categories such as soul, etc. Such understanding will be free from delusion and doubt. Right conduct becomes possible for one who has right faith and right knowledge. That conduct which seeks to observe what are called the 'five vows' (*vrata*) is said to be right. These vows, in their extreme form, are meant for the ascetics, for the lay disciples they are prescribed in a modified form. The vows in their extreme form are known as the 'great vows' (*mahā-*

vrata), and in their modified form the 'lesser vows' (*anuvrata*). The five great vows are. (1) non-injury (*ahimsā*) (2) non-uttering of falsehood (*satya*), (3) non-stealing (*asteya*), (4) abstention from sensuality (*brahmacariya*), and (5) non-possession (*aparigraha*). The lesser vows too are in the form of the same observances, except in the case of the last two. These are replaced respectively by the vow of chastity and the principle of limiting one's wants.

(1) *Ahimsā* Non-injury or non-violence heads the list of virtues because the greatest stress is laid on it. In Jainism, this rule is enjoined in the most extreme form. Non-injury means that one should not inflict injury on any living being in thought, by word, or by deed. Space is filled with souls. Each soul occupies the entire body in which it dwells. Hence, one must be extremely vigilant in seeing to it that one does not violate this rule. *Ahimsā* does not signify merely the negative principle of refraining from causing injury. Positively, it stands for the practice of active love towards all beings.

(2) *Satya* Abstention from uttering falsehood is a virtue which may be derived directly from *ahimsā*, and should be understood in association with it. To be untruthful is to cause injury. The speech that harms another is not truthful.

(3) *Asteya* Non-stealing means not taking what is not given. By depriving another person of what belongs to him, one inflicts injury on him. So, one should not covet another's property.

(4) *Brahmacarya* For the ascetic, this virtue means absolute celibacy. For lay people it means chastity.

(5) *Aparigraha*. The ascetic is not to own anything. He should renounce all personal property. He should not consider even his body as his own. He leaves off attachments to family and kindred. He considers the entire world to be his family. He owns nothing and yet he owns everything. For the lay person, *aparigraha* means reduction of his wants to the minimum possible. The principle for him is the one of limited possession (*parimita-parigraha*). Each householder should give as much as he can of his possessions for the welfare of others.

The practice of the five virtues paves for the liberation of the soul from the bondage of *karma*. The great vows lead one to the imperishable state (*avyayam padam*).⁴

Right conduct, together with right faith and right knowledge, renders the soul perfect. These three are efficacious, not severally, but in unison, even as in the case of the elixir producing its effect, there should be the combination of the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, and the actual taking of it by the patient.⁵

8 NO GOD, BUT GODHEAD

Jainism is a religio-philosophical tradition which is atheistic. It feels that there is no need for admitting a God who creates the universe. As *substances*, the things constituting the world are eternal; it is only their

modes that change. As the world is uncreated, there is no need for a Creator-God. The concept of First Cause, besides being self-contradictory, is not required for explaining the world. Even as the souls are eternal, the categories of the non-soul are eternal. To postulate an omniscient creator, therefore, is without warrant.

There is also another argument given in Jainism for showing that there is no need for a God. An omniscient creator is not within the range of our perceptual cognition. It cannot be contended that God is not an object of perception. Since the things of the world are perceptible, their creator also should be perceptible. Since this is not the case, there is no ground for holding that the world has God as its creator.

While God as an omniscient being is denied, omniscience as such is not denied. As we have seen, the perfected souls are omniscient beings, they serve as the models for other souls that are struggling to gain the supreme end. While Jainism rejects God, it accepts Godhead. Only, this Godhead is exemplified in each and every perfected soul. Thus, there is not one God but many Gods who are exemplars of perfection, who, having been imperfect humans, have achieved the highest state of isolation through persistent endeavour. The Kingdom of Gods receives a new member with every soul that is released.

9 CONCLUSION

As philosophy and as religion, Jainism has carved for itself a unique place in Indian Culture. Its contribution to epistemology, metaphysics, and practical ethics

is distinctive, and important. While its basic stand is non-absolutistic, it recognizes the possibility of integration of standpoints, accepts permanence in the midst of change, accommodates both identity and plurality, and promises the state of perfection to all.

NOTES

- 1 The doctrine of may be (*syāt*). The Sanskrit *syāt* comes from the root *as* which means 'to be'. *Syāt* is in the potential mood, meaning 'may be'.
- 2 This story occurs in the *Pañcatantra* which is an anthology of humorous moral tales. More than one school of Indian philosophy make use of this story. Śankara and his disciple Sureśvara employ it in their writings. Maulānā Rūmī, in *Masnāwi*, presents the story in a modified form. Here, the men are not blind, but the elephant is in a dark place.
- 3 Umāsvāmin's *Tattvārthādhigama sūtra · samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣa-margāḥ*.
4. See Mādhavacārya, *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* ('The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona'), 1924, p. 66: *mahāvratāṇi lokasya sādhayantyaavyayam padam*.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 66: *etāṇi samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi milī-tāṇi mokṣa-kāraṇaṁ na pratyekam yathā rasāyanam*.

Chapter Seven

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENED ONE

1 PERVERSIVE INFLUENCE OF BUDDHISM

Like Jainism Buddhism too is both philosophy and religion. It is the third of the heterodox schools. It owes its foundation to Gautama the Buddha, after whom it takes its name. Even in his time the Buddha had a great following. He spoke to the multitudes in their own language. After him, his followers travelled extensively, carrying the message of the Master with them. Some of the teachers of Buddhism crossed high mountains and perilous seas for the purpose of bringing the good tidings to other peoples and Buddhism became the religion and the way of life of several of the Asian countries. By virtue of its sweet reasonableness and insistence on conduct rather than on creed, the philosophy of the Enlightened One has enjoyed a pervasive influence in the East, and is currently receiving increasing attention in the West. "In point of age", observes Edwin Arnold, "most other creeds are youthful compared with this venerable religion, which has in it the eternity of a boundless love, an indestructible element of faith in final good, and the proudest assertion ever made of human freedom." ¹

2. THE BUDDHA

In the sixth century before the birth of Christ (c 563 B.C) in a principality on the slopes of the Hima-

layas, a hundred miles north of *Vāṇāsī*, the Buddha was born as the son of Śuddhodana, chief of the Śākya clan of Kapilavastu. Siddhārtha is the name that was given to him, and Gautama is his family name. It was prophesied at his birth that he would be an emperor (*Cakravartin*) if he would consent to rule, or would become a Buddha if he adopted the life of an ascetic. His mother died a week after his birth, and he was brought up by her sister, Śuddhodana's second wife. Even as a boy, Siddhārtha favoured a contemplative life. Getting alarmed, his father created an artificially pleasant world for him and married him to his cousin, Yasodharā. In due course, a son, Rāhula, was born to the young couple, and everything went on apparently smoothly. But one day an unusual event happened. Siddhārtha drove through the town to some gardens, on his way he saw in succession an old man broken and decrepit, a sick man worn out by disease and suffering, and a corpse borne on a bier. Enquiring of his charioteer, he came to know that old age, illness and death are the common lot of all beings. Going out on the next day he came across a wandering ascetic who told him that he was in quest of deliverance both for himself and for all creatures. These four visions caused a turning point in the life of the prince. He left his home, donned the ascetic's robe, and began his career of spiritual quest. He was twenty-nine then. For the next six years he followed the way of self-torture and starvation, but found no answer to his quest. Then he realized that just as self-indulgence was no good, self-torture also was of no use. Recalling to his mind an early experience

of his gained through mystic meditation, he adopted that mode of discipline and persisted in it. Sitting beneath a sacred fig tree, later known as the *Bodhi* or *Bo*-tree in a village, afterwards called Buddha Gayā, he took a final resolve not to rise from there, even though his body might perish, without receiving enlightenment. The *Lalitavistara*, which relates the story of the Buddha's life, expresses the resolve thus: "Here on this seat let my body dry up—let the skin, bones, and flesh get dissolved. Without obtaining the enlightenment which is difficult of acquisition even after aeons of endeavour, this body of mine will not move from this seat."²

There were formidable obstacles in the way. Māra, the Evil One, threw up temptations before Siddhārtha and sought to deflect him from his purpose. But Siddhārtha was invincible. He continued his meditations, and passed through the different stages of contemplation culminating in the final Awakening, whereupon he became a Buddha. The solution to the problem of suffering dawned on him, and in the last watch of the full-moon night in the month of *Vaisākha*, as he himself declares, Ignorance was destroyed, knowledge had arisen, as I sat there, earnest, strenuous, resolute.³ Having become the fully Awakened, Buddha, he started on his ministry. He delivered his first sermon in the Deer-park near Vārānasi. The old companions of his ascetic days were the first converts. He travelled far and wide teaching by precept and example the doctrine of enlightenment. People joined him in great numbers, and the Buddhist Order of Society was ushered into existence. Having completed his life's mission, he passed away at

the age of eighty (c 483 B C) in a village near the township of Kusinagara. Shortly before his death, the Buddha spoke these words to his principal disciple, Ānanda. It may be, Ānanda that in some of you this thought may arise 'The words of our Teacher are ended we have lost our Master. But it is not thus. The truths and the Rules of the Order, which I have taught and preached, let these be your teacher, when I am gone.

The Buddha was a perfect master, and had no use for flattery, even of the harmless type. Addressing him, Sāriputta, one of his disciples, once said. 'Master such faith have I in you that I think there never has been, and never will be, nor is there now, any other who is greater and wiser than you.' The Master tackled the disciple in a gentle way, and made him realize what an unthinking statement he had made. 'Did Sāriputta know all the past and the future wise ones? Did he know at least the Buddha thoroughly? Then why should he utter words so grand and bold? The Buddha also warned his disciples against getting upset or angry with those who reviled their Master, his Religion, or the Order. Gentleness and love of Peace can go to no greater extent than this. The Buddha's compassion and solicitude for the people was so universal and unrestricted that he kept back nothing from them. He did not make any distinction between the exoteric and the esoteric in doctrine. Speaking to Ānanda, he said: 'In respect of the truths, the Tathāgata (i.e. the Buddha) has no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher who keeps something back.

3. THE DHAMMA

The Dharma—Dhamma in Pāli—that the Buddha taught was not meant for a particular group or class. It was designed as the gospel for the entire mankind. 'The Dhamma is for all,' declared the Buddha, and addressing the householders he added, 'For you there is especially the rule of doing to others what you would have others do to you, and refraining from doing to others what you would not have others do to you.' The Master exhorted his followers to be devoted to the Dhamma even more than to his person, 'It is enough to see Dhamma. He who has seen the Dhamma, has seen me. This body of mine is like all else—for ever falling into decay.'

The quintessence of the Buddha's teaching about Dhamma is to be found in the very first sermon he gave in the Deer-park. The sermon itself bears the significant title *Dharma-cakra-pravartana-sūtra*, 'the discourse which set in motion the Wheel of Dharma. After remarking that spiritual aspirants should avoid the two extremes of self-gratification and self-mortification and adopt the middle path, the Buddha expounds the four noble truths and the noble eightfold path. The four noble truths relate to sorrow, the cause of sorrow, the removal of sorrow, and the way to the removal of sorrow (*dukkha, dukkha-samudaya, dukkha-nirodha, dukkha-nirodha-mārga*).

4 THE SANGHA

The Buddhist Order of monks, the *Sangha*, was founded by the Buddha himself. The nucleus of the

Order was formed in the Deer-park when the Buddha preached his first sermon. In the course of three months the number of disciples grew from five to sixty, including the beloved Ānanda. One day, the Buddha told them 'Go now and wander for the gain of many, for the welfare of many, out of compassion for the world, for the good, for the gain and for the welfare of gods and men. Let not two of you go the same way. Preach the Dhamma which is glorious in the beginning, glorious in the middle and glorious in the end in the spirit and in the letter—proclaim a consummate, perfect and pure life of holiness.' One of his earliest visits was to his home-town, Kapilavastu, where his own father, wife, and son joined the Order. On a later occasion many of his kinsmen became his followers. At Rājagṛha, King Bimbisāra donated a Grove which became the first property of the Order. Pouring water from a gold vessel over the Master's hand, the King said: 'I give up the Bamboo Grove, Veluvana pleasure gardens, near the north gate of the city, to the Blessed Buddha and the Fraternity. May it be accepted.' The King himself later became a monk. The Buddha threw open the doors of the Order to all—without any distinctions of class or caste. These are his words: 'Just as, O monks, the great rivers such as the Ganges, the Yamunā, Aciravatī, Sarabhū and Māhī when they fall into the ocean lose their former names and clans and are known as the ocean, even so do the four castes of Ksatriyas, Brāhmins, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras, when they have gone forth in the *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* taught by the Tathāgata from a home to a homeless life, lose their former

names and clans (*namagotta*) and are known as ascetics.' At first the rules of admission into the Order were very simple. It was to a life of wanting little and taking nothing not given that people were invited. But as the numbers increased detailed regulations had to be laid down and a list of prescriptions and prohibitions had to be drawn up. The Master was sad when such rules were made for the making of rules does not mean the making of people who are pure and virtuous. But the Buddha had to take the world as he found it and mould it to better purpose. The *Sangha* was meant to serve as an ideal community of monks who would serve as exemplars of the holy life. It was a vast fraternity intended to embrace all monks of the four quarters of the world, from the Buddha himself and the perfected Arhat, to every monk of the lowest degree. If the Buddha is the source of the *Dhamma*, the *Sangha* is the custodian thereof. It is not difficult, therefore, to appreciate the significance of the three-refuge formula.

'I go for refuge to the Buddha,
Buddham śaranam gacchāmi;

I go for refuge to the Law;
Dharmam śaranam gacchāmi;

I go for refuge to the Order;
Sangham śaranam gacchāmi.'

5 THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS

Reference has been made to the four noble truths that dawned on the Buddha as he was seated beneath

the *Bodhi*-tree. The four noble truths (*ārya satya*) are (1) sorrow, (2) the cause of sorrow, (3) the removal of sorrow, and (4) the way to the removal of sorrow

In his first Sermon,¹ the Buddha sets forth these truths, since they constitute the kernel of his teaching.

(1) *Sorrow (dukkha).*

This is the noble truth regarding sorrow : birth is sorrowful, old age is sorrowful, disease and death are sorrowful, grief, lamentation, depression, despair—these are sorrowful, association with the unpleasant is sorrowful, separation from the pleasant is sorrowful, not obtaining what one desires is sorrowful. In fact, every constitutive part of our being is subject to sorrow.'

Here, it is to be noted that under the category 'sorrow' are to be included not only the painful experiences but also the pleasant ones. It does not require wisdom to recognize that some things are painful and others pleasant. What the Buddha discovered was that *all is sorrow*, the entire course of empirical existence consisting of changing states and repeated births and deaths. This only means that everything connected with existence in the body-mind complex is phenomenal, and cannot be of the nature of the highest value. All phenomena—pleasure, pain, sensations which belong to the senses, ideas, concepts which belong to the intellect, tendencies, impulses, volitions which belong to the will—are impermanent, fleeting, and of the nature of sorrow.

The following dialogue between the Buddha and the *bhikkhus* (monks) is illustrative of what the first noble truth teaches :

“What think you, *bhikkus* is the body static or subject to growth, decay, and death ?”

—“Subject to growth, decay, and death, Lord ”

“But is that which is subject to growth, decay, and death painful or pleasant ?”

—“Painful, Lord.”

“Is it fit to consider what is subject to growth, decay, and death, what is painful and impermanent, as ‘Mine’, ‘I’, ‘Myself’ ?”

—“Certainly not, Lord.”⁵

What is true of the body is true of every other factor constituting empirical being.

In the *Dhammapada*, there occur, among others, the following statements of the Buddha:

“Painful is repeated birth.”

“There is no sorrow equal to this physical existence.”

“All created things are sorrowful.”⁶

(2) *The Cause of Sorrow (dukkha-samudaya)*.

“This is the noble truth regarding the cause of sorrow : it is ignorant craving that leads to rebirth, and is associated with desire-attachment, lusting for pleasure everywhere, the craving for happiness in this life and in a hereafter.”

The diagnosis of sorrow is what the Buddha makes

here If the cause of sorrow is discovered, then its cure becomes possible The cause of sorrow is craving (*tanhā*; *trṣṇā*, in Sanskrit), which in turn is traceable to ignorance (*aviṃjā*, *avidyā* in Sanskrit).

A young disciple, Ajita, asked the Buddha: "By what is the world enveloped? Why does it not shine forth brightly? What, would you say, spoils it? What is its greatest detraction?"

The Buddha replied: "The world is enveloped in ignorance, it does not shine on account of greed; desire spoils it, and its greatest detraction is sorrow."

Ignorance is the first of twelve links which together constitute a segment in the wheel of empirical revolving. The twelve links are (1) ignorance (*avidyā*), (2) predisposition (*saṃskāra*), (3) consciousness (*viññāna*), (4) name and form (*nāma-rūpa*), (5) the six fields, viz., the five sense organs and the mind with their objects (*saḍāyatana*), (6) sense-object contact (*sparsa*), (7) sensation (*vedanā*), (8) craving or desire (*trṣṇā*), (9) clinging or attachment to existence (*upādāna*), (10) coming-to-be (*bhava*), (11) birth (*jāti*), and (12) old age and death (*jarā-maraṇa*).

In this segment of twelve links there is retrospective as well as prospective reference, besides reference to the present span of life. The eight links from 3 to 10 cover the present life—the formation of the psychical and physical factors constituting individuality, the passions and volitions, etc., which confirm it, craving and clinging which bind it. The first two links refer to the previous life rooted in ignorance and inclination to perpetuate the limited individuation. And, the last

two links refer to the future rebirth and the repetition of the chain ending with old age and death to be followed again by another round

The doctrine of the twelve links is known as *pratītyasamutpāda* (*paṭiccasamūppāda*, in Pāli), which is central to the philosophy of the Buddha. This means that each antecedent factor is followed by each succeeding one, and together they form the soul's chain of bondage. "From ignorance spring the predispositions, from the predispositions springs consciousness, from consciousness spring name and form, from name and form spring the six fields, from the six fields springs contact, from contact springs sensation, from sensation springs craving, from craving springs attachment, from attachment springs becoming, from becoming springs birth, from birth springs old age and death"³

The root-factor that accounts for sorrow, thus, is ignorance. It must be noted that ignorance, here, means non-awareness of the four noble truths.

(3) *The Removal of Sorrow (dukkha-nirodha)*

"This is the noble truth regarding the ending of sorrow; it is the putting an end to ignorant craving, giving up that desire-attachment, abandoning that pleasure-seeking and craving for life."

The third truth is that when we give up our cravings and desires, there will be an end to sorrow. It is because of our ignorance that we crave and suffer. We are ignorant of the Truth that there is no persisting self, that nothing is permanent, that all is sorrow. When

this ignorance is removed, *nirvāna* is gained—*nirvāna* which is described as the Great Peace and Deathlessness

(4) *The Way to the Removal of Sorrow*, (*dukkha-nirodha-mārga*)

This is the noble truth regarding the path that leads to the ending of sorrow it is the noble eightfold path, namely right views, right mindedness, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right concentration."

The way to liberation is the reverse process of that which has led to bondage and sorrow. The eightfold path reverses the momentum, and, by affording an all-round training, culminates in the freeing of, or rather in freedom from individuality

6 THE EIGHTFOLD PATH

Of the paths, declares the *Dhammapada*, the eightfold is the best " It is the best because it avoids the extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification. In his first sermon, the Buddha said 'There are two extremes, O monks, from which he who leads a religious life must abstain. What are those two extremes? One is a life of pleasure, devoted to desire and enjoyment that is base, ignoble, unspiritual, unworthy, unreal. The other is a life of mortification it is gloomy, unworthy, unreal. The perfect one, O monks is removed from both these extremes and has discovered the way which lies between them, the middle way which enlightens the eyes, enlightens the mind, which leads to rest, to knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa

The eight disciplines constituting the path are not successive steps, they are to be cultivated together. When thus pursued they interact, strengthen one another, and make for total transformation and sublimation of the faculties of the individual. When this is accomplished, there is victory, cessation of sorrow, illumination, deliverance.

The eightfold path, as already mentioned, consists of the following disciplines

(i) *Right Views (sammā ditthi)*

This is the discipline which enables one to see empirical existence in its true nature as being sorrowful, impermanent, and unsubstantial. Right views reveal the four noble truths.

(ii) *Right Mindedness (sammā sankappa)*

This refers to the right motivation. Removing all prejudices and evil intentions from one's thoughts, one must cultivate a friendly attitude towards all sentient beings. One should cultivate benevolent thoughts, thoughts of compassion, thoughts of joyous sympathy, thoughts of equanimity.

(iii) *Right Speech (sammā vācā).*

Right speech is kind and truthful speech. Right speech is less speech. "Better than a thousand utterances composed of meaningless words is one sensible word on hearing which one becomes peaceful."¹¹ "Let one be watchful of speech irritation. Let him practise

restraint of speech. Having abandoned the sins of speech let him practise virtue with his speech."¹²

(iv) *Right Action (sammā-kammanta).*

Evil deeds that bear bitter fruits should be avoided. Right deeds are those which are well done, which, having been done, do not bring remorse, and do not result in sorrow. When good conduct supersedes evil conduct, it lights up this world even as the moon does when freed from a cloud. With his body, one should practise restraint, virtue, he should commit no wrong. He should eschew vain and violent actions. He should perform deeds with skill and sympathy.

(v) *Right Livelihood (sammā ājīva).*

The means of living that one adopts should be such that in pursuing it one is not compelled to transgress the laws of morality. One should avoid such cruel means of living as that of being a butcher or a huntsman.

(vi) *Right Endeavour (sammā vāyāma)*

This is effort of the right sort which is calculated to stifle all wicked tendencies and thereby augment the good ones. According to the Buddha, self-effort is an utmost necessity: there is no use looking up to the skies: *nirvāna* will not fall from the heavens. Through right effort the passions should be controlled, and the undesirable ideas that haunt the mind should be expelled. Without right effort one cannot gain enlightenment.

(vii) *Right Mindfulness* (*sammā sati*)

This literally means good memory (*smṛti*)—not merely the faculty of remembering the past, but also of being alert in mind, being watchful and in complete self-possession. It is through right mindfulness that one can control one's acts, feelings, and thoughts.

"Those whose mindfulness is always alert to the nature of the body," says the *Dhammapada*, "who do not aim at what ought not to be done, who steadfastly do what ought to be done—the impurities of these mindful and wise ones come to an end."¹³

(viii) *Right Concentration* (*sammā samādhi*).

This is practice of meditation resulting in the final wisdom. This is mental culture which "is not so much a suppression of the senses as a cultivation of them to see truth"¹⁴. When an aspirant told the Buddha in response to a question, that his teacher had instructed him that the training of the senses meant rendering them functionless, the Buddha rejoined saying that this would mean that those who are blind or deaf are the ones with their senses best cultivated. Sense-culture should enable one to become discerning and sharp so that one may not be carried away in the storm of sense-pleasures. This should lead one to the development of the power of concentration. Meditation is the way to realizing tranquillity or *samādhi*. Several stages in the meditative practice are distinguished—all culminating in equanimity and enlightenment.

The eight constituents of the path may be grouped under three heads: conduct (*śīla*), concentration (*sam-*

ādhī), and wisdom (*paññā*) *śīla* means righteous conduct including virtues such as non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, and non-possession. Right speech, action, and livelihood are comprised in *śīla*. *Samādhi* is meditation which covers also besides right concentration, endeavour and mindfulness. *Paññā* consists of the other two disciplines: right views and right mindedness.

If one follows the path with diligence and persistence, one would reach the goal here and now. Replying to a question put to him by Kappa, a young disciple, the Buddha said "For those caught in the stream, struggling in the whirlpools of life, faced with atrophy and death, there is an island heaven, Kappa. I shall tell you of such an isle, where all perils disappear.

"We call that isle *Nibbāna*. In that island there is no atrophy, no death there nothing becomes, and death and life are stilled

"Realizing this you reach *Nibbāna* here and now"¹⁵

And again. "A here and now peace this, no mere legend. Simply by grasping it, faring mindfully, one reaches the Farther Shore."¹⁶

7 NO METAPHYSICS

The Buddha was not in favour of speculative metaphysics. His teachings were untheoretical, practical. In order to impress on his followers that concern with metaphysical questions does not lead to enlightenment, the Buddha related the parable of the poisoned arrow. Suppose a man was pierced by an arrow that was thickly smeared with poison, and his friends took

him to a physician. If he should say, 'I will not have the arrow drawn out until I know the details about the person who shot the arrow, his caste, name, height, etc., he will only perish, and not be saved. Even as this man's attitude and behaviour were foolish, so are the speculations of the metaphysician.

Is the world finite or infinite? Does the ego exist or not exist? Does the saint live after death or not? Is there a God, or is there not one? When such questions were put to him, the Buddha kept silent. The reason for his silence is that, according to him, the knowledge of these things does not conduce to progress in holiness, does not contribute to peace and enlightenment. 'Whatever has not been revealed by me', declared the Buddha to one Mālukiya-putta, 'let that remain unrevealed, and what has been revealed, let it be revealed.'

There is no explicit metaphysics in what the Buddha taught. But there are certain metaphysical doctrines implicit in his teaching. We shall refer to two of them.

8 THE DOCTRINE OF NO-SOUL (*anātma-vāda*)

By an analysis of the so-called individual or substance, the Buddha finds that there is no individual and no substance, apart from a cluster of factors in each case. What is called 'soul' or 'thing' is a mere name—a name for a complex of constituents. The concept of a soul as the substrate of the changing states of consciousness, or of a thing as the bearer of attributes is a myth. 'There is no unity holding together the states or the attributes.

A dialogue in a book called the 'Questions of Milinda' makes this clear. The Buddhist teacher Nāgasena instructs the Yavana king Milinda (the Greek king Menander—c 100 B C)

King Milinda asks the sage Nāgasena 'How are you known, venerable Sir, What is your name'.

The sage replies: I am named Nāgasena, O great king, but Nāgasena is only a name, an appellation, a designation, an epithet, a mere word, here there is no subject."

For, what is Nāgasena? The hair, nails, teeth, bodily form, sensations, perceptions, etc. Apart from these, where is Nāgasena?

The sage, then, illustrates by citing the parable of the chariot. He asks the king "Have you come on foot or on a chariot?"

The king: "I do not travel on foot, Sir, I have come on a chariot."

"If you have come on a chariot, then define a chariot. Is the pole the chariot? Are the wheels the chariot? Is the body or the yoke the chariot?"

The king admits saying 'No'. Then, the sage draws the moral: "Wherever I look, then, O great king, I nowhere find the chariot. A mere word, O king, is the chariot."¹⁷

What is called individuality is really a cluster of five factors (*skandha* or aggregate)—*rūpa*, the physical form consisting of the four material elements, *viññāna*, consciousness, *vedanā*, feeling, *samjñā*, perception, and *samskāra*, mental dispositions. Apart from a matrix of these, there is no personality or soul. There is no con-

scious being, there is only consciousness. There is no one who feels, there is but feeling. Similarly, there are perceptions and dispositions: there is no individual perceiving or having dispositions.

“For there is suffering, but none who suffers,
Doing exists although there is no doer,
Extinction is but no extinguished person,
Although there is a path, there is no goer.”¹³

Thus, there is no soul. To believe that there is is a tragic delusion, a fabrication. In the *Samyutta Nikāya* (iii, 127), it is said: “Five groups of existence forming the objects of attachment have been taught by the Blessed One: corporeality, feeling, perception, mental disposition, consciousness. With regard to these five groups, I do not find any ego (*attā*), or something ‘belong to an ego’ (*attanīya*). I am no longer subject to the thoughts of ‘I am’ or ‘This I am’”.

Just as there is no soul, there is no ‘thing’ too. A thing is nothing but an aggregate of sense-data. Apart from orange colour, sweet taste, etc., there is no orange. Substantiality is a fiction. What we refer to as ‘things’ are aggregates of phenomena hanging together.

If there is no abiding soul, how could there be *karma* (action) and transmigration, it may be asked. The answer is that it is not a person that acts and transmigrates, but a process. What we call A is really A series A_1, A_2, A_3 , etc. There is no *unity* of A, there is only *continuity* of the A series. In fact, what we refer to

as one person is not the same at two consecutive moments "Strictly speaking," says the *Visuddhi-magga* (viii), 'the duration of the life of a living being is exceedingly brief, lasting only while a thought lasts. Just as a chariot wheel in rolling rolls only at one point of the tyre, and in resting rests only at one point, in exactly the same way, the life of a living being lasts only for the period of one thought. As soon as that thought has ceased the being is said to have ceased. As it has been said

'The being of the past moment of thought has lived, but does not live, nor will it live.'

'The being of a future moment of thought will live, but has not lived, nor does it live.'

'The being of the present moment of thought does live, but has not lived, nor will it live.'¹⁹

This takes us on to the doctrine of momentariness.

9 THE DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS (*kṣanika-vāda*).

Nothing continues the same even for two consecutive moments. All things constantly change. The similes that are usually given are those of the flowing river and the living flame. One cannot step into the same river twice when there is the second step, there is not the same river. At no two moments is there the same flame. In both these cases, similarity is mistaken for identity. Neither being nor non-being is real, what is real is becoming. There is change, there is no changing thing. "This world, O Kaccāna," says the *Samyutta Nikāya*, "generally proceeds on a duality, on the 'it is' and the 'it is not'." But, O Kaccāna, whoever

perceives the truth and wisdom how things originate in the world, in his eyes there is no 'it is not' in this world. Whoever, Kaccāna, perceives, in truth and wisdom, how things pass away in this world, in his eyes there is no 'it is' in this world. 'Everything is', this is the one extreme. O Kaccāna 'Everything is not', this is the other extreme. The Perfect One, O Kaccāna, remaining far from both these extremes, proclaims the truth in the middle."²⁰

Aggregation and momentariness constitute sorrow. The escape from sorrow is *nirvāna*, in the sense either of 'blowing out' or 'becoming cool'. Whether any positive principle remains or not in *nirvāna* the Buddha did not teach. He was interested only in outlining the way which leads to *nirvāna*.

10. THE CANON

There are no contemporary written records of the Buddha's teachings. The teachings were redacted and fixed in successive Buddhist councils. The first of them, according to Buddhist tradition, is said to have met at Rājagṛha, in 483 B.C., the second at Vaiśālī in 383 B.C., and the third at Pāṭaliputra in c. 250 B.C. Probably it was at the third meeting which is said to have been held under the patronage of king Aśoka that the canonical works were given a shape and were classified. Further refinement and definition of the texts were made still later. The process was not completed until the second century A.D.

The Buddhist Canon consists of three collections of texts referred to collectively as *Tripiṭaka* meaning

'Triple Basket'. The language in which the texts are written is Pāli, a post Asokan literary dialect. The language, according to scholars who have studied the problem, must have come into vogue "by a slow and complex process occupying centuries, and variations of place."²¹

The *Pāli Tripiṭaka* consists of (1) the *Vinaya-piṭaka*, (2) the *Sutta-piṭaka*, and (3) the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka*.

The *Vinaya-piṭaka* contains the rules and regulations governing the life and behaviour of the members of the Buddhist *Sangha*.

The *Sutta-piṭaka* which is the 'Basket of Discourses' contains the earliest recorded version of the Buddha's philosophy of life. It is divided into five sections (*nikāyas*): *Dīgha*, *Majjhima*, *Samyutta*, *Anguttara*, and *Khuddaka*.

The *Abhidhamma-piṭaka*, which is much later than the first two, is a collection of metaphysical expositions, doctrinal statements, discussions about practice, etc.

11. THE SCHISM

Very soon after the Buddha's passing away, there arose among his followers differences of opinion in regard to doctrine as well as practice. Even as early as at the first council which met at Rājagṛha, it is recorded, a monk by name Purāṇa refused to accept the canon as settled by the members of the council, preferring his own recollections of the Buddha's words. By the time the second council was convened at Vaiśālī, there were as many as eighteen different Buddhist sects. A century later, the council of Pātaliputra which, it is said, was

sponsored by king Aśoka, had as its aim the uprooting and destruction of all false doctrine.' Already the Buddhist society seems to have fallen a prey to schisms

Kaniska, the greatest of the Scythian monarchs who adopted Buddhism, is believed to have called a council at Jalandhara. It was about this time that the great divide of Buddhism into *Mahāyāna* and *Hīnayāna* took place

The term *Hīnayāna* is not to be found in the early Hīnayāna texts. The doctrine is called *Sthavira-vāda* (*Theravāda*, in Pāli). The Sthaviras, the elders, were conservatives claiming to follow the original Buddhism as preached by the Master himself. They excommunicated the liberal and advanced Buddhists known as the Mahāsaṅghikas. The Mahāsaṅghikas grew in number and influence. They styled themselves as the followers of *Mahāyāna*, the great vehicle, and called the Sthaviras the adherents of *Hīnayāna*, the little vehicle.

The following are some of the differences between the two schools:

The Hīnayāna considers the Buddha to be a historical figure, who showed the way to *Nirvāṇa* by renouncing the world, pursuing the path by discovering it, and gaining the ultimate end. Each seeker has to follow the example of the Buddha and gain perfection through personal effort. It is the sayings of the Buddha that are more important than his personality.

For Mahāyāna, the Buddha-essence is cosmic and eternal. The Absolute which is the Buddha-hood is in everything, is everything. "The one principle of the cosmos is present everywhere, and in this way everything

harmonizes with everything else. Each particle of dust contains in itself all the Buddha-fields and the whole extent of the Dharma-element, every single thought refers to all that was, is and will be; and the eternal mysterious Dharma can be beheld everywhere, because it is equally reflected in all parts of this universe.”²²

‘If the Element of the Buddha did not exist
(in everyone)

There would be no disgust with suffering,
Nor could there be a wish for Nirvāṇa,
Nor striving for it, nor a resolve to win it’.
‘Just as space, essentially indiscriminate,
reaches everywhere,

Just so the immaculate Element which in its
essential nature is thought is present in all.’²³

The Hīnyāna sets before itself the ideal of individual deliverance (Arhatship). Each person has to achieve his own Nirvāṇa.

To his faithful disciple who was persistent in asking questions about eschatology, the Buddha presented what he called the Mirror of Truth.

“What, then, Ānanda, is this Mirror of Truth? It is the consciousness that the disciple of the *Arhants* is in the world possessed of faith in the Buddha.

“Is possessed of faith in the Truth—believing the Truth to have been proclaimed by the Exalted One, and to be attained to by the wise, *each one for himself*.

“Is possessed of faith in the Order—believing the multitude of the disciples of the Exalted One . . . to be the supreme sowing-ground of merit for the world.”²⁴

For the Mahāyāna, the ideal is the *Bodhisattva*, who has deferred his final liberation for the sake of others. Out of infinite compassion which is coequal with his wisdom, the Bodhisattva postpones his entry into Nirvāṇa and devotes himself entirely to the welfare of others.

The *Nidāna-kathā* says thus: “The gods approached the Future Buddha in the heaven of delight and prayed to Him—O Blessed One, you did not attain the ten perfections from the desire for the glories of Indra or Māra or Bahmā or of a mighty emperor, but you fulfilled them for achieving Omniscience so that mankind can be saved. Now has the moment come, O Blessed One, for thy Buddhahood; now has the time O Blessed One, arrived.”²⁵

A hymn composed by Mātrceta addresses the Buddha thus:

“You strive for the world’s sake with mind free from attachments, how wonderful is the blessed Buddha-nature of the Buddhas!”²⁶

NOTES

1 Edwin Arnold, *The Light of Asia* (Trubner & Co., Ludgate Hill, London, 1886), p. x

2 *Lalitavistara*

*‘ihasāne śusyatū me śarīram
tvagasthimāṁsam pralayaṁ ca yātu*

*apṛāpya bodhiṃ bahukalpa-durlabhāṃ
narvāsanāt kāyam etat calisyati.'*

- 3 *Ibid* "Here is suffering and here is the origin of suffering, here is the way which leads to the suppression of suffering All this I have come to know as it is. And this is how the Bodhisattva in the last watch of the night, at dawn, due to his wisdom, having surveyed in one sweep of his thought all that a leader of men can know, understand, reach, see and clearly imagine—became enlightened by the supreme and complete Enlightenment."
- 4 See *Saṃyutta Nikāya* V, Sacca-samyutta, 12
5. *Ibid*, III, Khandha-saṃyutta, 59. See G. F. Allen, *The Buddha's Philosophy* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1959), p. 107
- 6 *Dhammapada* is a part of the *Khuddaka Nikāya* of the *Sutta Pitaka*. These statements are to be found in verses 153, 202 and 278 respectively

*dukkhā jāti punappunam
na 'atthi khandhādisā dukkhā
sabbe sankhārā dukkhā*

- 7 *Pārāyana Vagga*, Ajitamānava Pucchā, V, 1 'See G. F. Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 129
- 8 *Mahāvagga*, I, i, 1-5.
- 9 *maggān 'attaṅgiko settho* (273)
- 10 Hermann Oldenberg, *Buddha* (Williams and Norgate, London, 1882), p. 127
- 11 See S. Radhakrishnan, *Dhammapada* (Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 93.
12. *Ibid*, p. 133
- 13 *Dhammapada*, 293.
14. See S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Volume I (George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1962), p. 424.

15. *Pārāyana Vagga*, Kappamāṇava Pucchā, V, 10 See G. F. Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-5.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
17. See for a fuller account Oldenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-257.
18. Buddhaghosa, *The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga)* (Colombo R. Semage, 1956), p. 587
19. H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (Harvard University, 1909), p. 150.
20. See Oldenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
21. A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 25.
22. Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1962), p. 229.
23. Edward Conze (Ed), *Buddhist Texts* (1954), No 169. V. 40 and 49.
24. See C. H. S. Ward, *Buddhism*, Vol. I (The Epworth Press, London, 1947), p. 52.
25. Bombay University Edition, 1953, p. 62.
26. Mātṛceta, *Śatapañcāśatkanāma-buddha-stotra*, vv. 114-115.

Chapter Eight

THE BUDDHIST METAPHYSICAL SCHOOLS

1 THE SCHOOLS

The Buddha had warned against metaphysics. But his followers became divided on grounds of metaphysics. Some of them used metaphysics for showing the ephemeral nature of conditioned being. And some of them employed metaphysics to go beyond metaphysics. The leaders of the schools, in general, did not follow the Buddha's way of refusing to discuss, and his method of silence. The Buddha's silence on matters of metaphysics was itself, probably, responsible for the divergence of metaphysical views among the Buddhists.

The principal Buddhist Schools are four: Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika. The first two belong to Hīnayāna, and the other two to Mahāyāna. Fa Hian (c 400 A D), a Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, says that he found these four schools fully developed at the time of his visit to India. Each of these schools has had a history. The later leaders of thought have introduced changes and innovations. The Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika schools have been described as realistic schools, and the Yogācāra and Mādhyamika as idealistic. But, these expressions should not be understood in their usual sense.

2. THE VAIBHĀSIKA

One of the early schools of Buddhism is known as Sarvāsti-vāda, a view which holds that all (*sarva*) exists

(*asti*) in the past, present, and future. This school consisted of several sub-schools which were for a long time associated with Theravāda (the tradition of the Elders). The followers of Sarvāsti-vāda took as their authority the *Abhidharma* texts. About the time of the fourth council held under the patronage of King Kaniska, commentaries on the *Abhidharma* came to be written. These are called *Vibhāsās*. They were written in Sanskrit. But the originals are now lost; they are available only in Chinese translations. A section of the Sarvāstivādins in Kashmir elected to follow the *Vibhāsās*, therefore, they came to be called Vaibhāsikas. The term 'Vaibhāsika' is also taken to mean that, according to the followers of this school, the language of the other schools is contrary (*viruddhā-bhāsā*) to the original teachings of the Buddha. Dignāga (c 500 A.D.) and Dharmakīrti were the chief exponents of the Vaibhāsika doctrines. They also made important contributions to Buddhist logic. Dignāga's *Pramana-samuccaya* and Dharmakīrti's *Nyāya-bindu* may be mentioned as the most authoritative texts in this field.

The Vaibhāsika standpoint has been characterized as realism, and even as naïve realism, because, according to it, both things and ideas are real, and the mind can directly know objects in perception. But neither things nor ideas are reals, as we commonly understand them. What are real are *dharma*s, the ultimate particulars which are neither substances nor attributes, and the categories of thought are not applicable to them. The *dharma*s are discrete elements which constitute the basics of experience.

The *dharmas* are the ultimate elements of existence which are momentary, and yet real. They are the simplest entities, which by combining give rise to things and beings, such as trees, chairs, animals and men. These latter are aggregates (*skandha*) of *dharmas*, but have no reality apart from that of the constituent elements. By adding the *dharmas* to one another, nothing else is added. There is no matter over and above the discrete sense-data, and no mind or soul over and above the distinct psychical phenomena. It is the ultimate elements that are real, there is no identity running through and connecting them into wholes.

In the *Abhidhārma-kośa* of Vasubandhu, a list of seventy-five *dharmas* are given, seventy-two of which relate to the conditioned order, and the remaining three to the unconditioned. To the conditioned order belong physical phenomena, consciousness, mental states, and factors which are neither physical nor mental, but are common to both. The three unconditioned *dharmas* are: (1) *nirvāṇa*, ultimate cessation reached through the spiritual path; (2) *aprati-sankhyā-nirodha*, cessation brought about by absence of the conditioning factors, as for instance, with the diversion of attention, specific sensations such as taste, smell, etc., cease without being apprehended; and (3) *ākāśa*, space which does not impede, whose essence lies in offering no obstacle.

The Vaibhāṣika holds an atomistic view in regard to the composition of things. All objects are compounds of four elements: earth, water, fire, air. Ether is not recognized as an element. Atoms combine in different configurations and constitute things. The atoms are

irreducible particles. They are distinct, and are incapable of mutual penetration. The primary elements are imperceptible. They can be perceived when they appear in groups. Colour, sound, taste, and touch are not manifest in the primary atoms, they get manifested only in the aggregations. In all things all the substrata of colour, sound, taste, and touch are there, but one or the other of these features is dominant in each thing depending upon its nature.

A distinctive doctrine of the Vaibhāsika is that in perception the mind knows its object directly. The sense organ which is in contact with an object excites consciousness in the mind, thus the mind knows particular colours, sounds, etc. The mind can also know colour as such, sound as such. Even as fire is produced by the friction of two sticks, perception results from the mind's direct contact with the object through the sense-channels. To reduce perception to a form of inference, as the Sautrāntika virtually does, is inconsistent with our experience. And, if perception is not possible, inference which depends on perception will not be possible either. According to both the schools, Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika, however, what is perceived or postulated is the bare particular such as blue referred to as *sva-laksana*, the other elements which are conceptual are added by the mind and are termed *sāmānyalakṣaṇas*, such as blueness, peacockness, etc. What is real is the particular, and not the generality. To the *sva-lakṣaṇa*, it is the mind that adds subjective determinations which are of five types—generality (*jāti*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), name (*nāma*) and substance

(*dharmya*) In other words, *sva-lakṣaṇa* is known by the mind only as cast in these moulds which it itself imposes—as a substance bearing qualities, related to other substances, etc.

The analysis of the conditioned order of existence has no intrinsic value. This is only to help one to realize that phenomenal existence is rooted in sorrow. The conditioned being that is man can be transformed into the unconditioned *Nirvāṇa*, through following the path disclosed by the Buddha, who set an example by achieving the intuitive knowledge of the truth by his own effort, and without the aid of others. The most important lesson to be learnt from the Enlightened One is that one should serve as one's own light.

3 THE SAUTRĀNTIKA

The origin of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism may also, like that of the Vaibhāṣika, be traced to the fourth council held during the reign of King Kaniṣka. The Sautrāntikas did not consider the *Abhidharma* texts to be the most authoritative ones. These texts, according to them, were treatises of human inspiration, and were liable to error. The first place is assigned to *Sūtras* or *Sūtrāntas* which are believed to be the accounts of the original sermons and dialogues of the Buddha. Hence the name 'Sautrāntika' given to this school. The followers of this school are also called 'Dārṣṭāntikas'—a term which probably means 'those who teach through similes.' It is also possible that the Dārṣṭāntikas were a branch of the Sautrāntikas.

According to the Chinese tradition, the first teacher of the Sautrāntika school was Kumāralāta or Kumāralabdha, who was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghoṣa, and Āryadeva. That he branched off from Sarvāstivāda is learnt from his work, *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*. Yuan Chuang, the Chinese pilgrim, refers to another teacher of this school, Śrīlabdha. The logician Dharmottara and Yaśomitrā who wrote a commentary on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa* are, it is held, followers of this school.

Like the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika standpoint is a realism in the sense in which we have indicated. The argument for the existence of extra-mental things may be summarized as follows. An analysis of consciousness shows that there should be objects as apart from it. Consciousness implies consciousness—of, i.e., there is a duality involved in it. To say that consciousness appears as external objects would be absurd, if external objects did not exist. The external world does not appear at our will, nor does it depend on our consciousness. Our experiences of sound, colour, etc., each distinct from the others, could not be accounted for if there were no outer things. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that there is extra-mental reality. The distinction between consciousness and object is that while the former can know itself, the latter cannot.

We said that the Vaibhāṣikas hold that there are seventy-five categories of *dharma*s. The Sautrāntikas reduce the number to forty-three. Several of the factors that the Vaibhāṣikas consider to be *dharma*s are regarded as mental constructs (*vikalpas*) by the Sautrāntikas.

The latter exclude from the categories of *dharma*s, the existence of the past and the future and the non-mental forces that condition existences¹. The so-called factors of the unconditioned order, *Nirvāṇa*, etc., are also, according to the Sautrāntikas, not *dharma*s. The *dharma*s, which are forty-three, are distributed among the five *skandhas* (aggregates) as follows: *rūpa*—four primary and four derivative forms (8), *vedanā*—pleasure, pain, and what is indifferent (3), *saṃjñā*—five sense-organs and mind (6), *viññāṇa*—consciousness corresponding to the six under *saṃjñā* (6); *saṃskāras*—ten good ones and ten bad ones (20). The number of ultimate elements is, thus, reduced considerably in the Sautrāntika system. Many of the types of *sva-lakṣaṇas* (beings-in-themselves) of the Vaibhāsika become *sāmānya-lakṣaṇas* (conceptual constructs) here.

The Vaibhāsikas hold, as we noted, that the mind perceives objects directly. The Sautrāntikas do not accept this view. External objects are to be presumed to exist on the basis of our experience; we have no means of directly apprehending objects. It is a representation of the object in idea that we perceive, not the object itself. Since the object is momentary, it cannot be present at the time it is perceived. In other words, at the time the object is believed to be perceived, it has become a past member in the object-series. But before it vanishes it leaves behind an impression in the mind. It is this impression that is perceived, not the object as such. Thus, the objects are what are inferred (*anumāna*) rather than what are perceived. It is a sort of critical realism that the Sautrāntikas teach.

We may briefly note the Sautrāntika view of *Nirvāna*. That *Nirvāna* is not an ultimate particular (*dharma*) even of the unconditioned order, we have seen. *Dharmas* are what belong to the relational world, *Nirvāna* is what is beyond the empirical process, and therefore cannot be treated on a par with the particulars. Even as space is only the absence of something tangible, *Nirvāna* is the absence of all *dharmas*, such as passions, etc., the non-production of *dharmas* is what is called *Nirvāna*. It is the state of non-existence (*abhāva*) where there is no passion and no possibility of a fresh existence. *Nirvāna* has been described as the disappearance (*vyantibhāva*), decay (*kṣaya*), destruction (*nirodha*), appeasement (*vyupaśama*), detachment (*virāga*), passing away (*astan̄gama*) of sorrow, and as what is non-productive (*apratīsandhi*) of sorrow. Hence, it is clear that *Nirvāna* is sheer non-existence (*abhāva-mātra*). It is likened unto the blowing out of a flame—a complete ceasing to be. How can the passing away (*atyaya*) of a flame be an entity? Similarly, deliverance from sorrow cannot be a *dharma*. *Nirvāna* is the mere non-existence of the five *skandhas*; to ascribe existence to it is meaningless.

4. THE YOGĀCĀRA

Maitreyanātha (270-350 A.D.) is credited with having founded the Yogācāra school. Its early exponents were two brothers, Asanga and Vasubandhu (fourth century A.D.). Vasubandhu was first a follower of the Vāibhāṣika, and subsequently was converted by his bro-

ther to the Yogācāra mode of thinking. The important books belonging to this school are: Two Sūtras, the *Sandhinimocana* and the *Lankāvatāra*, two short works of Vasubandhu, the *Viṃśatikā* (Twenty Verses) with his own commentary, and the *Triṃśikā* (Thirty Verses) with the commentary of Sthiramati (fifth century A.D.), Asanga's *Mahāyāna-saṅgraha*, and two works attributed to Maitreya-nātha, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* and the *Madhyāntavibhāga*.

The name 'Yogācāra' means 'practice of Yoga': this indicates the emphasis placed on Yoga-practice, i.e. meditative exercises, in this system. Its other name 'Vijñānavāda' refers to its metaphysical position which is that consciousness alone is real, and not the external objects

That there is no extra-mental reality is the central thesis of the Yogācāra philosophy. If, as the Sautrāntika claims, the object cannot be directly known, why should we postulate its existence, asks the Yogācāra. Nothing becomes unintelligible if we do not presume the existence of external things. What the mind knows is its own idea, and not the object, the mind does not know the relation between the idea and the so-called object, and so it cannot know even if the idea is a copy or representation of the object. And so, why should we unnecessarily believe that the object exists outside? The mind creates its own objects; it has not to encounter them. From the past residual impressions, ideas are produced by the mind which are called its objects. So, the only realities are the mental facts or consciousness-series. What is real is *vijñāna-mātra*, mere thought.

The distinctions of knower, known, and knowledge are within thought or consciousness itself. In truth, there is no duality of mind and matter (*dvaya-śūnyatā*). The mind alone posits things as if external. Externality is a fiction, an illusion.

It will be noted that as against the Cārvāka doctrine that 'Matter is all', the Yogācāra maintains that 'Consciousness is all'. The arguments advanced by the latter for his mentalist position are as follows. (i) There is no means of knowing any correspondence between idea and its so-called object, for we know only the idea. Moreover, what correspondence there could be between the form of knowledge which is usually of tables, chairs, etc., and the atoms which constitute what is called 'object'. To postulate an unknown object as the counterpart of our idea is neither logical nor in conformity with experience. (ii) It is not as if the mind cannot create its own object. Reflection on what happens in dream will dispel any doubt in regard to this. In dream, the mind itself appears as the subject and the object, as experient, experiencing, and experienced world. There are no objects corresponding to the dream contents. The elephant, etc., seen in dream are all nothing but ideas. (iii) It is a common tenet of the Buddhists that cognition can cognize itself. In the case of self-cognizing cognition, what knows and what is known are identical. There is nothing unintelligible if we are to believe that this is the case in all cognitions. (iv) There is an invariable relation between cognition and its content. A thing is never given apart from its knowledge. Blue and cognition of blue appear together

invariably. This being so, we may well conclude that they are not distinct, that they are but different phases of one and the same process. (v) One and the same object appears differently to different persons, and to one and the same person at different times. This only shows the essential subjectivity of our experience. It is one of those perverted views which makes us believe in the reality of external objects.

From the denial of objects, it may be thought that it is an easy step to dismiss consciousness too, as is done by the Mādhyamikas. The teachers of the Yogācāra school are against this move. While the subject-object dualism is untrue, they contend, consciousness as such is not unreal. Everything else can be argued away, but not consciousness. Śūnyatā, voidness, really means 'pure consciousness' which is void of any object or content. The world of objects is illusory, it is true; but illusion must have a ground, and that is *viññāna*, consciousness.

It is not out of a mere doctrinaire interest that the Yogācāra argues against the existence of objects, and for the sole reality of consciousness. In the meditative exercises the first step is that where the unreality of external objects is realized. And, as one progresses in meditation one comes to see that even the subject is not real. The subject-object duality is an infection introduced into pure consciousness by ignorance (*avidyā*). In the transcendent consciousness, there is neither object nor subject. "First the Yogin breaks down the external object, and then also the thought which seizes upon it. Since the object does not exist,

so also the consciousness which grasps it; in the absence of a cognizable object there can also be no cognizer.”² Thus, it is not empirical thought that is real for the *Yogācāra* but pure thought (*prajñapti-mātra*).

The term *Ālaya-vijñāna* is used in the *Yogācāra* school to indicate the abiding or store-consciousness. Only there is some ambiguity about this term. Does it mean merely the consciousness which is the carrier of all latent potencies (*vāsanās*), good and bad, and the receptacle for all accumulating tendencies? Or, does it signify the transcendent and eternal reality which is the Absolute Consciousness? Is consciousness “unstable like a river, a seed, a lamp, wind, a cloud. . . subject to destruction from moment to moment?” Or, is it to be conceived as the one reality transcending all distinctions? Is it an individual consciousness? Or, is it the universal and undifferentiated Absolute? Probably, the answer will depend upon the standpoint from which *Ālaya-vijñāna* is contemplated. In a commentary on one of the works of Vasubandhu, there is the following observation: “A river appears to man as a mass of running water; to the infernal creatures doomed to suffer the torments of hell it appears as a stream of red-hot molten metal; while to the gods among celestial delights, looking down from above, it appears as a necklace of pearls on the breast of the Goddess Earth.”⁴ In itself, Consciousness is pure and non-dual; but on account of the seeds of phenomenality, it becomes overlaid with duality and defilement. So, the expression *Ālaya-vijñāna* is used sometimes to refer to the continually changing stream of consciousness, and at other time to the absolute Being.

In the former sense *ā-laya* may be interpreted as that which lasts till the empirical process (*saṃsāra*) is resolved in *Nirvāṇa*.⁵ In the latter sense, *Ālaya* would mean the basic or fundamental reality.

There are three levels from which we may analyse experience. At the first level, what is imagined (*parikalpita*) appears as real. At the second, the empirical phenomena are recognized to be relative and interdependent (*paratantra*). At the third, pure consciousness is realized to be the absolute (*pariniṣpanna*) reality. Radhakrishnan explains these three levels thus: "It is open to look upon *parikalpita-satya* as positive error, as when we mistake a rope for a snake, *paratantrasatya* as relative knowledge, as when we recognize a rope as a rope, and *pariniṣpannasatya* as metaphysical insight, as when we recognize that rope is a mere concept and has no being as a thing in itself."⁶

The *pariniṣpanna* or the absolute reality is also called *Tathatā*, 'suchness' or 'thatness.' Of this, Vasubandhu declares, "This is the transcendental truth of everything, and is termed *tathatā*, because its essential nature is real and eternal. Its nature is beyond the reach of language. It is indefinable."⁷ The *pariniṣpanna* is the highest truth (*paramārtha*). Like space, it is homogeneous; it has one taste, *ekarasa*. It is the true nature of things (*dharmatā*).

The realization of this truth is *Nirvāṇa*. The mind then ceases to be mind; the subject-object duality is removed completely. The removal of all imaginary cognitions of the mind is called *Nirvāṇa*, says the *Laṅkāvatāra*.⁸ It is "the realm of attaining to the inner

self by means of noble knowledge, free from the false notions of permanency and annihilation, existence and non-existence.”⁹ On the strength of constant meditative practices, all residual impressions are removed and knowledge is purged of the illusory object-forms. Thus there arises the pure consciousness. This is the great dawn (*mahodaya*), emancipation, *Nirvāṇa*.¹⁰

5 THE MĀDHYAMIKA

The Mādhyamika school owes its foundation to Nāgārjuna (c 150 A.D.). Both he and his pupil Āryadeva hailed from the South. Of the many works of Nāgārjuna, the most important ones are the *Mūla-madhyamika-kārikā*, *Vigraha-vyāvartanī*, and the *Ratnāvalī*. Probably, a collection of Mahāyāna-sūtras called *Sūtra-samuccaya* was a work of Nāgārjuna’s. An extensive commentary on the *Prajñā-pāramitā* is also attributed to him. Āryadeva’s principal work is the *Catuḥśataka* (Four-hundred Verses), which is preserved in Tibetan translation. The Mādhyamika school, subsequently, branched off into two sub-schools—the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika, the first emphasizing the negative dialectic of Nāgārjuna and the second stressing the positive implication of Nāgārjuna’s teaching. Buddhapālita is associated with the Prāsaṅgika branch, and Bhāvaviveka with the Svātantrika branch. These two teachers expounded their respective standpoints in their commentaries on the *Mādhyamika-śāstra*, which are lost in the original but are extant in Tibetan. Candrakīrti (early seventh century) and Śāntideva (691-743 A.D.) follow the Prāsaṅgika school and confirm it in their

works. Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (The Clear-Worded) is a commentary on the *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, he wrote also a commentary on Ārya-deva's *Catuh-śataka*. Śāntideva's two works, the *Śikṣā-samuccaya* and the *Buddhacaryāvatāra*, deal mainly with spiritual discipline and are very popular manuals. The last phase in the development of the Buddhist thought was reached when a syncretism of the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra was sought to be achieved. The leaders of this phase were Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla. The *Tattva-saṅgraha* and the *Mādhyamikālaṅkāra-kārikā* with a *Vṛtti* thereon were the works of Śāntaraksita; Kamalaśīla wrote a commentary, the *Pañjikā*, on the latter work.

The name *Mādhyamika* is derived from the Middle Way (*madhyamā pratipad*) which the Buddha taught. He avoided the extreme doctrines of Being and Non-being, and the extreme practices of self-indulgence and self-mortification. Nāgārjuna rejected the alternative standpoints of 'is' and 'is not', and their conjunction as well as disjunction. Hence, the name *Mādhyamika* for his philosophy. It is also known as 'Sūnya-vāda', because Śūnyatā (Voidness), according to it, is the ultimate reality.

The starting point of Nāgārjuna's thought seems to be the Buddha's silence over metaphysical questions. Speculation was forbidden by the Master. Through dialectic, Nāgārjuna shows that every possible speculative standpoint (*drsti*) is guilty of self-contradiction and so has to be rejected as meaningless. The two basic predications about reality are 'is' and 'is not'. The two other possibilities are 'both is and is not', and neither

is nor is not.' These are the four terms (*catuskoṭi*) which the dialectic is designed to dismiss. The four metaphysical views are: (1) affirmation of Being, (2) negation of Being, i.e. Non-being, (3) affirmation of both Being and Non-being; (4) negation of both, i.e. neither Being nor Non-being. None of these four views which reason formulates is tenable. Reality cannot be caught in the trap of reason. This the dialectic seeks to demonstrate by an analysis of the views. The analysis consists in exposing the inner self-contradiction of each view, and thus showing up its absurdity. The method of analysis is known as *prasanga* which is *reductio ad absurdum*. The Mādhyamika applies this method not from any particular standpoint; he claims that he has no standpoint, he considers his task to be purely a negative one of demolishing all standpoints. T. R. V. Murti calls this "a spiritual *ju-justu*"¹¹. The Mādhyamika has no thesis of his own to establish. He is a *vairāṇdika*, one whose argument aims only at destruction.

By employing the dialectic, the Mādhyamika proves that no category is intelligible as applied to reality: substance-attribute, cause-effect, etc. For instance, the cause-effect relation is riddled with contradictions, because none of the alternatives is intelligible: that cause and effect are identical, different, both, or neither. If cause and effect are identical, then cause *is* effect and effect *is* cause: there can be no relation of *and* connecting them. If cause and effect are different, then, like cow and horse which are different and are not inherently related, cause and effect can have no relation. When

these two primary positions are, as has been shown, unintelligible, their combination or disjunction also, it would follow, are untenable. The Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) is interpreted by the Mādhyamika to teach the unreality of the so-called ultimate elements on the ground of their mutual dependence. If things depend on each other essentially, it only means that they have no nature of their own, that they are without substance (*niḥsvabhāva*) i.e. *śūnya*.

Even as holding on to things is due to attachment, clinging to view is the result of false conceit (*abhini-veśa*). The theories woven by reason have no reference to reality. They camouflage and cover it rather than reveal or illumine it. What cannot be categorized, reason seeks to categorize; and so, its failure is in-built. Reason can function only in a relational context; it operates in a world of distinct and conditioned things. It has no relevance where reality is concerned. The real is supra-relational, and therefore beyond reason. The real is not other-dependent, it is self-existent and self-evident; quiescent and non-multiple. Since it is transcendent and uncharacterizable, thought cannot conceive it as being, non-being, both or neither.

The three levels from which truth may be envisaged according to the Yogācāra, are reduced to two in the Mādhyamika school: *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*, the absolute and the relative, the transcendent and the empirical. Nāgārjuna insists that the distinction between the two should be firmly grasped: "Those who do not know the distinction between these two truths—they

do not know the core teaching of the Buddha which is deep.¹² *Paramārtha-satya* is the truth relating to the Absolute Reality, that which is beyond all categories of thought. *Samvṛti-satya* is the pseudo-truth which relates to the world of phenomena, that which is concerned with empirical usage (*loka-vyavahāra*). This distinction between *paramārtha* and *samvṛti* which is epistemic does not, however, import a difference into Reality. The Real is one and non-dual (*advaya*) and is referred to by such terms as *Tathatā*, *Bhūta-koṭi*, *Dharmatā*, *Dharmadhātu*, and *Śūnyatā*.

Since there is no ontological duality, the Mādhyamika holds that *Nirvāṇa* or *Śūnyatā* and *samsāra* are the same. As T. R. V. Murti observes: "The transcendence of the absolute must not be understood to mean that it is an other that lies outside the world of phenomena. There are not two sets of the real. The Absolute is *the reality* of the apparent (*dharmāṇām dharmatā*); it is their real nature (*vāstavikam rūpam*). Conversely, phenomena are the veiled form or false appearance of the Absolute (*sāmvṛtam rūpam*)"¹³ This is the central teaching of the *Prajñā-pāramitā* texts from which Nāgārjuna draws inspiration for his philosophy. The division of reality into the conditioned and the unconditioned is not ultimately valid. When the conditioned is rightly comprehended, it reveals the unconditioned as the ultimate nature of things. The *Prajñā-pāramitā* declares that apart from the unconditioned there is nothing that is real.

The supreme truth is ungraspable by thought; but it is realized in intuitive wisdom (*prajñā*). The term

pāramitā means perfection. There are said to be six perfections, the last of which is wisdom (*prajñā*). The five disciplines that lead to wisdom are. charity (*dāna*), conduct (*śīla*), forbearance (*kṣānti*), heroic effort (*vīrya*), and meditation (*dhyāna*). The sixfold path called *satpāramitā-naya* is only an elaboration of the original spiritual discipline consisting of *śīla*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā*.

The meditational practices in a graded manner lead to the gaining of Buddhahood. Besides the well-known modes of concentration, the Mādhyamika gives the place of importance to *śūnyatā* which, in the present context, means the giving up of all views. It is only when the mind is cleared of all infection that it becomes ready to receive the final wisdom. In the process leading to *Nirvāṇa*, the worship of, and the grace bestowed by, the Buddha are essential. The Buddha, here, takes the place of *Īśvara* (God). He is the Personal Deity mediating between the Impersonal Absolute and the illusory phenomena. The Buddha is the one who knows the truth (*Tathāgata*), and is the guide to the Absolute Reality, the supreme Truth (*Tathatā*). What is characteristic of the Buddha is his infinite compassion (*mahā-karunā*). He is prepared to make any sacrifice for the sake of universal redemption. A great teacher of Vedic ritualism, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, a tough opponent of Buddhism, pays his tribute to the Buddha saying that he would willingly take on himself the weight of everybody's suffering if he could thereby bring succour to the world.¹⁴

In the opening verse of the *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, Nāgārjuna offers the following obeisance to the Buddha:

*yaḥ pratītya-samutpādam prapañcopaśamaṁ śivam,
deśayāmāsa sambuddhas taṁ vande vadatām varam.*

“He who taught the truth of dependent origination, the quiescence of the world, the beatitude—the Enlightened One—to Him who is the best of teachers, I offer my salutations. ’

NOTES

- 1 *Madhyamaka-vṛtti* (Bibliotheca Buddhica), pp 444-5 : *sautrāntika-mate ‘tītānāgataṁ śūnyam anyad aśūnyam, viprayuktā vijñaptiḥ śūnyā.*
- 2 E Frauwallner quoted by Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1962), p 252
- 3 *Laṅkāvatāra*, 68
- 4 Quoted in Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India* (Bollinger Series XXVI, Pantheon Books, New York, 1951), p 533
- 5 *ālayam—layaparyantasthāyī vijñānam Vācaspatya*, by Tarka-Vācaspati Śrī Tārānātha Bhattācārya, Chowkamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, p 822
- 6 S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol I. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 7th Impression 1962), p 638
7. Quoted in S Radhakrishnan, *op. cit*, p. 640.
- 8 *Lankāvatāra* (ed. by B Nanjio), p 126. *vikalpasya mano-vijñānasya vyāvṛttir nūvānam ity ucyate*
- 9 *Laṅkāvatāra* passage quoted in Edward J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1933), p. 235

10. Mādhavācārya, *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1924), p. 33 :
*prāg-uktabhāvanā-pracaya-balān-nikkhila-vāsanoccheda-
vicalita-vividha-viśayākāropaplava-viśuddha-vijñāno-
dayo mahodaya iti.*
11. T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1970), p. 132.
12. *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, xxiv, 9.
*ye'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṁ satyayor dvayoḥ,
te tattvaṁ na vijānanti gambhīraṁ buddha-śāsane.*
13. T. R. V. Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 232.
14. *Tantra-vārtika*, I, iii, 4.

Chapter Nine

THE LOGICAL REALISM OF NYĀYA

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF NYĀYA

Having made a survey of the heterodox schools of Indian Philosophy, we now proceed to consider the orthodox systems, in sequence. We shall begin this part of our study with the Nyāyadarśana which is a philosophy of logical realism. The Nyāya is a realism because it accepts the reality of an extra-mental world, it is logical because it seeks to build its world-view through logical reasoning. Nyāya is both logic and a philosophy. More than the particular philosophical perspective which is associated with it, what has exerted a pervasive influence on Indian thought is its definition of logic. The value of Nyāya primarily consists in its fashioning of the tools of inquiry and formulation of the technique of argumentation. The term *Nyāya* itself means logical reasoning. As it is also a school of philosophy, why is it called *logic* (*Nyāya*), it may be asked. The reason lies in the fact that its distinctive feature is the exposition of logic. It is but proper that this system should be called Nyāya, because reasoning or inference for the sake of others is what is principally taught in it. It is reasoning that makes possible all the sciences, and serves as the means to the performance of all actions.¹ The Nyāya is also referred to by other names such as Ānvīksikī and Tarka, which too

mean the science of reasoning and argumentation, the method of reflective understanding and reasoned discourse. The Nyāya has been defined as a critique of the categories through means of valid knowledge.² 'Nyāyā' has thus come to signify analytical investigation through the canons of logic, and is, therefore, regarded as a basic discipline which should be acquired before one begins to do philosophy. The science of logic (Ānvīksikī), it has been said, is "the lamp of all the sciences, the auxiliary means for all actions, and the basis for all religious duties".

*pradīpah sarva-vidyānām upāyah sarva-karmaṇām
āśrayah sarva-dharmāṇām vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā.*³

2. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

References to the Nyāya are to be found even in the very early literature of Indian thought, though not as a system of philosophy, but as a discipline in philosophizing. In Vedic exegesis, and in the debates as recorded in the *Upaniṣads*, we can discern the beginnings of logic as a science. In the *Chāndogya-upanīṣad*, there is a list of knowledge-disciplines given. one of these disciplines is called *Vākovākya* which is identified by Śāṅkara as the science of logic (*tarka-śāstra*).⁴ The term *Nyāya* occurs in the *Mahābhārata*, as also other names of the system such as *Hetu-vāda*. Quite early in the history of Indian thought, the Nyāya came to be combined with the Vaiśeṣika system which we shall discuss in the next chapter. The two together are referred to as allied systems (*samāna-tantra*). It is quite possible

that the Nyāya was to begin with a science of logic, but very soon built for itself a philosophical school. When it found a *Weltanschauung* acceptable to it in the Vaiśeṣika, it coalesced therewith, and the consequence was a syncretic school, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In the later phases in the development of Nyāya, especially with the rise of Neo-logic (*Navya-nyāya*), the discipline of thinking and arguing came to be detached from the philosophy and pursued independently for its own sake.

The basic text of aphorisms for the Nyāya system, i.e. the *Nyāya-sūtra*, is said to be the work of Gautama, also called *Akṣapāda*. Gautama is the family name, Akṣapāda means 'the one who has eyes in his feet'. There is a legend about how this name came to be attached to Gautama. "Gautama", it is said, "was so deeply absorbed in philosophical contemplation that one day during his walks he fell unwittingly into a well out of which he was rescued with great difficulty. God therefore mercifully provided him with a second pair of eyes in his feet to protect the sage from further mishaps".⁵ The legend apart, the name Akṣapāda may only mean that Gautama who bore it, emphasized the importance of the means of knowledge in philosophical investigations. Differently phrased, it may signify that the science of reasoning was "a lamp unto his feet".

Different dates are assigned to the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama. Probably, it was composed in the second century A.D. The work consists of five chapters; and each chapter is sub-divided into two sections. The first commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the *Nyāya-sūtra* was written by Vātsyāyana (c. 300 A.D.), also known as Pakṣila-

svāmin. Vātsyāyana refers to Gautama as a sage (*ṛṣi*), and offers alternative explanations to some of the aphorisms. The *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya* was criticized by the Buddhist logician Dignāga Uddyotakara (c. 600 A.D.) defended Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāya-vārtika*. Vācaspati Miśra (841 A.D.), although a follower of Advaita (non-dualistic Vedānta), wrote a gloss, explaining Uddyotakara's work. The gloss is called *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā*. There is a commentary on this work by Udayana (the tenth century A.D.) which is called *Tātparyā-ṭīkā-parisuddhi*. Among his other works is the *Nyāya-kusumañjali*, in which he defends the Nyāya theism as against the arguments of the atheist. An incident is related where Udayana is supposed to have referred to the importance of his defence of theism. It seems that when he went to the temple of Lord Jagannātha at Puri, he found the temple-doors closed. Upset by this, he is said to have addressed the following words to the Deity. "Intoxicated with the supreme glory, thou despisest me upon whom thy very existence depended when thou wast attacked by the Buddhists".⁶ One more commentarial work may be mentioned: Jayanta's *Nyāya-mañjarī* (the ninth century A.D.) This is an independent commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, and is a master-piece for clarity of exposition and criticism of rival views. An interesting piece of information about this work is that it was composed in prison.⁷

A new chapter in the history of Nyāya was opened by Gaṅgeśa (the twelfth century A.D.). He founded the neo-logical school (*navya-nyāya*), which evolved a

highly technical logical terminology and logical language. His famous work is the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, which is a treatise strictly on logic and epistemology and does not concern itself with metaphysics. Several commentaries and glosses were written on Gangeśa's work. Two of these may be mentioned Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma's and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's. Since these logicians lived in Navadvīpa in Bengal, their school bears the name of that place.

Among the easy manuals with which students usually begin their study of the Nyāya are Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarka-saṅgraha* with the author's own commentary on it, *Dīpikā*, and Viśvanātha-pañcānana's *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* with the author's commentary, *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī*. Both these authors lived in the seventeenth century.

3. LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

The Nyāya is pre-eminently logic and epistemology (*pramāṇa-śāstra*). Since, according to this system, whatever is, is knowable, the question relating to the means of knowledge acquires such great importance. There is nothing that cannot be illumined by the light of knowledge. Even knowledge can be known, and the knower too. The primary objects of knowledge are the things. But when this knowledge is reflected upon, it as well as the knower become known. It is the object that is at first known. Subsequently, in the reflective cognition (*anu-vyavasāya-jñāna*), both knowledge and the knowing subject get revealed. Thus, it will not be difficult to see why the Naiyāyika (i.e. the

follower of the Nyāya school) regards the problem of knowledge as belonging to first philosophy.

There are four factors involved in any knowledge-situation (1) the subject who knows (*pramātā*), (2) the object of knowledge (*prameya*), (3) the means of valid knowledge (*pramāna*), and (4) the resultant valid knowledge (*pramā*). The first two, i.e. the subject or the self, and the world of objects, we shall discuss later in this chapter briefly and in some detail in the next chapter. Our present concern is with the third and the fourth, i.e. *pramāna* and *pramā*.

Pramā is valid or true knowledge. *Pramāṇa* is the distinctive cause or instrument of valid knowledge (*pramā-kāraṇam pramānam*). For visual perception of a coloured object, for instance, several general causes, such as the presence of light, etc., are required, but the distinctive cause is the contact of the sense of sight with the object. The number of *pramāṇas* will depend upon the types of knowledge that are recognized. According to the Nyāya school, there are four means of valid knowledge: (i) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (ii) inference (*anumāna*), (iii) comparison (*upamāna*), and (iv) testimony (*śabda*).

(1) *Perception* (*pratyakṣa*): There is ambiguity in the use of the word *pratyakṣa*, for it may mean both perception as the instrument of knowledge (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*) and as the result which is perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa-pramā*). Perceptual cognition is defined as knowledge generated by contact of sense organ with object (*indriyārtha-sannikarsa-janyam pratyakṣam*). The sense-object contact is the last and distinctive term

in a series of relations necessary for perception to arise. The other terms are : the contact of the self with the mind (*manas*), and the contact of the mind with the sense-organ. While it may be admitted that normally perception is occasioned by sense-object contact, this does not seem to be a requirement in all cases of perception. There are cases where there is perception without sense-activity. God's perception is not sensory knowledge. He has no sense-organs, and yet he has immediate knowledge of all things. Those who are adepts in *yoga* perceive remote objects and past and future events without any sense-contact with them. So, the later Naiyāyikas defined perception simply as direct apprehension (*sākṣāt pratītiḥ*).⁸ What distinguishes perceptual knowledge from other types of knowledge is its immediacy.

Two stages in perception are distinguished : the indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and the determinate (*savikalpa*). Indeterminate perception is the bare awareness (*alocana*) of an object just as *there*, without an explicit recognition of its character. Determinate perception is the subsequent cognition of that object as qualified, as possessing a character. Indeterminate perception is of the nature of mere acquaintance with the object; determinate perception is descriptive, as well, of the object. At the indeterminate level we have simple isolated sense-data; at the determinate level, these elements are compounded and our knowledge becomes expressible in the subject-predicate mode.

All normal perception arises, as we have noted, when there is contact between sense-organ and object.

Sense-object contact is technically called *sannikarṣa*. According to the Nyāya, there can be sense-contact not only with substances but also with qualities, class-natures, etc. *Sannikarṣa* is sixfold: (1) conjunction (*saṁyoga*), e.g. contact of the sense of sight with a substance, say lily, which is in conjunction therewith; (2) inherence in that which is in conjunction (*saṁyukta-samavāya*), e.g. contact with the blue colour which is inherent in the lily which is in conjunction with the sense of sight; (3) inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*), e.g. contact with the blueness which is inherent in the blue which inheres in the lily which is in conjunction with the sense of sight, (4) inherence (*samavāya*), e.g. contact with sound which inheres in the sense of hearing,⁹ (5) inherence in that which inheres (*samaveta-samavāya*), e.g. contact with soundness which inheres in sound which, in turn, inheres in the sense of hearing; (6) adjunct-substantive relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* or *viśeṣaṇatā*), which is the sense-contact for the perception of non-existence (*abhāva*). Thus, it will be seen that the reach of sense-contact, and consequently of perception, is varied and vast

Besides the six normal (*laukika*) modes of sense-relation, the Nyāya admits of three super-normal (*alaukika*) modes: *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* and *yoga*. *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is the relation characterized by class-nature or generality (*sāmānya*) by which when we perceive a particular of that class we perceive also, in general, the other particulars. *Jñāna-lakṣaṇa* is the

relation characterized by previous knowledge and is responsible for all cases of acquired perception. When, for example, I look at a piece of sandal wood, I see its colour; but on account of past association, I perceive its fragrance also, even though there is no contact between the sandal wood piece and my sense of smell. *Yogaja* is the perceptive faculty cultivated by *yoga*. By means of this, the yogins are able to perceive things that are beyond the sense-reach, viz, subtle atoms, distant objects, past and future events, merit, etc.

Generally, in the systems of Indian philosophy, the sense organs are said to be five : auditory, tactile, visual, gustatory and olfactory, located respectively in the ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose. The mind (*manas*) is considered to be an auxiliary cause in knowledge. The Nyāya regards the mind also as a sense organ. In the perception of pleasure, pain, etc., it is the mind that serves as the sense-organ.

(ii) *Inference (Anumāna)* : *Anumāna* is the means of knowledge, the resulting inferential knowledge is called *anumiti*.

The doctrine of *anumāna* is, as we have pointed out already, the central doctrine in the Nyāya system. Extensive as the reach of perception is, the sphere of inference is much more expansive. Even a cursory examination of the domain of knowledge will reveal how much of it is governed by inference. By far the greater portion of the experience of finite minds is mediate and inferential and not immediate and perceptual.

The term *anumāna* means literally after-knowledge,

that is, knowledge that follows other knowledge. Inferential knowledge, thus, is knowledge that results through the instrumentation of some other knowledge (*jñāna-karaṇaka-jñānam*).— This may be explained with the help of the typical example of inferring the presence of fire on the perception of smoke. When one sees smoke on the yonder hill and recollects one's experience of the universal concomitance between smoke and fire, one concludes that there should be fire on the hill. This is inference which consists in predicating a character of a subject on the strength of a mark which is known to be concomitant with the inferred character. The character that is inferred (in the example, fire) is called the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved, *probandum*); the mark on the strength of which the character is inferred is the *hetu* (reason, *probans*, also called *liṅga*, or *sādhana*, in the example, smoke); the subject where the character is inferred is the *pakṣa* (in the example, the hill). The three terms correspond to the major, middle and minor in the Aristotelian syllogism.

The two factors that are essential in an inferential process are (1) the knowledge of the universal concomitance between the mark (*liṅga*, *hetu*) and the predicated character (*sādhya*), and (2) the observation of the mark as being present in the subject (*pakṣa*). The first is called *vyāpti-jñāna*, i.e. knowledge of the concomitance, and the second *pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna*, i.e. knowledge of the subject as having the mark. Neither by itself, according to the Nyāya, can lead to a valid inferential conclusion. It is a combination of the two that is necessary to serve as the instrument of inference. The

combination is called *līṅga-parāmarśa* (subsumptive reflection) *Parāmarśa* is the ratiocinative process which makes known the fact that the mark which is universally concomitant with the inferred character is present in the subject. The principle involved in this process is subsumption, the correlation of a particular case with the universal pervading it. In terms of our typical example, the presence of fire on the hill is inferred when the particular case of smoke which is observed on the hill is *subsumed* under the generalization involving the universal pervasion (*vyāpti*) of smoke by fire.

The invariable concomitance or universal pervasion between *hetu* and *sādhya*, the mark and the inferred character, is technically called *vyāpti*. It is a correlation between two terms, of which one is the pervaded (*vyāpya*) and the other is the pervader (*vyāpaka*). In a *vyāpti*, the *hetu* is the pervaded and the *sādhya* is the pervader. Ordinarily, the pervader is more extensive than the pervaded; from the latter (e.g. smoke) the former (e.g. fire) may be inferred, and not *vice versa*. But in some cases, the two may be equipollent; this is so, for example, in the proposition: "All cases of smoke are cases of fire fed with wet fuel". This may be converted simply into "All cases of fire fed with wet fuel are cases of smoke"; and either of the terms may be the reason (*hetu*) for inferring the other.

Vyāpti is a relation of co-existence (*sāhacarya*) of *hetu* and *sādhya*. But co-existence is not by itself determinative of *vyāpti* relation. The relation must be unconditional or necessary (*an-aupādhika*), i.e. it

must be free from any adventitious circumstance (*upādhi*). For instance, the relation of *vyāpti* in "Wherever smoke is, fire is" is unconditional, because there is no adventitious circumstance vitiating the relation; in the presence of smoke, fire is unconditionally and invariably present. But if the relata are transposed and the relation be had in the form "Where fire is, smoke is", it will be seen that there is no necessity about this relation, because it is not the case that in the presence of fire, smoke should necessarily be present. The presence of smoke in fire is due to an adventitious circumstance, i.e. wet fuel (*ārdhendhana*) feeding the fire. The relation between fire and smoke is, thus, a conditional relation which cannot serve as the ground of inference. The *hetu* or *linga* (*probans*) should be such that it is related to the *sādhya* (*probandum*), is known to exist in that which is connected therewith, and does not exist where the *sādhya* is not present.¹⁰

How is *vyāpti* known? What is the procedure by means of which a universal such as "Where smoke is, fire is", is discovered? The obvious answer would be: "By induction". But it is not mere repeated observation (*bhūyo-darśana*) that is the ground of inductive generalization. It is not enough that the *hetu* and *sādhya* are observed to be co-present in a number of cases, there should also be the absence of a knowledge of the presence of the *hetu* where the *sādhya* is not present.¹¹ In other words, there should be no inconstancy (*vyabhicāra*) between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. One of the methods by which the absence of incon-

stancy may be known is raising a doubt in regard to the *vyāpti* concerned. The doubt takes the form, "Let there be the *hetu*, the *sādhya* need not be present" (*hetur-astu, sādhyam mā'stu*). This doubt is removed by the mode of indirect reasoning called *tarka* which corresponds to *reductio ad absurdum*. If the universal "Whatever has smoke, has fire" is doubted, the doubt will take the form "Let there be smoke; there need not be fire". That is, we assume "Whatever has smoke, has fire" to be false. If this is so, then its contradictory "Some things which have smoke do not have fire" must be true, and this would mean that there may be smoke in the absence of fire. But this is absurd because it contradicts the law of universal causation. The causal relation between fire and smoke is a well-recognized truth. To assume that there may be smoke without fire is to believe that sometimes effects may take place without causes, which is absurd. If the assumption is wrong, then the original proposition "Whatever has smoke, has fire" must be true. Thus, through *tarka*, the validity of a *vyāpti* may be proved. The later Naiyāyikas maintain that the knowledge of *vyāpti* arises in many cases through the supernormal sense-relation called *sāmānya lakṣaṇa*, which we have already explained.

Classification of inference may be made in many ways. One of them is on the basis of the nature of *hetu*: as *anvaya-vyatirekī*, *kevalānvayī*, and *kevalavyatirekī*. (1) The *anvaya-vyatirekī* inference is that in which the *hetu* is both co-present and co-absent with the *sādhya*; e.g. smoke is both positively and negatively

concomitant with fire; the hearth is a similar instance where smoke is co-present with fire; the tank is a contrary instance where smoke is co-absent with fire. (2) The *kevalānvayī* inference is that in which the *hetu* is only co-present with the *sādhya*, as in "Whatever is knowable is namable"; here no negative instance is possible to illustrate the proposition "Whatever is not namable is not knowable". (3) The *kevalavyatirekī* inference is that in which the *hetu* is co-absent alone, there being no positive instance available. The proposition "All beings that possess animal function have souls" can be proved only by negative examples such as chairs and tables which have no animal function and therefore have no souls.

Another mode of classification of inference is into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-drṣṭa*. (1) An inference is *pūrvavat* when it proceeds from a perceived cause to an unperceived effect, e.g. the inference of rain from the perception of dark heavy clouds. (2) An inference is *śeṣavat* when it goes from a perceived effect to an unperceived cause; e.g. when we infer on the perception of a river in floods, that it should have rained in some part of the country drained by the river. (3) The *sāmānyato-drṣṭa* inference is based on non-causal uniformity; e.g. when we see an animal having horns, we infer that it must possess cloven hoofs.

By far the most spectacular division of inference is into *svārthānumāna*, inference for one's own sake, and *parārthānumāna*, inference for the sake of another. This is a distinction between the process of inference as it takes place in one's mind and its outer expression.

for the purpose of convincing others. The former does not require the formulation of inference into a syllogistic argument, the latter does. The fully expressed syllogism has five members : it is, therefore, called *pañcāvayava-vākya*. The following is the five-membered syllogism illustrated :

- (1) *Pratijñā*, the statement that is to be proved :
The hill has fire.
- (2) *Hetu*, the reason Because it has smoke
- (3) *Udāharana*, the universal proposition with example, Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g. the kitchen.
- (4) *Upanaya*, the application. The hill has smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire.
- (5) *Nigamana*, the conclusion Therefore, the hill has fire

(1) The first member is *pratijñā*, the statement of the thesis that is proposed to be proved. Its purpose is to make the other party know what is sought to be established and where (2) The second member, *hetu* or reason, states the ground on which the thesis is based. (3) The third member, *udāharana*, substantiates the reason by citing the universal and an example. *Udāharana* means example, and originally the third member contained only the example, "as for instance the kitchen." But later on, it was realized that there could be no genuine inference from particulars to particulars; and so to the example the universal was added. Even

after the addition, the name of the member, as *udāharana*, was retained, thereby indicating that the Indian syllogism is deductive-inductive. (4) The fourth member, *upanaya* or application, shows that the *hetu* which is known to be concomitant with the *sādhya* is present in the *pakṣa* (subject). (5) The last member, the conclusion, is not a futile repetition of the thesis; it states the thesis as having been proved or demonstrated.

The need for five members is explained by Vātsyāyana, when he says that all the four means of valid knowledge (*pramānas*) accepted by the Naiyāyika come together in the five-membered syllogism to demonstrate a fact in a conclusive manner, thus justifying the definition of Nyāya as critical examination of objects through means of valid knowledge. Vātsyāyana points out that the thesis (*pratijñā*) stands for valid testimony (*śabda*), the reason (*hetu*) for inferential reasoning (*anumāna*), the example (*udāharana*) for perception (*pratyakṣa*), and the application (*upanaya*) for comparison (*upamāna*). Thus, the first four members represent the cumulative evidence of the four means of valid knowledge, on the strength of which the conclusion (*nigamana*) constitutes the consummation of logical demonstration (*paramo nyāyah*).¹²

To one more topic connected with the doctrine of inference we shall refer. the fallacies. Fallacious reasoning is due to defective *hetu*. Hence, fallacies are called *hetvābhāsas* (pseudo-probans). The *Nyāya-sūtra* enumerates five of them: (1) *savyabhicāra*, (2) *viruddha*, (3) *prakaraṇa-sama*, (4) *sādhya-sama*, and (5) *kālātīta*. (1) *Savyabhicāra* is the *hetu* which is in-

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constant, i.e. which is present sometimes with the *sādhya*, and sometimes not; e.g. if 'fire' is taken as the *hetu*, it turns out to be inconsistent, and cannot prove the existence of smoke, for even where smoke is not, there is fire. (2) *Viruddha* is the contradictory *hetu*, i.e. *hetu* which proves the contradictory of what it is intended to prove; e.g. in "Sound is eternal, because it is produced", the *hetu* is 'being produced, and this proves only the non-eternality of sound : for whatever is a product must be non-eternal. (3) *Prakarāṇa-sama* is the *hetu* which is contradicted by a counter-inference; e.g. the inference "Sound is eternal because it is audible" is annulled by the inference "Sound is non-eternal because it is produced". (4) *Sādhya-sama* is the *hetu* which is unproved, and is yet to be proved, even as the *sādhya* is, and so cannot prove the *sādhya*; e.g. in the inference "Shadow is a substance, because it is characterized by movement", the *hetu* 'being characterized by movement' is as unproved as the *sādhya* 'being a substance'. (5) *kālātīta* is the inopportune or mistimed *probans*; e.g. the inference "Sound is eternal, because it is manifested through conjunction, like colour", is not sound, because the reason does not tally with the example given, in point of time : colour, which is the example, is simultaneous with the conjunction of light which shows what is already there, whereas in the case of sound, it is produced immediately after the conjunction of, say, the stick and the drum, and so is a product, and hence non-eternal.

It is not possible to exhaustively enumerate all the fallacies. While truth has its norms, error is in-

finite in its aberrations.

We have given sufficient indication to show how important the doctrine of inference is for Nyāya. It is sometimes glibly asserted that life does not proceed according to logic. But, nevertheless, it must be admitted that human existence would be impossible, were there no reason behind it.

(iii) *Comparison (upamāna)*: This particular means of knowledge is called *upamāna*, and the resultant knowledge *upamiti*.

Through this means of knowledge, that a name signifies a thing, unknown before, is known, on the strength of its similarity with some other known thing. The usual example given is as follows: A townsman does not know what *gavaya* (a wild cow) means. He learns from a forester that *gavaya* is an animal similar to the cow. Subsequently, the townsman goes to the forest and sees an animal which is cow-like. He recalls the information regarding this animal he had received from the forester. And, he now knows that this is the animal called *gavaya*. Here, the knowledge of similarity between the two animals is the *pramāṇa*; the resultant knowledge is the signification of the word *gavaya*.

(iv) *Testimony (śabda)*: *Śabda* is defined as valid testimony, i.e. the testimony of a trustworthy person (*āpta*). A person is trustworthy if he knows the truth and conveys it correctly. The value of *śabda* as a means of valid knowledge depends on the excellence of its source—the trustworthiness and competence of the speaker. The mere listening to (or reading of) words

is not enough for the knowledge of what they signify; one must understand the meanings of words. Every word has a capacity (*śakti*) for signifying a certain meaning. This capacity is determined, according to the *Naiyāyika*, by God's will (*īśvara-saṅketah*). It is God that wills "from this word, this meaning should be known". Thus, when we hear the words uttered by a trustworthy person, and when we grasp the meaning conveyed by the capacity of those words, we have valid knowledge through testimony.

Testimony is of two kinds - Vedic (*vaidika*) and secular (*laukika*). The texts of the *Veda* are all statements of God, and therefore their testimony is infallible. Not so are secular words. These words are valid, if they are the utterances of trustworthy persons, if not, they are not valid. ✓

Having explained the nature of the four *pramāṇas* accepted by the *Naiyāyika*, we shall now consider his view of truth or valid knowledge (*pramā*). According to him, knowledge is true, when it agrees with or corresponds to the nature of its object. Udayana defines *pramā* as cognition of the real nature of things (*yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā*)¹³ Valid cognition is knowledge of a thing as what it is (*tadvati tat-prakāraḥ anubhavaḥ*).¹⁴ For instance, to cognize a piece of silver lying before us as silver is true experience. In a judgment, the subject signifies that a certain thing exists; and the predicate characterizes it further by specifying its properties. If the properties specified agree with the nature of the thing, the judgment is true. This is the realist view of knowledge. The object known

(*viṣaya*) and the subject who knows (*viṣayin*) are externally related; our knowing makes no difference to the existence of the facts. The 'thing' is out there, independent of the mind. In the process of knowing, it is the mind that has to conform to the object, and not the object to the mind. This view is quite the opposite of the Yogācāra view. According to the Nyāya, things are not ideas; we have ideas of things. Truth is correspondence of knowledge to reality.

How is it known that knowledge corresponds to reality? By no means can we get outside of our knowledge; and so there can be no direct evidence of correspondence between a thing and its idea. And so, the Naiyāyika holds that the proof of correspondence lies in fruitful practice, i.e. the truth of a cognition is to be tested by putting that cognition to practice, and if the practice is fruitful, the cognition is true. Practical efficiency, however, is only the test of truth, and not the nature of truth. It is only the verification of truth that is pragmatic, and not its definition.

If truth is knowing a thing as what it is, it follows that error is the apprehension of a thing as other than what it is. When, for instance, nacre is seen as silver, there is error. The judgment "This is silver" is not wrong so far as the *this* is concerned, for it is right there in one's proximity; the *this* is presented and is perceived. The *silver* too, according to the Naiyāyika, is perceived: it is perceived not through any normal mode of perception, but through the super-normal mode of sense-relation called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa*. The silver is not proximate, but elsewhere in the shop. It is only the wrong synthe-

sis of the 'this' and the 'silver' that constitutes error. This theory of error is known as *anyathākhyāti*, which means 'apprehension otherwise'. It rejects the theories of error associated with the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika. The Yogācāra view is called *ātma-khyāti* (self-apprehension), according to which error consists in mistaking what is internal to be external, what is an idea to be a thing. The Mādhyamika view is known as *asat-khyāti* (apprehension of the unreal); according to this theory, error lies in believing the unreal to be real, in seeing the void (*śūnya*) as non-void (*aśūnya*). The robust realism of Nyāya will have nothing to do with the subjectivism of the Yogācāra, and the *śūnyatā* doctrine of the Mādhyamika.

Another vexed epistemological question is concerned with the nature of validity in relation to knowledge. Is validity or truth intrinsic to knowledge, or extrinsic? Truth will be intrinsic to knowledge, if the causes which generate knowledge will render it true also. It will be extrinsic if some factor other than those causes is required for making the knowledge true. Similarly, if the causes which make for knowing knowledge themselves reveal the truth of that knowledge, truth is intrinsic; if truth is known by some other means, it is extrinsic. According to the Nyāya system, truth is extrinsic to knowledge, for over and above the causes of knowledge, what is termed excellence (*guṇa*) is required for making knowledge true; and, while knowledge is made known by reflective cognition, truth is known by practical efficiency. In regard to error, the same considerations apply. The Nyāya view of error

is that it is extrinsic both in regard to its generation and in regard to its being known : it is generated by some defect (*doṣa*) in the causes that bring about knowledge; and it is inferred from failure in practice. Thus, according to the Nyāya, truth (*prāmāṇyam*) is extrinsic (*parataḥ*); and error (*apramāṇyam*) also is extrinsic (*parataḥ*).

4. THE CATEGORIES

The Nyāya conception of reality is profoundly influenced by the system's preoccupation with logic and epistemology. Sixteen categories are listed in the *Nyāya-sūtra*. Most of them have directly to do with the process of thinking and the procedure of debate.

The sixteen categories are (1) means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), (2) objects of valid knowledge (*prameya*), (3) doubt (*saṁśaya*), (4) purpose (*prayojana*), (5) instances (*dṛṣṭānta*), (6) established conclusions (*siddhānta*), (7) members of the syllogism (*avayava*), (8) *reductio ad absurdum* (*tarka*), (9) decisive knowledge (*nirṇaya*), (10) arguing for truth (*vāda*), (11) arguing constructively as well as destructively for victory (*jalpa*), (12) mere destructive argument (*vitandā*), (13) fallacious reasons (*hetvabhāsa*), (14) quibbling (*chala*), (15) specious and unavailing objections (*jāti*), and (16) vulnerable points (*nigraha-sthāna*).

In this list, except the second, all the categories have reference to the ratiocinative process and the art of arguing. Even the second has its tell-tale title, 'objects of valid knowledge'. These categories are, as has been remarked, "nothing more than the headings of chapters of a handbook of logic and dialectics."¹⁵

It is the Vaiśeṣika that deals with ontological categories. In the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the Vaiśeṣika account of the categories was accepted. We shall discuss this in the next chapter. This discussion will include the objects of knowledge (*prameya*) and also the self that is the knower (*pramātā*). But in the subsequent sections of this chapter we shall consider the arguments on the strength of which the Nyāya establishes the world of objects and the self. We shall also set forth the Nyāya arguments for the existence of God.

5. THE WORLD OF OBJECTS

As against the Yogācāra subjectivism, the Nyāya seeks to show that its own realist thesis is sound. The external world is not a fabrication of the mind, it is real, and can be known. The world of objects, when analysed, does not vanish away as the Yogācāra believes. A rational analysis, on the contrary, proves the world's independent reality. Let us set forth some of the arguments of the Naiyāyika in support of his realism.

(1) To hold, as the subjectivist does, that things can be analysed by reason, and that reason cannot apprehend their real nature, and that, therefore, they are non-existent, is a blatant contradiction. If things can be analysed, it means that they are not non-existent, if they are non-existent, they cannot be analysed.

(2) The Yogācāra argues that even as the dream-objects are unreal, the things of the waking world are unreal. But from the same consideration, the Naiyāyika draws the contrary conclusion. He argues : If the

dream-objects are declared to be non-existent because they are not perceived in the waking state, then the things of the waking-world should be regarded as existent because they are perceived in that state. If the non-apprehension of an object is the reason for inferring its non-existence, its apprehension must be the ground for concluding that the object exists. Moreover, the fact that the dream cognitions are varied, each different from the others, shows that they should be induced by real objects which are varied. Even erroneous cognitions have their basis in real things. Dream cognitions which are erroneous presuppose the cognition of real things at some previous time, somewhere.

(3) Cognition and the object of cognition cannot be identical. Cognition is an act; the object of an act cannot be identical with the act. Cognition is referred to a self which is its subject; it is a property of the self, and private to it. The object, on the contrary, is public and can be known by several persons. The cognition belongs to the self which is "I"; the object is designated as "this". If the two were the same, one should say "*I am blue*", which is not the case; the valid usage is "*this is blue*".

(4) The Yogācāra argues that cognition and object should be the same because they are always perceived together. But there are cases where cognition is apprehended, and not the object. And, sometimes cognition and object are perceived as apart from each other. So, there is not the rule of togetherness, as alleged by the Yogācāra. Moreover, even from his statement "cognition *and* object are identical" it is clear that they

cannot be identical, because the connective *and* implies difference.

(5) On the ground that one and the same thing appears differently to different people, and to the same person at different times, the Yogācāra says that there is no object apart from the mind's own constructions. The Naiyāyika replies that, since the phenomenon of different apprehensions of an identical object can be accounted for in terms of the variety of aspects possessed by the object and the multitude of subjective dispositions, it does not lend any support to the subjectivist thesis

The Nyāya, thus, finds no reason to reject the common sense view of a pluralistic world of objects which are real as apart from souls.

6. THE SELF

The self or soul cannot be dismissed as an epiphenomenon, as the Cārvāka does, nor be dissolved into a series of cognitions, as the Yogācāra claims. The Naiyāyika, here again, provides philosophical justification for the common-sense view of the soul as a non-material substance possessed of its own characteristic attributes, and capable of action, enjoyment, etc.

The following are some of the arguments for the existence of soul :

(1) Cognition, feelings of pleasure and pain, volitions, etc., cannot be ascribed to material things. They must belong to a non-material substance, which is the soul.

(2) Quite different from the sphere of the notion

'this' which is that of the not-self, there is the sphere of the notion 'I : this is the sphere of the self.

(3) From the recognition of different cognitions as 'mine', we have to infer the continued existence of the self.

(4) New-born children indicate, through facial expressions, etc., feelings of pleasure, etc., which cannot be the result of present deeds. Such feelings should be traced to experience in their previous lives.

(5) Inequalities among individuals in regard to the endowment with pleasures, pains, etc., show that the individuals should have existed before their present birth, and should have performed actions in the past and earned their present deserts.

(6) The souls are not observed to be produced, like the bodies. So, they must be eternal.

(7) The soul is not located in any part of the body; it does not move with the body; it is not a spatial substance. Hence, it is all-pervading—existing in all places at the same time.

The soul is a non-composite, partless, pervasive, eternal substance. There is an infinite number of souls.

7. God

God, in this system, is the supreme Self (*paramātmān*), all-pervading and eternal, like the souls. Postponing a consideration of the nature of God to the next chapter, we shall, here, set forth some of the arguments given by Udayana, in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, for the existence of God.

(1) Anything that is a product must have an intelligent agent as its efficient cause. As the law of causation is universal, there cannot be an effect without a cause. It cannot be maintained that only artifacts such as pots have intelligent agents, and not natural objects such as earth, mountains and rivers. There is universal concomitance between product-as-such and intelligent agency-as-such. It is only in the presence of the entire causal aggregate that an effect is produced. The efficient cause is included in the causal aggregate. If one were to say that the effect is produced even without an efficient cause, there would be rejection of the causal concept altogether. For an agent to produce an effect, what is necessary is that he should possess the requisite knowledge and will. The world as a whole is an effect, like a pot. The things constituting it are made of atoms -- Even as the order and arrangement that go into the making of a pot depend upon a potter, so also the disposition, etc., of the atoms that constitute the world require God as the creator and supervisor. The vastness and complexity of the world require a creator who must be omniscient and omnipotent. And, such a one is God.

(2) The atoms have to come together in order to constitute things. By themselves they cannot move because they are insentient. The conjunction of atoms which is responsible for cosmic creation implies an intelligent being who is responsible for bringing about this conjunction. And, that is God. It is he that, at the beginning of creation, introduces primary activity into the atoms.

(3) Things that have weight fall down. If they are to be held up, there are needed beings possessed with will as their support. In the universe there are luminaries and planets which revolve in their orbits. The agent who keeps them in their respective courses is God.

(4) It is not only creation, but also destruction that requires God as the agent. The ultimate disjunction of atoms which is cosmic destruction cannot be effected by the individual souls, because the atoms are beyond their ken. It is only God whose knowledge is infinite that can effect the dissolution of the world.

(5) There is no natural relation between a word and its meaning. There must be an agent who determines the denotation of a word at the beginning of creation. That agent is God.

(6) The different arts, like the art of writing, etc., require an author. That author is God.

(7) The Vedas which are composed of words must have been uttered by an intelligent being; they should have been produced by one who is omniscient: that omniscient being is God.

(8) According to the Vaiśeṣika atomic theory, two atoms coming together constitute a dyad. The notion of duality results from a complex cognition which is expressed in the form 'This is one' and 'That is one'. At the beginning of creation, the individual souls cannot have this notion because they are non-conscious then. But, at that time there must be some intelligent being whose enumerative cognition will account for the notion of duality. And that being is God.

Thus, in the Nyāya school, God is the creator of the universe, and its destroyer as well. He is Śiva who is all pervading, eternal, and omniscient.¹⁶

NOTES

1. See Mādhavācārya, *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* (The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1914), p. 244: *nyāyasya parārthānumānāparaparyāyasya sakalavyānugrāhatayā sarva-karmānuṣṭhāna-sādhana-tayā pradhānatvena tathā vyapadēso yujyate.*
2. Vācaspati, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatikā*, I i, 1. *pramānair artha-parīkṣaṇam.*
3. Kauṭilya quoted by Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, I, i, 1. Also by Mādhavācārya in his *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, p. 245.
4. *Chāndogya*, Vii, i, 2
5. *The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama*. Translated by Mr. Satiśa Chandra Vidyabhūṣana (The Panini Office, Allahabad, 1930), p. vi
6. Quoted from an appendix to the *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa* by Dharmendra Nath Shastri in his *An Outline of Critique of Indian Realism* (Institute of Indology, Delhi, 1964), p. 120 :
aiśvarya-mada-mattosi mām avajñāya vartase,
upasthitesu hi bauddhesu mad-adhīnā tava sthitiḥ.
7. See Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *op. cit.*, p. 115 "In the course of an argument, Jayanta says that he cannot lay any claim to originality. Then a question is asked : If it is so, why did you care to write a treatise at all ? In answer, he says : I have been thrown by the king into this dark dungeon where even a sound is not heard. Here I have passed my days by the diversion of writing this work."

8. Gaṅgeśa, *pratyakṣasya sāksātkāritvaṁ lakṣaṇam*. See *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Bibliotheca Indica), p. 546.
9. According to the Nyāya, the sense of hearing is a delimitation of ether, and sound is the quality of ether. As between substance and quality there is the relation of inherence (*samavāya*).
10. See *Vaiśeṣika Darśana* with *Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya* (Kasi Sanskrit Series, No. 3, 1923, p. 100).
yad anumeyena sambaddham prasiddham ca tad-anvite, tad-abhāve ca nāsty-eva tal-liṅgam anumāpakam.
11. *Vyabhicāra-jñāna-viraha-sahakṛtaṁ sahacāra-jñānam*.
12. Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, I. 1, 39.
13. Udayana, *Tātparya-parīśuddhi*.
14. Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarka-saṅgraha* (A Primer of Indian Logic by S. Kuppuswami Sastri, P. Varadachary & Co., Madras, 1932), p. 12.
15. A. B. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism* (The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1921), p. 174.
16. Haribhadra, *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* :
aksapāda mate devaḥ sṛṣṭi-saṁhāra-kṛc chivaḥ
vibhur nityaikāḥ sarvajño nitya-buddha-samāśrayaḥ.
(verse 13)
(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 95).

Chapter Ten

THE ATOMISTIC PLURALISM OF VAIŚEṢIKA

I. AN ANCIENT SCHOOL

The Vaiśeṣika is a system closely allied to the Nyāya. In the course of their development, the two traditions came to be amalgamated, and they were usually referred to in the hyphenated form: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In the last chapter we considered the doctrines that are distinctive of the Nyāya; in the present chapter, we shall set forth the concepts contributed by the Vaiśeṣika.

The Vaiśeṣika is a very old school of thought. Some of the early Buddhist texts contain allusions to the Vaiśeṣika concepts. From these allusions it is evident that the Buddhist tradition itself considered the Vaiśeṣika to be an ancient school. There is a reference to this system in the *Questions of Menander* (*Milinda-pañha*), where King Milinda is said to have been versed in Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nīti and Vaiśeṣika.¹ The Vaiśeṣika classification of actions into five kinds is referred to in another Buddhist text, the *Abhidarmamahāvibhāṣā-śāstra*, which was compiled at the Buddhist council held during the reign of Kaniṣka. In the Jaina works too, mention is made of the Vaiśeṣika. Of the two, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya, the former is a much older school.

The term 'Vaiśeṣika' is derived from *viśeṣa* which means 'excellence' or 'distinction'. The Vaiśeṣika is so called because, according to its followers, it *excels other systems*. In this sense, the name 'Vaiśeṣika' means 'superior to' or 'distinct from'. The name may also be connected with the doctrine of 'particularity' (*viśeṣa*) which is a peculiar feature of the Vaiśeṣika system. It is by this doctrine that the Vaiśeṣika seeks to sustain its pluralism.

As against all forms of idealism, the Vaiśeṣika, like the Nyāya, holds that the universe consists of a plurality of reals which are all externally related. The world exists independently of thinking minds. Our thinking makes no difference to the existence of facts. The knowledge-relation is an external relation. The physical world is out there, consisting of things, each of which is a collocation of atoms.

The first systematic exposition of the Vaiśeṣika was made by Kaṇāda (also called Kaṇabhuj or Kaṇabhakṣa) in his *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. The name 'Kaṇāda' means, according to some scholars, 'Atom-eater', and has reference to the atomic theory taught by Kaṇāda. According to other sources, "*Kaṇa*" means 'a grain (or a piece) of (rice) corn,' and *bhuj* or *bhakṣa* means 'to eat'. The origin of the name was that he was usually wandering about at night, but as young women were frightened by the sight of him he afterwards went in secret into mills, picked up pieces of corn from rice-bran, and ate them. He was consequently nicknamed the 'corn-piece-eater'.² Kaṇāda has other names also: Kāśyapa which is his family name, and Ulūka, in regard to the signifi-

cance of which there are different traditions. *Ulūka* means 'owl'. One version about this name is as follows : "In the daytime he meditated in a dense forest, secluding himself from worldly affairs, and at night, when people went to rest, he wandered about for food. This mode of living was very similar to that of an owl, so that he got the name *Ulūka*."³ In a Buddhist work, the *Kalpanā-manditīkā*, of Kumāralāta, "a story is related of a discussion between a Buddhist and a follower of the Vaiśeṣika. In that story the Buddhist compares the Buddha to the sun, and the Vaiśeṣika to an owl, the comparison obviously suggested by the word *Ulūka*, the name of the originator of the system."⁴ According to Rājaśekhara, a Jaina commentator on the *Nyāya-kandalī*, God appeared to Kaṇāda in the form of an owl (*ulūka-rūpa-dharī*), being pleased with his austerities, and instructed him in the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories. Hence, the system is called *Aulūkyā-darśana*.⁵

The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* is divided into ten chapters, each of which is sub-divided into two sections. There are references to a commentary on the *Sūtra* which is called *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*, but this work is not extant. The earliest available commentary is by Praśastapāda. His work is called *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha*; it is not a commentary in the usual sense, it is more an independent exposition of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines, with the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* as its basis. Of the commentaries on the *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha* may be mentioned Vyomaśiva's *Vyomāvatī*, Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-kandalī*, and Udayana's *Kirāṇvalī*.

Śivāditya, who was one of the pioneers of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, wrote a very useful manual, *Sapta-padārthī*, in which are combined the Nyāya epistemology and the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories.

2. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

There is nothing that is distinctive of the Vaiśeṣika theory of knowledge. Only, before its alliance with the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika admitted but two means of valid knowledge, viz, perception and inference, and regarded comparison and testimony as varieties of inference. The example for comparison that was given in the last chapter may be reduced, according to the Vaiśeṣika, to the following syllogism. "This animal is to be called *gavaya*, because it is like a cow, and whatever is like a cow bears the name *gavaya*" Testimony too is a form of inference. In inference, we argue from a sign or mark (say, smoke) to a conclusion (say, fire). So also in testimony, we draw an inference from a word to a thing signified by it. The validity of testimony is established by the Vaiśeṣika on the ground that the testimony is the utterance of a trustworthy person. So, this too is a case of inference.

3. THE SEVEN CATEGORIES

The characteristic doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika relates to the categories. A category (*padārtha*) is what can be known (*jñeya*) validly cognized (*prameya*), and named or denoted (*abhidheya*). A *padārtha* literally means the meaning (*artha*) of a word (*pada*), a namable or denotable thing. Śivāditya defines *padārthas*

as the objects of knowledge (*pratīti-viṣayāḥ padārthāḥ*). Originally six categories were recognized, depending on the six modes of observation and of the explanation of an object.⁷ Later on, non-existence was added as the seventh category, because it too is an object of knowledge.⁸ The seven categories are (1) substance (*dravya*), (2) quality (*guṇa*), (3) activity (*karma*), (4) generality (*sāmānya*), (5) particularity (*viśeṣa*), (6) inherence (*samavāya*), and (7) non-existence (*abhāva*).

(1) *Substance (dravya)*.

This is the principal category as it includes all things, living as well as non-living. *Dravya* is defined as the substrate of qualities and activity, and as the inherent cause of a product. There are nine substances : (i) earth (*pṛthivī*), (ii) water (*ap*), (iii) fire (*tejas*), (iv) air (*vāyu*), (v) ether (*ākāśa*), (vi) time (*kāla*), (vii) space (*dik*), (viii) self (*ātman*), and (ix) mind (*manas*).

The first four, viz., earth, water, fire, and air are in the form of atoms (*paramāṇus*) which are partless and eternal. Composite things such as pots and lakes are made of these atoms. And, into these atoms they are dissolved when they are destroyed. Ether is an element like the first four, but it does not consist of atoms. It is infinite, and does not produce anything. Time and space are infinite substances like ether. They condition the derivative objects such as pots, etc. Space is not the same as ether; it is that which is filled by ether.

Self which is the eighth in the list of substances is a spiritual entity. Though it is omnipresent and

eternal, it is limited by the psycho-physical organism with which it is associated during transmigration. Its attributes are cognition, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, merit, demerit, etc. These attributes are adventitious because they are not always present in the self. In the state of release, for instance, the self has no attributes whatsoever, not even consciousness. Mind which is the last substance is atomic and eternal. But unlike the first four, it does not give rise to any product. Each self has its own mind which is only an instrument of knowing and therefore inert. It is through the mind that the self experiences and goes through transmigration.

(2) *Quality (guṇa).*

Kaṇāda defines quality as that which has substance for its substratum, has no further qualities, and is not a cause of, nor has any concern with, conjunction or disjunction. Twenty-four qualities are listed, some of them being material and others mental. The qualities are : colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), touch (*spṛśa*), sound (*śabda*), number (*saṅkhyā*), size (*parimāṇa*), separateness (*pr̥thaktva*), conjunction (*saṁyoga*), disjunction (*vibhāga*), remoteness (*paratva*), proximity (*aparatva*), cognition (*buddhi*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), effort (*prayatna*), heaviness (*gurutva*), fluidity (*dravatva*), viscosity (*sneha*), faculty (*saṁskāra*), merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*). There is no particular virtue in the details of this list. All that we need note here is that some of them are common qualities (*sāmānya-*

guṇas), while the others are special qualities (*viśeṣa-guṇas*) of single substances.

(3) *Activity (karma).*

Karma has a special sense in the Vaiśeṣika system. It means physical motion, which is defined as that which resides only in one substance, is devoid of qualities, and is the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction. Motion is of five kinds—upward (*utkṣepaṇa*), downward (*avakṣepaṇa*), contraction (*ākuncana*), expansion (*prasāraṇa*), and locomotion (*gamana*).

(4) *Generality (sāmānya).*

Sāmānya or *jāti* is the generic feature that resides in all the members of a class. It is the common characteristic by virtue of possessing which an individual becomes a member of a class, e.g. animality, man-ness, etc. While the individual objects are many, come into being and pass away, the *sāmānya* is one (*eka*), eternal (*nitya*), and resides in the many (*anekānugata*). While men are born and they die after some time, man-ness which is common to all mankind is eternal. Like Plato's Ideas, the *sāmānya* has a reality of its own independent of the particulars. Generalities are of different grades. The highest is the *para*; it is 'Beinghood'. The lowest is the *apara*, like 'potness', etc. The intermediate grades are called *parāpara*, e.g. earthness. *Sāmānya* resides in substances, qualities, and activities. The relation between *sāmānya* and the individual is inherence (*samavāya*).

(5) *Particularity (viśeṣa)*.

Viśeṣa is an important category for the Vaiśeṣika, for upon it depends the system's pluralism. It is the feature which distinguishes one individual from another. It is the differentia of ultimate things which are otherwise alike. Thus two atoms of earth are alike in every respect. But if still they should be two, there must be a distinctive feature in each. Similarly, there should be a special trait in each of the selves which marks it off from the rest. This differentiating feature is its *viśeṣa*. The *viśeṣas* are innumerable, as the eternal substances (*nitya-dravyas*) are so. The particularities differentiate not only the ultimate substances from one another, but also themselves (*svato vyāvartaka*).

(6) *Inherence (samavāya)*.

Samavāya is an intimate relation between inseparables. It is to be distinguished from *saṁyoga* (conjunction) which is a temporary relation between two substances which can exist separately. In the Vaiśeṣika, *saṁyoga* is one of the qualities. *Samavāya* or inherence is a separate category. The entities which it relates are inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*), i.e. at least one of them cannot remain without its relation to the other. Inherence obtains between five kinds of inseparables: (1) substance and quality, (2) substance and activity, (3) particular and generality, (4) eternal substance and particularity, (5) whole and parts.

(7) *Non-existence (abhāva)*.

Abhāva is a name for all negative facts. It is defined as that which neither has *samavāya* nor is *samavāya*. It implies the negation of something somewhere. There are four kinds of non-existence: (i) *Prāg-abhāva* or prior non-existence. This is the non-existence of a product, say pot, before its production. It is without a beginning, but comes to an end when the object in question is produced. (ii) *Pradhavam-sābhāva* or annihilative non-existence. This is the non-existence of a thing after it is destroyed. It has a beginning but no end. (iii) *Anyonyābhāva* or reciprocal non-existence. Another name for it is difference (*bheda*). In statements like 'A is not B', the significance of 'not' is reciprocal non-existence. It is the same as saying 'A is different from B'. This type of non-existence is eternal. (iv) *Atyantābhāva* or absolute non-existence. When we say 'On this ground there is no pot', it is a case of *atyantābhāva*. Here we are predicating of the ground the non-existence of pot. This type of non-existence also is held to be eternal.

Having explained the seven categories, we shall turn to some of the philosophical doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika which are shared by the Nyāya also.

4. THE ATOMIC THEORY

As we have seen, the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air, are atomic in their primary form. That this should be so is because composite things are divisible into parts, and the process of division stops when the indivisible minimum is reached. There cannot be

endless division, for that would lead to infinite regress. The minutest conceivable particle of matter which cannot be further divided is the atom (*paramāṇu*). It is out of the atoms that material things are formed. The variety that is observed in the universe is due to the number of atoms that go into the composition of a thing, and also to the qualitative differences between the kinds of atoms. The four kinds of atoms, viz., earth, water, fire, and air, differ qualitatively; their distinctive qualities, respectively are: smell, taste, colour, and touch. The atoms are said to be globular (*parimāṇḍalya*). This however, does not mean that they have parts. The atoms are non-spatial, and have no inside or outside. From non-spatial atoms things occupying space are formed because of the particular number and arrangement of the atoms in each case. At first, two atoms come together and constitute a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*); then three such dyads combine and give rise to a triad (*tryaṇuka*). This is the smallest visible substance. From the triads grouped in different ways, the various things are produced. Each thing is homogeneous in the sense that its component atoms are of the same class. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not recognise the inter-mixture of atoms. When things disintegrate, it is because of disjunction of the constituent atoms. There is no ultimate destruction because the atoms, as we have seen, are eternal.

5. THEORY OF CAUSATION

Just as atomism as formulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśe-
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śika is designed to justify the system's pluralistic view, so is its particular theory of causation.

Cause and effect are related as antecedent and consequent. But any and every antecedent is not the cause of an event. The perching of a crow on a palm tree may precede the falling of a fruit from the tree; but the two are not causally related, for everytime a crow sits, a fruit is not seen to fall. The antecedent that is the cause should, thus, be not only immediate but also invariable. Invariability, again, is not enough. Day precedes night invariably; so is the flash of gunfire the invariable antecedent of the loud report. But in neither of these cases is there a causal relation. Besides antecedence and invariability there is a third condition which is indispensability. The cause is the indispensable or necessary antecedent of the effect. To use a technical term employed in this system, the antecedent should be *ananyathāsiddha*, i.e. the cause should be an antecedent which is not made out to be otherwise than indispensable. A dispensable antecedent is not the cause of an event. Anything that is not indispensable for the production of an effect is a dispensable antecedent. For example, a donkey may happen to be there, when a piece of cloth is woven; but it is not an indispensable antecedent. Similarly, the weaver's father is not an indispensable factor in the production of cloth. Only those invariable and immediate antecedents that are unconditional or necessary are the causal aggregate responsible for the production of an effect.

Causes are of three kinds; inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*), and occasioning or efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*).

The inherent cause is that in which the effect inheres when it is produced. The component parts (*avayavāḥ*), like threads, constitute the inherent cause of a composite substance (*avayavin*), like cloth. Similarly, a substance is the inherent cause of the quality or activity which is produced in it, as a fruit in relation to its yellow colour, or a horse in respect of its movement. It must be noted here that the term 'inherent cause' does not mean that the cause inheres in the effect, but that 'the cause which is capable of producing the effect that inheres in it.' Thus, with reference to the examples cited already (the cloth inheres in the threads, the yellow colour in the fruit, and movement in the horse), it will be seen that 'inherent cause' is a term which is wider than 'material cause'; while the threads are the material cause of cloth, the fruit is not the material cause of colour, or the horse of its movement.

The non-inherent cause is that cause which, under no circumstance, could be treated as an inherent cause. Substances alone can be inherent causes. Qualities and activities alone can be non-inherent causes. The term '*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*' should not be taken to mean 'a cause which does not inhere in a substratum'. In fact, every non-inherent cause inheres somewhere. The term has only the significance of excluding inherent causality. The non-inherent cause is simply that which is not the

inherent cause, but which inheres in the inherent cause and is also responsible for the production of an effect. Thus, with reference to the production of cloth, the conjunction of threads is the non-inherent cause, because the conjunction co-inheres along with its effect i.e. cloth, in the common substratum, i.e. threads, in other words, both conjunction and cloth are related to the threads by way of inherence. Similarly, the colour of the threads is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the cloth. Here, the common substratum is cloth, the relation connecting the effect, i.e. the colour of the cloth, with the substratum is inherence, and the relation connecting the cause, i.e. the colour of the threads, with the substratum is co-inherence.

The occasioning or efficient cause is that which does not fall under either of the categories of cause we have discussed so far. For instance, the shuttle, the loom, and the weaver are the occasioning causes of cloth. The occasioning cause is no less important than the other two types of cause. Without the intelligent agent (*kartā*) who is the efficient cause, and also the accessories, there will be no production of any effect.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation is known as *ārambha-vāda*, as distinguished from the *parināma-vāda* of the Sāṅkhya which we shall consider in the next chapter. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, 'to come into being' means 'to spring up at a certain point of time and not to have existed before'. Every product is hemmed in between two non-existences, viz., prior non-existence and annihilative non-existence. A pot for

instance, was not before it was produced; and it will not come into being again after it is destroyed. Anything that is produced is produced anew. That is why 'effect' (*kārya*) is defined as the counter-correlate of its prior non-existence (*kāryam prāg-abhāva-pratīyogī*). The effect is invariably preceded by its prior non-existence. For this reason, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation is also known as *ast-kārya-vāda*, the theory of the prior non-existence of the effect. This, however, does not mean that an effect arises out of nothing. The truth of the dictum *ex nihilo nihil fit* is admitted. But what is meant is that in the causal aggregate that produces an effect is included its own prior non-existence. To ignore this is to disregard the essential difference between a cause and its effect. If the production of a pot means no more than manifesting an already existent pot, then it will not be distinct from the lamp lighting up the pot that is kept in a dark place.

It will thus be realized how essential the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation is for the pluralistic *Weltanschauung* of this system. Everything is discrete, and should be differentiated from everything, even the effect from its cause.

6. NATURE AND DESTINY OF THE SOUL

The soul or self (*ātman*), as we had occasion to note, is one of the substances. It is not a material but spiritual substance. Although the soul is supersensible and therefore cannot be perceived, its existence is affirmed on the evidence of scripture and inference. The existence of the soul is inferred on the ground that

consciousness is its property—consciousness which cannot be ascribed to the physical body, sense-organs or the mind. Consciousness, however, is not an essential characteristic of the soul; it is only an accidental property. The difference between matter and soul is that while the former is not capable of being conscious, the latter is. On the basis of differences in status, condition, etc., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues that there is a plurality of souls.

The soul by nature is eternal, all-pervading and infinite. But on account of ignorance and the unseen potency (*adr̥ṣṭa*) caused thereby, it is caught in the transmigratory tract of repeated embodiment. The soul's association with a physical body and mind constitutes its bondage. The physical body lasts for a single span of life. For the next span, another body gets formed. But the mind continues till the soul is liberated.

The cultivation of ethical virtues and the acquisition of knowledge constitute the means to liberation. Knowledge here means insight into the true nature of the categories. If one knows that the body is but a collocation of atoms, and that the objects too are atomic compounds, one would cease to be attached to them. Similarly if one realizes the true nature of the self as the eternal non-material substance, one would no longer be affected by the vagaries of *saṁsāra*. The unseen potency (*adr̥ṣṭa*) in the form of merit and demerit will become a spent force, and the soul will regain its true nature.

In the state of release, the soul is separated from all its qualities, including consciousness. The soul's condition then is comparable to that of a stone. Release does not bring to the soul any experience of pleasure or happiness. There is no unmixed happiness possible. If absolute freedom from pain is the goal, this can be gained only when there is no happiness also. Happiness which is a positive entity can exist only for two moments. If it is to be continually enjoyed, there must be constant effort which would involve the perpetuation of bondage. If the goal be the negative one of freedom from pain, then there is no such contingency. The destruction of pain is annihilative non-existence, and therefore it will endure for ever afterwards. Release, in this system, is called *apavarga*, escape from pain.

7. God

The Vaiśeṣika view of God is almost the same as that of the Naiyāyika. Originally the Vaiśeṣika seems to have believed that the unseen potency (*adr̥ṣṭa*) could by itself account for the aggregation of atoms which marks creation and the soul's involvement in the world-process. But very soon the unsatisfactory nature of this belief came to be recognized. How could an insentient force like the unseen potency bring about the ordered course of things? The world-order requires an intelligent designer; it requires a designer who is all-knowing. God, thus, is the efficient cause of world-creation. Although he belongs to the class of souls, he is distinguished in that he alone has omniscience and

omnipotence He has in him lordly powers, and is the moral governor of the kingdom of souls. It is as supervised by him that the souls get their deserts; and it is by his grace that they progress towards, and finally reach the goal which is release from bondage.

Like the Naiyāyika, the Vaiśeṣika too is a follower of Śaivism. He identifies God with the Lord Śiva. In the *Samksepasārīraka*, an Advaita work, the author Sarvajñātman describes Śiva who has the bull-emblem for his banner as the lord who is worshipped by eminent sages like Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system. The *Saptapīḍāṛthī* which expounds the seven categories begins with an invocation to Lord Śiva :

*hetave jagatām eva saṁsārānava setave,
prabhāve sarva-vidyānām śaṁbhāve gurave namaḥ.*

“Obcissance to the Lord Śaṁbhu, who is the cause of the world, who is the bridge across the ocean of transmigration, and who is the teacher of all the knowledge-disciplines”.

NOTES

1. H. N. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools* (Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 12.
2. H. Ui, *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, according to the *Daśapadārthaśāstra*, Chinese Text (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1962), p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
4. D. N. Shastri, *An Outline of Critique of Indian Realism* (Institute of Indology, Delhi, 1964), p. 86. Also H. Ui, *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

5. D. N. Shastri, *op. cit.*, p. 96; H. Ui, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
6. *The Sapta-padārthī*, 2.
7. H. Ui, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
8. The author (Chan-tā-lo, in Chinese, meaning Moon, Candra) of the *Daśapadārtha-śāstra*, has three more categories: potentiality, non-potentiality and commonness. See H. Ui. *op. cit.*, p. 93 f.
9. See iii, 264: *kaṇabhugādi-munivarah prabhuḥ*: Edited by N. Veezhinathan (Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1972), p. 478.

Chapter Eleven

THE SPIRIT-MATTER DUALISM OF SĀṆKHYA

1. THE SĀṆKHYA TRADITION

The Sāṅkhya is a system of realism, dualism, and pluralism. It is a realism because it recognizes the reality of the external world; it is a dualism because it holds that there are two fundamental realities, distinct from each other, viz spirit and matter; and it is a pluralism because it believes in a plurality of spirits. It is, in short, a qualitative dualism and a numerical pluralism. While in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, many kinds of matter and many souls are recognized, in the Sāṅkhya system, unity is achieved in the realm of matter, though plurality is retained in the sphere of souls.

The history of the Sāṅkhya tradition is quite a long one. There are references to Sāṅkhya concepts in some of the Upaniṣads, such as the *Kaṭha*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Śvetāśvatara*, and *Maṭṭrāyaṇīya*. In the *Mokṣadharmā* and *Anugītā* sections of the *Mahābhārata*, as also in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, there are expositions of the Sāṅkhya doctrines. The Buddhist teacher Aśvaghoṣa summarizes the system in his *Buddhacarita*. An account of the Sāṅkhya is to be found in Caraka's medical treatise. Manu mentions Sāṅkhya tenets occasionally. There is an account of the system in the Tamil classic, the *Manimekhalai*.

In its early phase, the Sāṅkhya seems to have appeared in a variety of forms. From the Chinese

sources it is learnt that there were eighteen Sāṅkhya schools. Two of the most important schools were those of Pañcaśikha and Vārṣagaṇya. Under the overall scheme of the distinction between spirit and matter, variations in regard to particular doctrines became possible. Thus, early Sāṅkhya was in a fluid state; and it was much later that there arose what is generally referred to as the classical Sāṅkhya with a definitive system.

Kapila who is said to be the founder of Sāṅkhya is a venerable sage, according to Indian tradition. It is stated that he was born at Puskara, and that he took residence at Gangā-sāgara. It is surmised that Kapila-vastu, the city to which Prince Siddhārtha who became the Buddha belonged, was founded under the inspiration of the sage Kapila. The *Bhagavad-gītā* describes Kapila as a *muni* (ascetic) and *siddha* (accomplished one). A story is told regarding his stupendous miraculous powers. Sagara, a king of Ayodhyā, sent his sixty thousand sons to recover his sacrificial horse which had been stolen. The sons found the animal in the nether world tied near the place where Kapila was practising his austerities. They thought that it was the sage that had smuggled the horse, and accused him. This enraged Kapila, and he reduced them to ashes. The name 'Kapila' is mentioned in the *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad*; but this māyā not refer to the sage who taught the Sāṅkhya. Kapila is said to have imparted the Sāṅkhya teaching to Āsuri, and the latter in turn to Pañcaśikha. Vārṣagaṇya is also, as we have seen, an early teacher of Sāṅkhya.

No work of any of these early teachers is extant now. The *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* which is ascribed to Kapila is a very late work, it could not have been composed earlier than the fourteenth century A.D. The earliest authoritative book on the classical Sāṅkhya is the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This is a manual of seventy verses, and evidently draws upon earlier works which are not available. It was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (sixth century A.D.). There are several commentaries on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, including one by Gauḍapāda (probably different from the Advaita teacher who wrote the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*), and another by Vācaspati, which is known as the *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī*. A work called *Tattva-samāsa* is also an important manual; it has been wrongly attributed to Kapila. The *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* whose complete name is *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-sūtra* is in six chapters; it has been commented on, among others, by Vijñāna-bhikṣu (sixteenth century).

The term 'Sāṅkhya' means 'discriminative knowledge', and also 'enumeration'. Both the meanings are in place because, in the system, spirit is sought to be discriminatively known as apart from matter, and the various principles or categories are enumerated—primal nature and its evolutes, and spirit that does not belong to the evolutionary scheme.

2. THE CONCEPT OF MIND

The two basic categories recognized in the Sāṅkhya system are, as we shall see later, spirit (*puruṣa*) and

matter (*prakṛti*) The spirit cannot be the subject of experience, because it is of the nature of pure consciousness, unattached and unrelated to anything. Nor can matter be the experient, because it is insentient. The first evolutes in sequence from primal matter are the intellect (*buddhi* or *mahat*)¹ and egoity (*ahaṅkāra*); and from the latter there emerges the mind (*manas*). These three constitute, on the subjective side, what is known as the internal organ (*antahkaraṇa*), and what is popularly referred to in the English language as 'mind'. The mind too cannot be the experiencing subject, because it also is insentient, like its source, primal matter. What, then, is the subject of experience? Who is it that knows, experiences, feels, wills, acts, and reaps the consequences? The answer is: the empirical self which is a blend of the spirit and the mind. Although the spirit, by itself, is unattached, it appears as if the agent on account of the mind's association with it. It is the spirit's reflection in the mind that renders the latter intelligent, as it were, and accounts for the so-called sentient functions of knowing, feeling, and willing.

A modification of the mind is technically called *vṛtti*. In the perception of an object, for instance, what happens is this: the *vṛtti* or mental mode flows out through the appropriate sense-channel, reaches the object and takes on its form, thereby occasioning the reflection of the spirit thereon; and it is thus that the object becomes known. It is not only in perception, but in other forms of knowledge also, it is through *vṛtti* that experience results

3. KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

Knowledge is made possible by the instrumentation of the psychic medium which is *ṛtti*. So, what is known directly is the form of the object which the *ṛtti* has assumed, and not the object itself. This does not mean that Sāṅkhya favours subjective idealism; for, according to it, all knowledge has necessarily an extra-mental reference. The *ṛtti* does not take the place of the object; it only serves as the connecting link between the knowing subject and the known object.

Sāṅkhya accepts three means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇas*): perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and testimony (*śabda*). The Sāṅkhya account of these avenues of knowledge is almost the same as that of the Nyāya. We shall here take note of those points where there is difference between the two systems.

(i) The Sāṅkhya, as does the Nyāya, recognizes two stages in perception, indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*). But the explanation of these offered by it is different from that of the other system. Indeterminate perception, here, is not the perception of detached elements which are synthesized at the level of determinate perception. Perception is, at first, a vague awareness which later becomes clear and distinct through analysis, synthesis, and interpretation. So, the Sāṅkhya does not favour the mosaic theory of knowledge. According to it, knowledge is to be compared to organic growth from the simple to the complex, from the implicit to the explicit.

The perceptual process is described thus: The senses perceive objects indeterminately and bring such

perceptions to the *manas* (mind, as one of the faculties of the internal organ), which synthesizes them and takes them to *ahaṅkāra* (egoity). Egoity refers the percepts to the self which commissions the *buddhi* (intellect) to ascertain their nature. The procedure is analogous to the system of revenue collection. The village-accountant collects the taxes from the landholders and remits them to the mayor, who in his turn sends them to the governor. It is the function of the governor to see to it that the collected taxes reach the king's treasury.

(ii) The classification of inference is into *vāta* and *avāta*. The *vāta* type is that where there is positive concomitance between the *hetu* (*probans*) and *sādhya* (*probandum*). There are two varieties of *vāta* inference: *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. The former is based on observed concomitance of the specific *probans* and *probandum*, as, for instance, of smoke and fire. The concomitance is known through prior perception, as in the hearth. Where, however, perception is not possible, the concomitance is known through similarity. Such inference is called *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. For example, it is inferred that the perception of sound, colour, etc., requires the functioning of sense-organs. Neither the sense-organs nor their functionings are objects of perception. The inference is based on the similarity between the perception of colour, etc., on the one hand, and other acts, such as cutting, etc., on the other, which latter are objects of perception. The reasoning is this: just as the act of cutting requires an instrumental cause, the perception of colour, etc., requires the functioning of sense organs.

Avīta inference is otherwise known as *śeṣavat*, and is essentially negative in character. It is based on the co-absence of the *probandum* and the *probans*. In this type of inference, no positive instance is available, and only negative instances may be cited. Let us illustrate : 'The effect is non-different from the cause (cloth is non-different from threads), because the effect is seen to inhere in the cause as a property thereof. No positive instances can be given, because all instances will fall within what is sought to be proved. So, we have to argue only in a negative way. If the effect and the cause were different, inherence would not be possible, as, for instance, between cow and horse. But, there is inherence between effect (cloth) and cause (threads); hence they are non-different.'²

(iii) Testimony is valid when the source is reliable. It may come not only from scripture but also from persons who are trustworthy.

Over and above the three means of valid knowledge recognized by the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya reckons comparison (*upamāna*) as an independent *pramāṇa*. According to the Sāṅkhya, however, this is to be included in inference (*anumāna*).

The Sāṅkhya, which is a realism, considers correspondence to be the nature of truth. It is true that knowledge, as we have seen, arises only through a psychic medium. In other words, the mind is not in contact with the object directly, it knows but the idea of the object. But as the prototype of the idea there must be the object. Also, if there were no trans-subjective basis, the agreement among individuals in regard

to their experience of an identical object would become unintelligible. Thus, knowledge has an extra-mental reference. That knowledge is true which bears correspondence with the facts outside. Correspondence there is, if the mode of the mind concerned represents correctly the object perceived. The idea or mental mode is not an exact copy of the object; because the mind contributes its own share to the constitution of the image. The accumulated impressions give a particular bent to the mind. As is the bent or slant, so will be the image of the object perceived. This accounts for the fact that the percepts of the same object which different individuals come to have are not identical but only similar. The mind, however, does not add anything new to the sense-data; it is only selective in what it perceives. It chooses from the given, and the choice will depend upon its particular mood at the time.

What we have just said will enable us to understand the theory of error held by the Sāṅkhya. Error, here, is not one of commission, as in the Nyāya, but one of omission, it is not a case of mal-observation, but of non-observation. The theory of error is known as, akhyāti (non-apprehension). When one mistakes nacre for silver and makes the judgment 'This is silver', where does the error lie? There is no error in regard to the 'this' which is seen; nor is there error in regard to the 'silver' which is remembered. The error is due to the non-apprehension of the non-relation between the seen 'this' and the remembered 'silver'. In other words, there is error because of the failure to note that 'this' and 'silver' are not related as subject

and predicate. On account of the mental mood of the percipient at the time, the peculiarities of the 'this' such as its having a dark exterior, etc., are obscured, as also the remembered nature of 'silver'. And so, there is non-discrimination between the 'this' and the 'silver'. Thus, error arises from 'non-apprehension' (*akhyāti*), or non-discrimination (*aviveka*), it is to be traced to incomplete knowledge. When the error is removed, what happens is that nothing of what was cognized earlier is sublated. In the illustration given above, neither the 'this' nor the 'silver' is contradicted. As M. Hiriyanna puts it, "Truth does not supplant, but only supplements what is given in the so-called error."²

A modification is effected in the theory set forth above in the *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-sūtra* which, we had occasion to note, is a very late work. The modification is that an ideal element is introduced into error which renders it a positive misconception. When one sees a piece of crystal as red in the proximity of a hibiscus flower, what happens, according to the modified theory, is this : The crystal is the given, and not redness. The latter is fancied as belonging to the crystal. Though the relata are real, the relation between them is not so. In error, thus, there is a combination of what is given and what is not. This theory is known as *sad-asat-khyāti* (apprehension of what is and what is not).

In regard to the question of the intrinsic or extrinsic nature of validity and invalidity, the Sāṅkhya adopts a view which is quite the opposite of the Nyāya standpoint. While for the Nyāya, both validity (truth) and invalidity (error) are extrinsic to knowledge, for the

Sāṅkhya, both of them are intrinsic. The Sāṅkhya view is based on its theory of cause which we shall consider subsequently. But we may state here in brief that, according to the theory of cause known as *sat-kārya-vāda*, the effect is pre-existent in the cause. This being so, validity and invalidity which become manifest in cognitions must pre-exist in them. Cognitions are intrinsically valid or invalid. The causes that give rise to a cognition make it valid or invalid, no other factor is required for this purpose. Similarly, that which makes a cognition known, also makes it known whether that cognition is valid or invalid. Thus, validity is intrinsic to cognitions, as also invalidity (*prāmāṇyam svataḥ, aprāmāṇyam svataḥ*).

4 THEORY OF CAUSATION

We have already seen that, according to the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, causation means new production, that the effect is different from the cause, that before it is produced it is not present in the cause. This theory, we may recall, is known as *asat-kārya-vāda* or *ārambha-vāda*.

As against this view, the Sāṅkhya advocates *sat-kārya-vāda* or *pariṇāma-vāda*. Causation, for the Sāṅkhya, is the manifestation of what is in a latent condition in the cause. That is, the effect exists already in the cause in a potential state, and the causal operation only makes patent what is latent in the cause. Oil is already contained in the sesamum seeds. Pressing the seeds only makes the oil explicit. To take another example : There is no substantial difference between clay

and pot. In clay, the form of pot is obstructed by the form which is natural to clay. The removal of the form of clay which obstructs the form of pot from manifesting itself is what is popularly known as the production or the origination of pot. A change in the collocation of atoms in the cause is what is regarded as production of the effect. Nothing new is added to the cause in order to produce the effect. The same atoms that constituted the cause appear in the effect in a different arrangement. The pot is not different from clay except in respect of its shape. Causation, thus, only renders that manifest which was previously in an unmanifested state or brings about a change of form. Causation is nothing more than manifestation or transformation (*pariṇāma*). We shall see how this theory of causation is central to the Sāṅkhya philosophy when we come to discuss the doctrine of world-evolution.

5. PURUṢA AND PRAKṚTI

According to the dualistic metaphysics of Sāṅkhya, there are two basic categories, *puruṣa* (spirit) and *prakṛti* (matter), which are of diametrically opposed natures. Spirit is not what matter is, matter is not what spirit is.⁴ Spirit is conscious, but non-active. Matter is active, but non-conscious. Spirit is unchanging and pure. Matter is that which constantly changes and evolves into the world. Spirits are many. Matter is one. Thus, the contrast between the two is complete. Although the two are opposed to each other by nature, it is by a cooperation between the two that evolution is effected. In the presence of spirit, matter

evolves. And, the evolution of matter is for the sake of providing enjoyment for spirit, as also for liberating it from bondage. This we shall explain later.

6. PRAKṚTI AND ITS EVOLUTION

Primal matter which is the prius of evolution is called *prakṛti*. It is also known as *pradhāna* because it is the *principal* source from which evolution starts, and *avyakta* because, prior to the starting of evolution, it remains in the unmanifest state. Just because it is unmanifest, it cannot be said that *prakṛti* does not exist. Non-perception may be due to many reasons, such as extreme distance or very near proximity, defective sense-organ or mental distraction, subtlety or suppression, etc. *Prakṛti* is not perceived because it is subtle. But it can be inferred from its effects. As we have already seen, every effect implies a cause from which it has evolved. The evolutionary process, therefore, could not have come out of nothing; it must have as its cause primal nature which is *prakṛti*.

The following are some of the arguments advanced for postulating the existence of *prakṛti*: (i) Particular objects constituting the world are limited and dependent. They cannot be the cause of the world. As the cause of the world, there must be admitted what is unlimited and independent. That is *prakṛti*. (ii) All particular things possess certain common characteristics. They partake of the nature of pleasure, pain, and indifference. The cause also must possess the same characteristics. That which is characterized by these together is *prakṛti*. (iii) All effects arise from the activity

of some cause. The primal cause from which the world-evolution arises cannot be equated with any of the stages in the evolution. It must include all of them, be immanent in them, and be also greater than the entire evolutionary process. That cause is *prakṛti*.

(iv) An effect cannot be its own cause. There must be one root-cause for all the effects put together. That is *prakṛti*. (v) The universe presents a unity. The postulation of several causes cannot account for this unity. It is only a single cause that could have produced this universe. That cause is *prakṛti*.


Prakṛti is a composite of three constituents called *guṇas*. The term *guṇa* in the Sāṅkhya does not mean 'quality' as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The two other meanings of the term are, (1) rope, and (2) what is subsidiary. The *guṇas* are like the three strands of a rope with which the souls are bound. They are subsidiary in the sense that they are, as we have indicated, for the sake of the souls as they provide enjoyment for them, and also serve to liberate them finally. The *guṇas* are subtle entities or fine substances forming the *prakṛti*-complex; they are the stuff which evolves into the various categories of existence.

The three *guṇas* are *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. *Sattva* is intelligence-stuff which makes for all that is fine and light; *rajas* is energy-stuff which is responsible for activity; and *tamas* is mass-stuff which accounts for all that is coarse and heavy. As one of the proofs stated, pleasure, pain, and indifference constitute the common characteristics of things. From this we infer that the first cause, *prakṛti*, must have as its components

sattva, *rajas*, and *tamas*. When these *guṇas* are of equal force, they are in a state of tension, and evolution (*śṛṣṭi*) does not take place. It is only when their balance is upset that the process of evolution begins. But nevertheless, even when there is no evolution, *prakṛti* is not inactive. Only, in that state of dissolution (*pralaya*), each of the *guṇas* reproduces itself without giving rise to unlike forms. This latter phenomenon happens when there occurs imbalance among the *guṇas*. The upsetting of the balance is the occasion for the destruction of *prakṛti*, i.e. the ending of the state of dissolution, and the starting of the evolutionary process.

Of the three *guṇas*, the first to gain a dominating force is *sattva*. As a result of this, the first evolute to emerge is *maḥat*, which literally means 'the great'. It is called 'the great' because, of the manifested categories, it is the first, and is the seed of the rest. In its psychological aspect, it is referred to as *buddhi* which means 'intellect'. From *maḥat* evolves *ahaṅkāra*, the principle of individuation or egoity. *Ahaṅkāra* is that which makes for the 'I' sense. After this the evolutionary process bifurcates into a psychological branch, and a physical branch. In the evolutes that appear on the former branch, the dominant *guṇa* is *sattva*; in the physical evolutes, it is *tamas* that is dominant. The other *guṇa*, *rajas*, provides the dynamism and force required for the dual evolution. The psychological evolutes are : mind (*manas*), the five cognitive sense organs (*jñānendriyas*), viz the senses of hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell, and the five conative sense organs (*karmendriyas*), viz. the senses of speech, prehension, movement, excretion.

and reproduction. The physical evolutes are: the five subtle essences called *tanmātras*, viz. the essences of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, and the five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*) which emerge from the essences, viz. ether, air, fire, water, and earth



With the emergence of the psychical evolutes, on the one hand, and the gross elements, on the other, the primary evolution stops. There are no further categories of existence (*tattvas*) emerging. Out of these psychical and physical evolutes are produced the organic beings and material things that constitute the world.

Of the twenty-four principles or categories of existence (*tattvas*), *prakṛti* is evolvent alone and not evolute. It is that from which all other categories evolve. As it is the first cause, it is not a product of anything else. *Mahat*, *ahankāra*, and the five *tanmātras* are both evolvents and evolutes; they give rise to the principles which succeed them, and are emergents from those which precede them. For instance, *ahankāra* is evolvent in respect of the psychical evolutes and the *tanmātras*, and is an evolute of *mahat*. The remaining

categories, viz mind, the cognitive and conative sense-organs, and the gross elements are evolutes only. They are the last items in the scheme of primary evolution. The twenty-fifth category which is *puruṣa* (spirit) is neither evolvent nor evolute.

There is not much in common between the Sāṅkhya theory of evolution and the concept of biological evolution. In the Sāṅkhya, evolution does not stand for the growth of an indefinite incoherent homogeneity into a definite coherent heterogeneity. *Prakṛti*, the first member in the Sāṅkhya doctrine of evolution, has no parity with the amoeba, the most elementary living organism. And also, the evolution of *prakṛti* has a purpose, though unconscious. The purpose is, as we have seen, to afford enjoyment to *puruṣa* in this world. and eventually to liberate it from bondage. Just as the milk that flows through the udder of the cow is for the benefit of the calf, so, it is said, is the evolution of the categories for the sake of *puruṣa*.

It is difficult to explain why *prakṛti* should evolve for the sake of *puruṣa*, and how the evolution starts in the presence of *puruṣa*. To get over this difficulty, several analogies are employed. One analogy we have already given: that of the cow yielding milk for the benefit of the calf. Some of the other analogies are the following: (i) Just as in the proximity of a magnet the iron filings begin to move, so in the presence of *puruṣa*, *prakṛti* starts evolving. (ii) The association of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is like that of a lame man and his blind companion, which enables them to reach their common destination. (iii) As a dancer retires behind

the stage after having exhibited her charms to the audience, so does *prakṛti* cease from enticing the *puruṣa* after the purpose of evolution has been fulfilled.

7. PURUṢA, ITS NATURE AND DESTINY

Spirit, we have seen, is of the nature of pure consciousness. It is non-active, i.e. passive. It is not an agent; it is but a patient enjoyer. As everything is sought to be proved in this system, so is the existence of spirit (*puruṣa*). (i) *Prakṛti* and its evolutes are composite in character. Whatever is composite serves the purpose of a being other than itself. That other being is spirit. (ii) All objects of knowledge are composed of the three *guṇas*. Objects imply a subject which itself is not an object of experience. That subject which experiences, and is not a composite of *guṇas*, is *puruṣa*. (iii) The experiences come in bits. They require to be co-ordinated, which is possible only by a presiding consciousness. That conscious reality is *puruṣa*. (iv) *Prakṛti* which is non-intelligent cannot experience or enjoy its evolutes. There must be an intelligent experient and enjoyer of the evolutes of *prakṛti* : that is *puruṣa*. (v) There is the striving for release. This implies the existence of *puruṣa* which strives for and obtains release.

The Sāṅkhya also offers arguments for a plurality of *puruṣas*. The arguments, however, it should be noted, establish the doctrine of many empirical souls, and not that of a plurality of transcendent spirits. If there is only one spirit, it is argued, birth, death, etc., should be one for the whole universe; if one person is

blind or deaf, all should be blind or deaf; if one acts, all should act in the same way; if one suffers or enjoys, all should similarly suffer or enjoy. But, the evidence that the world presents is of a nature which is quite the opposite: Individuals are born, and they die at different times, their actions and experiences are diverse in character. Therefore, says the Sāṅkhya, it must be admitted that the *puruṣas* are many.

But paradoxically, the Sāṅkhya holds that *puruṣa* in itself has neither birth nor death, that it is changeless, immutable, eternal. What is subject to experience and the empirical process is the phenomenal self which, we have seen, is a blend of spirit and mind. In other words, it is the reflection of spirit in the mind (here, the complex of psychical factors, viz *buddhi*, *ahankāra*, and *manas*) that transmigrates, leaves off a physical body, and takes on a new one, acts and reaps the consequences of its acts, strives for release and gains it eventually. *Puruṣa* has nothing to do with this process. Yet, on account of ignorance (*avidyā*), it identifies itself with its reflection and imagines that it is the experient, agent, etc. This is bondage for *puruṣa*, caused by non-discrimination (*aviveka*) between spirit and the products of *prakṛti*. When the spirit knows that it has nothing to do with *prakṛti*, it is liberated. It realizes its aloneness or aloofness (*kaivalya*) from *prakṛti*. It becomes completely freed from all types of sorrow. Although there is no positive pleasure in the state of release, for pleasure is the fruit of *sattva-guṇa*, there is undisturbable peace for the spirit which has regained its nature as pure consciousness. The moment there is

discrimination (*viveka*)—not only theoretical but experiential—there is release. Release, therefore, need not wait till the falling off of the present body. Release can be gained even while the body lasts. This is called *jīvan-mukti*, release while yet tenanting the body. The continuance of the body after release, it is said, is due to that part of the past *karma* which has brought it about. When this residual *karma* is exhausted, the spirit is liberated from the body too. This is known as *videha-mukti*, release without the body.

The disciplines which one should follow in order to gain release are taught in the Yoga system with which the Sāṅkhya is closely related, and which will form the theme of the next chapter.

8 No God

Classical Sāṅkhya is atheistic, since it does not assign a place to God in its scheme. God is not necessary for creating the world, for the world is an evolution from *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* does not require a Prime Mover, because it is self-moving. Nor is God needed for giving the souls their deserts or guiding them to release: *karma* executes the former, and effort in the direction of discrimination accomplishes the latter. Later Sāṅkhya thinkers like Vijñāna-bhikṣu sought to find a place for God in the system. But even in the late *Sūtra* there does not seem to be an anxiety to accommodate God. There is no reference to God in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*. The classical Sāṅkhya sees no rational justification for postulating a God for explaining the relevant facts related to the world of nature and the

realm of spirits. It is in the Yoga system which is closely connected with the Sāṅkhya that God is introduced.

NOTES

1. The first evolute *mahat* is also called *manas* in the *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* (i, 71): *mahad-ākhyam ādyaṁ kāryaṁ tan-manah*.
2. This is according to Vācaspati Miśra's explanation. For a different account of these varieties of inference, see the relevant section in chapter nine.
3. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1932), p. 291.
4. Compare the quibble: What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind.

Chapter Twelve

THE YOGA OF MIND-CONTROL

1. ANTIQUITY OF YOGA

The Yoga has no metaphysics of its own. It accepts the Sāṅkhya philosophy, and formulates a method whereby the goal of man, as conceived in that system, could be gained. What has to be done is to isolate the spirit (*puruṣa*) from primal matter (*prakṛti*); and this isolation is to be accomplished by a process of mind-control. It is in the mind that the spirit is reflected; and all the trouble that the spirit goes through is because of the fact that it identifies itself with its reflection in the mind. If the mind could be stilled and emptied, and if there is no more reflection in it, the spirit will realize its true nature and escape from the snares of primal matter. The method by which this becomes possible is *yoga*.

The technique of *yoga* is very old, even anterior to the formulation of the philosophy of Sāṅkhya. In some of the principal *Upaniṣads*, the method of concentration and meditation is taught. The *Kaṭha-upaniṣad*, in one place, speaks of the progressive resolution of speech into mind, of mind into intellect, of intellect into the cosmic subtle self, and, finally, of the latter into the supreme quiescent Self.¹ In another place, the *Kaṭha* says: "That they call the supreme state, when the five sources (i.e. sense-organs) of knowledge are at rest along with the mind, and the intellect

moves not. This they regard as *yoga*—the firm holding back of the senses; then one becomes vigilant. *Yoga*, verily, is the origin and the end.”² In the *Śvetāśvatara-upanīṣad*, detailed instructions are given in regard to the practice of *yoga* : holding the body steady with the three (upper parts, viz. chest, neck, and head) erect; causing the senses and the mind to enter into the heart; control of breathing, and of all movements; restraining the mind, as one would restrain turbulent horses yoked to a chariot, the sort of place that should be chosen for meditative-exercises; the visions that appear in the preliminary stages, the conquest of illness, old age, etc.; supernormal manifestations like clearness of complexion, pleasantness of voice, and sweetness of odour; and finally the intuition of *Brahman*, the Godhead that is unborn, steadfast, free from all conditioning factors.³ Of particular interest is the *Maṭirī-upanīṣad* because it refers to a six-fold *yoga* (*ṣaḍaṅgā yogah*) The six limbs of *yoga* are : control of the breath (*prāṇāyāma*), withdrawal of the senses (*pratyāhāra*), meditation (*dhyāna*), fixed attention (*dhāranā*), contemplative inquiry (*tarka*), and concentration or absorption (*samādhi*). By this *yoga*, according to the *Upanīṣad*, one realizes *Brahman*.⁴ The *Upanīṣad* also gives the etymological meaning of the word *yoga* as ‘joining’ : “Because one thus joins the breath, the syllable *Om*, and all this world in its manifoldness, or because they are joined, this (process of meditation) is called *yoga*.”⁵ In the *Bhagavad-gītā*, specific instructions are given in regard to the practice of meditation, as we have pointed out in the chapter on ‘The Song of the Lord’.

Not only the orthodox traditions, but also the so-called heterodox ones were familiar with the *yoga* techniques. The Jaina prophets (*tīrthaṅkaras*) were adepts in *yoga*. Buddha practised *yoga* : he had reached the highest level of contemplation, passing through the intervening ones. The *Suttas* refer to the methods of concentration. Four states of *dhyāna* (meditation) are mentioned in the Buddhist texts. One of the schools of Buddhism, as we know, bears the name *Yogācāra*.

2. THE CLASSICAL YOGA

The classical phase of Yoga as an orthodox system owes its foundation to Patañjali, author of the *Yoga-sūtra*. There is a tradition which identifies this Patañjali with the Patañjali who wrote the great commentary, *Mahābhāṣya*, on Pāṇini's grammar, and also believes that he wrote a work on medicine as well. Thus, it is claimed that Patañjali was a triple healer—healer of physical ills, of defects in speech, and of the deformities of mind and spirit. It is with the third aspect, healing of mind and spirit, that the *Yoga-sūtra* is concerned. This work consists of four chapters called *pādas* (quarters). The first is 'samādhi-pāda' dealing with meditative absorption (*samādhi*). The second is 'sādhana-pāda', explaining the means to reach the goal of *yoga*. The third which is 'vibhūti-pāda' discusses the supernormal powers that come to one who practises *yoga*. And, the fourth which is 'kaivalya-pāda' sets forth the nature of release, the state of aloneness. There is a commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra* by Vyāsa (500 A.D.), and another by King Bhoja (1000 A.D.). Vācaspati wrote a gloss

on Vyāsa's commentary. Another gloss was written by Vijñānabhikṣu. The last mentioned scholar is also the author of a useful manual called *Yogasāra-saṅgraha*.

3. YOGA PSYCHOLOGY

What is termed *buddhi* in the Sāṅkhya is called *citta* in the Yoga system. Both the expressions mean what we understand by 'mind' in English. The mind, here, as in the Sāṅkhya, is a product of *prakṛti*, a composite of the three *guṇas*, viz. intelligence-stuff (*sattva*), energy (*rajas*), and mass (*tamas*), with a predominance of the first. Because of this predominance, the mind is translucent, and is able to reflect the consciousness which is the spirit. It is the mind as receiving this reflection that becomes the experient it knows, feels, and wills, through the appropriate modes of its own. It is the wrong identification of the spirit with the modifications of the mind that makes for bondage. As soon as the spirit realizes its aloofness, as we have seen, it gains release.

Before we consider the method prescribed by Yoga for gaining release, let us get to know the structure and modes of the mind which serve to hinder the spirit's realization of its true nature.

A distinction is made between the cause-mind (*kāraṇa-citta*) and the effect-mind (*kārya-citta*). The cause-mind is all-pervading like ether: it is the cosmic mind. As associated with each one of the spirits, it expands or contracts in accordance with the space of the body in question: and in this condition, it becomes the effect-mind, subject to modifications and afflictions.

The modifications of mind are of five categories :
 (i) True cognition (*pramāṇa*) The Yoga system recognizes three sources of valid knowledge, viz perception, inference, and testimony. (ii) Erroneous cognition (*viparyaya*). This is false conception of a thing, where there is no correspondence between the conception and the thing. (iii) Imagination (*vikalpa*). This is abstract imagination based on words without any corresponding object. For instance, when we say "consciousness of the Self," there is nothing in reality corresponding to "of," because the self itself is consciousness. (iv) Sleep (*nīdrā*) This is a mental state, in the Yoga system, where the mass-stuff (*tamas*) predominates. That this is a state of the mind is evidenced by the fact that a person, on waking up from sleep remembers it as such. (v) Memory (*smṛti*). Any experience leaves behind a trace which is called *saṁskāra* (residual impression). This is revived on the appropriate occasion, and this is memory.

The modifications of the mind, enumerated above, may be afflicted (*kliṣṭa*) or non-afflicted (*akliṣṭa*). The afflicted modes are those which are caused by the afflictions or hindrances which we shall discuss subsequently. They provide the field for the growth of the accumulations of *karṣa*, which reinforce the bondage of the spirit. The non-afflicted modes have for their aim discriminative knowledge which eventually leads to release.

The afflictions (*kleśa*) are of five types : (i) Ignorance (*avidyā*). This is the same as erroneous cognition (*viparyaya*) which is one category of the modes of the

mind. The other four afflictions carry ignorance with them and cannot exist without it. Ignorance is the mistaking of the non-eternal, the impure, the painful, and the not-self, for the eternal, the pure, the pleasurable and the self. (ii) Egoism (*asmitā*). This is erroneous identification of the self with the mind, body, etc. (iii) Attachment (*rāga*). This is the desire for pleasure, the thirst for what is believed to be pleasurable, and the hankering after the means thereof (iv) Aversion (*dvesa*). This is repulsion from pain, the wish to remove it as also the means thereof (v) The will-to-live (*abhiniveśa*). This is the instinctive clinging to life and dread of death. These afflictions, as we had occasion to note, are hindrances to the taming of the mind and the release from bondage.

How are the afflictions to be removed and the mental modifications suppressed? Through continued endeavour (*abhyāsa*) and dispassion (*vairāgya*) It is by long and persistent practice that a person acquires the habit of detachment which will impart to him the discriminative knowledge of the self and the not-self. The details of this practice are set forth in the form of eight steps which are called the limbs of yoga (*aṣṭāṅga-yoga*) The eight steps are: *yama* (abstentions), *niyama* (observances), *āsana* (posture), *prāṇāyāma* (control of breath), *pratyāhāra* (withdrawal of the senses from their objects), *dhāranā* (fixed attention), *dhyāna* (meditation), and *samādhi* (concentration). We shall now turn to a consideration of these steps.

Of the eight steps, the first five are said to be external aids, and the last three internal aids: "external"

means the disciplines that lead to *yoga* proper, and 'internal' signifies the stages within *yoga* which is mind-control. Of the external aids, the first two constitute the ethical training, the third is physical culture, the fourth is designed to regulate the vital process, and the fifth aims at sense-control. When these techniques have been practised, one is ready to scale the heights of *yoga*.

4. ETHICAL TRAINING

Spiritual progress must have a moral basis, without which it cannot be achieved. All the systems of thought in India stress the need for ethical training. In the method of *yoga*, the first two steps represent this phase. As we have seen it is the afflicted mind that is subject to delusion and sorrow. The afflictions stand as hindrances to the realisation of *yoga*. The first and the root affliction is ignorance, which engenders the second affliction, egoism. Attachment, aversion, and the clinging to life arise from ignorance and egoism, and as a result the bondage of the soul becomes complete.

In order to liberate the soul from bondage, the mind must be rid of its afflictions. The basic discipline which will effect this riddance is ethical training. The energy-stuff and mass-stuff of the mind should be gradually reduced allowing the natural intelligence-stuff to shine. In other words, the mind should be cleansed of passions and emotions, and of supine and lethargic traits. This end is achieved by cultivating certain essential negative and positive virtues which are indicated

in the first two steps of *yoga*, viz *yama* and *niyama*.

(1) *Yama* (*abstentions*) There are five abstentions enjoined: non-injury (*ahimsā*), truth (*satya*) which is abstention from falsehood, non-stealing (*asteya*), celibacy (*brahma-carya*) which is abstention from incontinence, and non-possession (*aparigraha*). These are described as the great vows (*mahāvratā*), they are not conditioned by anything such as caste, place, time or circumstance.

(a) Non-injury is not causing pain to any creature in any way at any time. It does not mean merely refraining from inflicting physical injury. It means also not using offending words and not thinking ill of others. Non-injury is the basic virtue, since all other virtues spring from it. (b) Truth consists in the accord of words and thoughts with facts. Words are spoken in order that one's own knowledge may be communicated to someone else. The words one utters should not be deceitful or mistaken or barren of information. Words should be used for the service of all; not for their ruin.

(c) Non-stealing means resisting the tendency to appropriate what legitimately belongs to others. Coveting another's property is evil. One should realize the defects of passions such as greed and envy, and refrain from yielding to them. (d) Celibacy or continence is the restraint of the hidden power, the power of generation. (e) Non-possession is the non-acquisition of goods which only weigh one down. Acquisition of objects is fraught with anxiety, pain, and causing-injury to others. And so, one should cultivate the habit of doing without unnecessary things. One should not

accept anything which is superfluous, and will add to one's burden.

(ii) *Niyama* (*observances*). There are five rules which are to be observed : purity (*śauca*), contentment (*santoṣa*), austerity (*tapas*), study (*svādhyāya*), and devotion to God (*īśvara-pranīdhāna*). (a) Purity is both external and internal. External purification is the removing of dirt from the body. Internal cleansing is the washing away of the blemishes of the mind-stuff. (b) Contentment is the absence of desire to secure more of the necessities of life than what one has; it is the desire to take no more than is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of life. (c) Austerity stands for practices which enable one to endure the pair of opposites such as cold and heat, and also for disciplines such as observing fasts, silence, etc. (d) Study is the reading of the sacred texts which relate to *mokṣa* (release), and the repetition of the syllable *Om*. (e) Devotion to God means the dedication of all acts and their fruits to the supreme Deity.

The abstentions and the observances prepare the ground for *yoga* practice. It is interesting to note that under the scheme of *yama* and *niyama* insistence is laid on a harmonious relation between the individual and society, between the human and the rest of the living world, and between man and God. The Yoga ethics—in fact, all Indian ethics—is universalistic ethics. The five abstentions and the five observances together constitute all that is necessary for a perfect moral life. They are, so to say, the ten commandments of Yoga,⁶ which may be formulated thus :

- (1) Thou shalt not injure any living being.
- (2) Thou shalt not speak an untruth.
- (3) Thou shalt not steal.
- (4) Thou shalt not be incontinent.
- (5) Thou shalt not be avaricious.
- (6) Thou shalt be pure.
- (7) Thou shalt be contented.
- (8) Thou shalt perform austerities
- (9) Thou shalt study the sacred texts
- (10) Thou shalt be devoted to God

How are these virtues to be cultivated? If there appear obstructions in the way of cultivating them, what is one to do? Patañjali teaches a technique which he calls *pratipaksa-bhāvanā*, reflecting on what is contrary, and the cultivation of those traits which are opposed to the obstructions.⁷ For instance, if there arises anger in one, one should reflect on the evil consequences that will result from anger, and cultivate the opposite of anger which is love. Thus, the mind must be trained. It must develop an attitude of friendliness (*maitrī*) towards all living beings that are happy. It must show compassion (*karuṇā*) towards all those that experience pain; it must express joy (*muditā*) towards those whose character is meritorious; and it must be indifferent (*upeksā*) towards those that are endowed with demerit. By cultivating these positive emotions, one will get the mind purged of its dross, and thus gain the necessary qualification for the ascent in *yoga*.

5. CONTROL OF BODY, BREATH, AND SENSES

The next phase in the *yoga* discipline consists of cultivating steady posture of the body, regulating the breath, and withdrawing the senses from their respective objects.

(iii) *Āsana* (*posture*) The student of *yoga* should cultivate the skill necessary for keeping his body in steady posture. The later writers on *Yoga* give the names of several *āsanas* and describe in detail each one of them. It is these that now figure prominently as what are known as yogic exercises. But Patañjali merely defines *āsana* as that posture which is stable and conducive to happiness.⁸ The idea is that the body must be disciplined to assume a posture which is helpful for concentration. It is a matter of common experience that when the mind is concentrated, the body becomes fixed and relaxed. At the stage of *yoga* called *āsana*, one adopts the reverse process of making the body fixed and relaxed and thus seeks to calm the mind.

In his *Yogasāra-saṅgraha*, Vijñāna-bhikṣu cites the authority of the *Īśvara-gītā* and says that, of the many postures, three are the most important: *padmāsana*, placing the soles of the two feet upon the two thighs; *urdhāsana*, placing the sole of one foot only on the other thigh; and *svastikāsana*, placing the soles of the feet between the thigh and the knee.

(iv) *Prānāyāma* (*control of breath*) What is true of the body is truer of breath. The regulating of the breathing process helps considerably to bring the mind under control. The breathing of a person whose

mind is deeply absorbed is regular and slow. If the breathing is made regular and slow, and is even stopped for a while, it will make the controlling of mind easy. *Prānāyāma* is the technique of regulating and restraining the function of breathing. In-breathing is called *pūraka*; out-breathing *recaka*; and stopping the breath *kumbhaka*. The practice of *prānāyāma* aims at making the span of *pūraka* and *recaka* longer as also the period of *kumbhaka*. 'Suspended animation' is not an end in itself, it is useful only in so far as it aids concentration, and must be practised without the risk of asphyxiation. *Prānāyāma*, as also the other aspects of *yoga*, should be learnt from a competent guide.

(v) *Pratyāhāra* (*withdrawal of the senses*) At this, the fifth step in *yoga*, one calls back the senses from their respective objects. Perfect sense-detachment can come about only when the mind is under complete control. Just as when the queen-bee flies up, the other bees fly up after her, and when she settles down, they settle down after her, so also when the mind is agitated, the senses are agitated, and when the mind is still, the senses become still.⁹ But the discipline of *pratyāhāra* reverses the process of control, as do the earlier two disciplines. Its purpose is to tame the mind through taming the senses.

6. STAGES IN MIND-CONTROL

The last three steps are stages in mind-control, and, therefore, they constitute *yoga* proper.

(vi) *Dhāraṇā* (*fixed attention*) The fixing of the mind to a particular spot is called attention. The

roving mind is to be tied to a place, in order that it may become steady and unmoving. The spots suggested for fixing one's attention are the heart-lotus, the sphere of the navel, the light in the head, the tip of the nose, the fore-part of the tongue, etc. The modes of the mind should be directed towards any of these spots, or even any particular external object. Thus, the mind's attention should be held steadfast in the place selected without allowing it to move therefrom.

Even due to passions and personal interests, we fix our attention on objects. But this kind of attention is of no use for the *yogin*. When there is an excess of the energy-stuff (*rajas*) in the mind, the mind gets tossed about by the objects. This condition of the mind is called *ksipta*, restless. When the mind has an excess of the mass-stuff (*tamas*), it becomes a victim to sleep, and is then said to be *mūḍha* or blinded. When the mind is unstable shifting its attention from object to object, it is described as *vikṣipta*, distracted. The three mental conditions so far mentioned are not conducive states: they are associated with a preponderance of *rajas* or *tamas*, and serve, therefore, as obstacles to *yoga*. The conditions of the mind which are conducive, on the contrary, are *ekāgra*, one-pointed, and *niruddha*, restrained. The one-pointed mind is that which is devoted to a single object, and is filled with *sattva* (intelligence-stuff). This prepares the mind for its ascent to *yoga*. The restrained mind is that from which distractions have been checked, and the flow of modifications has been arrested. It is in the gaining

of this end that *dhāraṇā*, fixed attention, becomes a great help.

(vii) *Dhyāna* (*meditation*). Meditation is the uninterrupted flow of mental modes towards the same object. Like a stream of oil, when the process of thought is continuous, it is called *dhyāna*. The emphasis is on continuity and uninterruptedness. Whatever may be the object chosen for meditation, if the *yogin* directs an even current of thought towards it, undisturbed by others, he gains in steadiness, and he can meditate on other objects also with ease.

(viii) *Samādhi* (*concentration*). The culmination of the process of mind-control is *samādhi* loosely rendered as 'concentration', 'absorption', 'trance', etc. When meditation (*dhyāna*) matures, it passes into *samādhi*. It is in *samādhi* that the spirit is lifted above the world-process, and restored to its original status. Therefore, the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya* identifies *yoga* with *samādhi*. Two stages are distinguished in *samādhi*, conscious (*saṁprajñāta*) and superconscious (*asaṁprajñāta*). In the former, there is consciousness of the object; in the latter, there is not that consciousness too.

The combined practice of the last three steps in *yoga* (*dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna*, and *samādhi*) is technically known as *saṁyama*. 'Combined practice' means the practice of these three together with reference to the same object of thought. The practice of *saṁyama* may lead to the manifestation of supernormal powers. But Patañjali administers the warning that one should not become a victim to these manifestations. Perfection in

samādhi is the culmination of *yoga*, and not the acquisition of supernormal powers.

There are two forms of *samādhi*, as we have noted, the conscious and the superconscious. In the conscious *samādhi* (*samprajñāta*) the mind continues to function, though it is completely absorbed in the contemplation of a particular object. In the superconscious *samādhi* (*asamprajñāta*), objective consciousness also disappears, and the mind ceases to function. Being concentrated on the self, the mind vanishes, and the self or spirit is left alone to experience its *kaivalya* which is the ultimate goal.

7. GOD

The one doctrinal difference between the Yoga system and the Sāṅkhya is that while the latter assigns no place for God, the former does. The Yoga, therefore, is described as the Sāṅkhya-with-God (*seṣvara-sāṅkhya*). Devotion to God, as we have seen, is one of the positive virtues that should be cultivated as an aid to *yoga*. God, according to Patañjali, is one of the objects of attention, meditation, and concentration. He helps the practisant of *yoga* by removing the obstacles that stand in the latter's way. God is the supreme spirit that is untouched by afflictions and blemishes. In him is reached the upper limit of knowledge; he is omniscient. He is the first preceptor of *yoga*, as he is not conditioned by time. The name by which he is known is the sound-symbol 'Om'.

Although, in the classical age, the Yoga came to be affiliated to Sāṅkhya, *yoga* as the technique of mind-

control is a common heritage of Indian thought on its practical side.

NOTES

- 1 *Katha-upaniṣad*, iii, 13
- 2 *Ibid.*, vi, 10–11.
3. *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad*, ii, 8–15.
- 4 *Maitrī-upaniṣad*, vi, 18.
5. *Ibid.*, vi, 25 .
*evaṁ prāṇam athoṁkāram yasmāt sarvam anekadhā,
yunakti yuñjate vāpi tasmād yoga iti smṛtaḥ.*
6. See M. Hiriyanna, *op. cit.*, p 205.
7. *Yoga-sūtra*, ii, 33.
8. *Ibid.*, ii, 46.
9. See Vyāsa's commentary on *Yoga-sūtra*. ii, 54.

Chapter Thirteen

THE RITUALIST PHILOSOPHY OF MĪMĀMSĀ

1. VEDIC INQUIRY

The four orthodox schools we have so far considered. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga, are *āstika* or Vedic only in name. They are orthodox in the negative sense that they are not heterodox, not anti-Vedic. In the construction of their respective world-views they are not dependent on the *Veda*, they do not profess to interpret the *Veda*, they do not look to the *Veda* for the justification of their doctrines. It is the remaining *āstika* schools to which we now turn, viz the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta, that are strictly Vedic traditions.

We saw, in chapter two, that '*Veda*' in its wider sense consists of *Mantra*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Āraṇyaka*, and *Upaniṣad*. The *Mantras* which are hymns and the *Brāhmaṇas* which are liturgical texts constitute the ritual-sections of the *Veda* (*kārma-kāṇḍa*). The *Āraṇyakas* which are 'forest books' mark the transition to the *Upaniṣads*. The *Upaniṣads* form the knowledge-sections of the *Veda* (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*). The ritual sections and the knowledge-sections are related as earlier (*pūrva*) and later (*uttara*) in the logical order. The philosophy that is based on the earlier sections is *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, and the philosophical traditions which are inspired by the later sections, the *Upaniṣads*, constitute *Uttara-*

mīmāṃsā Since Uttaramīmāṃsā is known by its more usual name 'Vedānta', Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is referred to generally as Mīmāṃsā which is a shorter name

Mīmāṃsā, means 'inquiry', 'investigation' The main objective of the Mīmāṃsā system is to establish the authority of the *Veda*, and to make out that the *Veda* teaches ritual. Hence, this system is also known as *Karma-mīmāṃsā* As for its philosophical position, it is more or less similar to the pluralistic realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The history of Vedic interpretation is as old as the *Veda* itself. The *Brāhmaṇas*, which are liturgical manuals, themselves seek to rationalize the rituals. Further systematization of the Vedic rituals is to be found in what are known as the *Śrauta-sūtras*. The first systematic work on Mīmāṃsā, however, is that of Jaimini which is called the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* (c 400 B.C.). This book of aphorisms consists of twelve chapters (*adhyāyas*), each chapter is divided into sections (*pādas*), and each section into topics (*adhikaranas*). Jaimini's work contains nearly one thousand *adhikaranas*, and is the longest of the Sūtra-works. The procedure of exposition followed in each *adhikaraṇa* is as follows : (i) first, a Vedic sentence is taken up as the subject for investigation : this sentence forms the *viśaya-yākya* (the text offering the subject for discussion) of the *adhikaraṇa*; (ii) then, a doubt (*saṁśaya*) is raised in regard to the correct meaning of the Vedic sentence; (iii) this is followed by the statement of the *prima facie* view (*pūrva-pakṣa*); (iv) this is refuted next (*uttara-pakṣa*); and finally (v) the conclusion (*nirṇaya*) is

established. These are called the five limbs of an *adhikarana*; and it will be seen how the method followed in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* is philosophical. In the several chapters of his work, Jaimini discusses philosophical topics, and even the discussion of ritual has methodological value for philosophizing in general. The *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* has had several commentators. One of the early commentaries was by Upavarsa, which is not extant. The earliest extant commentary is by Śabara (c. 200 A.D.). Śabara's commentary was interpreted by two great scholars, Prabhākara (c. 650 A.D.) and Kumārila Bhatta (c. 700 A.D.). Since there are differences between the two interpretations, two sub-schools came into existence named after the two scholars: the sub-schools are called the Prābhākara and the Bhātta respectively. There is also stated to be a third way shown by one Murāri Miśra. Prabhākara's work bears the title *Brhatī*. And Kumārila Bhatta's explanation is in three parts—*Śloka-vārtika*, *Tantra-vārtika*, and *Tup-tīkā*. Prabhākara's *Brhatī* was commented on by Śālikanātha in his *Rṇuvimalā*. In an independent manual *Prakarana-pañcikā*, the same author expounds the epistemological and metaphysical views of his teacher. Of the works of Kumārila Bhatta, the *Śloka-vārtika* was commented on by Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Nyāya-ratnākara*, and by Sucarita Miśra in his *Kāśikā*, the *Tantra-vārtika* was commented on by Someśvara in his *Nyāyasudhā* or *Rāṇaka*; and the *Tup-tīkā* was commented on by Veṅkateśvara Dīksita in his *Vārtikābharana*. Besides the commentaries, there are popular introductory texts: among these are: the *Mīmāṃsānyāya-pra-*

kāśa of Āpadeva, the *Artha-sangraha* of Laugāksi Bhāskara, the *Mīmāmsā-paribhāṣā* of Raghunātha, and the *Mānameyodaya* of two scholars bearing the name Nārāyaṇa.

2. KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOURCES

The epistemological questions are supremely important for Mīmāmsā because its main aim is to establish the absolute validity of verbal testimony in the form of the *Veda*. In order that the *Mīmāmsā* apotheosis of the authority of the *Veda* may be made clear, let us consider first its teaching about knowledge in general and its sources. Wherever there are differences between the two schools of Mīmāmsā, the Prābhākara and the Bhāṭṭa, we shall indicate them.

The Prābhākara view of cognition or knowledge is that it is an attribute of the self which, in this school, is identified with egoity (*ahankāra*). In a cognitive process of the form 'I know the pot,' there are three factors, viz 'I' which is the subject (egoity), knowledge, which is the attribute of the subject, and pot which is the object. Of these three, it is knowledge alone that is self-luminous, the subject or the self is not self-luminous, because it is the substance to which the attribute, knowledge belongs, and substance is not attribute. There are other attributes also for the self—attributes such as desire, aversion, etc.; all these result for the self when it gets conjoined with the mind. In a cognitive act, then, the cognition reveals all the three factors, viz itself which is self-luminous, egoity as its locus, and the object (in the example, pot) as the content. In all

knowledge, therefore, there is a triple revelation (*tripuṭī-jñāna*); knowledge reveals itself, and in doing so it reveals both the subject and the object simultaneously with itself.

The Bhāṭṭa school presents a different view of cognition and of the self. The self, here, is not completely inert or non-luminous, it is a composite of consciousness and inertness. Like the glow-worm, it is a mixture of light and darkness. There are two elements in the self, the substance-element and the knowledge-element. To the former belongs cognizedness, and to the latter cognizership. In what may be called 'self-consciousness' or 'I-notion', the self is both subject and object. The expression 'I know myself' is evidence to show that the object of cognition, here, is the self. In all objective cognitions, such as 'I know the pot', there are two elements—the self-awareness and the object-awareness. There can be no object-awareness without self-awareness. But this does not mean that the self is known as the *subject* knowing. The fact of knowing itself is not known at the time of knowing. It is from the knownness of the object that the knowledge has to be inferred. Knowledge can reveal objects; it cannot reveal itself. So, the mode by which the self is known is as the *object* of the 'I-notion'. And, in order that the self may know itself, it must be aware, at the same time, of some object or other.

Valid cognition is *pramā*; and *pramāṇa* is the instrument or source of valid cognition. The *Bhāṭṭa* school recognizes six *pramāṇas*: perception (*pratyakṣa*)

inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), testimony (*śabda*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), and non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*).¹ The Prābhākara school admits the first five into its scheme, and excludes the last one, i.e. non-cognition.

(i) *Perception* (*pratyakṣa*). This is defined in the same way as in the Nyāya system. The distinction between two stages in perception, indeterminate and determinate, is also recognized; but the explanation offered here is different from that of the Nyāya. Indeterminate perception, according to the Bhāṭṭa view, is simple observation or mere awareness (*ālocana*), comparable to the cognition of a new-born child. The knowledge at this stage is vague and indefinite. The class-characteristics and the specific features are not presented; what is apprehended is the individual object in which these characteristics and features subsist. The Prābhākara view holds that in indeterminate perception the class characteristics and specific features are presented; only they are not recognized as such. This becomes possible in determinate perception where other objects of the same class are remembered, and the resemblances and differences are taken note of.

According to Mīmāṃsā, then, the stage of indeterminate perception is not what has to be inferred on the basis of the subsequent determinate perception as it is for Nyāya; it is an experienced stage in perception. Also, it is maintained, here, that indeterminate perception can serve as the basis for action.

Perception is possible only of objects that are pre-

sent and are fit to be perceived. One of the super-normal modes of perception recognized in Nyāya is yogic perception. This the Mīmāṃsaka (follower of Mīmāṃsā) does not accept. According to him, it is only the *Veda* that can yield knowledge of distant objects, and of past and future events. The sense-organs and the mind have their limitations. No measure of training can offset these limitations.

(ii) *Inference (anumāna)*. In regard to inference also there is not much difference between the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā views. Śabara in his commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* defines inferential cognition thus : 'When a universal relation is known to exist between two things, on the perception of one of them, the cognition of the other is inferential 'cognition.'² A distinction is made by Śabara between two kinds of inference : the one based on directly perceived relationship (*pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa*), where both the relata are perceptible objects, and the one based on generalized relationship (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*), where the terms related are not what are perceived but abstract concepts.

The relation between the *hetu* (*probans*) and the *sādhyā* (*probandum*), is, thus, the ground of inference. It is a necessary relation, and Prabhākara says that it must be unfailing, true, and permanent, e.g. the relation which obtains between cause and effect, whole and parts, substance and quality, class and individuals, etc. Prabhākara considers necessity as the essential feature of inference. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa thinks that novelty too is necessary for inference, as for all valid knowledge.

(iii) *Comparison (upamāna)*. The Mīmāṃsā account of comparison differs from that of the Nyāya. Let us explain with the help of the example which we gave in this connection. According to the Nyāya, the townsman who goes to the forest and sees the *gavaya* (wild cow), remembers the information given by the forester that the *gavaya* is an animal similar to the cow, and now knows that the word *gavaya* denotes the wild animal.

The Mīmāṃsā offers a different version of this *pramāṇa*. Going to the forest, the townsman sees the *gavaya* and notices its similarity to the cow. And then he compares the cow with the *gavaya* and knows that the cow resembles the *gavaya*. This cognition is the result of *upamāna* (comparison).³ The judgement, "The cow is like the *gavaya*," is not born of perception, because the cow about which the judgement is made is not an object presented to sense. Nor is it a case of inference, for there is no universal relation (*vyāpti*) involved. It is the result of comparison.

(iv) *Presumption (arthāpatti)*. Presumption or postulation is a distinctive *pramāṇa*, according to both the Prābhākara and the Bhāṭṭa schools, over and above the four sources of knowledge recognized by the Nyāya system.

Presumption is the postulation of what explains through the knowledge of what is to be explained. When a certain fact is to be explained, we presume something which explains it. *Arthāpatti* is that process of knowledge which makes something intelligible by

postulating something else. When it is known that a particular person is alive and when he is not to be found in his house, we presume, in order to reconcile the two facts of his being alive and of his absence from home, that he must be somewhere outside his house. The knowledge of what is to be explained, i.e. the absence from home of the person who is alive, is instrumental to the knowledge of what explains, i.e. that the person exists somewhere outside the house.

This is the Bhāṭṭa account of presumption. The Prābhākara view introduces the element of doubt. In the example, the doubt will be of the form, "Since the person is not in his house, is he alive at all?" But this doubt stays only until the presumption is made, that the person is somewhere outside.

(v) *Non-cognition (anupalabdhi)* The Bhāṭṭa school adds this as a *pramāṇa* to the five sources of knowledge listed by the Prābhākara, and so, non-cognition is described as the sixth avenue of knowledge (*ṣaṣṭha-pramāṇa*). It is the *pramāṇa* for non-existence. The existence of a thing is known through the other *pramāṇas*, perception, etc.; its non-existence is known through non-cognition. In a particular locus, say, a hall, there is the non-existence, say, of an elephant. How is this non-existence known? It is known by non-cognition, says the Bhāṭṭa school.

In the Nyāya system, non-existence is considered to be a category, but no separate *pramāṇa* is admitted for cognizing it. When one sees the bare floor of the hall, he sees it also as *qualified* by the non-existence of

the elephant. In other words, the floor is perceived as qualified by the non-existence of the elephant. Since the qualities of an object are given in the perception of that object, the quality called non-existence is also made known by the perception of the locus of non-existence. The particular sense-contact for the perception of non-existence is adjunct-substantive relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*)

As for the Prābhākara school, it does not recognize non-existence as a category. An object is known to be existent with reference to itself and non-existent with reference to other objects. The non-existence of a thing is the existence of another. The non-existence of the elephant, in the present instance, is but the bare floor. It is the perception of the bare locus that makes known the non-existence of the counter-correlate, i.e. the elephant.

Rejecting the rival view, the Bhāṭṭa maintains that non-cognition is a distinctive *pramāṇa*. Since non-existence is what is cognized, the means for cognizing it should be of the nature of non-existence, i.e. the non-existence of cognition. Just as non-cognition cannot account for the cognition of positive entities, positive *pramāṇas* cannot serve as the means for cognizing negative facts. Negative facts are apprehended through non-cognition.

Postponing the consideration of verbal testimony (*śabda*) which is the most important *pramāṇa* to the next section, we shall discuss here the *Mīmāṃsā* views about truth and error.

True knowledge is that which is uncontradicted or unsublated and also new or novel. It should not be sublated by subsequent knowledge (*abādhita*); and it should relate to what is not already known (*anādhigata*). The condition of novelty serves to exclude memory (*smṛti*) from the sphere of valid knowledge; memory is not new knowledge. This is according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Prabhākara does not consider novelty as a condition of valid knowledge. All knowledge or experience (*anubhūti*) is valid, irrespective of the fact whether the object which the knowledge relates to is already known or not. But, even according to Prabhākara, memory is excluded because it is dependent on a previous experience, and is itself not experience.

If all experience or knowledge is valid, how does error or invalidity arise? The two schools of *Mīmāṃsā* offer different theories of error.

The Prabhākara view is that of *akhyāti* (non-apprehension), similar to the theory of *Sāṅkhya*. According to the Prabhākara, as we have seen, there is only a two-fold classification of cognition into valid cognition and memory; there is no third category of delusive cognition. A cognition may be less than true, but never untrue. What is called delusive cognition is really a composite of two cognitions. In the nacre-silver example, when the judgement "This is silver" is made, we have two cognitions—the perceptual cognition of the 'this' and the memory cognition of the "silver". The cognition of the "this" is perceptual, because there is sense-contact with what is in front. The cognition

of the "silver" is a memory being generated by a sense-impression called up by similarity between nacre and silver. Neither of these cognitions is untrue. But because the perceiver of the "this" does not at the time recognize the remembered silver as the "remembered", he is not able to see the separateness or non-relation of the two cognitions, and their respective contents. In other words, there is the non-apprehension of their non-relation (*asamsargāgraha*), and this is responsible for what is usually spoken of as error. The element of error lies in the empirical usage of the "this" and the "silver" as being appositional, and not in the cognitions themselves. From the point of view of cognitions there is no error at all.

The Bhāṭṭa view of error is known as *viparīta-khyāti* (apprehension otherwise), which is, in essence, indistinguishable from the *anyathā-khyāti* doctrine of the Nyāya system. Like the Prābhākara, the Bhāṭṭa distinguishes the two elements—"this" and "silver". The "this" is the seen object, and the "silver" is what is remembered. But, while for the Prābhākara error lies in a failure to apprehend that the two elements are not related, for the Bhāṭṭa it arises out of wrongly relating the "this and the silver" as subject and predicate. It is because of this that nacre is cognized differently as silver. According to the Prābhākara, error does not infest our cognitions, which are all of them valid; the distinction between truth and error is pertinent only to our practice: the useful is true, and the not-useful is false. According to the Bhāṭṭa school, the fruitfulness or otherwise

of cognitions is only a consequence, there is logical error as such and it can be distinguished from what is logically true.

Is validity or truth intrinsic or extrinsic to knowledge? Similarly, is invalidity or error intrinsic or extrinsic? The Mīmāṃsā view is that validity is intrinsic to knowledge, and invalidity extrinsic (*prāmāṇyam svataḥ aprāmāṇyam parataḥ*). Knowledge is self-valid both in respect of its generation (*utpattau*) and cognition (*jñaptau*). The causes which give rise to knowledge themselves account for its validity: no other factor is necessary for making the knowledge true. Similarly, when the knowledge is known, its truth also is known. And so, validity is intrinsic to knowledge. We presume that all knowledge is valid; we do not ask why it is valid. It is only where there is failure we seek for a cause thereof; and we find the cause in the instrument of knowledge. In the case of the nacre-silver example, we trace the cause of invalidity to defective eyesight. How is this invalidity discovered? It is discovered when the silver-cognition is known to be incompatible with the subsequent nacre-cognition. Thus, according to Mīmāṃsā, truth is natural to knowledge, it is only error that is unnatural.

3. SUPREMACY OF THE VEDA

The supreme *pramāṇa* for the Mīmāṃsaka is *śabda* (testimony). The *Veda* which constitutes the highest testimony is not a human production (*apauruṣeya*), and

is eternal (*nitya*). The *Veda* is not a human production because no man is mentioned as its author. Not only is the *Veda* not a human production, it is not also a composition of God. There is no need to postulate a god as the author of the *Veda*, for the *Veda* is eternal.

The eternality of the *Veda* is sought to be established on the strength of a certain philological theory. The Mīmāṃsaka believes that the relation between a word and its meaning is natural and therefore eternal. The letters which constitute a word are partless (*niravayava*), omnipresent (*sarvagata*), and eternal (*nitya*). A letter (*varṇa*) is an articulate sound, and should be distinguished from the mode of utterance (*dhvani*). The sound *a*, for instance, may be uttered in several tones and in many ways, but yet it is the same sound. A word is only an aggregate of letters. The meanings that words express are universal. The words are eternal and the universals are eternal; therefore, the relation between them is also eternal.

With this much it cannot be proved that the *Veda* is eternal. If the eternality of the letters and words and of their relation to things were the ground for holding that the *Veda* is eternal, then we must say that all literary works are eternal. That, however, is not the teaching of Mīmāṃsā. The permanence of words provides only a negative argument. Just because the *Veda* consists of words, it need not be held that the *Veda* is non-eternal. The reason why the *Veda* alone is considered to be eternal, and not the other literary works, is that the particular order (*ānupūrvī*) in which words

occur in the *Veda* is permanent. The words were not arranged by any agent, human or divine.

The *Veda* is self-revealed and self-valid. In fact, all knowledge, as we have seen, is self-valid. If this be the case, then it can be readily seen that the *Veda* has intrinsic validity. But, what then is the distinction of the *Veda*? While the other types of knowledge may sometimes fail to be valid on account of some defect in their source, the *Veda* is never invalid. The defectiveness of source cannot be alleged in the case of the *Veda*, because the *Veda* has no source. It has already been shown that the *Veda* is self-existent and self-established. Nor may it be urged that there is a possibility of the *Veda* coming into conflict with the other *pramāṇas* like perception; for while the other *pramāṇas* have the sensible world as their sphere, the *Veda* relates to what is super-sensible. It may be asked: is not the *Veda* vitiated because of self-discrepancy? The reply is that there is no self-discrepancy whatsoever in the *Veda*. Only, we must understand the meaning of the *Veda* aright. In fact, the chief aim of Mīmāṃsā is to frame rules of interpretation which will help in unravelling the true purport of the *Veda*.

What is the purport of the *Veda*? The Mīmāṃsā view is that the *Veda* teaches *dharma* (religious duty). What is *dharma*? It is what is enjoined in the *Veda* (*codanā-laksāṇo-ṛithaḥ*). Vedic command is in the form of both do's and don'ts. The positive command is called *vidhi*, and the negative command *niṣedha*. The commands of the *Veda* should not be mistaken for those

of ordinary morality. It is true that ordinary morality is required for a man before he gains competence to perform the rituals enjoined in the *Veda*. But the rituals themselves belong to the supernatural order. *Dharma*, therefore, is religious duty. By performing it, what one acquires is uncommon merit. The aim of the *Veda* is to impel man to perform *dharma*.

To be sure, there are in the *Veda* passages which are non-injunctive in character—passages such as those in the *Upanisads* discussing the nature of the Self. Even in the ritual-sections of the *Veda* there are assertive statements regarding the deities and the accessories of sacrifice. But these texts have no independent purport, according to Mīmāṃsā. They are to be construed in conjunction with some injunction or other. If the *Veda* were to stop with talking about existent entities (*siddha*) it would be of no use at all. To describe what already is is not the purpose of the *Veda*; its purpose is to prescribe what-is-to-be-accomplished (*bhāvya*).

We have seen that there are both positive and negative commands in the *Veda*. The positive commands are of various kinds: (1) There are some which prescribe obligatory duties (*nitya-karma*). 'Offer twilight prayers everyday' is one such command. Another is 'Perform the *Agnihotra* as long as you live.' Obedience to such commands does not depend upon the option of the individual. He who is eligible to perform them ought to perform them unconditionally. (2) The second kind of command relates to occasioned rites (*naimittika-karma*). These are not daily duties, but

rituals which should be observed on occasions, as, for instance, the ceremonial bath during the eclipses. These are also obligatory. (3) The third variety of Vedic injunctions consists of those which prescribe optional rites (*kāmya-karma*), e.g. 'Let him who desires heaven perform the *jyotiṣṭoma*' is not obligatory. If a person desires heavenly enjoyment, he has to offer this sacrifice; otherwise not. The injunctions of obligatory and occasioned rites are categorical imperatives; those which are concerned with optional rites are hypothetical imperatives. The performance of the first two varieties of rites does not lead to any merit; but their non-performance will result in demerit. If the optional rites are not performed, there is no demerit; but if they are performed, there accrues merit.

An interesting question at this stage is this : a sacrifice is a set of actions; an action comes to an end as soon as it is performed; the result of a sacrifice is generally to be reaped not immediately after its performance, but at a future date; especially, what is regarded as the supreme end of all sacrifices, heaven, can be gained only after death; how, then, can a sacrifice which comes to an end here and now produce a result elsewhere and hereafter? The solution to this problem is to be found in the conception of what is called *apūrvā* (unseen potency). A sacrifice, as soon as it is performed, generates an unseen potency in the soul of the sacrificer which endures till the appropriate reward is reaped. It is the *apūrvā*, then, that bridges the time-gulf between a sacrifice and its fruit.

The two schools of Mīmāṃsā differ on the question as to what prompts a man to obey the commands of the *Veda*. The Bhāṭṭa view is that the motive for carrying out Vedic commands is provided by the desire that is in man for acquiring pleasure and avoiding pain. The natural desire for pleasure is taken advantage of by the *Veda*, and it tells man: 'Do this, and you will achieve your end.' So, the knowledge that the performance of an action is the means to attain what he desires (*iṣṭasādhana-tā-jñāna*) is what makes a man perform that action. This is true in the case of Vedic sacrifices also. The Prābhākara does not agree with this view. He argues that the *Veda* is not so impotent as to depend on human will or desire for its fulfilment. The mandate of the *Veda* is impervious. It is only reverence for the mandate that should serve as the motive for obeying it. The knowledge that 'this duty is to be done by me' (*kāryatā-jñāna*) is the sole motive for obedience to Vedic commands. As regards the necessity for obeying the *Veda*, however, there is no difference of opinion between the two schools.

4. METAPHYSICS

The metaphysical position of the Mīmāṃsā is realism, similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

— On the strength of very much the same arguments as those advanced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā refutes the idealistic schools of Buddhism. The external world cannot be dismissed as a chimera. Cognitions cannot hang in the air, as it were; they must have

a basis. They must refer to things in the external world. The world is real, and is independent of the minds that perceive it. The mind does not invent its object; it only discovers it

The categories, according to the Prābhākara school, are eight : substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karṇa*), generality (*sāmānya*), inherence (*paratantratā*), potency (*śakti*), similarity (*sādrśya*), and number (*saṅkhyā*).

The first three categories are conceived more or less in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika fashion: Generality (*sāmānya*) is what exists wholly in each individual, and can be perceived, it has no existence apart from the individuals. Inherence (*paratantratā* or *śamavāya*) is the relation between inseparables, such as the universal and the particular. It is not eternal, because it obtains between what are perishable as well. Potency (*śakti*) is the power which subsists in substances, qualities, actions, and generalities. It is either natural (*sahaja*) or occasioned (*ādheya*). It is eternal in things that are eternal, and non-eternal in the others. It is inferred from the effects it produces. Similarity (*sādrśya*) is not the same as class-nature or generality : it is not only individuals that can be similar, but genera also. Similarity cannot be known through perception; it is ascertained through inference, comparison, or testimony. Number (*saṅkhyā*), which is one of the qualities in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, is here reckoned as a separate category.

The Bhāṭṭa school accepts only five categories : the first four of the ones already mentioned, and the fifth

which is the negative category of non-existence. In the place of inherence, the relation of identity in difference (*bhedābheda*) is made the pivotal concept. Similarity is regarded as nothing more than the common characteristics of two or more similar objects. And, potency and number are considered to be qualities.

The general view in Indian thought in regard to the world that it is periodically created and dissolved is not acceptable to the Mīmāṃsā. There is neither creation (*sr̥ṣṭi*) nor dissolution (*pralaya*) of the universe as a whole. Never was the world otherwise than what it is at present (*na kadācit anīdr̥śam jagat*). The world-process is perpetual. And so, there is no need to postulate a God as its creator. Nor is it necessary to assume the existence of God as the source of the *Veda*, for the *Veda* is eternal, and is not a composition of any being, human or divine. God is not required either for bringing unto the agents of Vedic sacrifices the appropriate rewards; for this is accomplished by the unseen potency (*apūrvā*) given rise to by the ritual acts themselves. Not only is the idea of God found to be superfluous in the Mīmāṃsā system, even the deities for whom sacrifices are offered pale into insignificance. The important thing is the performance of sacrifice; whether there are deities or not is a matter of little consequence. When a sacrificer offers the sacrificial material saying, for instance, "This is for Indra, *svāhā* (*indrāya svāhā*)," he need not worry himself over the question whether there is such a being called Indra or not. The gods are only grammatical datives, mere adjuncts of sacrifice.

The self or soul is one of the substances, according to the Mīmāṃsā. It is distinct from the physical body, the sense-organs, and the mind. It is a permanent entity, an eternal being. It is both the agent of actions and the enjoyer of the fruits of actions. It migrates from one body into another; it goes to heaven and enjoys there; it is finally released from the bondage of *karma*. There is a separate soul in each body. Hence, there is a plurality of souls.

5 THE WAY OF WORKS

It is quite possible that the ultimate aim of man, according to the Mīmāṃsā in the early stages of its development, was enjoyment in heaven (*svarga*). But subsequently, the Mīmāṃsakas gave up this view and fell in line with the other systems in holding release (*mokṣa*) to be the final human goal. Even after this change, they, however, insisted that the performance of Vedic works was the only way to gaining release.

The Mīmāṃsā view, as we had occasion to point out, is that the entire *Veda* has ritual action (*karma*) for purport. The aim of the *Veda* is to prescribe certain actions, and prohibit certain others. Injunction or command (*codanā*) is the soul of the Vedic texts. The end that is achieved through the performance of the acts enjoined by the *Veda* is prosperity (*abhyudaya*) here and in a hereafter. But even release (*nirhīṣreyaśa*, *mokṣa*) is to be gained through the Vedic rites alone. It is true that release implies freedom from *karma*, both in the sense of action and in the sense of the fruit of

action consisting in merit (*punya*) and demerit (*pāpa*). This, however, is to be achieved by performing the duties ordained in the *Veda*. Of the three kinds of positive commands noticed earlier, the seeker after release has to refrain from the optional rites (*kāmya-karma*), because he has not to accumulate any fresh merit. But he has to perform the obligatory (*nitya*) and occasioned (*naimittika*) rites, because their non-performance would bring in demerit, and their performance does not result in any merit. The prohibited deeds (*pratisiddha-karma*) he ought not to perform, because their performance would lead to the acquisition of demerit, and the consequent suffering in hell. If the aspirant for *moksa* follows this pattern of life, he will find that when he has reached the end he is left with a nil-balance of *karma*. And, with the falling off of his present body, there will be no more *saṁsāra* for him. Thus, it is by an unremitting execution of the Vedic commands that release is to be gained. Like prosperity, argues the Mīmāṃsaka, release is what-is-to-be-accomplished, and what-is-to-be-accomplished requires action for its accomplishment.

The element of value in the Mīmāṃsā system is that it has formulated rules of Vedic interpretation. Just as grammar is necessary for understanding language and literature, so is semantics. In so far as Mīmāṃsā inquires into the meaning of meaning, it has philosophical value. The technique of inquiry devised by Mīmāṃsā is applied by the schools of Vedānta in their task of interpreting the Vedic teaching. Only,

the conclusions at which they arrive are different from the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā.

NOTES

1. *Mānameyodaya*, Introduction, 15 :

*pratyakṣānumānaṁ ca śabdaṁ copamītis-tathā,
anṭhāpattir-abhāvaś-ca pramāṇāni māuṣāṁ.*

2. *Śabara-bhāṣya*, I, i, 5.

3. *Mānameyodaya*, Upamāna, 1.

Chapter Fourteen

THEISTIC VEDĀNTA

1. THE VEDĀNTIC CANON

The term 'Vedānta' means primarily the *Upaniṣads* which constitute 'the Veda-end'. It also is the name of the different schools of philosophy which are founded on the *Upaniṣads*. In our study of the *Upaniṣads* we saw that the ultimate Reality, *Brahman*, is conceived in these texts in two ways, as cosmic (*saprapañca*) and as acosmic (*niṣprapañca*). The theistic traditions in Vedānta sponsor the cosmic view; the non-dualistic tradition which is Advaita considers the acosmic view to be the higher, and therefore more adequate to the nature of the ultimate Reality.

Before we turn to a study of the Vedāntic traditions, let us consider what the basic texts of Vedānta are. The basic texts of Vedānta are three: the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the *Brahma-sūtra*. Together they are referred to as the *prasthāna-traya*, the triple canon of Vedānta. The *Upaniṣads* constitute the *śruti-prasthāna*: *śruti* means literally the 'heard', and the *Veda* is *śruti*. Since the *Upaniṣads* are the summits of the *Veda* (*śruti-śiras*) and therefore are parts of it, they are described as the *śruti-prasthāna* (*prasthāna* means 'foundation'). The *Bhagavad-gītā* comes next only to the *Upaniṣads*. It is assigned a status which is almost equal to that of the *Upaniṣads*. As this text

forms part of the *Mahābhārata* which is a *smṛti* (the remembered, i.e. a secondary text based on the *Veda*), it is called *smṛti-prasthāna*. The third of the canonical texts is the *Brahma-sūtra* which is regarded as the *nyāya-prasthāna*, because it sets forth the teachings of Vedānta in a logical order. This work is known by other names also : *Vedānta-sūtra*, since it is the aphoristic text on Vedānta; *Śārīraka-sūtra*, since it is concerned with the nature and destiny of the embodied soul, *Bhikṣu-sūtra*, since those who are most competent to study it are the renunciates (monks, *sannyāsins*); *Uttara-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, since it is an inquiry into the final sections of the *Veda*.

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* is Bādarāyaṇa whom Indian tradition identifies with Vyāsa, the arranger or compiler of the *Veda*. A verse in the *Bhāmātī* which is Vācaspati Miśra's commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* describes Vyāsa as the incarnation or Viṣṇu's cognitive energy (*jñānaśakty-avatāra*). In the *Brahma-sūtra* (c. 400 B C), Bādarāyaṇa strings together the leading concepts of Vedānta in an ordered manner. The *Sūtra* is an exquisite garland made out of Upaniṣad-blossoms. It is divided into four chapters (*adhyāyas*); each chapter consists of four parts (*pādas*); each part has a number of sections (*adhikaraṇas*); and each section has one or more aphorisms (*sūtras*). According to Śaṅkara, the number of sections is 192. The total number of aphorisms is 555. In the first chapter which is on 'harmony' (*samanvaya*), it is shown that the Vedāntic texts, taken as a whole, have for their purport *Brahman*, the non-dual Reality.

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it should rather 'be conceived on the analogy of an organism involving internal differentiation. *Brahman* is a substance bearing attributes, some of which are themselves substances. As thus endowed with attributes, it is the 'qualified' (*viśiṣṭa*), although 'non-dual' (*advaita*); it is not the undifferentiated consciousness (*nirviśeṣa-caitanya*), as in Advaita. It is difficult to find an equivalent English expression for the term *Viśiṣṭādvaita*; we may, however, render it as 'organismal non-dualism.'

Viśiṣṭādvaita on its religious side is a Vaiṣṇava cult, and may be traced to a long line of teachers and saints. In the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* it is said that devotees of Viṣṇu would appear in South India, on the banks of the rivers, Tāmrapraṇī, Kṛtamālā, Payasvinī, Kāverī, and Mahānadī.¹ The reference is to the Ālvārs who, according to the Vaiṣṇava belief, were incarnations of Lord Viṣṇu's attendants such as Ādi-śeṣa and Garuḍa, and accoutrements such as the conch (*śaṅkha*) and the discus (*cakra*). The Ālvārs, twelve in number including a woman-saint, were born in all classes and strata of society, and in areas widespread in the South. They were peripatetic saints, visiting the holy places dedicated to Viṣṇu, and singing his praise in Tamil compositions. The collection of the hymns of the Ālvārs consists of four parts, each numbering a thousand stanzas. Hence, the work is called the *Nālāyira-divya-prabandham*. (The Book of Four-thousand Divine Stanzas). It is not any consistent philosophy that one should expect from the outpourings of the Ālvārs, who, as their name signifies, were saints 'who dived into the

Divine' They were immersed in God-love and God-bliss; they had no concern other than spreading the glory of the Lord.

In the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition the hymns of the Ālvārs are said to constitute the Tamil *Veda*, and are considered to be as authoritative as the *prasthāna-traya*. Since there is a double source for this Vedāntic system—the poems in Tamil and the texts in Sanskrit—the system itself is sometimes referred to as *Ubhaya-vedānta* (double Vedānta). And, as authoritative texts in Sanskrit, to the triple canon are added the *Vaiṣṇava Āgamas* and the *Purāṇas* like the *Bhāgavata*.

Rāmānuja, the greatest consolidator of Viśiṣṭādvaita, interprets Vedānta in the light of the tradition he inherited. Of the immediate predecessors of Rāmānuja, mention may be made of Nāthamuni (tenth century), a disciple of the last of the Ālvārs, and Nāthamuni's grandson, Yāmunācārya, otherwise called Ālavandār. The latter is the author of several manuals on Viśiṣṭādvaita, some of which are : the *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, the *Gītānta-saṅgraha*, and the *Siddhi-traya*. Rāmānuja claims that in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* he only follows the earlier *Vṛtti* of Bodhāyana; and as teachers who preceded him, he mentions the names of Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardin, and Bhāruci. Besides his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, which is known as the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, Rāmānuja wrote a commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and several manuals such as the *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* and the *Gadya-traya*. Of those who succeeded Rāmānuja, Sudarśana Sūrī (1300 A D.) wrote a gloss on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called

the *Śrutaparakāśikā*; Vedānta Deśika, also called Venkatanātha, (b. 1268 A. D.) was a polymath and prolific writer, among his writings are: an incomplete commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya* which bears the title, *Tattva-tīkā*, a gloss, *Tātparya-candrikā*, on Rāmānuja's *Gītā-bhāṣya*, and a polemical work, *Śata-dūṣaṇī*, which is in the nature of a powerful attack on Advaita Piḷlailokācārya, who became the leader of the Tamil school in Viśiṣṭādvaita, is the author of eighteen treatises called *Rahasyas* the chief of these are the *Artha-pañcaka* and the *Tattva-traya*. Commentaries on the *Upaniṣads* from the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita were written by Raṅgarāmānuja

(1) *Epistemology*. Viśiṣṭādvaita holds a peculiar view of knowledge (*jñāna*). There is knowledge which is constitutive of the self, there is also the self's attributive knowledge. The latter is called *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*. If the constitutive or substantive consciousness is like light, the attributive consciousness is like luminosity. The self is self-luminous; but it knows the objects through its attributive consciousness. The self which is of the nature of knowledge can manifest only itself. The attributive consciousness can manifest both itself and the objects. Its manifestation, however, is not for itself, but is for the self. It is not inert (*jada*) like the objects; nor is it consciousness (*cetana*) like the self. It is unlike the self, and yet is not inert. It is capable of expansion and contraction. In this sense, though it is attributive to the self, it may be regarded as a 'substance' also. It expands or contracts as the occasions demand in empirical knowing. Only in the state of

release, it becomes all-pervasive. As characterizing God, the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is not subject to expansion and contraction, being always all-pervasive

The *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* functions through the mind in all knowing processes, and in perception, with the help of sense-organs. In perception, it goes out to the object; takes on the latter's form, and as a result the object becomes known to the perceiving subject. Thus; objective knowledge is a modification of the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*. The internal states of the mind, such as desire and anger, are also its modes

Generally, three sources of knowledge are recognized in Viśiṣṭādvaita : perception, inference, and verbal testimony. In regard to perception, we need take note of only the distinctive teaching about the difference between indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*) stages. The *nirvikalpaka*, here, does not mean the perception of an uncharacterized mere 'that'. In fact, all knowledge is of a 'that-what', and not of a simple 'that'. There is no indeterminate or unqualified knowledge even in the first stage of perception. Knowledge is always of a qualified object (*viśiṣṭa-viṣaya*). Even when a cow, for instance, is seen for the first time, it is seen as an animal with characteristic features. And so, what is called 'indeterminate' perception is also perception of a qualified thing. The term 'determinate perception' only signifies the perception of the same object on the second and subsequent occasions. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, relations are not added to things and attributes; they are their very nature. And so, even when a thing is perceived for

the first time, its relation to its attributes also must be perceived. Like the substance and the attribute, the relation too is perceived. The difference between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* lies only in this that, while in the latter there is involved a reference to past association of similar things, in the former the presented object is perceived without reference to the past.

The doctrine of inference in the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita is, in essence, the same as that of the Nyāya. Inference, however, is not to be used to prove what is super-sensuous or trans-empirical. Thus, there can be no logical proofs for the existence of God. Inference is limited to cases where universal concomitance has been established through observation of sensible objects. "We do not, therefore, favour," says Vedānta Deśika, "inference in regard to what is super-sensuous."² Inference, on that account, does not become perception, because inferential knowledge is not immediate, but only mediate.

Verbal testimony in the form of Scripture is the supreme *pramāṇa*, since it alone is the means for the knowledge of *Brahman*. The *Veda* is the authority for what is super-sensuous. Since the *Āgamas*, the Epics, and the *Purāṇas*, as also the hymns of the saints, expound the same truth as the *Veda*, they are also authoritative. Yāmūnācārya argues, in his *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, that the *Pāñcarātra-āgama* has the same validity as the *Veda*, because it was revealed by God himself.

All knowledge, according to Rāmānuja, is of the real.³ Reality is not made by knowledge, it is only revealed by it. Valid knowledge is that which reveals

an object as it is, and is useful in practice⁴ Knowledge gives us not only a *that* but also a *what*. In all knowledge, therefore, that which we apprehend is what can be expressed in the subject-predicate mode, e.g. "This is a lily," "The lily is blue," etc. Knowledge, thus, is always of the complex, and never of the simple. No substance is known without knowing its relation to its attribute or mode. Knowledge relates to what is as *what*.

If knowledge is always of the real, how does error or illusion arise? Strictly speaking, there is no error at all. Even in the case of the so-called erroneous cognition of the form "This is silver," where what is there in front is nacre, it is not only the "this" that refers to what is real, but also "silver." Taking advantage of the doctrine of quintuplication, according to which in any given gross element the other four elements are also present as subordinate parts, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin would say that all things should be present in all things. In nacre there are particles of silver; and in the so-called illusion, "This is silver", it is the particles of silver that are perceived. And so, the silver-cognition in nacre is of the "real," and not of what is fictitious or imaginary. To take another example, in a mirage what is seen as water is "water", for in the desert-sand which belongs to the category of the element "earth," there is the element of "water" also. Thus, knowledge necessarily refers to what is real, even in cases where cognitions are considered to be erroneous or misleading. This theory of error is known as *yathārtha-khyāti-vāda* (the doctrine of the apprehension of what is real).

How, then, is the distinction between valid cognition and erroneous cognition to be accounted for, if both refer to what is real? The distinction is not a logical one. We cannot even say that in erroneous cognition, the reference is to a *part* of what is presented, while in valid cognition, the reference is to the *whole*; for in valid cognition too, it is only a part that is perceived. In nacre, for example, the nacre-particles do not constitute the whole of the object presented; they too are only a part, although the predominant part. Psychologically, the explanation for the nacre-silver cognition is that on account of greed, defective sense-organ, etc., one sees only the silver-element, although it is minute, and omits to notice the other elements, of which the nacre-element is the major one. The distinction between truth and error may also be accounted for in terms of success and failure, respectively, in practice. What is of service in life is regarded as true; what fails to serve one's practical needs is considered to be false. That is why in the definition of valid knowledge we gave, the expression "practically useful" is included along with "that which reveals an object as it is."

Knowledge normally corresponds to its object. It is only in cases where there is doubt or failure in practice that there is inquiry into the validity of knowledge. So, validity is intrinsic to knowledge, and invalidity is extrinsic. Also, validity is known intrinsically, and invalidity extrinsically. If validity is known by some other cognition, then, there should be admitted another cognition to ascertain the validity of the second cogni-

tion, and this will lead to infinite regress. If, on the other hand, the second or any other subsequent cognition is held to be self-valid, then, what reason is there to deny self-validity to the first cognition? Thus, the Viśiṣṭādvaita agrees with the Mīmāṃsā in regard to the intrinsic nature of validity and the extrinsic nature of invalidity.

(11) *Metaphysics* According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, there are three ultimate realities (*tattva-traya*): God (*Īśvara*), soul (*cit*), and matter (*acit*). Of these, God alone is the independent reality; the other two are dependent on him. The relation between God on the one hand and the world of souls and matter on the other is analogous to the relation between soul (*śarīrī*) and body (*śarīra*). God is the soul of souls, and of nature. These latter are distinct from God, but not separable from him. It is not an external relation which merely connects them, but the internal relation of inseparability (*apṛthak-siddhi*). The relation of *apṛthak-siddhi* is a key-concept in the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. In judgments such as "The cow is white" or "Devadatta is a man," what we do is to predicate a mode (*prakāra*) or quality (*viśeṣaṇa*), in each case, of a substance (*prakāraṇa*, *viśeṣya*). The substance-mode or qualified-qualification relation is an inseparable relation. God as qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by the world of souls and matter is non-dual (*advaita*). Hence, the system is called '*viśiṣṭa-advaita*'.

There are two fundamental categories, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita. They are: substance (*dravya*) and non-substance (*adravya*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories such as quality, action, etc., are brought under

the category of non-substance. God or *Brahman* is the supreme substance. From the standpoint of God, the entire world of souls and matter must be characterized as non-substance. But the souls and matter may be regarded as relative or dependent substances. They are substances in the sense that they are substrates of changes or modes. Including God, there are six substances (*dravyas*). The six substances are *prakṛti* (primal nature), *kāla* (time), *śuddha-sattva* (or, *nitya-vibhūti*, pure matter), *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* (attributive consciousness), *jīva* (soul), and *Īśvara* (God).

Of the non-substances (*adravyas*), there are ten : the five qualities of the elements—sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell; the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, viz. *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*; potency (*śakti*), and conjunction (*samyoga*).

We shall briefly consider the nature of each of the six substances :

(a) *Prakṛti*. This is primal nature, as in the Sāṅkhya system. But as a category in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, it has certain distinctive features. *Sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* are the qualities of *prakṛti*, and not its constituents. As qualities, they are inseparable from *prakṛti*, but not identical with it. *Prakṛti* is not independent of spirit, it is subordinate thereto. The relation between spirit and matter, again, is one of inseparability (*apṛthak-siddhi*). *Viśiṣṭādvaita* accepts the notion of causation as transformation or change (*pariṇāma*). Nothing comes out of nothing. In the cause the effect is latent (*sat-kārya*). Causation consists in making patent what is latent. Hence, creation and dissolution

are the appearance and disappearance, respectively, of matter, and not the absolute origination and distraction thereof

(b) *Kāla*. Time, like *prakṛti*, is non-conscious (*jaḍa*) substance. It is not on a par with space, because while space is derived from *prakṛti*, time is not. Time is a co-ordinate of *prakṛti*, and is comprised in *Brahman*. What are usually referred to as parts of time, viz moments, days, months, etc are modes or evolutes of time. Just as *prakṛti*, time also is subject to change (*pariṇāma*)

(c) *Śuddha-sattva*. This is pure nature as distinguished from *prakṛti* which is the prius of creation. It is the stuff of the world of eternal glory (*nitya-vibhūti*), which is above *prakṛti* and extends infinitely beyond. The supreme place (*parama-pada*) known as Vaikuntha is located in it. This is the shining spiritual world, the Abode of Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, and since it is made of *śuddha-sattva*, it is immutable. It is the place of plenary joy and felicity for the soul. *Nitya-vibhūti* is a non-inert (*ajada*) substance, like *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*

(d) *Dharma-bhūta jñāna*. We have already explained the nature of attributive consciousness, and the role it plays in Viśiṣṭādvaita epistemology. It may be recalled that *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is neither inert (*jada*) nor conscious (*cetana*): it is non-inert (*ajada*). Although it is called 'attributive consciousness', it is both substance and attribute—substance because it is the substrate of change, and attribute because it characterizes the souls and God. It shows itself (*svayaṃ*—

prakāśa) and the objects (*artha-prakāśaka*), but cannot know itself. The self knows itself, but can know the objects only through the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*.

(e) *Jīva*. The soul is of the essence of spirit. It is and has knowledge. The soul as knowledge does not change, but as having knowledge it changes. The soul's attributive knowledge expands to its fullest extent in the state of release, there is nothing then that the soul cannot know. In the state of bondage, however, the soul's attributive knowledge is more or less contracted. The soul in this condition acquires the body that befits its past *karma*, and has to transmigrate from one life to another till it attains release.

The soul is atomic in size.⁵ This does not prevent it from knowing distant or remote objects, because, as we have seen, its attributive consciousness is capable of expansion and contraction. Its knowledge is eternal, like God's, but on account of its empirical limitation, it suffers diminution; and this defect will be removed when the soul's nature is restored to it in release. Like knowledge, bliss also is a characteristic of the soul. Being caught in the transmigratory tract of *samsāra*, the soul goes through pain and suffering which, however, do not destroy its nature as bliss. When the cause of diminution and limitation is removed in the state of release, omniscience and infinite happiness are restored to the soul.

The soul is agent (*kartā*) and enjoyer (*bhoktā*). It is free in its volition, indulges in acts of will, and experiences the fruits of its actions. The soul's freedom of

the will in no way affects the absoluteness of God. God functions in accordance with the law of *karma*. The law itself is the expression of his nature. Although he is the inner ruler of the soul, it is his will that the soul should exercise its freedom of the will

Experience is the evidence for postulating a plurality of souls. The souls are infinite in number, and of three classes: (a) the eternal (*nitya*) souls are those which have never been in bondage, they dwell in Vaikuntha, always in the state of bliss, and are eternally free from *samsāra*; (b) the freed (*mukta*) souls are those which have already been liberated from bondage; they were once bound, but are now free, and (c) the bound (*baddha*) souls are those which continue to revolve in *samsāra* on account of ignorance and egoity, they are yet to achieve liberation through knowledge and devotion

The soul is a part (*amśa*) or mode (*prakāra*) of God. It depends (*ādheya*) on God who is its support (*ādhāra*). The relation between the soul and God is one of inseparability (*aprthak-siddhi*). The soul is related to, and dependent on God, as body (*śarīra*) is in respect of soul (*śarīrī*).

(f) *Īśvara*. God, whom Viśiṣṭādvaita identifies with Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, is the same as the Upaniṣadic *Brahman* endowed with the eternal attributes of truth, goodness, beauty, and bliss. He is *saguna* (with attributes), and not *nirguna* (attributeless). When the *Upaniṣads* declare that *Brahman* is *nirguna*, the meaning is not that God is devoid of all attributes, but only

of those attributes which are despicable and evil (*heya*). There are no realities other than, or apart from God : the souls and matter which are reals are within God. God is not a distinctionless or homogeneous being, he has internal distinctions (*svagata-bheda*). In the state of dissolution (*pralaya*), all things are unmanifest in God; creation (*sr̥ṣṭi*) consists in the manifestation of the world out of God. God is both the material and efficient cause of the world. God's causation, however, does not subject him to any substantive change. God in himself does not change; the entities that are comprehended in him, and of which he is the inspiring principle—it is they that change. He is the substance (*prakāṇī*); they are his modes (*prakāra*). He is the controller (*nīyantā*), they are the controlled (*nīyāmya*). He is the principal (*śeṣī*); they are the accessories (*śeṣa*). He is immanent in them, and also transcends them.

God appears in five forms. (a) There is his transcendent form which is called *para* (supreme). God as the transcendent possesses six attributes, which are knowledge, lordship, potency, strength, virility, and splendour. (b) The grouped form is known as *vyūha*. There are four grouped forms. Vāsudeva, Saṁkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. The *vyūha* Vāsudeva is the same as the transcendent form of God. The other three are named after the elder brother, the son, and the grandson, respectively, of Kṛṣṇa. There is a distinctive function assigned to each of these *vyūhas* in cosmic creation as well as in the act of redeeming souls. With Saṁkarṣaṇa, creation assumes an embryonic form;

through Pradyumna the duality of spirit (*purusa*) and matter (*prakṛti*) makes its first appearance; and finally, Aniruddha enables the body and soul to grow. As regards the process of redemption, Samkarsaṇa promulgates the Vaiṣṇava path (*ekāntika-mārga*), Pradyumna helps its translation into practice (*tat-kṛiyā*), and Aniruddha brings about the fruit of this practice (*kṛiyā-phala*), which is release. (c) The incarnated forms of Viṣṇu are called *ūbhava*. They are the *avatāras* described in the Epics and the *Purāṇas*. The principle of incarnation is declared by Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavad-gītā* thus. "Whenever righteousness declines and wickedness is on the ascendent, I incarnate myself in every age, in order to protect the righteous and punish the wicked, and thus firmly establish dharma"⁶ (d) The immanent form of God is referred to as the *antaryāmin* (inner ruler). This forms the theme of a section of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* where *Brahman* is described as the inner ruler, immortal. "He who dwells in the world, and is within it, whom the world does not know, whose body is the world, and who controls the world from within, is the self, the inner ruler, immortal"⁷ It is the form of God as *antaryāmin* that is favoured by those who are given to the practice of meditation. (e) The most concrete form of God is in the shape of sacred idols. This form is named *arcāvatāra*. The belief is that God descends into the idol and makes it divinely alive, so that he may be easily accessible to his devotees. In the holy places where the idols are installed, they constitute permanent incarnations and re-

servoirs of the redemptive mercy of God. The significance of the five forms of God is explained by Pillai-lokācārya thus: the attempt to comprehend the transcendent form is like getting water from the other world for quenching thirst, the *vyūha* form is like the legendary ocean of milk which also is not easy of access, the immanent form is like subterranean water which is not readily available to a thirsty man although it is right underneath his feet, the incarnated forms are like the floods that inundate the country for a while but do not last long; and the *arca* is like the stagnant pool from which anyone anytime could slake his thirst.

(iii) *Practical Teaching* The stages in the pilgrim's progress to the City of God are *karma-yoga*, *jñāna-yoga*, and *bhakti-yoga*. *Karma-yoga* is the path of disinterested action, action performed without desire for its fruit. This discipline results in the purification of mind. It is with a purified mind that one has to seek knowledge (*jñāna*) of one's true self. *Jñāna-yoga* in the Viśiṣṭādvaita does not mean the wisdom of the highest Self, *Brahman*, but self-reflection and self-knowledge. Through *jñāna-yoga* the self knows that it is distinct from the body-mind complex, that it is dependent on God, and that God is the Soul of souls. This paves the way for *bhakti-yoga*, the path of devotion. Devotion is the intense love of God, and includes, in Rāmānuja's system, contemplation of, and meditation on God (*upāsanā*). One has to listen to the glory and grandeur of God, reflect on what one has heard, and

continually dwell in mind on the supreme object of devotion. When *bhakti* matures and becomes complete, the soul has a vision of God, gets enraptured, and leads thenceforth a transformed life. The final release, however, comes only after the death of the body. The Viśiṣṭādvaita denies the possibility of liberation in life (*jīvan-mukti*). The soul, when liberated, goes to Vaikuṇṭha, God's own world, with a new non-physical body which is pure and perfect; joining the galaxy of the eternally released and the already released, it lives in the presence of God, enjoying omniscience and all-bliss.

Besides *bhakti-yoga*, the Viśiṣṭādvaita recognizes the path of utter submission and self-surrender known as *prapatti*. For the practice of *bhakti*, qualifications such as caste, etc., are required, for following the path of surrender, none whatever. For *prapatti* there are no restrictions of place, time, mode, eligibility, and fruit.⁸ Once the devotee has given up his pride and attachment to the ego, and surrendered himself unreservedly to God, no further effort is required on his part for being saved. What one has to do is simply to resolve 'to follow the will of God, not to cross his purposes, to believe that God will save, to seek help from him and him alone, and to yield up one's spirit to him in all meekness.'⁹ The devotee who follows the path of *prapatti* has no attachment even to liberation. He is utterly devoid of egoity. It is God that lives and moves in him. God is his All. It is the reinstatement and rehabilitation of the soul in its rightful place in God that is the goal of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

3. DVAITA-VEDĀNTA

Madhva¹⁰ (1199-1278 A.D.), like Rāmānuja, identified God with Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa; but unlike the latter's, his system is a radical pluralism. Madhva's Vedānta is called *Dvaita* (dualism), because the concept of difference (*bheda*) is foundational to it. Dvaita-Vedānta is also a realism, because it believes in the reality of the external world. It is a theism, since it fixes its faith in a personal God who is the only independent (*svatantra*) reality, the other reals being entirely dependent on him.

Madhva draws his inspiration from all the texts accepted by Rāmānuja as the authorities, except the Tamil hymns of the Ālvārs. He makes a distinction between good scriptures (*sad-āgama*) and bad ones (*dur-āgama*). The *Veda*, the Epics, the *Pāñcarātra-āgama*, the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, and other texts that follow from them are good scriptures. Those texts which expound doctrines that are contrary to the teachings of the good scriptures are the bad ones.

The first to expound Dvaita-Vedānta systematically was Madhva himself. He wrote ~~twenty~~ twenty-seven works, collectively called *Sarvamūla*. Among these are : commentaries on ten *Upanisads*, the *Brahma-sūtra*, and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, gloss on the first three chapters of the *Rg-veda*, brief expositions of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Bhāgavata*, ten philosophical manuals (*Daśa-prakaranas*) expounding the tenets of Dvaita, and the *Anu-uyākhyāna* which is a metrical work setting forth the main points regarding the purport of the *Brahma-sūtra*.

Among the followers of Madhva who expounded the system, mention may be made of two Jayatīrtha (1365-1388 A.D.) and Vyāsarāya (1478-1539 A.D.) Jayatīrtha wrote commentaries on almost all the important works of Madhva, and also a manual of logic, *Pramāna-paddhati*, and one on metaphysics, *Vādāvalī*. His commentary on the *Anu-vyākhyāna* is called *Nyāya-sudhā* which presents a lucid account of Madhva's philosophy. Vyāsarāya also known as Vyāsātīrtha, was a great dialectician. He wrote nine works, the most important of which are : *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Tarka-tāndava*, and *Tātparyacandrikā*.

That there is a plurality of reals is the basic doctrine of Dvaita. "Diverse are all the things of the world, and they possess diverse attributes"¹¹ Difference is of the very nature of things. While distinguishing things, difference distinguishes itself also. There is difference between (i) God and soul, (ii) one soul and another, (iii) God and matter, (iv) soul and matter, and (v) one material thing and another. Thus Madhva's Vedānta is a philosophy of distinctions. The main principles of his philosophy are summarized in the following statement contained in a verse attributed to Vyāsarāya. "In Śrī Madhva's system, Hari (Viṣṇu) is the supreme being, the world is real, difference is true, the host of souls are dependent on Hari, there are grades of superiority and inferiority among them, release consists in the soul's enjoyment of its innate bliss, faultless devotion is the means thereto, perception, inference, and verbal testimony are the three ways of knowing, and

Hari is knowable only through the *Veda*."

(i) *Epistemology* Madhva's system, as is but natural, sponsors an unambiguously realistic theory of knowledge. Without reference to a subject who knows and an object that is known, there can be no knowledge. And the object of knowledge cannot be a distinctionless being, it must always be an entity endowed with attributes (*saviśesa*). Objectless (*nirvisaya*) knowledge and unqualified (*nirviśesa*) knowledge are impossible. The object that is known is a determinate entity, independent of the knowledge. Knowledge does not create its object; it only reveals it. It is the object that determines the form of knowledge, and not knowledge that determines the nature of the object. Even as knowledge and the object are real, the relation between them is also real, it is not a mere concept. This particular relation is described as the object-subject-relation (*visaya-visayī-bhāva*). Since knowledge is an attribute of the self, the relation connects the subjects too. It is not the same relation that obtains in all cases of knowledge; for each piece of knowledge, there is a different relation. And, the relation does not change or alter the terms it relates.

Knowledge belongs to the self, and is not identical therewith. It is an attribute of the self, and should be distinguished from it. No one says, "I *am* knowledge." What is meaningful is the expression "I *have* knowledge." Knowledge is an eternal attribute inhering in the self. It is self-revealing (*sva-prakāśa*), and does not require to be illumined by another. In revealing its

object, it reveals itself as also the self of which it is an attribute

There is an ambiguity in the use of the term *pramāṇa*. Ordinarily, *pramāṇa* means the instrument or source of valid knowledge. But, sometimes, the expression is employed in the sense of 'valid knowledge' itself. This ambiguity is sought to be avoided, in Madhva's system, by the coining of two new expressions: *anu-pramāṇa* and *kevala-pramāṇa*, the sources of valid knowledge are secondary *pramāṇas* (*anu-pramāṇa*). *Kevala-pramāṇa* is defined as the knowledge of an object as it is (*yathārtha-jñānam kevalam*) and *anu-pramāṇa* as the means thereto (*tatsādhanaṁ anu-pramāṇam*). The forms of knowledge are three: perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge, and knowledge given rise to by verbal testimony. Correspondingly, the means of knowledge are three: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*).

(A) *Anu-pramāṇa* Dvaita-Vedānta agrees with the Sāṅkhya and the Viśiṣṭādvaita in recognizing only three means of valid knowledge. Objects of knowledge are either immediate or mediate. Perception is the means for the knowledge of the first kind; and inference is the means for the knowledge of the second. God can be known neither through perception nor through inference. The *pramāṇa* that makes known God is scriptural testimony.

(a) *Perception* Perceptual cognition is defined as knowledge generated by sense-object-contact (*nir-doṣār-*

*the*ndriya-sannikarṣa-janyam jñānam) Both the sense organ and the object should be free from defects. Only then the knowledge that arises from the contact between them will be valid. We have now defined perception as *kevala-pramāṇa*. The corresponding *anu-pramāṇa* is the contact (*sannikarṣa*) The external senses are the well-known five cognitive sense-organs Mind (*manas*) is considered to be the sixth sense-organ While in the case of external perceptions, the mind functions through the external sense-organs; in regard to internal perceptions, it itself becomes the instrument of knowledge. Besides the mind, the *sākṣin* or the intuitive faculty is recognized as the purest sense-organ. The function of the *sākṣin* is required for all knowledge, and the *sākṣin* exclusively reveals certain objects which are not within the reach of the external sense-organs and the mind We shall indicate briefly the cases in which the mind and the *sākṣin* are, respectively, the instruments of perceptual knowledge

In memory-cognition (*smṛti-jñāna*) it is the mind that operates as the instrument of perception If valid knowledge is defined as knowledge that is uncontradicted (*abādhita*) and new (*anadhigata*), memory will have to be excluded because it is not new knowledge. But in Madhva's system, novelty is not insisted on as a condition for knowledge to be valid. And so, memory (*smṛti*) is, according to this system, a form of valid knowledge. It is knowledge that conforms to its object. Although the object to which memory relates may not be present now, it was existent at the time of the origi-

nal experience. of which there is memory now. The form of the memory is not, "The object is such and such *now*," but "The object was so then." So, memory is valid knowledge. If memory is not recognized as valid, it is pointed out, the *Smṛtis* which are 'remembered' texts will have to be declared as invalid. If the *Smṛtis* are valid because they are based on the *Śruti* (*Veda*), memory also is valid experience. The instrument which causes memory-cognition is the mind (*manas*). The mind, which is the internal sense-organ, directly produces memory; the mode of contact between the mind and its object in memory is in the form of residual impressions (*samskāra*).

The *sākṣin* is the self's own sense-organ (*svarūpen-driya*). It is intuitive faculty which apprehends knowledge as well as its validity. The *sākṣī-pratyakṣa* (witness-perception) is absolutely infallible and self-valid. Doubts may be raised in regard to forms of knowledge which are produced by the external senses and the mind; but the deliverances of the *sākṣin* are indubitable and perfectly certain. This is because defects are impossible in the case of *sākṣī-pratyakṣa*.

In regard to all perceptions, external or internal, the *sākṣin* operates indirectly. But, there are certain objects which are directly perceived by the *sākṣin*. These objects are . *ātman* (self), *manas* (mind), *sukha* (pleasure) and *duḥkha* (pain), *avidyā* (nescience), *kāla* (time), and *avyākṛta-ākāśa* (unmanifested ether). It is the operation of the *sākṣin* that makes the following possible : the consciousness of the self as "I", the cogni-

tion of *manas*, the apprehension of pleasure and pain in the form "I am happy; I am miserable," etc., and the perception of other transcendent entities such as time, nescience, and unmanifested ether

The distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception is not accepted by Madhva, because, according to him, no perception, however primitive, is indeterminate, as all perception is of some determinate object

(b) *Inference*. In regard to the definition and classification of inference, there is nothing that is new in Dvaita epistemology. Of the three types of universal concomitance between the *probans* and the *probandum*, the purely positive (*kevalānvayī*), the purely negative (*kevala-vyatīrēkī*), and the positive-negative (*anvaya-vyatīrēkī*), the system of Madhva claims that positive concomitance (*anvaya*) by itself is sufficient for establishing the universal relation (*vyāpti*).

(c) *Verbal Testimony*. This is of two kinds. human (*pauruseya*) testimony, and non-human (*apauruseya*) testimony. To the former kind belongs the testimony of the *Smṛtis* besides that of ordinary humans; to the latter, the entire corpus of Vedic literature. The main argument for establishing the authority of the *Veda* is that but for it, super-sensuous values such as *dharma* and *adharma* would have no meaning. Ethics and spirituality would be void of significance if the *Veda* is not regarded as the supreme authority

Valid verbal testimony is the testimony that is flawless and infallible. The *Veda* is free from defects and

is veridical because it is not a composition of any human being. Tradition does not attribute the *Veda* to the authorship of any person or persons. Hence, the *Veda* is independent and eternal. God is the revealer of the *Veda*, and not the author thereof. It is only the order of the words that he creates, not the words themselves. The order of the Vedic words also may be said to be eternal because the intellect (*buddhi*) of God in which the words appear is eternal. At the beginning of each world-aeon, God's intellect manifests the Vedic words in their eternal order.

(B) *Kevala-pramāṇa*. While discussing the means of valid knowledge, we have also referred incidentally to the forms of valid knowledge. Corresponding to every source of knowledge, there is a mode of knowledge.

Kevala-pramāṇa is the means by which is effected direct intuition of the objects of cognition. Such direct intuitions are of four types: (a) The intuition of ordinary persons (*ayogin*). Where the means, such as the sense-organs or the mind are infected with defects, or where the object is faulty, there may be no agreement between the intuition and the object. But even in such cases the intuition is valid because it correctly apprehends what is conveyed by the senses and the mind. (b) The intuition of the *yogins*. This is the knowledge that the adepts in *yoga* gain. (c) The intuition of Lakṣmī. Lakṣmī is the consort of Viṣṇu. Her knowledge ranks next only to that of Viṣṇu. It is dependent on Viṣṇu, and is inferior to his knowledge.

It is non-reflective knowledge of all objects. Its correspondence to objects is always correct. It is without beginning and is eternal. (d) The intuition of God. God's knowledge depends only on itself. It is beginningless and eternal. It is all-comprehensive and never unveridical. It has for its content all things (*sarvārtha-visayakam*). It is of God's very nature, the essence of his *svarūpa* (own being).

(C) *Theory of Error*. Since validity or truth is knowledge of a thing as it is (*yathārtha*), invalidity or error is the knowledge of a thing as it is not (*ayathārtha*). In all realistic theories, it is clear what the status of the object is in valid knowledge. There is an object corresponding to knowledge. The object is apprehended as having the attributes it possesses. In non-realistic theories, truth is defined in other ways, as also the nature of the object of knowledge. But, what is the status of the object in erroneous cognition? The view that the object is unreal is *asat-khyāti*, and is held by the Mādhyamika Buddhist. All other views so far considered hold that the object in error is real in some sense or other. They are varieties of *sat-khyāti*. In Madhva's theory of error, there is a combination of *asat-khyāti* with one variety of *sat-khyāti* known as *anyathā-khyāti*. Hence, this view is called *abhinava-anyathā-khyāti* (theory of apprehension otherwise in a new form).

What does this mean? When, for instance, nacre is seen as silver, the silver that is seen is unreal (*asat*) there. But the unreal silver does not appear without a substrate, as it is claimed by the Mādhyamika. There

can be no substrateless delusion. The substrate, nacre, is real. It is nacre that appears as silver, which it is not. In other words, nacre appears as otherwise (*anyathā*) than what it is. In the Nyāya view, it is the silver that is in the shop that is seen in the nacre-silver delusion. This is not acceptable to Madhva. The content of the delusion of silver is unreal, and the reference to real silver present elsewhere is irrelevant. It is not the real silver present in the shop that appears or is seen here. When there arises the sublating cognition of the form "not silver," the presence of silver here is denied, and this is not concerned with the presence or otherwise of silver elsewhere. It is not, however, denied that real silver plays a part in the appearance of silver in nacre. The real silver is only the prototype (*sadyśa*) of the illusory silver. That itself is not perceived in delusion, as contended by the Naiyāyika. Thus, according to Dvaita-Vedānta, what is seen in erroneous cognition is unreal, but it is seen in a substrate which is real.

(D) *Self-validity of Knowledge.* The position adopted in Madhva's system is that validity is intrinsic to knowledge, and invalidity extrinsic (*prāmāṇyam svataḥ, aprāmāṇyam parataḥ*). Validity is generated by the causal aggregate (*jñāna-sāmagrī*) of knowledge itself; hence, it is intrinsic to knowledge. For occasioning invalidity in knowledge, some other factor, i.e. defect, is necessary, and so, invalidity is extrinsic. Similarly, in regard to ascertainment also, validity is intrinsic. It is the *sāksin*, the intuitive faculty, that apprehends the certitude of knowledge. By its inherent power (*sahaja-*

śakti) the *sākṣin* reveals not only the presence of knowledge but also of its validity. The innate power of *sākṣin* is sometimes obstructed by the defects in instruments such as the mind. It is at such times that there arises doubt in regard to the validity of knowledge. In order to remove doubt we seek for verification in fruitful activity, and from failure in practice, we come to know that the knowledge in question is invalid. And so, the apprehension of invalidity is extrinsic.

(ii) *Metaphysics* The realistic metaphysics of Dvaita-Vedānta is founded on the principle that whatever can be known through any *pramāṇa* is real. It is the real that becomes the object of valid knowledge (*pramiti-viṣaya*). It follows from this that the object of any knowledge, even perceptual knowledge, is real. Perception is not inferior to any other *pramāṇa*—even to scriptural testimony; for it is not contradicted by scripture. In its own field, the sensuous, perception is perfectly valid and has unquestioned authority. The object of perception, therefore, cannot be dismissed as what is illusory or unreal. Anything that is related to time and space is real. It is not necessary that, in order to be real, a thing must be eternal and all-pervading. Even the non-eternal and the limited is real. Anything that exists at some time, somewhere, is real. Technically defined, the real is that which is not the counter-correlate of negation at all time and in all space.¹³

In Madhva's system, the categories are ten in number: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), qualified

(*viśiṣṭa*), whole (*amśī*), power (*śakti*), similarity (*sādrśya*), and non-existence (*abhāva*). Of these, the first five and the last are those which figure in the Nyāya list of categories. Inherence (*samavāya*) is not an independent category in Madhva's school. Four other categories are added, which make the total number ten. Of the ten categories, the first nine are positive, and the tenth is negative. Of the nine positive categories, the first, i.e. substance, is the most important one, because on it depend the other positive categories.

Substances (*dravya*) are said to be twenty. (1) God who is the supreme Self (*paramātmān*); (2) Lakṣmī, the consort of God; (3) souls (*jīva*); (4) unmanifested ether (*avyākṛtākāśa*), which is eternal and all-pervading, and not subject to modification; (5) *prakṛti* which is the material cause of the world; (6) *guṇa-traya*, the three *guṇas*, viz *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which at the time of creation are evolved out of *prakṛti* by God; (7) *mahat*, 'the great', which is a product of the three *guṇas*, (8) *ahankāra* (egoity) which is an evolute of *mahat*; (9) *buddhi* (intellect) which, like *ahankāra*, arises out of *mahat*; (10) *manas* (mind) which is in two forms—the substantive, coming out of *ahankāra*, and the non-substantive, which is of two kinds—the eternal which is the same as *sākṣin*, the real nature of the soul, and the non-eternal which is external to the soul; (11) *indriya* (sense-organs), which are classified in three ways—substantive and non-substantive, cognitive and con-
ative, eternal and non-eternal: the cognitive and con-
ative sense-organs which are substantive and non-eter-

nal; the *sāksin* which is the non-substantive eternal sense; (12) *tanmātrās* (the subtle essences of elements), viz. sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour; (13) *bhūtas* (elements), viz. ether, air, fire, water, and earth; (14) *brahmāṇḍa* (the cosmic egg), the whole which holds together the different substances; (15) *avidyā* (nescience) which is of two types—the eternal and subtle which is in the soul, and the gross which is produced out of the *tamas* ingredient of the elements; (16) *varṇa*, the letters, which are eternal, all-pervasive, and beginningless, and fifty-one in number; (17) darkness which is the substrate of blueness and movement; (18) *vāsanā*, mental impression, which is the material cause of dream and dream-objects; (19) *kāla* (time), which always has a beginning and is subject to destruction, and which consists of ever-flowing time-units, and (20) *pratibimba* (reflection), which is similar to and inseparable from the prototype (*bimba*).

Quality (*guṇa*) is that which always resides in a substance. There are countless qualities. There are mental qualities as also physical qualities.

Action (*karma*) is that which leads either directly or indirectly to merit (*punya*) or demerit (*pāpa*). Even physical motion, such as the upward or downward, is not ethically indifferent, but causes merit or demerit.

Generality (*sāmānya*) is the nature that characterizes a class. It is eternal in eternal substances like souls, and non-eternal in non-eternal substances. In the destructible individuals, there is no generality which

will survive the destruction of the individuals, it also will be destroyed.

Particularity (*viśeṣa*) is a concept which is basic to Dvaita-Vedānta. A radical pluralism is sought to be justified with the help of the doctrine of specific particulars. According to this doctrine, every substance is composed of an infinite number of particulars—one particular for every quality that the substance possesses. The *viśeṣas* in each substance are innumerable; they serve to distinguish the different aspects which they qualify, but they do not require further *viśeṣas* to distinguish them, for they are self-distinguishing.

The qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) is a separate category in Madhva's system. By *viśiṣṭa* what is meant is the form which a thing acquires when it gets related to its attributes. The expression "The man with a stick" (*dāṇḍī puruṣaḥ*), signifies that the man as qualified by the stick acquires a form which is different from the mere man or the mere stick.

The 'whole' (*aṁśī*) is also a separate category, like the 'qualified'. The whole is neither the parts, nor their relation, nor both the parts and their relation, it is distinct from either.

Power (*śakti*) is of four kinds : (1) the mysterious power (*acintya-śakti*), as that of God, (2) the causal or natural power (*kāraṇa* or *sahaja-śakti*) which exists in things, and by virtue of which they produce changes; (3) a power that is occasioned in a thing (*ādhēya-śakti*) by some new operation, as in an idol through the con-

secration ceremony; and (4) the significatory power of words (*pada-śakti*).

Similarity (*sādrśya*) is a distinct category. When, for example, it is said that the *gavaya* is similar to the cow, what is expressed is the knowledge of similarity between the two animals; this knowledge must have a real object corresponding to it; and that is 'similarity'.

Non-existence (*abhāva*) is said to be of four kinds. prior non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*), annihilative non-existence (*dhvamsābhāva*), reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*), and absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*). Reciprocal non-existence is only another name for 'difference'; and difference is the very nature (*sva-rūpa*) of things. Absolute non-existence is that whose counter-correlate is not known through any *pramāna*, e.g. the horns of a hare, or the son of a barren woman.

Having briefly considered the ten categories recognized in Madhva's philosophy, let us select for study, in some detail, three of the substances. God, the world of nature, and the souls.

All the three are equally eternal; but it is God alone that is the independent substance. He is the supreme reality (*sarvottama*), endowed with the plenitude of all properties (*gunapūrṇa*). 'He is the one supreme being that is to be known, he alone is the independent agent.'¹⁴ He is the efficient cause alone of the world, and not its material cause. Nevertheless, he is the creator, controller, and destroyer of the universe. All beings—substance, *karma*, time, nature, soul—exist only by his grace, and would at once come to

nothing, if that grace were withdrawn. God manifests himself in various forms (*vyūhas*), incarnates himself (*avatāras*) from time to time, and is present in the sacred images. He is Hari, Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu, who can be known through Scripture. The *Harivaṁśa* declares: 'In the *Veda*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Purāṇa*, and *Bhārata*, at the commencement, in the middle and at the conclusion, and in fact everywhere, Viṣṇu is praised'¹⁵ In the *Viṣṇu-tattva-viṇirṇaya*, Madhva says: 'Ever do I bow to Nārāyaṇa, who is knowable only through the true Scriptures, who transcends the perishable and the imperishable, who is free from defects, and who is endowed with all auspicious qualities'¹⁶ Lakṣmī is the personification of the Lord's creative energy. She is eternally free from *samsāra*, and is untainted by sorrow. Though God is greater than Lakṣmī, there is no other greater than she. While God alone is independent, Lakṣmī is the foremost of the dependents.

The world of nature is not an illusion or a magical show. Nor is it a transformation of *Brahman* or God, as curd is of milk. *Prakṛti* whose first products are *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, is the material cause of the world. The effect is both existent and non-existent in its material cause (*sadasat-kārya-vāda*). Before the world was produced it was in *prakṛti* as cause, and not as effect. From *prakṛti*, the world is evolved by God who energizes it through Lakṣmī. The evolutes of *prakṛti* furnish the souls with the means and material for their working towards their final destiny.

The souls are different from God and the world of

matter. The entire world is filled with souls or *jīvas*. In his *Viṣṇu-tattva-ṁirṇaya*, Madhva observes : 'Infinite are the souls dwelling in an atom of space.'¹⁷ The souls are atomic in size, but pervade their bodies by virtue of the quality of intelligence. They are active agents, dependent on God's will. They are eternal and by nature blissful. But the connection with matter brought about by past *karma* makes them suffer pain and undergo transmigration. The process of changing forms comes to an end only when the impurities are removed. This is called release. The native bliss of the soul then becomes manifest.

There is a plurality of souls. And, no two souls are alike. Three grades of souls are distinguished : (1) those that are eternally free (*nitya*), like Lakṣmī, (2) those who have attained freedom from *samsāra* (*mukta*), the gods and men, the sages and fathers, and (3) the bound (*baddha*). The third group consists of two classes : (i) those who are eligible for release (*mukti-yogyā*), and (ii) those who are not so eligible. Of those who are not eligible for release, there are two types : (a) those who are tied down to the cycle of *samsāra* for ever (*nitya-samsārins*), and (b) those who are destined to go to hell, the region of blinding darkness (*tamoyogyā*). While some souls are pre-ordained to be saved, the others are eternally damned; they have either to revolve in *samsāra* without end, or go to the nether world of darkness. The *sāttvika* souls go to heaven; the *rājasa* souls keep to *samsāra*; the *tāmasa* souls fall into hell.

(iii) *The Practical teaching*

The soul is saved by the knowledge that it is dependent on, and is under the control of, God. Correct knowledge results in the love of God. And, love or *bhakti* is the means to release. Madhva declares: 'That love is called *bhakti*, which is the result of a knowledge of the greatness of God, which is firm, and which excels all other kinds of attachment.' And, he adds, 'Release is attained through such love, and not otherwise.' Vāyu, the wind-god, is the mediator between God and souls. God's grace is needed for the souls' release.¹⁸ Even in heaven the essential difference among the souls is preserved. The released are not all equal, but there is no discord among them. Madhva quotes in this connection the *Tura-śruti*: 'The classes of souls in the world of bliss are various and of different grades. But they are not at variance (with one another); for they all know *Brahman*, and are free from faults.'

4. OTHER VAISNAVA SCHOOLS

Besides Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita, there are other systems of Vedānta which identify the highest reality with Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. Of these, we shall take note of three.

(i) *Dvaitādvaita*. Nimbārka (eleventh century A.D.) wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Its title is *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*. In it he makes out that the world of souls and matter is both different and non-different from *Brahman*. The same doctrine is expounded by him in his other works, such as *Daśaślokī*.

The *Vedānta-kaustubha*, which is a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* by Śrīnivāsa, an immediate disciple of Nimbārka, presents Dvaitādvaita in a lucid manner. Kesavakāsmīrin defends Nimbārka's philosophical position in his *Tattvaparakāśikā* which is a gloss on the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Nimbārka agrees with the other Vedāntins in teaching that *Brahman* is the only independent reality. It is endowed with attributes (*saguna*), and is not attributeless (*nirguna*). What is meant by saying that it is *nirguna* is that evil qualities do not find a lodging in it. *Brahman* is eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. It is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. To Nimbārka, *Brahman* is Go-pālākṛṣṇa, (the Boy Kṛṣṇa) accompanied by Rādhā.

The world of nature is composed of three principal categories. These are . (1) *aprākṛta* which is not a product of *prakṛti*, and which constitutes the stuff of celestial bodies, etc , (2) *prākṛta*, what is derived from *prakṛti*, and (3) *kāla*, time, which, along with *prakṛti*, is the basic principle of cosmic existence.

The individual soul (*jīva*) is essentially a sentient being. It not only is consciousness, but also has consciousness. It is knower, doer, and experiencer as well. It is atomic in size, its attribute of knowledge expands or contracts according to the size of its body. There is an infinite number of souls. The kinds of souls are chiefly two: those that are in bondage, and those that have attained release.

The three realities, *Brahman*, *cit*, (the sentient)

and *acit* (the insentient) are equally eternal. *Brahman* is the controller (*niyantr*), *cit* is the experiencer (*bhoktr*), and *acit* is the object experienced (*bhogya*). The latter two are dependent realities, while *Brahman* alone is independent being. The relation between *Brahman* on the one hand, and souls and matter on the other, is a relation of natural difference *cum* non-difference (*svābhāvika-bhedābheda*). Souls and matter are different from *Brahman* in the sense that they have dependent and distinct existence (*paratantrasattābhāva*). They are non-different in the sense that they have no independent existence (*svatantrasattābhāva*). The relation of identity-in-difference is to be understood after the manner of cause-effect relation and whole-part relation. Just as pot is both different and non-different from clay, so are souls and matter from *Brahman*.

The soul does not lose its individuality even in the state of release. It only realizes its essential similarity to God. Through *karma* (work), *jñāna* (knowledge), *upāsana* (meditation), *prapatti* (self-surrender), and *gurūpasatti* (devotion to preceptor), the soul gains the ultimate goal. The love of God is the means to liberation. It should be based not simply on a recognition of God's greatness (*aiśvarya-pradhāna-bhakti*), but on his intrinsic and infinite sweetness (*mādhurya-pradhāna-bhakti*). The soul can attain release only at the end of its life, and not while it is yet in the body.

(ii) *Śuddhādvaita*. Vallabha (A.D. 1473-1531), like Nimbārka, founded a Kṛṣṇa cult. Kṛṣṇa Gopāla is the supreme *Brahman*, in his system also. But the

relation between *Brahman* and the world is not a relation of difference *cum* non-difference, but one of pure non-difference (*śuddhādvaita*) Vallabha calls it pure (*suddha*), in order to distinguish his view from that of Śankara which is *Kevalādvaita*. In his opinion Śankara's Advaita is impure in so far as it has to depend on *māyā*, the principle of illusion, to explain the world.

Vallabha's *Anubhāsyā*, which is a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and which was completed by his son Viṭṭhalanātha, is the basic text of *Śuddhādvaita*. There are also parts of Vallabha's commentaries available on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* and the *Bhāgavata*. Another important work of his is *Tattvārthadīpa-nibandha* with his own gloss *Prakāśa*.

To the three *prasthānas* of Vedānta, Vallabha, like the other Vaiṣṇava teachers, adds the *Bhāgavata*. The four canonical texts are arranged in the following order. (1) the *Veda* (including the *Upaniṣads*), (2) the *Bhāgavadgītā*, (3) *Brahma-sūtra*, and (4) the *Bhāgavata*. Vallabha's view is that these texts are complementary to one another, that where doubts arise, each preceding text should be interpreted in the light of the next. The *Bhāgavata* which comes last, therefore, occupies a unique position in Vallabha's system. An interesting feature about Vallabha's attitude to the Scriptural texts is that he accepts all of them in their literal sense, and regards even apparently contradictory statements as true.

The highest reality, in Vallabha's Vedānta, is Kṛṣṇa known as *Brahman* in the *Upaniṣads*, and as

Paramātmān (the supreme Self) in the *Bhāgavata*. He is *Puruṣottama*, the supreme Person. He is *sat* (existence), *cit* (consciousness), *ānanda* (bliss), and *rāsa* (sentiment). He possesses all qualities—even contradictory qualities. Though eternal and unchanging, he becomes all things through his *māyāśakti* (the power of *māyā*). He is not different from the world which he creates. He is not different from the souls which emanate from him.

Vallabha teaches that the supreme *Brahman* appears as (1) the *Antaryāmin* (the inner ruler) and as (2) the *Aksara-Brahman* (the immutable *Brahman*). *Brahman* dwells in the souls as *Antaryāmin*, limiting its bliss. *Aksara-Brahman* also is a form where the bliss-nature is limited. It is this *Aksara* that the wise ones meditate upon, and have as their goal. The negative texts of Scripture apply only to *Aksara*. The devotees look upon the *Akṣara* as the foot and abode of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. *Akṣara* is the *caraṇa*, (foot), *parama-dhāman* (the supreme place), or *vyoman* (sky) of the Supreme. It appears as *prakṛti* and *purusa*, and becomes the cause of everything. It is also called *mukhya-jīva* (principal soul), and is superior to the souls.

In the beginning, God was alone, and he desired to become many. As a consequence, he created the world out of mere pleasure, as a sport (*līlā*). The world is thus a transformation of the very essence (*svarūpa-pariṇāma*) of God. In this process, God is not affected in the least. He does not suffer any change within himself (*avikṛta-pariṇāma*.) In the world that is a trans-

formation of *Brahman*, the element of *sat* (existence) is manifest, while the other elements of *cit* (consciousness), and *ānanda* (bliss) are latent. The world (*jagat*) is not unreal or illusory, it is, in fact, non-different from *Brahman*. What is unreal is *samsāra*, consisting of the soul's notions of 'I' and 'mine'. It is this that has to be destroyed by knowledge, not the world.

The soul is a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman, and is eternal. At the beginning of world-creation, the souls issue out of the *Aksara*, as sparks from fire. They are cognizers, agents and experiencers.

They are atomic, but pervade their bodies through their attribute of intelligence. In them the *sat* and *cit* aspects are manifest, while the *ānanda* aspect remains latent. There are three classes of souls: (1) those that wallow in the stream (*pravāha*) of *samsāra*, (2) those that follow the Vedic path (*maryādā*), and (3) those that worship God out of pure love, having received his grace (*puṣṭi*).

The distinction between the path of *maryādā* and *puṣṭi* is very important. Release that is obtained through the former is gradual, one has to advance step by step, and go through the path of the gods (*devayāna*) to the world of *Brahmā*, and there attain release. The *puṣṭi-mārga* which depends entirely on the grace of God yields immediate release. The best example of those who elected this path is that of the milk-maids of *Bṛndāvana*. The highest stage in liberation is to join the Lord in his sport and enjoy his bliss for all time. The divine husband of all souls is *Kṛṣṇa*. The *rāsa*-

līlā (ring dance) in Gokula to which he beckons the soul is an eternal dance. More than union is the privilege of enjoying the company of the Lord through love

(iii) *Acintya-bhedābheda* The leader of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism is Caitanya (fifteenth century). Rādhā-kṛṣṇa is the supreme reality, according to him. His teachings are to be found in a poem of ten verses, *Daśamūla-śloka*, ascribed to him. Jīva Gosvāmī and Baladeva, among others have expounded Caitanya's philosophy in a systematic way. The most important work of Jīva Gosvāmī is *Satsandarbha* with a commentary by himself called *Sarvasamvādinī*. Baladeva's *Govindabhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* is quite a useful guide.

The Upanisadic definition of *Brahman* as *sat-cit-ānanda* is accepted by the Caitanya school. But, *sat-cit-ānanda Brahman* is not a bare distinctionless identity. He has an infinite number of *śaktis* (powers), which are supernormal (*parā*) and inseparable (*svābhāvikī*) from him. Of these, three are the main powers, viz. *svarūpaśakti*, *māyā-śakti* and *jīva-śakti*.

The Lord's *svarūpaśakti* (self-power), which is also called *cit-śakti*, exists in him eternally, and is responsible for all his *līlās* (sports); hence, it is his internal power (*antaranga-śakti*). Corresponding to the three elements in God's nature, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, there are three aspects of his *śakti*, viz., *sandhinī*, *samvit*, and *hlādinī*. By these he supports, knows, and enjoys his own as well as other beings' existence, consciousness, and bliss. What is known as *śuddha-sattva* (pure being) is composed of these three *śaktis*; it is called *śuddha*, because

it is unmixed with *māyā* *Māyā-śakti* is the Lord's inconscient power which is responsible for the material universe. As it is inert (*jaḍa*), it is opposed to *cit-śakti*, and yet cannot function without its aid. It is God's external power (*bahiranga-śakti*), and has two aspects, cosmic (*guṇa-māyā*) and individual (*jīva-māyā*). By the former, it creates the universe out of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, by the latter, it makes the *jīva* forget its self-nature and taste the sweets and bitters of life. God's *jīva-śakti* forms the essence of the finite souls, and stands between the other two *śaktis*.

Besides being *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*, God is *rasa* (aesthetic sentiment) as well as *rasika* (enjoyer of sentiment). It is for this reason that he is called Kṛṣṇa. In him felicity is perfect and complete. His *śakti* is Rādhā with whom he is united in love. Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa are two-in-one, inseparably bound together. The *Antaryāmin* is the immanent aspect of Kṛṣṇa, and is pervasive of the universe. Lower than that is the *nirviśeṣa Brahman*, the distinctionless being, which is only an adjectival aspect of the supreme. In between Kṛṣṇa and the *Antaryāmin* there are innumerable grades of *svarūpa-śakti*; at each level the Divine Lord sports himself with his playmates, who are all parts of him.

The universe has God as its material as well as efficient cause. *Brahman* is of the nature of the universe, but is not exhausted by it. As we have already seen, the world is created by God through his *māyā-śakti*. He is, however, untouched by *māyā*, and so is undefiled.

by the defects of the world. The world of nature provides the soul with a location, instruments and objects of enjoyment, etc. The souls are related to God as sparks to fire, or as parts to a whole. They are knowers as well as doers. Although their power is derived from God, they are entitatively separate from God, and are eternal. Even after release they maintain their separateness. Their true joy consists in serving the Lord (*sevānanda*).

Better than knowledge or contemplation is the path of devotion. The culmination of devotion is a complete self-giving, an unconditional self-surrender to God. *Kevala* or *śuddha bhakti* is not merely a means; it is the final human end as well, even transcending release. One who realizes it desires nothing but exclusive service of Kṛṣṇa.

The relation between the souls and the world on the one hand, and God on the other is *acintya-bhedā-bheda* (incomprehensible difference and non-difference). This is the relation that obtains between cause and effect, whole and part, possessor of power (*śaktimat*), and power (*śakti*). The relation is one of simultaneous difference and non-difference. This is, of course, inexplicable or incomprehensible. But that is a fact and cannot be denied. The example of fire and heat may be, in this connection, given. Heat is neither identical with fire, nor different from it. So is the relation of the world of souls and matter to God. It is impossible to think of this relation as falling under either of the categories, absolute difference and absolute non-difference.¹⁰

NOTES

- 1 *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, xi, 5, 38-40
2. *Nyāya-parīśuddhi* : *ata eva ca vāyam atyantātīndriya-vastvanumānaṁ necchāmaḥ*.
3. *Śrī-bhāṣya*, I, i, 1 *sarvaṁ vijñānaṁ jātam yathārtham*.
4. *Yatīndramata-dīpikā*, 1, 9 · *yathāvasthita-vyavahārānugunam jñānaṁ pramā*.
5. *Śrī-bhāṣya*, III, iii, 26.
6. *Bhagavadgītā*, iv, 7-8.
7. *Brhadāraṇyaka*, III, vii.
8. *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa-bhāṣya*, quoted in S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III (Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 375
prapatter deśa-niyamaḥ kāla-niyamaḥ prakāra-niyamaḥ adhikāra-niyamaḥ phala-niyamaś ca nāsti
- 9 *ānukūlyasya saṅkalpah, prātikūlyasya varjanam, rakṣi-
syatīti viśvāsaḥ gopṛtva-varaṇam tathā, ātma-nikṣepa-
kārpanye saḍvidhā śaraṇāgatīḥ*
- 10 Madhva was known by other names also Pūrṇaprajña, Ānanda-tīrtha, Nandi-tīrtha, and Vāsudeva.
11. *bhinnāśca bhinna-dharmāś ca padārthā akhilā amī*.
12. Jayatīrtha, *Nyāya-sudhā* (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), p. 249.
13. Vyāsarāya, *Nyāyāmṛta* (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), p. 95.
sarvadeśakālanisedhāpratyogitvaṁ sattvaṁ.
- 14 *ekaḥ sarvottamo jñeyah, eka eva karoti yat*.
15. *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*, 132, 95
16. Invocatory verse
17. *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirnaya*, 1, 387
18. *Ibid*, i, 105.
19. *bhinnābhinnatvādi-vikalpaścintayitum, aśakyah*.

Chapter Fifteen

ŚAIVA AND ŚĀKTA PHILOSOPHIES

1 THE ŚAIVA TRADITION

Theistic Vedānta, in its various Vaisnava forms, was the theme of the previous chapter. Non-dualistic Vedānta known as Advaita, we shall expound in the next which will be the last chapter. In the present one, we shall give an account of the theistic philosophies which consider Śiva as the supreme Godhead. These too, like the Vaisṇava schools, are founded on the *Veda* and the *Āgama*. But the *Āgama* that is taken as authoritative here is the *Śaiva-āgama*. As in the case of the Vaisṇava schools, so in that of the Śaiva traditions, there is a wide range of philosophical perspectives from pluralism to monism.

The concept of Śiva as God, who is the same as Rudra, is traceable to some of the hymns of the *Ṛg-veda*. It is not only the fierce or terrible aspect of this deity that is referred to in the hymns, but also his auspicious and beneficent aspect. According to one of the derivations of the word *Rudra* given by Sāyaṇa, who wrote commentaries on the *Veda*, the God is so called because he drives away suffering or sin (*rud drāvayitā*). It is significant that the word *Śiva* too may be interpreted to yield the same meaning. 'Śo' means 'to make thin'

or 'to attenuate', and thus *Śiva* means 'he who attenuates sin (*aśubha*)'. '*Śiva*' also means 'he who is auspicious'. In the *Śata-rudriya* section of the *Yajur-veda*, there is a grand litaney addressed to Rudra. The God, there, is described as the All, and as the auspicious lord of all creatures. In the *Atharva-veda*, Rudra is identified with all beings. In this *Veda*, we come across such well known names of the God, as *Mahādeva* and *Īśāna*.

Among the *Upaniṣads*, the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Atharvaśiras* are of special importance to the Śaiva tradition. The two *Upaniṣads* identify Rudra-Śiva with all-that-is. Śiva is the creator of the universe, the one embracer of the universe. He becomes the many through *māyā*. He is all the gods and goddesses such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara, Umā, Vināyaka, Skanda, Indra, and Agni. He is all the worlds and categories. He is universal-formed (*viśva-rūpaḥ*).

In the epic *Mahābhārata*, the Pāśupata, an early school of Śaivism, is mentioned along with the systems of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra, and *Veda*; and it is stated that Śiva-Paśupati, the consort of Umā, revealed the wisdom known as the Pāśupata. It is the belief of the Śaivas (followers of Śaivism), to whatever school they might belong, that Śiva himself was the first preceptor of their doctrine. In the *Vāyu-purāṇa* and the *Lingapurāṇa*, Śiva is represented as having declared that, at the time of Viṣṇu's incarnation as Kṛṣṇa, he himself would be born as a bachelor, by name Nakulin (or Lakulin), after entering into a dead body in the burial ground of Kāyārohaṇa, and that he would have four

pupils who would be duly initiated into *Māheśvara-yoga*.

It is in the *Śaiva-āgamas* that we have exclusive exposition of Śiva-worship and Śaiva philosophy in its different aspects. According to the Śaiva tradition, Śiva himself revealed twenty-eight *Āgamas*. Probably, the oldest *Āgama* is the *Kāmikā* with its subsidiary known as *Mrgendīa-āgama*. Each *Āgama* is said to consist of four parts : (1) *vidyā-pāda* which sets forth the philosophical doctrines; (2) *yoga-pāda* which teaches meditative practices, (3) *kriyā-pāda* which contains directions for the building of temples and making of idols, and (4) *caryā-pāda* which describes the methods of worship. The term '*Āgama*' literally means 'what has come down as tradition'. It has also been mnemonically understood, the three letters *ā*, *ga*, and *ma*, standing respectively for bonds (*pāśa*), soul (*paśu*), and God (*pati*), respectively, or for 'Śiva-knowledge', 'release', and 'discarding of impurities'.

There arose in the different parts of India various schools of Śaivism, taking as their sources the same authorities, viz, the *Veda* and *Āgama*, adding to them the sacred literature in the local languages where such existed. Of these schools, we shall consider four : Śaiva-siddhānta, Vīra-Śaivism, Śivādvaita, and Kashmir Śaivism.

2. ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

Śaiva Siddhānta is the name by which Tamil Śaivism is known. The expression literally means 'the

settled conclusion or final position of Śaivism'; and it serves to distinguish the system from non-Śaiva schools as well as from other types of Śaivism. The chief sources of Śaiva Siddhānta are the twenty-eight *Śaiva-āgamas*, and the hymns of the Śaiva saints. The authority of the *Veda* is also accepted. Both the *Veda* and the *Āgama* are recognized to be works of God, the *Veda* being general and the *Āgama* being special in nature.

References to Śiva and the worship offered to him in South India are to be found in the earliest extant literature in Tamil. The great period of Śaivism, however, was when the sixty-three canonical saints, called *nāyanmāns* or *aḍiyārs* lived and showed the people the way of devotion to Śiva. Of these, Appar, Tirujñāna-sambandhar, Sundaramūrti and Mānikkavācakar are the foremost. But the four great saints referred to above did not attempt any systematic exposition of the Śaiva doctrines. This task was left to the teachers who followed them. The most important of these teachers are Meykaṇḍadeva, Aruṇandi-śivācārya, Marai-jñāna-sambandha and Umāpati-śivācārya. Meykaṇḍa's *Śivajñāna-bodham* (thirteenth century A.D.) is the basic text of the Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy. There are twelve *sūtras* (aphorisms) in the *Śivajñāna-bodham* with a *vārtika* (commentary) written by the author himself. Aruṇandi's *Śivajñāna-siddhiyār* and Umāpati's *Śiva-prakāśam* are among the other important Siddhānta works.

The main categories of Śaiva Siddhānta are *pati* (God), *paśu* (soul) and *pāśa* (bond). According to this

system, God, soul, and matter (which constitutes the bond) are all real; and so the Siddhānta is a pluralistic realism.

God. God is the highest reality. He is referred to as *pati*, which term signifies that he is the only lord of all beings. God is regarded as the efficient cause of the world. The first *sūtra* of the *Śivajñāna-bodham* advances the causal argument for the existence of God. The world is an artefact of God. The three-fold change, viz., origination, sustentation, and destruction of the world, has its source in him. But God himself does not undergo any change. He is the unchanging ground of all that changes.

God is designated in the Siddhānta by such names as Hara and Śiva. He is called Hara because he removes the bonds of the soul, and Śiva because he is the supreme bliss. He may be referred to by any of the three genders corresponding to the threefold form in which the universe appears, namely as 'he', 'she' and 'it'—Śivah, Śivā, and Śivam.

The Śiva of the Śaiva Siddhānta is superior to the Trīmūrtis, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. The Siddhāntin claims that even as identified with Rudra, the third member of the Hindu trinity, Śiva is superior to the other two in the sense that in *pralaya*, the period of the dissolution of the world, Rudra alone stands unaffected, while even Brahmā and Viṣṇu are affected in a way.

God for the Siddhāntin is nirguna. But the expression does not mean 'attributeless' as in the tradition of Advaita, it only means "devoid of the *gunas* of

prakṛti, namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.” He is called *turiya* (the fourth), because he is beyond the states of waking, dream and sleep, which are conditions respectively of the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti*.

Eight qualities are usually attributed to Śiva. They are independence, purity, self-knowledge, omniscience, freedom from *mala* (the impurity of ignorance), boundless benevolence, omnipotence, and bliss. There is no limit to his greatness. He is incomprehensible, and he transcends human intelligence.

Śiva is immanent in the universe and also transcendent of it. Śiva appears in the form of the universe. He is therefore called *viśvarūpa* (of the form of the universe). But the universe does not exhaust his nature. He is more than the universe, *viśvādhika*. Almost every Śaiva saint has sung the praise of both these aspects of God. He is with form and is formless as well. God is usually spoken of as in eight forms (*aṣṭamūrti*). Mānikkavācakar for example, sings :

Earth, water, air, fire, sky, the sun and the moon,
The sentient man—these eight forms He pervades

But this conception is not to be confused with pantheism, for Śiva exceeds the world, while being its ground.

God in Śaiva Siddhānta is the operative cause of the world, and not its material cause also, as in some schools of Vedānta. The material cause of the world is *māyā* or *prakṛti*. Hence the Siddhānta view is not *brahma-parināma-vāda* but *prakṛti-parināma-vāda*. In this respect it resembles the Sāṅkhya but with this

difference that the Sāṅkhya does not recognize the need for an efficient cause. According to the Siddhāntin, just as clay will not transform itself into a pot without the activity of an agent, namely the potter, *prakṛti* cannot evolve into the world without an efficient cause. So God is required for creating the world of *māyā*. But the analogy of the potter should not be pressed too far. The potter has only finite intelligence and he plies his wheel for a livelihood. Not so is the Lord who is omniscient and omnipresent and has no ends of his own to accomplish. He makes the world evolve simply in order that the souls may be saved through the removal of their impurities. Śiva has five functions : *tirodhāna* (obscuration), *śṛṣṭi* (creation), *sthiti* (preservation), *samhāra* (destruction), and *anugraha* (grace). The first four of these have the last one (grace) as the goal. The world-process is for the sake of the soul's release through God's grace. But for the power of God, nothing would move, and the world-process would be impossible. But God himself is unaffected by the process.

The Siddhāntin does not favour the doctrine of *avatāra* (incarnation). While the other gods are subject to birth and death, suffering and enjoyment, Śiva is free from these. Śiva has no incarnation, because without *kaṛma* there can be no incarnation, and Śiva has no *kaṛma*. God does not take on a body in the manner of the transmigrating soul. He does appear, however, in the form in which he is worshipped by his devotee and also in the forms that are required to save the soul. But these forms are not material, they are the express-

ions of his grace. One of the precious modes in which God appears is that of the *guru* (teacher) whose purpose it is to save the struggling soul from *saṃsāra*. The conception of God as love (*anbu*) and grace (*anugraha*) figures as a frequent theme in the hymns of the Śaiva saints

We have now explained the nature of the most fundamental category of Śaiva Siddhānta, namely *pati*. It is fundamental in the sense that it is the only independent substance. The other two categories, namely *paśu* and *pāśa* are dependent on God. Between these two, the world, which represents *pāśa*, provides the soul (*paśu*) with the locations, vehicles and objects of finite experience. We shall explain the Siddhāntin's conception of the world first.

The World *Māyā* is the material cause of the universe. The Siddhāntin believes in *sat-kārya-vāda*. The universe must have evolved from a material cause which is not different from it in nature. God cannot be its material cause, because God is *cit* (consciousness) and the universe is *acit* (non-conscious). Hence *māyā*, which is non-conscious, alone can be the material cause of the universe. *Māyā* is so called because the universe is resolved (*mā*) into it and is evolved (*yā*) from it. The bodies (*tanu*) and organs (*karaṇa*) with which the souls are endowed as well as the worlds in which they live (*bhuvana*) and the objects of their enjoyment (*bhogyā*) have their origin in *māyā*. But, being non-conscious, *māyā* cannot function by itself. It requires the guidance of Śiva. Śiva operates on *māyā*, not direct-

ly but through his *cit-śakti* (consciousness-power), which is the instrumental cause.

The evolutes of *māyā* consist of thirty-six principles (*tattvas*). *Māyā* is twofold in nature, pure and impure, *śuddha-māyā* and *aśuddha-māyā*. *Śuddha-māyā* is *māyā* in its primal state. *Asuddha-māyā* is *māyā* when it is mixed with the impurity of ignorance (*ānava*) and action (*karma*). *Śuddha-māyā* gives rise to five pure principles. It is through these pure principles that Śiva functions and produces the bodies, organs, worlds, and objects of enjoyment for the pure souls (*adhikāra-muktas*). From *aśuddha-māyā* evolve the bodies, organs, worlds, and objects of enjoyment for the impure souls. The whole process of creation is for the sake of the liberation of the souls.

Māyā is one of the bonds (*pāśas*) of the soul. It provides the soul with the means, locations, and objects of enjoyment called *bhogyā-kāṇḍa*. The world of *māyā* is usually referred to as *asat*. The expression does not mean that the world is non-existent or unreal, but only that the world is other than God, who is *sat*.

Soul. We now come to the Siddhāntin's conception of the soul. Souls are by nature infinite, pervasive and omniscient. But because of their association with impurities (*malas*) or bonds (*pāśas*), they experience themselves as finite, limited, as parviscient. They thus become subject to birth and death. The souls are called *paśu* because they have *pāśa* (bonds). The three *malas* that bind the soul to the course of transmigration are *ānava*, *karma*, and *māyā*. (1) *Ānava-mala* is a connate

impurity. The concept of *āṇava-mala* in Śaiva Śiddhanta corresponds to the concept of *avidyā* in Advaita-vedānta. It is called *āṇava* because, on account of the delusion caused by it, the infinite soul becomes finite or atomic (*aṇu*), as it were. It is a positive entity and is also beginningless. It is called *mūla-mala*, because it is the original cause of the soul's bondage. It is compared to darkness (*irul*). Being non-intelligent, it has to be operated upon by the Lord through his power of obscuration (*tirodhāna-śakti*). (2) *Karma-mala* is the bond forged by deeds. The soul, deluded by *āṇava*, is prompted by appetition and aversion to engage itself in action. Action brings merit and demerit which the soul necessarily enjoys through a series of births. This is the impurity of *karma*. (3) *Māyā-mala*, which is the third impurity is the material cause of the universe. It endows the soul, as we have already explained, with the means and objects of enjoyment. The three *malas* together constitute the bondage of the soul. They are compared to the bran, husk, and sprout of paddy.

According to the conditions of its existence, a soul is either *sakala*, *pralayākala* or *viññānā kala*. The soul as it exists with the three bonds or conditions of empirical existence is called *sakala*. The soul as it exists in *pralaya*, or period of cosmic dissolution, when it is rid of *māyā* alone, is called *pralayākala*. Because of the continued presence of *karma*, the *pralayākala* becomes *sakala* again when there occurs fresh creation. The *viññānākala* is the soul from which *karma* too has been removed besides *māyā*, and for which only *āṇava* remains. It

resides in the world constituted by *Śuddha-māyā* and has no need to return to empirical existence. It is in a state fit for release, which it attains when through the grace of Śiva the impurity of *āṇava* is removed from it.

The *jīva* is related to Śiva as body to soul. God's relation to the soul is also explained with the help of the analogy of the relation of the letter *a* to all other letters. The Siddhāntin describes this relation as *advaita*, by which expression he does not mean non-difference (*abheda*) but only non-separateness (*ananyatva*). Though in nature the soul is similar to God, as an entity it is different from God. Even in release it retains its entitative distinctness. The souls are many and the familiar argument based on the distinctness of body, mind, etc., for each soul is advanced by the Siddhāntin to establish the plurality of souls.

Practical Teaching The path to release consists of four stages: *caryā*, *kriyā*, *yoga* and *jñāna*. The first stands for external acts of worship like cleaning the temples, gathering flowers for the deity, etc. This is called *dāsamārga*, the path of the servant. Its goal is *sālokya*, residence in the realm of God. The next stage, which is *kriyā*, is marked by acts of intimate service to God. This path is known as *satputra-mārga*, the path of the good son. The objective of this discipline is *sāmīpya*, attaining the nearness of God. The third discipline is *yoga*, which means union, and here signifies contemplation and internal worship. Through this method, the devotee becomes more intimate with God, as a friend with a friend. The path, therefore, is called *sakhā-*

mārga, the path of friendship. It leads to *sārūpya*, gaining the form of God. The three disciplines so far explained constitute the preparatory stages in the journey to perfection. The direct means to perfection is *jñāna* (knowledge). This path is termed *sanmārga* because it takes the soul straight to *sat* which is God. Its fruit is the ultimate human good which is *sāyujya*, union with God. This union is called *advaita* in Śaiva Siddhānta. But as we have already explained, it does not mean non-difference, but only non-separateness from God. Even in the state of release the soul retains its individuality. But it then shares in the nature of Śiva. It becomes similar to God in that it regains its infinitude, pervasiveness and omniscience. While the soul is now free from *mala* and enjoys the bliss of Śiva, it does not share with the latter his five functions of creation, sustentation, destruction, concealment, and bestowal of grace. *Mokṣa* is thus the experience of unity-in-duality. God is the giver of eternal bliss; and the soul is the recipient thereof. Without becoming identical with God, the soul enjoys his nature. What is denied by the negative particle (*a—*) in the expression *advaita* is not the existence of two but the duality of two. The Siddhāntin says, "They are not two", and not "There are not two."

3. VĪRĀŚAIVISM

Vīrāśaivism or Lingāyatism traces its origin to the five great ancient teachers mentioned in the *Svāyam-bhuva-āgama*. These teachers are Revaṇasiddha, Marulasiddha, Ekorāma, Paṇḍitārādhyā, Viśvārādhyā. They

are said to have established five *mathas* (monastic institutions) in the different parts of India—Kedāra in the Himālayan region, Ujjayinī in the South, Śrīśailam in the East, Rambhāpurī in the West and Vārāṇasī in the North-East. These institutions were charged by them with the mission of spreading the Liṅgāyata faith and guiding the lives of its followers. The greatest name in the history of Vīraśaivism is that of Basava (twelfth century A.D.). Though not the founder of the faith, Basava was mainly responsible for making it popular in the Kannaḍa country. After Basava, his nephew Channabasava became the leader of the movement, which, gaining increasing strength, spread to the Āndhra and Tamil areas as well.

‘*Vīraśaivism*’ means the Śaivism of the stalwarts, or heroic *Śaivism*. It is also called Liṅgāyata because its followers wear a *liṅga* (the symbol of Śiva) on their person. The Vīraśaivas accept as authoritative texts the *Vēdas*, *Āgamas* and *Purāṇas*. As for the other forms of Śaivism, the Śaiva-āgamas constitute the central authority for *Vīraśaivism* also. Reverence is also paid to the sixty-three Tamil saints and their writings. These saints are referred to as *purātana*, or ancients, in contrast to other mystics who arose later in the Kannaḍa country. These later saints are called *nūtana purātana* (new elders). Seven hundred and seventy of these later mystics are enumerated; Basava and his principal disciples are included among these. They expounded the doctrine of Vīraśaivism in a popular and catching manner through pithy epigrams called *vacanas*. Hence

their writings are called by the collective name of *vacana-śāstra*. The *vacanas* are current coin even among the humblest in the Kannaḍa country. They uniformly call men back from sin and beckon them to take refuge in Śiva.

As in the other systems of Śaivism, so in Vīraśaivism, Para Śiva is the supreme reality. He is of the nature of existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*), and bliss (*ānanda*). He is endowed with all auspicious qualities. The universe comprising of souls and matter is a part of him—a projection of his will. But the manifestation of the universe does not affect him in any way. As in Kashmir Śaivism, in Vīraśaivism also, Para Śiva is regarded as both the material and the instrumental cause of the universe. He is immanent as well as transcendent. From him all beings emerge, in him they subsist, and into him they finally get resolved.

Śakti is the power which eternally resides in Para Śiva as his inseparable attribute, as heat in fire and light in the sun. It is also called *mūla-prakṛti* or *māyā*. It is that which evolves itself into the phenomenal universe. It is through Śakti that Śiva becomes the cause of the universe. Creation (*srṣṭi*) is the evolution of all beings from Śakti, and resolution (*pralaya*) their return to Śakti. Śiva lends his own nature to Śakti.

The individual soul is a part (*aṁśa*) of Śiva in the sense that it proceeds from Śiva, partakes of his essence, and finds final rest in him. It is also distinct from Śiva in the sense that, though sharing in his essence, it does not possess the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence,

etc. Its powers of knowledge and action are limited and imperfect. It is a victim of impurities such as *karma* and *māyā*, and is consequently a creature of transmigratory existence (*samsāra*). Thus both difference and identity are said to govern the relation between the soul and Śiva. The relation, therefore, is described as *bhedābheda* (difference *cum* non-difference). The Upanisadic simile of sparks and fire is employed by the Vīraśaiva philosophers to explain the relation of the soul to God. The soul is also compared to the body of which God is the soul as in Viśiṣṭādvaita. In fact, Vīraśaivism is described also as Śakti-viśiṣṭādvaita. The expression connotes that the soul is inseparably united with God through Śakti.

Para Śiva Brahman, which is the supreme reality, is known as *sthala* in Vīraśaivism. The first part of the word, namely '*stha*' signifies that the universe exists in him, and the second part '*la*' that it returns to him in the end. Out of his own will and by the agitation of his innate power (*Śakti*), *sthala* or Śiva becomes divided into *Linga* and *aṅga*. *Linga* or *Liṅga-sthala* is Śiva or Rudra, and is the object of worship or adoration. *Aṅga*, which means part, is the individual soul, and is the worshipper or adorer. *Śakti* also gets divided into two parts—*kalā* and *bhakti*, the former resorting to Śiva and the latter to the individual soul. *Kalā* is responsible for the projection of the world from Śiva. *Bhakti* leads the soul from bondage to release. The final goal of the soul is unity (*aikya*) with Para Śiva, wherein the soul enjoys unexcellable bliss. This final state is *tēchni*

cally called *lingāṅgasāmarasya*, i.e. identity in essence between *Līṅga* (Śiva) and *aṅga* (soul).

Līṅga-sthala or Śiva manifests itself in six forms. There is a similar sixfold manifestation of *āṅga-sthala* or soul. The manifestation in the two cases proceeds on parallel lines. The fact that for each *Līṅga* manifestation there is a corresponding *āṅga* manifestation shows the essential identity between soul and God. The soul imagines itself to be different from God on account of ignorance (*avidyā*). The six stages in the manifestation of *Līṅga* and *āṅga* mark the progress of the soul in realizing its identity with God. Describing the final union, Reṇukācārya says, "Like water placed in water, fire in fire, the soul that is resolved in the supreme *Brahman* is not seen as distinct."

The soul's path to *mokṣa*, or union with Śiva, is marked by its devotion to the following three : (1) the spiritual preceptor (*guru*), (2) the realized or perfected soul (*jaṅgama*), and (3) Śiva (*Līṅga*). The aspirant should surrender his all to these three, worship them to obtain divine grace, and identify himself with them. As aids to progress in this path of faith, Vīraśaivism teaches eight rules to be observed. They are called *aṣṭāvaraṇa*: (1) obedience to a *guru*, (2) worship of *Līṅga*, (3) reverence for the *jaṅgama*, (4) smearing of the sacred ash (*vibhūti*), (5) wearing of a rosary of *rudrākṣa* beads, (6) *pādodaka*, sipping the water in which the feet of a *guru* or *jaṅgama* have been washed, (7) *prasāda*, offering food to a *guru*, *jaṅgama*, or *Līṅga*, and partaking sacramentally of what is left over, and (8) *pañcākṣara*,

uttering the five-syllabled formula *namah śivāya*. These eight modes of piety are taught to every Lingāyat child at the initiation (*dīksā*) ceremony.

4 ŚIVĀDVAITA

Śrīkantha, who was probably a contemporary of Rāmānuja, expounded a system of Śaivism which is called Śivādvaita. While resembling Kashmir Śaivism in certain respects and Śaiva-siddhānta in certain others, Śrīkantha's Śaivism has unique features of its own. Śrīkantha bases his exposition on the *Brahma-sūtra*, and identifies *Brahman* with Para-Śiva who is superior to the Trinity consisting of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. Because Śrīkantha explains the relation between the world of souls and matter on the one hand and God on the other on the analogy of the relation between body and soul, his system has been described as *Śiva-viśiṣṭādvaita*. Śrīkantha himself calls his system so. But unlike Rāmānuja, Śrīkantha does not criticise Śaṅkara's Advaita. On the contrary, there are indications, in his writings, of his leaning towards non-dualism. Appayya Dīkṣita (sixteenth century A.D.), in his commentary on Śrīkantha's *bhāṣya* as well as in his other works, makes out that in essence Śrīkantha's philosophy is Advaita. The passages in Śrīkantha's *bhāṣya* which appear to teach Viśiṣṭādvaita, says Appayya, are for the benefit of dull-witted people who have neither the intelligence to understand, nor the strength of mind to remain steadfast in, *nirguṇa-Brahman*. Though one may not be willing to go so far as Appayya Dīkṣita does, a careful reading of Śrīkantha's *bhāṣya* will convince one that

this philosopher occupies a position midway between those of Śankara and Rāmānuja. While theism is the pronounced doctrine he teaches, he leaves the door open for passing beyond to the higher truth of non-duality.

God, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, is the supreme Lord who exercises the fivefold function of the creation, preservation and destruction of the world, and of concealment and grace in respect of the soul (*srsti*, *sthiti*, *samhāra*, *tirodhāna* and *anugraha*) The purpose of creation is to redeem the soul. Since impurity is innate in the soul, and it could be got rid of only through action, the soul has to pass through cycles of births and deaths. For this purpose the Lord conceals the soul's eternal perfection. And when by successive performance of action the soul has become pure and is fit for release, the Lord bestows grace on it in consequence whereof it realizes its own eternal nature which is in essence the nature of God. Thus *tirodhāna* and *anugraha* are the two ends in the process of perfecting the soul, and the creation, preservation and destruction of the world are the intervening links in this chain.

Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the world. As the material cause, it is the soul of the universe. As the operative cause, it is higher than the universe. It is both *viśvākāra* and *viśvādhika* (immanent and transcendent). To the question, how may transformation be predicated of *Brahman*, Śrīkaṇṭha replies that the transformation (*pariṇāma*) so far as *Brahman* is concerned is to be conceived as some-

thing unique. The *parināma* is a change, not of *Brahman*, but *in Brahman*. It is a change not of substance but of form. The entire universe, conscious (*cit*) as well as non-conscious (*acit*), is already *in Brahman*, in a subtle condition, indistinguishable by name and form. What happens in creation is, the subtle is made gross; there is a change from *Brahman* as qualified by the subtle universe (*sūkṣma-cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman*) to *Brahman* as qualified by the gross universe (*sthūla-cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman*). The change is comparable to the growth from childhood to youth, virility which is not manifest in childhood becomes manifest in youth; but this does not mean that virility was not there in childhood, only it was latent then.

, *Brahman* effects the manifestation of the world through its Śakti or Power. It is by virtue of its Śakti that *Brahman* is immanent in his creation and yet transcendent. The ultimate Reality is not a bare identity; it is a unity-in-duality, an identity-in-difference. *Parā-Śakti* is the form of the Lord. She figures as the Lord's wisdom, strength and activity. The Lord's will, knowledge and action are but modes of his Śakti. Through his *icchā-śakti* (power of desire), the Lord desired "May I become many", by *jñāna-śakti* (power of knowledge) he considered the means and instruments necessary for creation, with *kriyā-śakti* (power of action) he created the universe which is like a picture painted on the wall of *icchāśakti*.

Śrīkaṇṭha believes in *sat-kārya-vāda* and maintains that the universe is non-different from *Brahman*, just as

the pot is non-different from the clay of which it is made. And yet *Brahman* is not completely one with the universe, for it is of the nature of consciousness while the universe is for the most part non-intelligent. The relation between *Brahman* and the world is to be explained on the analogy of the soul-body relation. The whole world, consisting of intelligent beings and non-intelligent things, is the body of Īśvara. Ignorance, change, etc., affect this body, while qualities like permanence, omniscience, etc., belong to Īśvara.

Śrīkantha identifies *Brahman* with Śiva. He sees in the *Brahma-sūtra* "a doctrine of the Supreme Being as Śiva, the auspicious one, the Being whose throat shows for all time the mark of His grace to His creatures, the consort of Umā who is the Supreme Light of Intelligence and Bliss, the three-eyed cause of the destruction and subsequent ré-creation of the universe."¹ Śrīkanṭha shows how the eight names of Śiva, viz., Bhava, Sarva, Rudra, Īśāna, Paśupati, Ugra, Bhīma and Mahādeva, are applicable to Brahman as defined in the *Brahmasūtra*.² Among the several Upaniṣadic texts that the teacher quotes is the one from the *Śvetāśvatāra* which declares that men can indeed attain release without knowing Śiva, when they can roll up the skies like a piece of hide.

The passages like "*neti; neti* (not this, not this)" do not deny all qualities of *Brahman*. What they do mean is that the nature of *Brahman* cannot be exhausted by the qualities already mentioned. When *Brahman* is characterized as *nirguṇa*, it only means that it is free from

anything that is defective or objectionable. It is the home of all auspicious qualities. Even *Brahman's* connection with a body is perfectly intelligible, though in its case the connection does not lead to imperfection. While the *jīva* becomes imperfect because its true nature is concealed by the will of the Lord, and its connection with the body is not voluntary, but is due to *karma*, *Brahman* which is self-luminous consciousness and bliss assumes forms at its own will. To *Brahman* belong such auspicious qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, independence, eternal contentment, beginningless understanding, and undiminished energy. It is the internal ruler of all, and should be meditated upon as *Cīdambaram* or *dahara-ākāśa*, the ether within the heart.

The soul is a part or *amśa* of *Brahman*. The Upanisadic texts which assert the identity of the two establish only the pervasion of the former by the latter. The soul is one of the forms (the eight *mūrtis*) of Śiva. But due to beginningless association with impurity, it finds itself in bondage consisting of repeated births and deaths. The features that characterize it are ignorance, dependence and bondage. It is associated with bodies, because it has to work out the consequences of *karma* which is beginningless. Bondage is said to be beginningless, because no beginning there could be for it in time. But there can be release from bondage, as the soul is intrinsically pure. "The dirt which envelops the self from time immemorial cannot be part of the inner nature of the self, which is essentially pure, and

shines forth on the removal of the impurity, like the moon when the clouds roll off ”’

When Scripture compares the souls to sparks flying forth from fire, it does not mean to predicate origination of the souls. The soul is eternal. What are originated are names and forms. And one of the distinguishing doctrines held by Śrīkantha is that the soul is atomic in size. The soul’s atomicity is understood, he says, from the scriptural passages which mention its departure from the body, its going to other worlds and its return here. The soul is also compared to the point of a goad or the tip of a hair divided a hundredfold. In spite of its minuteness, the soul may feel what happens in any part of the body, “just as the pleasure derived from a spot of sandal paste is diffused throughout the body ”’⁴

Śrīkantha speaks of the three impurities (*malas*) that envelop the soul. But what these are he does not tell us clearly. *Karma* is undoubtedly one of them, and his treatment of it is fairly extensive. In one place he refers to the impurity that obscures (*tirodhāna-mala*). But it is not clear whether he agrees here with the Śaiva-siddhāntin, according to whom *tirodhāna* which is one of the activities of the Lord is called an impurity because of its association with impurity. In several contexts Śrīkantha refers to the veiling of the individual’s purity or knowledge. But he nowhere mentions by name *āṇava*.

Release is attained through realization of one’s own essential nature. But this has to wait till *karma* fructi

fies and is fully experienced through enjoyment or suffering. The Lord is impartial and wills the release of all. But only those whose *karma* is ripened are released, even as on the rising of the sun only those lotus buds that are ready bloom

Contemplation of the Lord is the means to release. The soul's *samsāra* is due to its beginningless finitude and dependence. But this miserable state can be terminated, for it is not of the essence of the soul. The soul should rise above its limitations by meditating on the glory of Śiva. According to the *tatkratu-nyāya* (the maxim "what a man contemplates, that he becomes"), one becomes what one meditates on. By meditating constantly on Brahman the devotee acquires *Brahman's* distinctive characteristics (*asādhāraṇa-guṇāḥ*). Occasional acts of meditation will not do. Only when practised unintermittently and with concentration, meditation will lead to Brahman-realization. Meditation should not be given up at any time, it must continue every day until death. The Lord should be contemplated as identical with the self, not as different therefrom. Otherwise the soul will not be released from its bondage (*paśubhāva*). To go beyond the limitations one must identify oneself with the unlimited.

The enlightened one attains final release from good and evil deeds, 'not at death, but only on crossing the Virajā, the river that constitutes the boundary of Viṣṇuloka, beyond which lies the abode of Śiva, the region of final liberation and the full attainment of self-hood.'⁵ Till that stage is reached there is *samsāra*. The enligh-

tened soul departs at death on the path of the gods, sheds all the residue of its impurities at the Virajā, crosses the river and attains final release. Speaking of the devotees of the Non-related (*nīranvaya-upāsakas*), Śrīkaṇṭha says that there is no passing for them along the path. This is one of the reasons for Appayya Dīksita's thesis that Śrīkaṇṭha was an Advaitin at heart.

The soul which has attained release through the intuition of *Brahman* and has become equal to *Brahman*, enjoys supreme bliss before which the joys of the world pale into insignificance. The world is seen now, in its proper context, as a part of the Lord. Negatively, release is freedom from *pasutva* (bondage), positively, it is the attainment of bliss (*Śivatva*). The self's real nature is made manifest in release. It regains self-luminosity and acquires the auspicious qualities characteristic of Śiva. The fivefold functions of creation, etc., however, continue to be exercised by the Lord alone. The similarity of the released soul to *Brahman* is only in respect of wisdom and enjoyment. Is it not enough that the soul has been redeemed from *saṃsāra*, and that it no longer returns to the world of tears and sorrow?

5. KASHMIR ŚAIVISM

Kashmir Śaivism is a kind of monism or non-dualism. The names by which the system is known are Trika, Spanda and Pratyabhijñā.⁶ The name *Trika* primarily refers to the triple principle with which the system deals, viz. *Śiva śakti-anu* or *pati-pāśa-paśu*

(God, bonds, and soul) Though the other schools of Śaivism also accept these three categories, Kashmir Śaivism regards the individual soul and the world as essentially identical with Śiva, and so the three, according to it, are reducible to one. The term *Spanda* indicates the principle of apparent movement or change from the state of absolute unity to the plurality of the world. And the expression *Pratyabhijñā* which means 'recognition' refers to the way of realizing the soul's identity with Śiva.

The beginnings of Kashmir Śaivism are to be traced to the *Śiva-sūtra* whose authorship is attributed to Śiva himself. The *Sūtra* is said to have been revealed to a sage by name Vasugupta who must have lived towards the end of the eighth or the beginning of the ninth century A.D. The date of Vasugupta is settled on the authority of Kalhaṇa's *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* which says that Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, a pupil of Vasugupta, was a contemporary of Avantivarman who was king of Kashmir in 855-883 A.D. There are different traditions about the way in which the *Sūtras* were revealed to Vasugupta. According to one of them, Vasugupta had a vision of Śiva in a dream while residing in his hermitage below the Mahādeva peak; and he was directed by the Lord to a rock in the valley on which the *Sūtras* had been inscribed. When the sage went there and touched the rock, it turned and showed the inscription. According to a second version, the *Sūtra*, although composed by Śiva, was taught to Vasugupta by a sage. A third version is that Vasugupta received the instruction from Śiva himself

in a dream. Whatever might have been the way in which the *Sūtra* was revealed to Vasugupta, it is definite that the *Sūtra* laid the foundation of Kashmir Śaivism. A succession of talented exponents of the system followed Vasugupta. Kallata who was Vasugupta's chosen pupil wrote, among other works, *Spanda-sarvasva* in which he explained the meaning of the *Śiva sūtra* as taught by his master. Somānanda, the author of *Śivadīpti* and a gloss thereon, was probably another pupil of Vasugupta. Among other teachers of Kashmir Śaivism, we find the names of Utpala, Rāmakantha and Abhinavagupta. The last named was a prolific writer on a variety of subjects. The period of his literary activity extended over a quarter of a century, from about 991 to 1015 A.D. His best known work on Kashmir Śaivism is the *Paramārthasāra* which is an adaptation of an earlier Advaita work of the same name by Ādi Śeṣa.

The ultimate Reality, in Kashmir Śaivism, as in every school of Śaiva philosophy, is Śambhu or Śiva, the supreme God. Śiva is the Ātman, the self of all beings, immutable and ever perfect. He is pure consciousness (*caitanya*), absolute experience (*parā samvit*), supreme lord (*parameśvara*). He is the ground of all existence, the substrate of all beings. He is beginningless and one, he resides in all that moves and all that moves not. Time and space do not limit him, for he transcends them, and they are but his appearances. He is both immanent (*viśvamaya*) and transcendent (*viśvottīrṇa*). The world does not exhaust him, for he is infinite. He is called *anuttara*, the reality beyond

which there is nothing. In the familiar strain of the *Upaniṣads*, the teachers of Kashmir Śaivism tell us that the ultimate Reality, is beyond the reach of thought and language. Yet both mind and speech attempt to understand and express the Real in its relation to the universe.

The pure consciousness, which is the supreme Reality and is referred to as Śiva, is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. This view is much the same as the one sponsored by Advaita Vedānta as regards *Brahman* with attributes (*saguna*). God or Reality is the stuff of which the world is made as well as the agency which makes it. Fundamentally there is no difference between the cause and the effect. But while for Advaita the manifested world is non-real, for Kashmir Śaivism it is real.

By means of several illustrations the writers on the Pratyabhijñā system explain the creation of the universe from and by Śiva. The world is very often compared to the reflected city in a mirror. "As in the orb of a mirror pictures such as those of a town or village shine which are inseparable from it, and yet are distinct from one another and from it, so from the perfectly pure vision of the supreme Bhairava (i.e., Śiva) this universe, though void of distinction appears distinct part from part and distinct from that vision."⁷ And again, "As syrup, molasses, jaggery, sugar-balls, candy, etc., are all alike juice of the sugar-cane, so the diverse conditions are all of Śambhu, the Supreme Self⁸ The illustration of the rope appearing as the snake is also employed, though not with the same implication as in

Advaita-Vedānta. Another familiar analogy used to explain creation is the appearance of ideas in the mind. The creation-theory of the Pratyabhijñā school is known as *ābhāsāvāda*, i.e. the view which holds that the universe consists of appearances which are all real in the sense that they are aspects of the ultimate Reality.

The manifestation of the universe is effected through the Power (*Śakti*) of Śiva. And power is not different from the Possessor thereof. Śakti is Śiva's creative energy, and is spoken of as his feminine aspect. There are innumerable modes of Śakti. But the most important of them are five. They are: (1) *cit-śakti*, the power of intelligence or self-luminosity, which means that the Supreme shines by itself without dependence on any other light and even in the absence of all objects; (2) *ānanda-śakti*, the power of independence (*svātantrya*) which is bliss or joy, and by virtue of which the ultimate Reality is self-satisfied; (3) *icchā-śakti*, the power of will or desire, the wonderful power of the Lord to create; (4) *jñāna-śakti*, the power of knowledge by virtue of which the objects are brought together and held together in consciousness; (5) *kriyā-śakti*, the power of action which is responsible for the actual manifestation of objects and their relations. By these powers the supreme Śiva in his aspect as Śakti manifests himself as the universe. He manifests himself by his own free will (*svecchayā*) and in himself as the substrate (*svabhittau*). That is, there is nothing other than Śiva. If the universe appears as if different, such appearance is a delusion. With the opening out of Śakti, the universe

appears; and when Śakti closes herself up, the universe disappears. *Sṛṣṭi* (creation) and *pralaya* (dissolution) alternate, and this process is without a beginning.

As in the other schools of Śaivism, thirty-six categories or *tattvas* are recognized in Kashmir Śaivism

(1) The *tattva* which is counted as the thirty-sixth but which is first in the logical order is Śiva, the ultimate Reality, as it holds the potentiality of creation. It is of this reality, as we said, that the universe is an appearance. The *Śiva-tattva*, is the first stage in the process of world-manifestation. Of the five aspects of Śakti, *cit* or intelligence predominates over the others at this stage. (2) The next category or *tattva* is *śakti*. It is not proper to call it the second stage, for it is by virtue of its operation that the manifestation of the *Śiva-tattva* is made possible. When Śakti is counted separately, what is meant in reality is the manifestation of its *ānanda* aspect—the aspect of bliss and self-satisfaction which is the precursor of the manifestation of a variety of forms. (3) The third category is called *Sadāśiva* or the *Sādākhya-tattva*, the principle “from which or in which the experience of Being begins”. At this stage, *icchā-śakti* or the power of desire or will is the dominant feature. And it is so because desire has to precede actual movement or activity. (4) *Īśvara-tattva* is the fourth category in which the power of knowledge (*jñāna-śakti*) is predominant. If at the stage of the *Sādākhya-tattva* the experience of the divine Experienter may be stated in the form ‘I am this’ with the emphasis on *I*, the experience at the stage of the *Īśvara-*

tattva may be expressed in the form 'This am I' with the stress on this. That is, the objective universe gains prominence here, and thereby the lordliness of the divine Being is realized. (5) In the *Sad-vidyā-tattva* which is the next stage, the two sides of the experience, the subjective and the objective, the 'I' and the 'this' get equalized. The experience is of the form 'I am this'. Here neither is thrown into the background; the two have equal importance. In such an experience there is activity and movement of thought. The power of action, *kriyā-śakti*, functions as the dominating influence.

The five categories from *Śiva-tattva* to *Sad-vidyā-tattva* constitute what is called pure (*śuddha*) creation. They are pure because they are manifested by Śiva himself without dependence on any prompting cause like *karma*, or material cause like *māyā*. And also, the manifestation so far sketched is an ideal one, without any fragmentation or limitation of the One into the many. Hence it is called 'perfect and pure way or order' (*śuddhādhvan*). The five *tattvas* are the manifestation of the universal Self, and not of any individual soul. So, they have for their content the whole of experience, the 'All-this'. It is only after the stage of *Śuddha-vidyā-tattva* that finitization or fragmentation begins to take place. The experiencers of the five *tattvas* are said to be super-normal beings, and they are classified into five groups in accordance with the *tattva* that is predominant in each. The names of these groups are :

Śāmbhava, Śakti, Mantra-maheśvara, Manireśvara, and Mantra

The remaining *tattvas* form the impure (*aśuddha*) order of creation. Their manifestation constitutes the sphere of the experience of limited beings which does not cover the universal 'All-this', but relates only to particular aspects thereof. The course of manifestation after the *Śuddha-vidyā-tattva* is called the imperfect or impure way (*aśuddhādhvan*). It is also known as the *māyādhvan* or *māyā's* way, from the fact that *māyā* is the first member of this order.

(6) *Māyā* is the power of obscuration. Its purpose is to limit the Experience as regards both the Experiencer and what is experienced. The universal Self becomes obscured as it were, and, as a result of this, a plurality of souls and things becomes possible. The stage of *māyā* is comparable to the state of lapsing into sleep. The universal Self whose powers were unrestricted upto the stage of the *Śuddha-vidyā-tattva* falls into sleep as it were, and fetters are forged to bind it apparently and finitize it. The limitless powers and features of the universal Self which are manifest in the course of the pure creation are eternality (*nityatva*), all-pervasiveness (*vyāpakatva*), completeness (*pūrnatva*), omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) and omnipotence (*sarvakartṛtva*). These get limited by the power of *māyā*; and we now have in their place: (7) *kāla* or time (limited duration), (8) *niyati* or restriction in regard to space, (9) *rāga* or attachment to particular things, (10) *vidyā* or limited knowledge and (11) *kalā* or limited agency. These five

of desires. And so, the *guṇa* that is dominant in it is *tamas*.

Besides *manas*, *ahaṅkāra* produces the five organs of sense (*jñānendriyas*), the five organs of action (*karmendriyas*), and the five essences called *tanmātras* from which evolve the gross elements. The five organs of sense are · (17) the sense of hearing, (18) the sense of touch, (19) the sense of sight, (20) the sense of taste, and (21) the sense of smell. These five are the channels of perception, and are the products of that variety of *ahaṅkāra* in which *sattva* is predominant—the variety which is called *taijasa*. The five organs of action are (22) the organ of speech, (23) the organ of grasping, (24) the organ of locomotion, (25) the organ of excretion, and (26) the organ of reproduction. These organs, as their collective name denotes, are the instruments of action; and they are the products of the *vaikṛta-ahaṅkāra*, i.e. the *ahaṅkāra* in which *rajas* is the dominant *guṇa*. The five *tanmātras* are evolved out of the variety of *ahaṅkāra* in which *tamas* predominates, and which is called *bhūtādī*. The *tanmātras* are : (27) sound, (28) touch, (29) colour, (30) taste, and (31) odour. These should not be confused with the particular sounds, etc. which we experience. They are the subtle essences from which are evolved the gross elements.

The gross elements are the remaining categories. They are five in number, and are the products respectively of sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour. The five gross elements (*bhūtas*) are · (32) ether, (33) air,

(34) fire, (35) water, and (36) earth. These are the ingredients of what we call the physical world. They constitute the abodes of enjoyment and the objects of experience for the individual souls.

The individual soul, though identical with the supreme Śiva, suffers the ills of *samsāra*, because it has forgotten its essential nature. It is covered with three impurities called *malas*, and encased in the sheaths or *kañcukas*. The three impurities are *āṇavamala*, *kārmamala* and *māyīyamala*. *Āṇavamala* is the innate impurity of ignorance, and is the root cause of bondage. It is beginningless, though it can be destroyed. And final release consists in the destruction of *āṇava*. *Kārmamala* is the result of *āṇava*. It is responsible for the association of the individual soul with the effects of *māyā*. *Māyīyamala* which is caused by *kārmamala* is the impurity of transmigratory existence. Endowed with these three *malas*, the soul migrates from one state of existence to another, putting on the cloaks created by *māyā*.

The supreme aim of the Pratyabhijñā system is to enable the individual soul to find its salvation. The salvation consists in the soul's recognition of its identity with the ultimate Reality. As bondage is the result of ignorance, release is to be attained through knowledge. The knowledge which liberates, however, is not mere intellectual awareness, it is spiritual intuition of the fundamental unity. The intuition is gained by *dīkṣā* (initiation) which is the name for the act whereby spiritual knowledge is imparted and the bondage of innate

ignorance is removed. The intellectual knowledge of the Pratyabhijñā system is also necessary, because without it *dīkṣā* will not be efficacious.

The way to liberation (*mokṣa*) is exactly the reverse of the way of manifestation (*ābhāsa*). The individual soul which is subject to birth and death, being endowed with the three *malas* is called *sakala*. At the time of dissolution or *pralaya*, the soul is not associated with the effects of *māyā*, viz., body, etc., and so it is free from the *māyīyamala*, and is called *pralayākala*. When, by the adoption of the Śaiva-path, the soul has made some advance on the road to liberation, the *kāma-mala* too gets dissolved; and the soul in that stage is called *vijñānākala*. It is, in fact, a transitional stage from the impure to pure creation. *Ānava* alone lingers, and it too is destroyed by stages. Four such stages are recognized by the Śaivas, before the final annihilation of *ānava* is accomplished. The soul passes through the five *tattvas* of the pure creation in the reverse order, before it gains the knowledge of its identity with Parama Śiva. The names of the soul in these stages, as we have given already, are *Mantra*, *Mantrēśa*, *Mantra-maheśa*, *Śaktiśa*, and *Śāmbhava*.

There are four ways, or rather steps, to liberation *ānava*, *śākta*, *śāmbhava*, and *anupāya*. Each preceding stage leads to the next in order. The *ānavopāya* is otherwise known as *kriyopāya*. It is the path in which external aids like repetition of *mantras* are used as means to self-realization. At the next stage which is called *śāktopāya* or *jñānopāya*, the aspirant makes repeat-

ed attempts to rise from a dualistic outlook to the knowledge of unity. At the third stage which is known as the *śāmbhava-mārga* or *icchopāya*, the knowledge of the ultimate Reality arises through mere exercise of the will power. The *anupāya-mārga* or *ānandopāya* is the last stage in the journey. Here there is no need even for *bhāvanā* (contemplation). The ultimate Reality is realized through *pratyabhijñā* or recognition, and the soul is completely liberated.

This is how the process of recognition is illustrated and explained: "A certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to her, but when she saw him she did not recognize in him the qualities she had heard about, he appeared much the same as any other man, and she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she recognized those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them out, she was fully gratified. In like manner, though the personal self be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of those attributes, but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director to recognize in itself the perfections of Maheśvara, his omniscience, omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of being."

Mere human effort will not be of much avail in the path of *moksa*. What really moves here is the Divine

Will. Besides the three powers of creation, sustentation, and destruction of the universe, God has the powers of concealment and grace. His real nature is concealed from the soul, and after the soul has played out its part in *samsāra*, God's grace descends on the individual, and the individual is released. The descent of Divine Grace is called *śakti-nīpāta*.

Moksa, according to the Pratyabhijñā system, is a return to the original state of perfection and purity of consciousness. Abhinavagupta describes it thus: "When thus the imagination of quality has vanished, and he (the released soul) has surmounted the illusion *māyā*, he is merged in Brahman, as water in water, as milk in milk. When thus through contemplation the group of elements has been resolved into the substances of Śiva, what grief, what delusion can befall him who surveys the universe as Brahman?"¹⁰

6 ŚĀKTA PHILOSOPHY

Closely allied to the philosophies of Śaivism is the Śākta tradition which regards Śakti (Power, personified as the consort of Śiva) as the supreme Deity. 'The Hymn to Beauty' called *Saundaryalaharī*, ascribed to Śankara, opens with these words: "When Śiva becomes united with Śakti, he is able to exercise his lordly power, if it be not thus, the God does not, indeed, have the skill even to move". The basic texts for this school are the *Śākta-āgamas*, also called *Tantras*. *Tantra*, by definition, is that scripture by which knowledge is spread. The orthodox view about the *Tantras* is that

they are founded on the *Veda*, and that there is no divergence of doctrine between *Veda* and *Tantra*. In the *Kulārnava-tantra*, Śiva addresses *Pārvatī* and says that *kula-dharma*, i.e. the religious philosophy of the *Tantras*, is based on and inspired by the truth of *Veda* ¹¹ The number of *Tantras* belonging to the Śākta tradition is twenty-seven

The antiquity of the Mother-cult is well known. What is important to note is that, in India, the cult acquired for itself a philosophy—and that, a highly evolved meta-physical perspective. The Śākta concept of the motherhood of God is a fascinating one. In a world which is so much male-dominated and prone to be profane, the Śākta emphasis on Divine Motherhood is very desirable. In Śākta-darśana, the woman especially as mother, is assigned the first place of honour. An essential feature of *Śākta-sādhana* is the ritual worship of women and girls. The *Śākta-tantras* prohibit inflicting injury on women, and put a ban on such practices as the *satī* (the burning of widows along with their dead husbands). Even in sacrifices, they insist, female animals should not be immolated. The *Mahā-nirvāṇa-tantra* prescribes a whole day's fast to the man who speaks rudely to his wife, and enjoins the education of girls before their marriage. The Muslim author of the *Dabistan* says 'The *Āgama* favours both sexes equally. Men and women equally compose mankind. This sect holds women in great esteem and calls them Śaktis, and to ill-treat a Śakti—that is, woman—is a crime".

The philosophy of Śaktism is a kind of non-dualism (*advaita*), similar to that of Kashmir Śaivism. In both the systems, the highest Reality is styled Śiva-Śakti. Śiva and Śakti are not different, they are one. Śiva is consciousness as stasis (*cit*), Śakti is consciousness as dynamis (*cidrūṣinī*). Śiva is pure awareness, which is the ground of all existence. Through his *Parā Śakti*, he effects the manifestation of the universe. He is the sole and whole cause of the world. Only he becomes the cause, not in his aspect as stasis, but through his dynamic aspect which is spoken of as his feminine part. The main difference between Kashmir Śaivism and Śaktism is that while the former lays relatively greater stress on the Śiva aspect, the latter emphasizes more the Śakti aspect. Between the Śaiva and Śākta philosophy on the one hand, and Advaita-Vedānta on the other, there is close kinship. Advaita too teaches that the ultimate Reality is non-dual, and that it is of the nature of pure consciousness. But, for it the world-process is not real. The world, according to Advaita, is *māyika*, illusory appearance. The theory of world-appearance is called *vivarta-vāda*. The corresponding doctrine of the Śaiva and Śākta schools is known as *ābhāsa-vāda*. According to this view, the universe consists of appearances which are all real in the sense that they are aspects of the ultimate Reality.

Evolution, we are told, is the result of self-movement (*spanda*) on the part of Śiva-Śakti. It is the movement of God that brings about the distinctions of word (*śabda*), object (*artha*), and cognition (*pratyaya*).

These three are, in fact, aspects of God's primal energy. It is the causal impetus of the Divine that makes them emerge out of itself. The world of sounds, things, and thoughts, is the self-manifestation of the non-dual Spirit.

The line of evolution is from the subtle to the gross. The Reality in itself—Para Śiva—is transcendent, it is beyond the levels of Matter, Life, and Mind. It is without parts (*niskala*), without activity (*niskriya*), and beyond the reach of word (*aśabda*) and mind (*amanaska*). The same Reality as the cause of the world-process is called Parameśvara (the Supreme Lord). From Parameśvara arise at first the five categories of pure (*śuddha*) creation, and then begins the course of finitization consisting in the emergence of the thirty-one categories composing impure (*aśuddha*) creation.

The five categories (*tattvas*) of the pure creation are . (1) *Śiva-tattva*, (2) *Śakti-tattva*, (3) *Sadāśiva* or *Sādākhya-tattva*, (4) *Īśvara-tattva*, and (5) *Śuddhavidyā tattva*. The first, *Śiva-tattva*, is the first in the order of world-evolution. Here the predominant aspect of power is consciousness (*cit*). The second, *Śakti-tattva*, is not a subordinate of the first, it is more properly to be regarded as its co-ordinate, manifesting mainly the aspect of bliss (*ānanda*). The third, *Sadāśiva-tattva*, is the stage where the experience of being (*sat*) begins. Here, it is the power of will (*icchā*), that is dominant. At the next stage which is *Īśvara-tattva*, the power of knowledge (*jñāna*) figures prominently; and at the final stage, *śuddhavidyā-tattva*, it is the power of action (*kriyā*) that functions as the dominating influence.

Interpreted philosophically, these five stages or categories represent the gradual differentiation in the pure Experience, which subsequently serves as the basis of the evolution of the pluralistic universe. At first, there is only the distinctionless experience. Into this the condition of distinction is introduced by *Śakti*. When we reach the *Sadāsiva-tattva*, the experience of the form 'I am this' arises, with the emphasis on 'I'. At the next level of *Īśvara-tattva*, the stress is on the this 'this am I'. In order that the universe of minds and objects may emerge, there should be a balance between *this* and *I*. This is what is obtained at the stage of *Śuddhavidyā*. Here, in the experience 'I am this' the two get equalized. It is in such an experience that there is activity and movement of thought.

Upto *Śuddhavidyā* what we have is only ideal creation. It is after this, and with *māyā*, that there commences actual creation—the creation that is called impure. *Māyā*, which is the first of the thirty-one categories of impure creation, is the power of obscuration. It obscures the infinite spirit, and makes possible the rise of a plurality of souls and things. The limitless Experience gets limited as regards both the experiencer and the experienced, the 'I' and the 'this'. The next five categories called *kañcukas* (constrictors) constitute the ways in which the limitation is brought about. *Kāla* is temporal limitation. *Niyati* is restriction in regard to space. *Rāga* is attachment to particular things. *Vidyā* is limited knowledge. *Kalā* is limited agency. As enveloped in these *kañcukas*, the soul (*purusa*)

arises. This is the seventh category. The eighth is *prakṛti* which is the corresponding limitation on the objective side. From this, the rest of the evolution appears, almost as in the *Sāṅkhya* scheme. *Buddhi* (intellect), *ahamkāra* (individuation or egoity), and *manas* (mind) come into manifestation in sequence. From *ahamkāra*, there are evolved, besides *manas*, the five organs of sense (*jñānendriyas*), the five organs of action (*karmendriyas*), and the five essences of elements (*tanmātras*). Out of the last five emerge the five gross elements which are ether, air, fire, water, and earth.

So far we have been speaking of the evolution of the world of things (*artha-prapañca*). It should be noted that there is a similar evolution of the world of sounds (*śabda-prapañca*). In this context Parameśvara is *Śabda-Brahman*. The entire world is said to be born of *Śabda* (*śabda-prabhava*). Here also the line of evolution is from the subtle to the gross. Corresponding to the five categories of pure creation there are five stages of the emanation of sound. The first is *Parā* which is absolutely supreme and subtle. The second is *Paśyantī* which is less subtle but still undifferentiated. The third is *Madhyamā* which is grosser and undifferentiated, though not articulate. Articulate sound is called *Vai-kharī*. This is of two forms: subtle and gross. It is from *Vaikharī* that all the letters (*varṇa*), syllables (*pada*) and sentences (*vākya*) are manifested.

Parā which resides in the *Śiva-tattva* represents the first movement of *śabda*. This is also called *Nāda-tattva*. *Paśyantī* stands for *Śakti-tattva* which is known as *Bindu-*

tattva. *Nāda* and *Bindu* are the complements of the ultimate potency of creation. From these arise what is known as the *Tribindu* or *Kāmakalā* which is the root of all *mantras*. The three *Bindus* are the white (*sita*), red (*śoṇa*), and mixed (*miśra*). These are the effect-*Bindus* in relation to the original *Mahā-bindu*. They are also referred to as *Bindu*, *Nāda*,¹² and *Bīja*, and represent respectively the *Prakāśa* (effulgence), *Vimarśa* (distinction), and *Prakāśa-vimarśa* (combination of both) aspects of the Lord's Power. In *Tāntrika* ritual they are referred to as *Garānatritaya* (the three Feet). A host of correspondences are made with the three *Bindus*. e.g., (1) Moon, Fire, and Sun, (2) *icchā*, *jñāna*, and *kṛyā*; (3) *Vāma*, *Jyesthā*, *Raudrī*, (4) *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu*, and *Rudra*. The three *Bindus* constitute symbolically the points of a triangle. It is the *icchā* (desire), *jñāna* (knowledge) and *kṛyā* (action) of the universal Being, represented by Moon, Fire, and Sun, that are responsible for world-creation. The Sun is technically spoken of as *Kāma*, and the Moon and Fire together as *Kalā*. So, the great triangle is *Kāmakalā*. From *Kāma-kalā* arise the subtle *śabdas* called *Mātrikās* (the little Mothers); and from them, the gross *śabdas*, viz., letters (*varṇa*), words (*pada*), and sentences (*vākya*).

The three lines constituting the *Kāma-kalā* triangle are named after *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu*, and *Rudra*. The letters of the Sanskrit alphabet are distributed thus: 16 letters from *a* to the *Brahmā* line, 16 letters from *ka* to the *Viṣṇu* line; 16 letters from *tha*, to the *Rudra* line;

and the remaining three letters, *la*, *ha*, and *ksa* to the three corners

Śabda is said to be of the nature of *varṇa* (letters) and *dhvani* (sounds). The latter may be regarded as the manifest of the former. Each element or category of the universe has its own natural sound which is called its *bīja* (seed). For example, the sounds of the five elements, ether, air, fire, water, and earth, are *baṁ*, *yaṁ*, *raṁ*, *vaṁ* and *laṁ*, respectively. The typical sounds are said to be eternal, as also the relation between them and their objects. These sounds may themselves constitute *mantras*, or by mutual combination. A *mantra* is so called because it *saves* one who *meditates* on its significance. Each *mantra* has its *devatā* (deity) and each *devatā* has its *mantra*. For instance, the mantra of Mother *Kālī* is *krīm*, and of *Māyā* or *Śakti*, *hrīm*. The significance of *hrīm*, e.g., is that it is composed of the letters *ha*, *ra*, *ī* and *ma*, representing respectively *ākāśa* (ether), *agni*, (fire), *ardhanārīśvara*, and *nāda-bindu*. Even the word *ahaṁ* is a mantra. *a*=Śiva; *ha*=Śakti, *a+ha* (with *nāda-bindu*, viz., *m*)=*ahaṁ*=I. The breathing-process consisting of inspiration and expiration constitutes the *mantra*, *ham+sa*. The queen of all *mantras*, and their source as well, is *Om* composed of the letters, *a*, *u*, *m*. There is a whole literature on the significance of *Om*, and on the technique of meditation thereon. And, there is the grand conception of the world-Mother wearing the garland of letters.

What is extremely important in *Śākta-tantra*, as in all *Tantra*, is the teaching about the ways of worship

one should adopt in order to reach the human goal which is *moksa* (release). The Śākta conception of the goal is not different from that of Advaita-vedānta, which is the realization of the non-duality of the supreme Spirit. But the one difference between Śaktism and Advaita is, as already pointed out, that for the former the process of the One becoming the Many is real, whereas it is not so for the latter. Hence, the *sādhana* for the Śākta consists in a life of ceaseless activity and meditation. He does not avoid the world, but embraces it in order to overcome it. He sees the workings of the Divine everywhere, even in things and functions that are ordinarily held to be despicable and low. This is the reason for the adoption by the Śākta of the so-called 'left-handed' practices. The true meaning of the expression 'left' (*vāma*) is 'reverse' process towards the goal. The soul is carried away from its true nature as Śiva by the 'outgoing' process. If it has to go back to its source, it must follow the 'reverse' process. The main purpose of the *sādhana* is to switch on to the return current so that the soul may regain its lost identity with Śiva.

The *Śākta-tantras* classify the souls into three ascending groups: *paśu*, *vīra*, and *divya*. *Paśu* is the soul in bondage. Through *sādhana* it has to rise to the other two grades in succession, viz., the heroic (*vīra*) and the divine (*divya*). The objective of this ascent is that the soul should cast off its animal dispositions and become completely divine. Expressed in the language of the three *guṇas*, the soul should overcome

tamas by *rajas*, and *rajas* by *sattva*. The disciplines that the soul should adopt will naturally depend on the level in spiritual evolution that it finds itself in. The *Kulārṇava-tantra* speaks of seven *ācāras* (paths) in sequence. *Veda*, *Vaiṣṇava*, *Śaiva*, *Dakṣiṇa*, *Vāma*, *Siddhānta*, and *Kaula*. Of these seven, the first three are designed for the *paśu jīva*, the next two for the *vīra*, and the last two for the *divya*. The first three *ācāras* stand respectively for *karma*, *bhakti*, and *jñāna-mārgas*. The emphasis in the Vedic discipline is on ritual, in the Vaiṣṇava on devotion, and in the Śaiva on knowledge. The fourth *ācāra* which is called *Dakṣiṇa* seeks to conserve the results gained in the first three. So far, the process is one of going forth. It is at the next stage, *vāmācāra*, that the return-current commences. Certain aspects of this discipline involve the use of 'wine' and 'woman'. It is these that have brought on calumny to *Śākta-sādhana*. The ritual connected with these aspects is called *pañca-tattva*, as it involves the offering of five objects to the Deity. As the Sanskrit names of these objects begin with 'm', the ritual is also known as *pañca-makāra-pūjā*. The five objects are. wine (*madya*), meat (*māmsa*), fish (*matsya*), grain (*mudrā*) and woman (*maithuna*). The *Tantras* tell us that there are three ways in which this ritual may be performed, each subsequent way being superior to each earlier one. The first which is the lowest is the ritual in its gross form. Even here it is to be noted that the significance of the ritual is the sublimation of all life-functions including those of eating, drinking, and mating. The principle underlying the ritual is: 'By that one must rise by

which one falls'. The second way of performing the *pañca-tattva* ritual involves substitution. Here, instead of meat, for instance, ginger is used, and instead of wine cocoanut water. It is not the original objects indicated by the five *m*'s that are offered, but their substitutes which are all non-objectionable. The highest mode of the *pañca-tattva* worship is purely an internal process. It depends on no outside material. It consists of *yoga* practices. Here, for example, *go-māmsa-bhaksana* does not mean eating beef, but placing the tip of the tongue at the root of the throat. Thus it will be clear that the use of the *pañca-tattva* in the literal sense is made only at the lowest level of the *sādhana*. And even then the aim is to achieve for the aspirant self-control. That is why it is specifically stated in the *Tantra-śāstra* that the *pañca-tattva* is for the *vīra*. The *paśu* is not fit for it, the *divya* does not require it. It is a form of *rājasika-sādhana* for which only the *vīra* is eligible. The technique that he has to follow is to consecrate what are usually regarded as impure and repulsive things and acts and learn to look upon them as expressions of the Divine. Here the aspirant is not to stop. He has to go beyond the *vīrabhāva* (status of *vīra*) and attain to the *divya* status. The last two stages in the Tāntrika discipline, viz., *Siddhānta* and *Kaula ācāras*, complete the process of making the soul divine. *Siddhānta* means arriving at a final position as a result of reflection upon the relative merits of the path of enjoyment and that of renunciation. This, of course, implies that the aspirant realizes the emptiness of the so-called pleasures, and cultivates dispassion. In the final stage which is *Kaula*,

he pursues the path of renunciation to its conclusion, and realizes *Brahman* which is termed *kula* in the *Śākta* system. Here, as in the other *Tāntrika* traditions, the guiding hand of a *guru* is absolutely essential. It is he that must initiate the aspirant into the path, and lead him on, step by step, to the final goal. The supreme *guru* is *Śiva-Śakti*, the ultimate principle, of that, the human *guru* is but a terrestrial manifestation.

The technique of *Tāntrika* worship is an art by itself, and involves several phases, ranging from gross physical forms to subtle mental modes. Every item of this technique has a deep significance. The aspirant is asked to start with outer worship (*bāhya-pūjā*); but he is not to stop there. He has to go inward by stages through chanting of hymns (*stava*), muttering of *mantras* (*japa*) and meditation (*dhyāna*), until he attains unity with the non-dual reality (*advaita-bhāva*). In the *Tāntrika-sādhana*, images are used as objects of worship at first. Sometimes these objects bear no definite shape, e.g., the *Śivaliṅga* and the *Śālagrāma*. Gradually the worshipper trains himself to contemplate the Deity in the form of a *yantra* or *cakra* consisting of linear designs, and in the form of a mantra or sound-formula. The process of ritual-worship is a highly complicated one. The worshipper has first to purify his body composed of five elements. This is known as *bhūta-śuddhi*. Then he has to perform what is known as *nyāsa*, which means touching the various parts of the body with the tips of the fingers and palm of the right hand, to the accompaniment of the appropriate *mantra*. After this, he has to invoke the presence of the Deity in the image

and thus enliven it. This is called *prāṇa-pratiṣṭhā*. Then the worshipper has to make gestures with his hands indicating thereby the different intentions and wishes he has in mind. These gestures are the *mudrās*. After these preliminaries, he has to worship the Deity by bathing the image, adorning it, etc. The objective of all these acts is to make the mind pure so that it may direct its attention constantly towards God.

The *Śākta-sādhana* which makes use of the *Tānt-rika* technique of worship in a very detailed and elaborate manner is as fascinating as it is potent. But one must be on one's guard while practising it. If one understands the expressed instructions superficially and acts accordingly, one may go wrong egregiously. What is of utmost importance here is to get behind the mere words and grasp their spirit. For example, a verse of the *Karpūrādi-stotra*, which is a hymn to *Kālī*, says that *Devī* is pleased to receive in sacrifice the flesh, with bones and hair, of goat, buffalo, cat, sheep, camel and of man. The significance of this statement is that the worshipper should offer to the Goddess his lust, anger, greed, stupidity, envy, pride, and infatuation with the things of the world. The aim of sacrifice is to surrender the ego to the Deity, and thus to realize the non-difference of the soul from the supreme Spirit. The *Gandharva-tantra* declares the goal of *sādhana* thus :

*aikyam sambhāvayed-dhīmān
jīvasya brahmaṇo'pi ca*

“The wise one should accomplish the identity of the soul with *Brahman*”.

NOTES

1. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *The Śivādvaita of Śrikāṇṭha* (University of Madras, reprinted 1972), p. 275.
2. *Brahma-sūtra*, I, i, 2.
3. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *op. cit.*, p. 177
4. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 193
6. There are other names also, such as Ṣaḍardha-śāstra.
7. Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra*, vv 12-13, see JRAS, 1910, p. 723.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 728.
9. See *The Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* of Mādhavācārya, translated by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, p. 136.
10. The *Paramārthasāra*, vv 51-52, JRAS, 1910, p. 734
11. *tasmāt vedātmakaṁ śāstram
viddhi kaulātmakaṁ priye*
12. Here *Nāda* is the effect-Nāda

Chapter Sixteen

NON-DUALISTIC VEDĀNTA

1. THE ADVAITA TRADITION

The non-dualist tradition in Vedānta known as Advaita can be traced to the *Upaniṣads*. The Upaniṣadic sages like Uddālaka and Yājñavalkya expound Advaita in a lucid and telling manner to their respective pupils—young and old, men and women, aspirants in all stages in life and conditions in society. That the Real is non-dual is taught by Uddālaka in the well-known text, “As Being alone (*eva*), O dear One, was this (world) in the beginning, one only (*eva*) without a second”¹. Yājñavalkya, in a famous passage says “Where, indeed, there is duality, as it were (*iva*) one smells another, one sees another, one hears another, one speaks to another, one knows another, but where, of this one, all has become the Self, there what should one smell and through what, what should one see and through what, what should one hear and through what, what should one think and through what, what should one know and through what?”². It is significant that in these two passages are used, respectively, the expressions *eva* (alone, only) and *iva* (as it were, as if), the former as qualifying *Brahman*, and the latter as qualifying the world of duality. As qualified thus, it is evident, *Brahman* designated as *sat* (being, existence) is the sole reality, and the world of duality is an illusory appearance.

There are other Upaniṣadic texts where the same distinction is made between reality and appearance. To quote but one more instance of each usage, *eva* and *iva* : the *Īśāvāsyā-upanīṣad* declares, "When all beings have become the Self alone (*ātmā eva*) of the knowing one, then, for that one who sees oneness, what delusion is there, what sorrow?",³ the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Kaṭha* denounce the one who is deluded by the pluralistic view thus, "From death to death he goes, who sees plurality here, as it were (*nānā iva*)".⁴ That *Brahman-Ātman*, the ultimate reality, is one or non-dual, and that the world of duality is non-real or illusory is the cardinal principle of Advaita. This is the teaching, not only of the *Upaniṣads* but also of the *Bhagavad-gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra*, according to Advaita tradition.

In an invocatory verse, mention is made of the successive teachers of Advaita in the following order : Nārāyaṇa, the lotus-born Brahmā, Vasistha, Śakti, his son Parāśara, Vyāsa, Śuka, the great Gaudapāda, Govinda-Yogīndra, his pupil Śankarācārya, and then Śankarācārya's four disciples, Padmapāda, Hastāmalaka, Totaka, and Sureśvara.⁵ It will be seen from this list that the first teacher is the Lord Nārāyaṇa himself; and the line of succession upto Śuka is from father to son. From Gaudapāda onwards, we have the rule of monks (*sannyāsins*) succeeding to the leadership of the Advaita tradition. Before Gaudapāda, the teachers were divine or semi-divine. The tradition of *human* preceptors started with Gaudapāda, whose verse-commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-upanīṣad* is the first known work on Advaita, after the canonical texts.

Gaudapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, on which Śāṅkara himself wrote a commentary, contains the quintessence of the teaching of Vedānta.⁶ The work consists of 215 couplets arranged in four chapters. Following the *Upaniṣad*, the first chapter, 'Āgama-prakarana', analyses the three states of experience (*avasthās*), waking, dream and deep sleep, and finds that the Self which is referred to as the *Turiya* (fourth) underlies and transcends these changing states. The second chapter, 'Vaitathya-prakarana', seeks to establish the illusoriness of the world of plurality, on the analogy of dreams, and through a criticism of creationistic hypotheses. The third chapter, 'Advaita-prakarana', sets forth the arguments for the truth of non-duality, gives citations from scripture in support thereof, and discusses the path to the realization of non-duality, called *aśparśa-yoga*. The last chapter, 'Alātaśānti-prakarana', repeats some of the arguments of the earlier chapters, shows the unintelligibility of the concept of causality through dialectic, explains the illusoriness of the phenomenal world, comparing it to the non-real designs produced by a fire-brand (*alāta*) and pressing into service modes of Bauddha reasoning, and establishes the supreme truth of non-duality which is unoriginated, eternal, self-luminous bliss.

The central theme of Gaudapāda's philosophy is that nothing is ever born (*ajāti*), not because 'nothing' is the ultimate truth, as in *Śūnya-vāda*, but because the Self is the only reality. 'No soul is born, there is no cause for such birth, this is the supreme truth, nothing whatever is born.'⁷ From the standpoint of the Absolute there is no duality, there is nothing finite or non-eternal

The Absolute alone is; all else is appearance, illusory and non-real. They are deluded who take the pluralistic universe to be real. Empirical distinctions of knower and object known, mind and matter, are the result of *māyā*. One cannot explain how they arise. But on enquiry they will be found to be void of reality. If one sees them, it is like seeing the foot-prints of birds in the sky.⁸ The Self is unborn: there is nothing else to be born. Duality is mere illusion, non-duality is the supreme truth.⁹

In his *Brahma-sūtra*, Bādarāyaṇa refers to the views of several early teachers of Vedānta—Jaimini, Āśmarathya, Bādari, Auḍulomī, Kāśakṛtsna, Kārśnājini, and Ātreya. Of these, Kāśakṛtsna seems to have belonged to the Advaita tradition. He held the view that the immutable supreme Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. The soul is not a product of the Supreme, it is non-different therefrom. At death, the soul is not destroyed, nor is it born with the body. It is eternal, unchanging consciousness, there is no possibility of its destruction. The elements and the sense-organs are the products of nescience (*avidyā*). It is these that import illusory difference between the soul and the supreme Self. When true knowledge dawns, the illusion disappears, and the non-difference is realized. Such is the view of Kāśakṛtsna as expounded by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. It is a non-dualism of the type which was taught by Śaṅkara himself.

Among the other pre-Śaṅkara teachers of Advaita, mention may be made of Dravidācārya (or Drami-

ḍācārya), who seems to have written a commentary on the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad-vārtika* which was probably a work consisting of aphorisms by one Brahmanandin who is referred to as the *Vākyakāra*. Draviḍācārya is claimed by Viśiṣṭādvaita also as a teacher belonging to that school of Vedānta. Another preceptor of Advaita who came before Śankara was Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Vākyapadīya* which is a basic text for the philosophy of grammar. Bhartṛhari teaches Advaita in the sense that he regards the ultimate Reality as non-dual and the world of phenomena as an appearance thereof. But he speaks of the Reality as *Śabda-Brahman*, the primal word, the supreme non-dual truth, which is the source of the universe. An elder contemporary of Śankara was Maṇḍana Miśra who in his *Brahma-siddhi* expounds Advaita. There are some points of difference between Maṇḍana Miśra's Advaita and Śaṅkara's.

The greatest consolidator of Advaita was Śankara who, in the brief life that he lived on this earth, accomplished a stupendous task which is a marvel even to the most acute of mind and spirit. Very little is known about his life apart from the legendary accounts we have in the various *Śankara-vijayas*. His date is yet unsettled. the range is between 509 B C. and 788 A D. Only the barest outline of his life may be gathered from the available accounts. He was born of Nambūdiri parents at Kālāḍi, a village in Kerala on the westcoast of South India. Having lost his father quite early, he grew up as a precocious boy under the tender care of his mother. The ways of the world had no attraction for him. He was born, not to lead an aimless life, to

vegetate and wither away after a time, but with the greatest mission one could have in life, namely, to lead mankind to the blessedness of unexcellable peace, by dedicating himself dauntlessly and irrevocably to the quest of the Absolute and by sharing his great discovery with all his fellow-beings. So, he renounced the world at an age when most children do not leave behind their toys and trinkets, received formal instruction from Govindapāda which gave him the insignia of spiritual leadership, and spent the rest of his life which was not long—for he died at thirty-two—in spreading far and wide the gospel of the Absolute. At a time when false doctrines were misguiding the generality of people, and orthodoxy had nothing better to offer to counteract the atheism of the heterodox than a barren and outmoded ritualism, Śaṅkara recaptured the heights of the Upaniṣadic philosophy and brought from there for the benefit of humanity the waters of eternal life. Great as was his logical skill, it was not logic alone that crowned his mission with success, but a conviction and authority born of living experience. In the only oblique reference that he makes to himself in all his writings—and this occurs towards the end of the *Sūtra-bhāṣya*—he observes, ‘How can one deny the heart-felt experience of another as possessing *Brahman*-knowledge while being in a body?’¹⁰

It was out of his own self-evidencing plenary experience that Śaṅkara poured forth the ageless philosophy which bears the name ‘Advaita’. He mightily influenced the people of his time—even the tallest of them—and spread over the country a net-work of

organizations to serve as spiritual guide-posts. His philosophy has come to be regarded not only here in India but even abroad as 'one of the most valuable products of the genius of mankind in its researches of the eternal truth. And as a great contemporary Indian philosopher rightly remarks, "Even those who do not agree with his general attitude to life will not be reluctant to allow him a place among the immortals" ¹¹

Although Śāṅkara disclaimed originality for what he taught, he set a model in thinking and exposition which subsequent philosophers in India have striven to follow. More than one Vedāntic teacher who came after him have described his style of writing as lucid (*prasanna*) and deep (*gambhīra*). His works are characterized by penetrating insight and analytical skill. The metaphysic of the Absolute which he taught is, it is true, difficult to understand. Any attempt to expound it would necessarily involve expression of obscurity. But Śāṅkara's manner of exposition does not present us with the usual but unnecessary additional difficulty which is obscurity of expression. He wrote monumental works, both in prose and verse; and all of them are marked by depth of thought and lucidity of language. Among his major works are the great commentaries on what are known as the three canons of Vedānta, viz., the principal *Upanisads*, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the *Brahma-sūtra*, and such independent manuals as the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, and the *Ātma-bodha*.

Of the immediate disciples of Śāṅkara, four are considered to be the most important ones : Padmapāda,

Hastāmalaka, Toṭaka, and Sureśvara. Padmapāda wrote a gloss on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Only a fragment of it is extant bearing the title *Pañcapādikā*. Hastāmalaka is credited with a short poetical composition in which is set forth the quintessence of Advaita. According to tradition, Śaṅkara honoured his pupil by himself writing a commentary on the *Hastāmalakīya*. Toṭaka is celebrated for his moving hymn of praise dedicated to his master, set in the difficult *tōṭaka* metre. And Sureśvara, who was an inveterate critic of the ritualist school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā to which tradition he had himself belonged before his conversion to Advaita, is the reputed author of the *Vārtikas* (verse-commentaries) on Śaṅkara's commentaries on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Taittirīya Upaniṣads*. He also wrote a manual on Advaita called the *Naṣkarmya-siddhi*. Great as these disciples were, they held their master in the highest esteem, and deepest reverence, probably unparalleled even in sacred history. Sureśvara, for instance, says in one of the invocatory stanzas in his *Naṣkarmya-siddhi*: "The authentic exposition of Vedānta has been made by my preceptor. Indeed, the weakling that I am, I have nothing (new) to say. Can a fire-fly illumine the sky that is already pervaded by the rays of the effulgent sun?"¹² Toṭaka sings in his Hymn. "Knowing that Thou art verily the supreme Lord, there arises in my heart overwhelming elation. Save me from the vast ocean of delusion. Be Thou my refuge, O Master Śaṅkara!"¹³

After Śaṅkara, there came a long period of philosophical discussion among the leading schools of Vedānta.

The followers of Viśiṣṭādvaita and of Dvaita were the principal debaters with the exponents of Advaita. Some of the teachers employed the technique of neologic (*navya-nyūya*) in their polemical discussions. Among the dialectical Advaita works, mention may be made of Śrīharsa's *Khandana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, Citsukha's *Tattva-pradīpikā*, and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Advaita-siddhi*. These and similar works, together with their counterparts in the other traditions, make a valuable contribution to the dialectics of Vedānta.

An early exposition, in verse-form, of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* is the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* of Sarvajñātma Muni. We have already referred to the fragment of a gloss, *Pañcapādikā*, by Śaṅkara's immediate disciple, Padmapāda. A commentary on this work was written by *Prakāśātman*: it is called the *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*. From this work arose one of the post-Śaṅkara traditions in Advaita, known as the *Vivaraṇa* school. The other tradition derives its name from the *Bhāmatī* which is a commentary written by Vacaspati Miśra on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. There are outstanding texts belonging to these two traditions. Akhaṇḍānanda's *Tattva-dīpana* is a gloss on Prakāśātman's *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*; one of Nṛsiṃhāśramin's works is the *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa-prakāśikā*; Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya expounds the concepts of the *Vivaraṇa* school in his *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha*. On Vacaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī*, Amalānanda wrote his *Kalpataru*, and on this latter work, Appayya Dīkṣita has his *Kalpataru-parimāla*. Between the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Bhāmatī* traditions, there are no major

divergencies in doctrine, the differences are of a minor character and are designed to suit the different types of students devoted to Advaita. In the invocatory verse of a work which gives a digest of the doctrinal differences among the teachers of Advaita, *Siddhānta-leśa-sangraha*, its author Appayya Dīkṣita says that the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* (commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*), having for its sole purport the non-dual *Brahman*, issued from the blessed lotus face of the Bhagavatpāda (i.e. Śaṅkara) and got diversified a thousand-fold on reaching the preceptors who expounded it after him, in the same way as the Ganges, which originates from the feet of Viṣṇu, gets variegated on reaching different lands.

There are quite a few expositions which serve as introductions to the Advaita teaching in general, besides the manuals composed by Śaṅkara already referred to. Some of these are the *Vedānta-sāra* of Sadānanda, the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, and the *Pañcadaśī* of Bhāratī-tīrtha-Vidyāraṇya.

Although Advaita has been, and can be, expounded systematically, it is not, strictly speaking, a system of thought or a school-philosophy. According to the Advaita tradition, it stands for the plenary experience of non-duality which is the culmination of all systems of thought and schools of philosophy. The expression *Advaita*, as referring to the supreme Self, means the truth of non-duality; and as indicating the tradition which teaches this truth, the expression may be rendered into English as *non-dualism*. Here, it is to be noted that the negation signified by the prefix *non* applies not only to duality but also to *ism*. One of the aims of

Advaita is to show that the rival views which are called philosophical systems have their limitations, and are serviceable only in so far as they lead to something beyond. It is the total experience that is the goal. The supreme objective of Advaita is to urge man not to rest till he has realized that experience.

Against the background of what we have just now stated in regard to the uniqueness of Advaita, we shall study its teachings under three broad heads : epistemology, metaphysics, and the means to release.

2. EPISTEMOLOGY

(1) *Consciousness-as and Consciousness-of*. Knowledge or consciousness is the very nature of the Self. Terms such as *prajñāna* and *jñāna*, meaning knowledge, are employed in the *Upanisads* to indicate the nature of *Brahman-Ātman*. The Self is its own light; it is self-luminous (*svayam-īyotis*). It is not an object that is to be made manifest; it is self-manifest. The so-called luminaries such as the sun and the moon are themselves made manifest by the Self. Even the mind shines only by the light that it borrows from the Self.

As in the Sāṅkhya, so here in Advaita, a distinction is made between the consciousness which is the nature of the Self and the consciousness that is due to a mode of the mind. The Self is *consciousness-as*; the mental mode leads to *consciousness-of*. The former is *svarūpa-jñāna*, essential knowledge; the latter is *vṛtti-jñāna*, knowledge which results from the operation of a mental mode. By themselves, the mind and its modes are

inert, since they are the products of *prakṛti*. But since the mind is made of the *sattva* constituent of *prakṛti*, it has the ability to reflect the consciousness which is the Self. Thus far, the Sāṅkhya and Advaita agree. The one difference between them is that while for the Sāṅkhya, the mind and its parent, *prakṛti* are real, for Advaita *prakṛti* is the principle of illusion, *māyā*, and therefore not real.

The knowledge of objects is made possible by the functioning of the cognitive mode (*vṛtti*) of the mind. But the mental mode can function only as carrying the reflection of the essential consciousness which is the Self. For objective knowledge to arise, then, there are required the mental mode and the prototype consciousness which is also described as the witness-consciousness (*sāksi-caitanya*). There are cases of knowledge where the witness alone is the revealer, and not the mental mode. The cognition, say, of a pot arises in the form "This is a pot". For this cognition, the instrument is the appropriate cognitive mode (*vṛtti*) of the mind. But how is this cognition known? When I say "I know this is a pot", how is this knownness of the pot known? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is that the first cognition is known through reflective cognition (*anuvyavasāya-jñāna*). But this will lead to infinite regress. And so, the Advaita position is that the knownness of an object is revealed by the witness-consciousness. While cognitions manifest objects, it is the witness that manifests cognitions. It is not cognitive modes alone, but also all modes of the mind, such as desire, anger, pain, pleasure, etc., are directly revealed by the witness.

There is one more significant instance where there is awareness because of the witness, without the instrumentation of a cognitive mode : i.e. the awareness of the absence of objects, or the unknownness of a thing. The awareness of the absence of objects, as in deep sleep, is nonetheless awareness ; the unknownness is also known. Here it is the witness that is the revealing principle. The witness-self is the constant and unfailing consciousness. It neither rises nor sets. It is the eternal, immutable, pure awareness (*cin-mātra*). It is on the basis of the Self that all empirical knowledge takes place, involving the distinctions of cognizer, means of cognition, and object of cognition.

It is *avidyā* or nescience which obscures the eternal, immutable Self, and transforms itself into the form of the pluralistic universe. This is how the process of empirical knowledge takes place : that transformation of nescience which resides in the body and is called internal organ or mind, being prompted by merit and demerit, goes out through the channel of the sense organs like eyes, etc., pervades suitable objects like the pot, and becomes of their respective forms. This may be compared to the water flowing from the tank to the fields through irrigation channels and assuming the forms of the respective fields, or to the molten metal which, when poured into a crucible, puts on the shape of the crucible. Śaṅkara's disciple, Sureśvara, observes : from the cognizer, i.e., the reflection of consciousness (*cidābhāsa*) which resides in the intellect, there arises *pramāṇa* which is of the nature of a mode of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*); the *pramāṇa*, on reaching

the object of cognition, e.g., a pot, assumes the form of the object.¹⁴ It is the mental mode that connects the cognizer and the object cognized. The same internal organ resides in the body, goes out through the channels of the senses, pervades the object, and manifests it. That part of the internal organ which is defined by the body is called egoity (*ahaṅkāra*); that part which connects egoity with the object is termed the cognitive mode (*vr̥tti*), and that part which pervades the object and invests it with the character of objectness is known as fitness for manifestation (*abhiṣyakti-yogyatā*). Because the internal organ with its three parts is a product of the *sattva*-constituent of nescience (*avidyā*), it mirrors the consciousness which is the Self; and although consciousness is impartite, it appears as if split up into three forms on account of the difference in the parts of the internal organ which mirrors it. The aspect of consciousness which is defined by egoity is the cognizer (*pramātā*), the aspect of consciousness which is defined by the cognitive mode is the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*); the aspect of consciousness defined by the element of fitness for manifestation present in the object is the cognition (*pramiti*). Thus Advaita attributes the empirical usage in respect of cognition to the work of nescience which presents the impartite consciousness as if it was split up into parts. The distinctions of cognizer, means of cognition, etc., are, as we have already stated, the creation of *avidyā*.

(ii) *Sources of Knowledge*. In empirical matters, Advaita generally follows the way of the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā.¹⁵ As in the Bhāṭṭa school, so in

Advaita six means of valid knowledge are recognized : perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), testimony (*śabda*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), and non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*).

Of these means of valid knowledge, we shall consider here, in some detail, only testimony (*śabda*), especially of the form of the *Veda*. Both for Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and for Vedānta, the *Veda* is the supreme authority in matters supersensuous. While for Pūrva-mīmāṃsā the purport of the *Veda* lies in the ritual sections, and there too in the injunctive texts, for Advaita the purport is to be discerned in the *Upaniṣads*. It is in the *Upaniṣads* that we have the teaching about *Brahman-Ātman*, the knowledge of which alone will lead to the final goal which is release.

As against the Mīmāṃsā view that non-injunctive statements have no purport of their own, Advaita maintains that statements relating to the nature of Reality are supremely purportful.

The activist school seeks to justify its view of language as action-centred by a theory of learning according to which the meanings of words are supposed to be learnt only in the context of actions. A child observes the actions of his father in obedience to certain commands issued by his grandfather : "Bring the cow", "Tie the cow"; etc. By a process of insertion and elimination, the child understands the meaning of the words "bring", "tie", "cow", etc. Thus, it is only as associated with commands that words become meaningful. Assertive statements are auxiliary to injunctive sentences. In an injunctive sentence the verb is the principal part of

speech. The others such as noun and adjective have to be understood only as modifying the verb. And, in the verb the injunctive suffix is the most important factor. The injunctive suffix signifies what is technically called *niyoga*, meaning what-is-to-be-done. If it be the case that even secular words have *niyoga* for purport, contends the Prābhākara, it goes without saying that the *Veda* has *niyoga* as its sole purport. Existent entities are known through secular means of knowledge such as perception and inference. If the *Veda* too were to give us knowledge about the existent, it would not be independent as a *pramāṇa*. It is only from the *Veda* that the super-normal *niyoga* is known. That is why *niyoga* is described as that which is novel and is not known through any other *pramāṇa* (*mānāntarāpūrva*): What the *Veda* teaches primarily is activity. It is not desire or appetite that prompts activity. What prompts it is the cognition of a command or *niyoga*. For instance, a servant executes an act because his master orders him to do it, even though he may have no desire in the matter. The *Veda* which is the supreme master issues certain commands. Man's wisdom lies in simply obeying those commands. The Vedic *niyoga* is imperious. The *Veda*, in short, is *niyoga-śāstra*, the text that teaches what-is-to-be-done.

The Advaitin's reply to the Prābhākara view is as follows. It is not the case that the meaning of words is invariably learnt in association with action. Even if we concede that it is so learnt, it cannot be maintained that subsequently also, if the meaning of words is to be understood there must be some reference to action.

When a person is informed, for instance, that a son has been born to him, he is observed to be happy. Here, no activity is enjoined; the statement is not a command. Yet the person concerned understands the meaning of the words conveyed to him. It is not true to say that all words are related to what-is-to-be-done. If this were so, there would be no mutual relation among the words. The words that constitute a sentence are in mutual relation; they are not always or all of them related to what-is-to-be-done (*kārya*). Expectancy, competency and proximity are what bind words into a sentence. It was urged by the Mīmāṃsaka that the cognition of *niyoga*, and not desire, is what prompts activity. But it is not so. Activity can always be traced to some desire for acquisition or avoidance. Even in the case of the servant executing the commands of his master that was cited as an illustration, on closer analysis it will be found that the motive behind the action is either to please the master or to avoid punishment. And, in the context of any action it is neither the command, where one is issued, nor the agent that is the principal factor, but the enjoyer of the desired fruit. The words of the *Veda* only help in understanding what is desirable and what is not. If the words are the cause of action, then everyone who hears them must act, which is not the case. Activity follows even on the cognition of existent things, such as a serpent. So, it is not a valid argument to say that activity springs only from the cognition of *niyoga*, and that the sole purport of the *Veda* is *niyoga*. The function of the *Veda* as a *pramāṇa* is to make known what is unknown, and not to occasion

activity. The *Veda* is valid only as making known the real-nature of things, and not as prompting activity. Thus, even in regard to the ritual sections of the *Veda*, it is not the case that what-is-to-be-done is the purport. And, in regard to the *Upaniṣads* it is not action that is their central teaching, but the supreme reality which is *Brahman-Ātman*.

That the non-dual *Brahman-Ātman* is the central teaching of the *Upaniṣads* will become clear when we seek to understand them in the light of the six characteristic marks (*ṣad-līṅga*) determinative of purport. The six marks are : the harmony of the initial and concluding passages (*upakrama-upasaṁhāra*), repetition (*abhyāsa*), novelty (*apūrvatā*), fruitfulness (*phala*), glorification by eulogistic passages and condemnation by deprecatory passages (*arthavāda*), and intelligibility in the light of reasoning (*upapatti*). Let us illustrate by applying these marks to the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, with a view to determining its purport. The chapter opens with the words, "As Being alone, O dear One, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second," thereby indicating that the subject taught here is the secondless *Brahman*. The same truth is taught in the end in the words, "All this is of the essence of it." Thus there is harmony between what is taught in the beginning and what is declared to be the truth in the end. That reality is non-dual, that there is no difference, is stressed repeatedly in the course of the chapter. The text 'That thou art' is repeated nine times. That the truth of non-duality is not obtainable through other means of knowledge, that it

is, therefore, novel is also made clear in the chapter. That the greatest fruit, the attainment of the final goal, is the result of the knowledge of *Brahman* is taught in texts like, "He knows who has a preceptor; for him there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body), and then he becomes one (with *Brahman*)" The non-dual *Brahman* is extolled in the text. "Did you ask for that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the unknown becomes known, the un-understood becomes understood?" The *Upanisad* gives reasons for its teaching that *Brahman* is the foundation of all things, that it is the non-dual reality. Through analogical reasoning, the truth taught is sought to be established. "Just as by means of a single lump of clay, all things earthen are known, all transformations are verbal and therefore are only name, earth alone is real," etc. Applying the same technique of interpretation, the teachers of Advaita claim to show that the purport of scripture as a whole is the non-dual *Brahman*.

Scripture is revelation. If scripture is the only means for the knowledge of *Brahman*, will not Advaita which relies on scripture, it may be asked, become sheer dogmatics? If there is no scope or place for rational inquiry, how can Advaita be treated as metaphysics? In answering this criticism, we must first note in what sense scripture is the means for the knowledge of *Brahman*, and then discuss the limits of reasoning and also consider how far logic can be of help. The Advaita attitude to scripture should not be confused with the fundamentalist or literalist attitude which is that of the Mīmāṃsā school. Advaita does not believe in any

dogmatic idolatry of scripture. As Vācaspati Miśra observes in his *Bhāmatī*, it is purportful scripture that is authoritative, and not scripture as such.¹⁶ As we have seen above, one of the marks for determining purport is *upapatti*, intelligibility in the light of reasoning. If scripture were to proclaim something which is non-sensical or absurd, one is not to accept it as true. As Śāṅkara remarks, "Even a hundred scriptural texts declaring fire to be cold or non-luminous will not attain authoritativeness".¹⁷ The keenest ability to inquire is thus, called for in unravelling the meaning of scripture. To quote Śāṅkara again, "That which is accepted or believed in without proper inquiry prevents one from reaching the final good and results in evil consequences."¹⁸ In the interpretation of scripture, therefore, reason has to function relentlessly and thoroughly. Although *upapatti* (intelligibility) is only one of the six marks of interpretation, on closer scrutiny it will be found how important a mark it is. In determining, for instance, which the initial and which the concluding passages of a topic are, one has to resort to reasoning. There are texts which will become void of meaning if the words are understood in their primary sense. In such cases, it is the secondary implication of words that becomes relevant. Here, again, it is reasoning that will be of help : also, in the matter of determining which type of implication is to be resorted to. There are passages where words are employed in a figurative sense. In detecting them and in fixing the sense, reason has to play an effective role. Thus, it is obvious that reason

has to come in as a valuable aid at every stage in the selection and interpretation of scriptural texts.

The reason why reasoning by itself cannot lead to *Brahman*-knowledge is as follows: Thought or reason can be but a secondary means of knowledge, it cannot serve as the primary source of indubitable experience. The knowledge that reason yields is mediate, and mediate knowledge is that which depends on the validity of some other knowledge which is its ground. This other knowledge, in the last resort, should be characterized by immediacy. That is why the Indian theory of Inference recognizes the perceptual basis of *anumāna*. If, for instance, one had not *seen* the co-presence of smoke and fire in a place like the hearth, one would not be able to infer the presence of fire on the hill from the perceived presence of smoke thereon. In matters empirical, inference follows perception. In regard to metaphysical truth, logic has to follow and render intelligible the plenary experience, of which scripture is a record. The *Upaniṣads* embody the discoveries made by the ancient seers; they constitute the testimony of the most authentic experience of those who are awake in Spirit. It is not in the dogmatic sense that the authority of scripture is to be accepted. The final test of Vedānta is experience. The culmination of the inquiry into the nature of *Brahman*, says Śaṅkara, is *anubhava*, intuitive experience.¹⁹ The knowledge that is revealed by scripture must become a matter of direct experience; only then revelation would have fulfilled its mission.

It is significant that the *Brahma-sūtra* begins with

the aphorism : "Then, therefore, the inquiry into *Brahman* (literally, the desire to know *Brahman*)". The method of inquiry is the same here as elsewhere. It consists in raising relevant problems or doubts and seeking solutions for them. For instance, one of the first problems raised in Vedānta concerns the reason for its study. The subject of study in Vedānta is *Brahman*. Now, is *Brahman* what we know already, or what we do not know? If we know it already, there is no need for inquiry; if we do not know it, there can be no inquiry, for no one can possibly inquire into something of which he is not aware. The way out of this dilemma lies in the fact that the alternatives posed here are not exhaustive, for there is a third possibility which is partial knowledge. As *Brahman* is the same as the self, everyone knows it, but knows it only superficially. Prior to inquiry, *Brahman* is known only vaguely. As a result of inquiry, one arrives at a settled knowledge of *Brahman*. The problem we have just now considered is only one of many problems that a student of Vedānta has to tackle. The cobwebs of ignorance and prejudice have to be swept with the broom of inquiry, before one becomes fit to receive the final knowledge. We have sought to show how essential inquiry is in Vedāntic study. The inquiry is to be made till the onset of *Brahman*-intuition. That is the meaning, says Śaṅkara, of the expression *jijñāsā*, 'desire to know'.²⁰ The glossator, Ānandagiri, declares in his explanation of a passage in Śaṅkara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* : "Without inquiry, the sacred teaching is incapable of generating *Brahman*-knowledge."²¹

A special difficulty which Advaita has to face *vis-a-vis* scriptural testimony concerns the ontological status of scripture. Is scripture ontologically real or not? If it be real, then as there is a reality which is other than *Brahman*, the position that *Brahman* is the sole reality will have to be given up. If scripture be unreal, then what is revealed by an unreal evidence should also be unreal. Words can establish a reality which is of the same grade as themselves. If verbal testimony be illusory or unreal, *Brahman* which is its content cannot be real.

The Advaitin replies to this criticism by admitting the unreality of verbal testimony. But he sees no validity in the argument that an evidence can establish only what is of the same grade of reality as itself. Even the empirical and the unreal can be practically efficient, and there is nothing unintelligible in verbal testimony, which has only empirical reality and is transcendently unreal, establishing the absolutely real *Brahman*. The familiar example given by the Advaitin to show how the testimony of scripture, though it be illusory, can sublate the illusory world is that of the dream-cognition of a lion subsuming the dream experience itself. The lion's roar heard in the dream is undoubtedly illusory, but, nonetheless, it enables the dreamer to wake up from his dream.

The two main post-Śaṅkara schools of Advaita differ over the question whether verbal testimony yields mediate knowledge alone, or immediate experience also. According to the *Bhāmatī* school, words can generate only mediate knowledge. It is continued meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*) on the content taught through words

that can convert verbal knowledge which is mediate into immediate experience. Meditation can do this, because the instrument of meditation is the mind; and since the mind is a sense-organ, in the *Bhāmatī* view, it can give rise to direct experience. According to the *Vivaraṇa* school, verbal testimony is capable of generating immediate as well as mediate knowledge. A bare sentence conveys only mediate knowledge. But the sentence whose purport has been inquired into can cause immediate experience. When, for instance, the full purport of the text, "This self is *Brahman*," is cognized after thorough inquiry, *Brahman* becomes the content of immediate experience. The story of the ten travellers may serve to make the point clear. The travellers crossed a swollen river, and started counting themselves to see if all of them were safe. But each time the one who counted left himself out and counted only nine. A passer-by stopped there, asked for the cause of the commotion, mentally counted and found out that all the ten travellers were there, he told them at first "There is the tenth man." This statement produced mediate knowledge. Then the passer-by pointed out to the man who had counted last, and said, "You are the tenth." This certainly produced the immediate awareness of the identity of the tenth man. Similarly, the Upaniṣadic texts like, "Being alone, O dear One, this was in the beginning," impart mediate knowledge. But the major texts such as "That thou art," when their purport is realized, reveal the immediacy of *Brahman*. The mind is not a sense-organ, in the *Vivaraṇa* view; it is not a *pramāṇa*. In order to

generate immediate knowledge, it is not necessary that in all cases there should be the operation of a sense-organ. And words, as we have seen, can be the means to direct experience, if what they speak about is immediate. There can be nothing more immediate and intimate than the *Brahman*-self.

(iii) *Truth and Error.* True or valid knowledge is defined as that knowledge which has for its content what is unsublated and unestablished by any other means. Unsublatability or non-contradiction and novelty are the characteristics of truth. Judged by these characteristics, nothing other than *Brahman*-knowledge can be true. *Brahman*-knowledge arises by sublating all other knowledge, and it can be had only through Vedāntic inquiry and through no other means. The absolutely real is *Brahman*; and the absolutely true knowledge is the knowledge of *Brahman*. To the facts of the empirical world belong only relative reality; and empirical knowledge is but relatively true. In other words, empirical knowledge is taken as true only till *Brahman*-knowledge arises. It is sublated when there dawns the intuition of *Brahman*. Less valid than empirical knowledge is the knowledge that pertains to such fanciful objects as those of dream and delusion. Thus, reality or truth is said to be threefold : absolute (*pāramārthika*), empirical (*vyāvahārika*), and apparent (*prātibhāsika*). The threefoldness, however, is not ultimate. All distinctions including that between the absolute and the empirical are induced by nescience or ignorance (*avidyā*, *ajñāna*), which is the same as *māyā*.

It is nescience that brings about error. Metaphysi-

cal error consists in mistaking the self for the not-self or wrongly transferring the features of either to the other. This is known as *adhyāsa*, superimposition. The self is the absolute reality; the not-self is the phenomenal world consisting of factors ranging from psychical modes such as egoity and intellect to physical things such as body and stone. The notion 'I' indicates the self; the notion 'this' refers to the not-self. On account of nescience, the self and the not-self are superimposed each on the other, and their characteristics also are wrongly interchanged. This ought not to be the case, because the self and the not-self are of contrary natures, opposed to each other like light and darkness; but it so happens that they are confounded with each other. All our empirical usage is based on this confusion. Such expressions as "I am this," and "This is mine", are the result of coupling the real and the unreal—which coupling is *adhyāsa*, superimposition. Here, in all cases of superimposition, it is the self which is the non-dual reality that is mistaken for the plurality of phenomena constituting the not-self, and *vice versa*.

In the phenomenal realm itself there are superimpositions which may be called empirical errors. These may serve as analogies for the metaphysical error. The two familiar cases are : mistaking a piece of rope for a snake, and wrongly seeing nacre as silver. When we make the erroneous judgments, "This is a snake," "This is silver," etc., we ascribe, in each case, to the subject what does not belong to it. We superimpose 'serpent' on 'rope', 'silver' on 'nacre'. Superimposition is the apparent presentation of the attributes of one

thing in another thing ²² It is the cognition of 'that' in what is 'not that'.

The theories of error we have so far considered fall under two categories : *asat-khyāti* and *sat-khyāti*. That the content of error is unreal (*asat*), as is the content of all cognitions, is the view of the Mādhyamika Buddhism. All other systems take the content of error as in some sense real (*sat*). The Mādhyamika bases its view on the sublation. The nullity nature of nacre-silver, which is one of the examples we have cited, is understood, says the Mādhyamika, from its sublation in the subsequent cognition "This is not silver." The sublation makes known the silver which was manifest in delusion to be unreal. If silver were real, there would be no sublation thereof, since there is observed sublation of the illusory silver, silver must be unreal.²³ The other theories of error we have taken note of so far are included in the category of *sat-khyāti*: the *ātma-khyāti* of the Buddhist Yogācāra, the *akhyāti* of the Sāṅkhya and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, the *anyathā-khyāti* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the *viparīta-khyāti* of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and the *yathārtha-khyāti* of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta—all of them consider the content of error to be in some sense real (*sat*). These theories take their stand on the positive import of delusive cognition. Of the unreal, there can be no cognition.²⁴ In delusion, there is the cognition of the content, e.g. silver. Hence, the content of delusion must be real.

The Advaita theory of error results from the incompatibility of the two standpoints, *sat* (real) and *asat* (unreal), and also from the need to reckon with both

cognition and sublation. If nacre-silver were real, its cognition could not be delusive; nor could there be sublation for it. If silver, even as it appears, be absolutely real, then it should be seen even by those who are free from defect. And, there would not arise the sublating cognition of the form "This is not silver," which makes known the non-existence of silver in all the three times, past, present, and future, in the locus where it was cognized. Since the nacre-silver is not cognized by those who are free from defect, and since it is sublated by the cognition of nacre, the silver that appears in delusion cannot be real. Nor can it be unreal, since it is cognized. If it were unreal, then, as in the case of the horns of a hare or the son of a barren woman, there would be no cognition thereof. So, neither delusion nor sublation would be possible. Thus, neither the theories which regard the content of error as real, nor the doctrine which considers it to be unreal can adequately explain error. Because of cognition, the silver which is seen in delusion is not unreal; because of sublation, it is not real. And, it cannot be both real and unreal, because of contradiction. Hence, it has to be *per force* admitted that nacre-silver is indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*) either as real or as unreal.²⁵ Since the content is indeterminable the delusive cognition also is indeterminable. Error, thus, is *anirvacanīya*, and the doctrine, if doctrine it may be called, is *anirvacanīya-khyāti*. While the various theories attempt the impossible in defining the content of error either as real or as unreal, Advaita frankly admits the futility of the task. Since the different

alternatives are untenable, and since there is no other alternative left, the content of error should be described as *anirvacanīya*, indeterminable.

In regard to the question whether validity or truth and invalidity or error are intrinsic or extrinsic, Advaita adopts the same position as that of Mīmāṃsā, i.e. validity is intrinsic in nature and invalidity extrinsic. Validity is intrinsic to cognition, because for it to rise nothing other than the cause of cognition is required, and for it to be cognized also nothing other than what reveals cognition is needed. Invalidity is extrinsic, because what generates it is a defect present in the cause of cognition, and what makes it known is the sublating cognition.

3. METAPHYSICS

In Advaita, what we have is not a philosophical system but metaphysical insight. The insight may be formulated thus : *Brahman* is the reality, the world is an illusory appearance; the so-called individual soul is *Brahman* itself, and no other.²⁶

(i) *Brahman*. The two terms frequently employed in the *Upaniṣads* to indicate the ultimate reality are *Brahman* and *Ātman*. The usage of these two terms as synonyms implies that the supreme Spirit is the same as the Self. *Brahman* is that which is great (*br̥hat*), ~~that than~~ which there is nothing greater. This does not mean that there are other reals which are less great; what it really means is that there is no reality other than *Brahman*, that reality is non-dual. *Brahman*²⁷ is great because it is unexcellable, free from limitation due

to space, time, or other things. *Brahman* is indicated by the word *bhūman* (infinite) in the *Chāndogya-upanīṣad*. The Infinite is the reality; what is not that is the finite (*alpa*) and is of no value (*ārta*). This is the explanation offered. 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else that is the Infinite. But where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else—that is the finite. That which is infinite is immortal; and that which is finite is mortal.'²³ Commenting on this passage, Śaṅkara observes: "In the Infinite there is nothing else that is seen, etc., nor is there a seer standing apart. No differentiations such as the one between the container and the contained are possible in it. In regard to the Infinite, all empirical usage is irrelevant."

Brahman, the non-dual reality, cannot be defined in terms of any category. Its nature is indicated *via negativa* as 'not this, not this' (*neti, neti*). This does not mean, however, that *Brahman* is a night of nothingness, a contentless void. It is the plenary being, the sole reality. In some texts of the *Upanīṣads*, positive expressions are also employed with reference to *Brahman*—terms like *satya*, *jñāna*, and *ānanda*, existence, consciousness and bliss. But these too are designed for making us understand the Real by telling us what it is not, viz., that it is not non-being, not what is inert, and not that which is related to sorrow. To define a thing is to limit it, to finitize it. The infinite and the unlimited cannot be characterized in terms of finite categories. *Brahman* is *nirguṇa*, without characteristics. Even to say that it is one is not strictly true; for

the category of number is inapplicable to the Absolute.

It is true there are in the *Upaniṣads* passages which characterize *Brahman* as the cause of the world, and as the home of all auspicious qualities. But how are we to reconcile the two views—the view of *Brahman* as the Absolute, without characteristics, and the view which characterizes it as the world-ground? For solving this problem, Śankara postulates two standpoints—the absolute (*pāramārthika*) and the relative (*vyāvahārika*). The supreme truth is that *Brahman* is non-dual and relationless. It alone is; there is nothing real besides it. But from our standpoint, which is the empirical, relative standpoint, *Brahman* appears as God, the cause of the world. There is no real causation, the world is but an illusory appearance in *Brahman*, even as the snake is in the rope. This doctrine is known as *vivarta-vāda* (the theory of phenomenal appearance) which is to be distinguished from *pariṇāma-vāda* (the theory of transformation).

Brahman the ultimate Reality, as we have seen, is unconditioned, without attributes, without qualifications. But it is the same Reality that is called God, when viewed in relation to the empirical world and the empirical souls. *Brahman* is the same, as *nirguna* (attributeless) and as *saguna* (with attributes). There are not two *Brahmans*, as wrongly alleged by some critics. Even when God is referred to as the lower (*aparā*) *Brahman*, what is meant is not that *Brahman* has become lower in status as God, but that God is *Brahman* looked at from the lower level of relative ex-

perience. These are two forms (*dvirūpa*) of *Brahman* and not two *Brahman's* : *Brahman* as-it-is-in-itself, and *Brahman* as-it-is-in-relation-to-the-world. The former is the unconditioned *Brahman*; the latter is *Brahman* as conditioned by nomenclature, configuration, and change.

(ii) *Īśvara* God, thus, is the conditioned *Brahman*; the conditioning principle is called *māyā*. As *māyā* is not a reality alongside or apart from *Brahman*, it does not make for the introduction of any real duality. All that Godhead requires for its status is assumed duality, and not real duality. Ether is spoken of as ether-at-large in relation to pot-ether, etc.; in and for itself, there is no difference. Similarly, God is said to possess omniscience, omnipotence, etc., as distinguished from the soul which is parviscient, with limited power, etc. In itself, Godhead knows no distinctions, and cannot be categorized. But, in relation to the world, Godhead becomes the source and ground.

God is not *a* cause among causes producing the world, he is the whole and the sole cause. The view of an Artificer-God manufacturing things out of extraneous matter is not favoured by Advaita. God is both the material and efficient cause of the world. Since the idea of cause is associated with the concept of time, it is probably better to consider God to be the ultimate *ground* of things. Godhead or *Brahman* is that from which beings arise, in which they reside after arising, and into which they disappear at the end. When one contemplates the nature and constitution of the universe, one is struck with wonder. The universe is differentiated by names and forms; it includes many

agents and enjoyers; its constituents are regulated in respect of place, time, cause, action and fruit; the design which it reveals cannot be even conceived by the mind. For such an infinitely ordered and variegated universe, no other cause or ground could be postulated than the omniscient and omnipotent God. Neither primal Nature, nor a set of atoms, nor non-existence, nor the individual souls are equal to the task of the world-projection. God alone can serve as the adequate ground. The argument which has now been advanced and other similar arguments should not be regarded as proofs for the existence of God. God is not the end-result of syllogistic reasoning. The arguments are useful only as helps that render intelligible the intuitively discerned and scripturally declared truth.

(iii) *Māyā* The principle that makes for the phenomenal appearance of the world is *māyā*. It has significance only from the relative (*vyāvahārika*) standpoint, and not from the standpoint of the Absolute (*pāramārthika*). The supreme truth is that *māyā* is that which (*yā*) is not (*mā*). But from our point of view, *māyā* appears as an inscrutable power of God that veils the true and projects the untrue. The power of veiling is termed *āvarana*, and that of projecting *viksepa*. If one were to ask : is *māyā* real or not?, the only answer is : it is neither real nor unreal. Because the world of plurality appears, *māyā* is not unreal; because *māyā* is sublated by the knowledge of the non-dual Self, it is not real. It cannot be both real and unreal. Therefore it is indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*). Any inquiry into *māyā* is not to make the concept intellig-

ible. but to enable one to go beyond it. When one has gone beyond, there remains no problem to be solved.

Any attempt to explain creation is bound to fail. On the phenomenal level, the intellect seeks to inquire into the nature of the world, and does not succeed in its attempt. When the final intuition of the Absolute is gained, it will be realized that the world was never created, that it is an illusory appearance. *Brahman* or *Ātman* alone is : the world is a misreading thereof, even as the illusory snake is seen in the rope. The texts of the *Upanisads* which speak of creation have no purport of their own. They are to be interpreted figuratively. They serve to introduce the subject of non-duality.

(iv) *The Soul*. We have so far been concerned with the first two aspects of Advaita : that *Brahman* is the non-dual reality, and that the world of plurality is illusory appearance. We shall now turn to the third aspect, i.e. that the so-called individual soul is no other than *Brahman*. The individual soul is *jīva*, conscious living being. There are several grades of conscious beings—as the phrase goes—from a blade of grass to *Brahmā* (the first to be created). These may be grouped under three heads, sub-human, human, and super-human. The group into which a soul is born is determined by the soul's past *karma*. The soul is born as an animal if there is an excess of demerit, as a god if there is an excess of merit, and as a human being if there is a balance between merit and demerit. So far as instinctive behaviour is concerned, man is not different from the animal. A cow, for instance, approaches

the man who goes towards it with fresh grass in his extended hands, and runs away from him who runs after it with a club held aloft. Exactly similar is the behaviour of men in parallel situations.

Is not man, then, superior to the animal? Wherein lies his excellence? Explaining a text of the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* which speaks about the evolution of man from matter, Śaṅkara observes as follows: "When all things without distinction are modifications of matter (*annarasa*) and lineal descendants of *Brahman*, why should man alone be singled out here? The reason is that he is the principal. Why is he the principal? Because he has the eligibility for action and knowledge."²⁹ In this context Śaṅkara quotes also a passage from the *Āitareya-āranyaka* which runs thus: "The *Ātman* is expanded only in man. He, indeed, is most endowed with intelligence. He gives expression to what is known. He sees what is known. He knows what is to come. He knows the visible and the invisible worlds. He perceives the immortal through the mortal. Thus is he endowed. But with the other animals, eating and drinking alone constitute the sphere of their knowledge."³⁰

In a sense, man occupies a position which is even more advantageous than that of the gods. For, normally, the status of the gods only provides the soul with the enjoyment of merit acquired in previous human lives, even as the animal state is meant for paying for past demerit. It is as a human being that the soul acts in order to enjoy, enjoys in order to act, and also has the competence to break through this vicious circle and

gain the highest human goal which is release (*moksa*).

According to Vedānta, the soul is not created; only its empirical-outfit consisting of body and mind is created. The body-mind complex and its cause, nescience (*avidyā*), constitute the soul's *saṁsāra* (transmigratory life). Nescience is the causal body (*kāraṇa-śarīra*) of the soul. The causal body is also known as the sheath of bliss (*ānandamaya-kośa*). The subtle body is composed of three sheaths: the sheath of intellect (*viññāna-maya-kośa*), the sheath of mind (*manomaya-kośa*), and the sheath of breath (*prāṇamaya-kośa*). What happens at death is only a change of the physical body. The *Bhagavad-gītā* compares this to the change of garment. Just as a person discards a set of old clothes and puts on a new set, even so the soul leaves a worn-out body and takes on a fresh one³¹. The subtle body, however, continues with incidental alterations, and also the causal body, till the onset of release.

Man's experience is distinguishable into three states: waking (*jāgrat*), dream (*svapna*), and sleep (*susupti*). In the state of waking, man experiences the external world of things. In dream, he creates an inner world of images and imagines that he is a denizen thereof. In sleep, the sense of plurality is lost and there is awareness without awareness of *anything*. Of the three states, waking is unique in the sense that it is only as located here that man can know that he is bound by *avidyā* (nescience), strive for and eventually gain *moksa* (release). We saw above that the status of man is a privileged one. Similarly, the state of waking

has a vantage-point. Genuine philosophical inquiry leading to illumination is made possible here. But the inquiry should not be restricted to the implications of the waking world alone, for waking is only a segment of experience. And, inquiry in order to be fruitful must take into account the total experience. It is thus that the inquiry into the three states becomes supremely important in Advaita. The result of this inquiry is that the Self is of the nature of pure consciousness, unaffected by the accidents such as the body, the mind and the world, which change and pass. In the language of the *Māṇḍūkya-upanīṣad* and the *kārikā* of Gauḍapāda, the true Self is *caturtha* or *turiya* (the fourth), the transcendent reality. It is the 'fourth' not in addition to or as-different from its appearances in waking, dream, and sleep. It is the basic reality of the appearances, both individual and collective.

It does not take much time to set forth the truth of Advaita or to understand it intellectually. But long discipline and education are necessary in the case of the average man before he can intuitively 'realize' that truth.

4. THE MEANS TO RELEASE

It is on account of nescience, ignorance, that the individual soul imagines itself to be limited, to be transmigrating from one life to another, to be different from the ultimate Reality, *Brahman*. It is because of nescience, as we have seen, that the self and the not-self are wrongly identified with each other, and the characteristics of the one are superimposed on the other.

Since nescience is the cause of bondage, it should be admitted, says Advaita, that knowledge is the means to release. *Brahman* which is to be realized—and this is release—is not the object of an act. *Brahman* is ever existent, it does not depend on human activity. This is the position of Advaita. The *Upaniṣads* teach *jñāna* (knowledge) as the means to release, and not action.

The reason why Advaita does not accept the Mīmāṃsā view that the entire *Veda* has ritual action (*karma*) for its purport, and action is the means not only to prosperity but also to release is as follows. It is not proper to regard the Vedānta texts as purportless, and to subordinate them to the ritual sections (*karma-kāṇḍa*). The eligibility for the Vedānta study is quite different from that for the *karma-kāṇḍa*; the fruit also is different. It is he who has renounced all attachment to works that is eligible to study the Vedānta texts and profit thereby. The fruit of *karma* is prosperity which is what-is-to-be-accomplished and is impermanent. The goal of Vedānta as taught in the *Upaniṣads* is release (*mokṣa*) which is not what-is-accomplished, but is eternal. It is only figuratively stated that release is to be achieved. In truth, however, release is the eternal nature of the self. What stands in the way of realizing this is ignorance or nescience (*ajñāna*, *avidyā*). When ignorance is removed through knowledge (*jñāna*), there is release. This is not a new acquisition; it is the realization of what eternally is. Anything that is caused by action is bound to perish. Through action one of four results may be obtained: origination, attainment,

purification, and modification. Release is different from these. The self which is of the nature of release is not what is originated, attained, purified, or modified. The Mīmāṃsaka claims that release can be gained by avoiding the optional and prohibited deeds and by performing the obligatory and occasioned rites. Any performance must lead to some positive result; so the obligatory and occasioned rites must yield their fruit which, it must be admitted, is merit. Even if we ignore this fact, the discipline recommended by the Mīmāṃsaka can at best make us free from *karma*. But *karma* is the effect of nescience; and with the destruction of the effect, the cause is not destroyed. What can destroy nescience is knowledge alone, and not works. As for the contention that the Vedānta texts have no purport of their own, and should be treated as eulogies (*arthavāda*), that is not sound. The Vedānta texts have their own fruit—and that the highest, i e. release. While heaven which is the ultimate fruit of ritual is an unseen one (*adr̥ṣṭa*), the goal of Vedānta is a seen (*dr̥ṣṭa*) fruit which can be enjoyed even here. So, the *Upaniṣad* texts cannot be regarded as eulogistic statements. They are capable of causing the realization of the highest goal which is *mokṣa*. Here, there is no need for an injunction of *karma*. The merit of the *Upaniṣads* is that they do not prescribe any action. Not only is action futile with reference to release, but also it will be the cause of evil, in so far as it will create obstacles in the way of release. So, one who seeks release should renounce all action and adopt the way of knowledge.

An important question, then, arises : if *jñāna* is the

means to *mokṣa*, and not *karma*, is there no place at all for *karma* in the aspirants' discipline? The Advaitin's answer is this: the competence to tread the path of knowledge is gained only when one's mind has become pure. For the purification of the mind, the means is *karma-yoga*, the performance of one's duties without attachment to results.

Disinterested and dedicated action (*niṣkāma-karma*, *karma-yoga*) serves to purify the mind, and thus becomes a remote auxiliary of the path of knowledge. Although knowledge itself is not an act, it is the mind that has to seek for and gain it. A mind that is impure, filled with passions and selfish desires, cannot even turn in the direction of self-knowledge. The discipline by which the passions may be eliminated is the performance of one's duties without caring for rewards. The craving for possessions, the thirst for sense-enjoyments, is what defiles the mind and makes it unfit for the higher pursuits. Therefore, the mind must first be freed from defilements through actions that are performed without motives, and are not directed towards finite ends. This is *karma-yoga*.

Is it possible to act without motive, it may be asked. The reply of the *Bhagavad-gītā* is this. It is true that there cannot be endeavour without motive. But instead of having a different motive for each action, have one and the same motive for all actions. Each action will, no doubt, bring in its own result. Regard that as a consequence and not as the end sought for. What, then, is the one end of all actions? The end is dedication to God, and the realization of *Brahman*.

Brahman cannot be realized except through knowledge. The sun of knowledge will not rise, unless the mind is thoroughly cleansed. And, the purification of mind is accomplished by worshipping God through the performance of one's allotted work.

The worship of God is *bhakti*. The object of worshipping God with devotion is to gain his grace, and to achieve one-pointedness of mind. The external accessories of worship are not important. What is essential is that we should offer ourselves to God, surrender the ego to him.

The destruction of ego can be achieved also through the technique of *yoga* as taught by Patañjali. But what is of particular importance here is to note that mind-control, or even the emptying of mind, is not an end in itself. *Samādhi-yoga*, the *yoga* of concentration, must lead to the path of knowledge (*jñāna*).

The path of knowledge is the way of self-inquiry. Four qualifications are prescribed for making one eligible to pursue this path. The qualifications are : (1) discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal, (2) non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruits either of this world or of the other world; (3) possession in abundance of six virtues, viz., calmness, equanimity, turning away from sense-objects, forbearance, concentration and faith; and (4) longing for release.

The path itself consists of three steps : hearing or study (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and contemplation (*nididhyāsana*). Hearing or study stands for the proper understanding of the meaning of Vedāntic statements. The statements are of two kinds : intermediary texts

and major texts. The intermediary texts relate to the nature of the world, the nature of the individual soul, the nature of the non-dual Self, etc. The major texts impart the supreme knowledge of identity. From the intermediary texts, only mediate knowledge of the truth is gained. From the major texts, the direct experience of the plenary reality may be obtained. In the case of the supremely competent inquirer, even a single hearing of the major text 'That thou art' (*tat tvam asi*) will do to effect release. But in the case of others, this does not happen because of impediments. The impediments are in the form of long-established false beliefs, the belief that the teaching of the Vedānta is impossible (*asambhāvanā*), and the belief that the contrary is the truth (*viparītabhāvanā*). The first of these beliefs should be countermanded through rational reflection (*manana*); and the second should be destroyed through the practice of contemplation (*nīdīdhyāsana*). When the impediments have been removed, there arises the intuitive experience of the non-dual Spirit. The intuition which is the final mental mode is technically called akhaṇḍā-kāraṇavṛtti. This is what is known as the direct knowledge of the Self; it is the mode of the mind whose content is the Self. Although it is a mode of the mind, it is not like the other modes. It destroys the other modes and finally destroys itself, with the result that the self-luminous non-dual Spirit alone remains. The final mental mode destroys nescience; when nescience is destroyed, bondage disappears, and there is gained Self-realization which is release.

It is true that release is said to be "attained" and bondage "destroyed" when nescience is removed. But the expressions "attainment" and "destruction" should be understood in this context in a figurative sense. There are two kinds of attainment, and two of destruction: attainment of the unattained, and attainment of the already attained, destruction of what has not been destroyed, and destruction of the already destroyed. For the first kind in each, action is necessary, not for the second variety of attainment and destruction. Let us illustrate. For getting an ornament made of gold, action is essential. It is not enough that one procures the money, which itself involves action, one must buy the gold, and get the ornament made, or go to the smith's shop and buy the jewellery. This is a case of attaining what has not been attained. An instance of the other type is the following. A person imagines that the gold chain he is wearing round his neck is lost. The chain is right there round his neck; but he is under a delusion. He sets about searching for the chain. A passer-by, on being appraised of the situation, points out to the deluded person that the chain is there round his neck. The person clutches at the chain, jumps up in elation, and cries out saying, "I have got back my precious chain". This is a case of attaining what is already attained. The person concerned has nothing to do for "getting back" the chain. All that he needs to get is the knowledge of the fact that the chain was not lost. Destruction, we said, is of two kinds. For destroying a real serpent, action such as beating with a stick is required.

This is a case of the first kind. For destroying the rope-serpent, any amount of beating will not do; what is necessary is sufficient light. This is an instance of the second kind of destruction. Now, the “attainment” of release and “destruction” of bondage are in the second of the two senses, which is the figurative sense. Release is eternal, and, therefore, it is the ever-attained. On account of nescience it seems to be un-attained as it were. At the dawn of knowledge its eternal nature is revealed. Similarly, bondage is not real, being nescience-caused. At the rise of knowledge, it is removed as it were, being already removed.

As release is the eternal nature of the Self, one need not wait for realizing it till death overtakes the physical body. Even while tenanted by a body one is released at the onset of knowledge. Such a one is called a *jīvan-mukta*, released even while living in the body. *Mokṣa* is not a *post mortem* experience. It can be realized here and now. A text of the *Upanisads* declares: “One realizes *Brahman* here.”²³ The supreme knowledge arises as dispelling ignorance. And, when this happens, release which is the eternal nature of the Self is realized. The continuance of the body is in no way incompatible with the status of release. What happens when release is gained is a change in perspective. Before release, one took the world of which the body is a part to be real; after gaining Self-knowledge one realizes that the world is an illusory appearance. If the body were real, then release could come only after the destruction of the body. But, since the body is not real, its continued appearance or disappearance is of no

consequence. From the standpoint of the *jīvanmukta*, if standpoint it may be called, there is no body at all. He seems to live in a body only for the unreleased. After a time when the body dies, we say, "He gains liberation from the body" (*videha-mukti*). But the truth is there is no difference in *mukti* (release). When release is attained, there is no more travail for the soul. It realizes its non-difference from *Brahman*. This realization is the experience of non-duality. "The knot of the heart (ignorance) is cut, all doubts are destroyed, and one's deeds cease," declares the *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad*, "when the supreme Reality is seen."²⁴

5. CONCLUDING NOTE

We have come to the end of our survey of Indian philosophy. We have followed the plan indicated at the end of the first chapter with a few additions. In the chapter on "Theistic Vedānta", besides the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Dvaita, short expositions, have been given of other Vaiṣṇava schools. In the chapter where Śaiva philosophies are discussed, brief accounts of Vīraśaivism and Śivādvaita have been added to the treatment of Śaiva Siddhānta and Kashmir Śaivism, as also a section on Śākta philosophy. The exposition of Advaita has been given after explaining the doctrines of the theistic schools. An account of the current trends in philosophy in this country will be found in the Appendix.

NOTES

1. *Chāndogya*, VI, ii, 1
2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II, iv, 14
3. *Isāvāsyā*, 7.
4. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV, iv, 19, *Kaṭha*, IV, x, 11.
5. *nārayānam padma-bhuvam vasīṣṭham Śaktim ca*
tat-putra-parāśaram ca,
vyāsaṁ śukam gauḍapadaṁ mahāntaṁ
govinda-yogīndram athāśya śiṣyam,
śrī-śankarācāryam athāśya padmapādaṁ ca
hastāmalakam ca śiṣyam,
tam trotakam vārtikukāram anyān asmad-gurūn
santatam ānantosmi.
6. Śankara's commentary : *vedāntārtha-sāra-saṅgraha-*
bhūtam.
7. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, iii, 48, iv, 71
8. *Ibid*, iv, 28.
9. *Ibid*, i, 17.
māyā-mātram idam dvaitam advaitaṁ paramārthataḥ
10. Commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* :
kathaṁ hy ekasya svahr̥daya-pratyayaṁ
brahma-vedanaṁ dehadhāraṇaṁ ca apareṇa
pratikseptum śakyate.
11. S Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1962), p. 658.
12. *Naīṣkarmya-siddhi*, 1, 5.
13. *Toṭakāṣṭakam*, verse 4.
14. Cited in the *Pañcadaśī*, iv, 30.
15. *vyavahāre bhaṭṭa-nayaḥ.*
16. *Bhāmatī* :
tātparyavatī hi śrutiḥ pratyakṣād balavatī,
na śruti-mātram
17. Commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, xvii, 66 : *na hi śruti-*
śatam, apī śītaḥ agniḥ aprakāśo vā iti bruvat prāmāṇ-
yam upaiti

18. Commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, I, i, 1 : *tatrā' vicārya yat kiñcit pratīpadīyamāno nīhśīeyasāt pratihanyeta anarthañce' yāt.*
19. Commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, II, 1, 4 : *anubhav-āvasānam ca brahma-vijñānam*
20. Commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, I, 1, 1 : *avagati-paryantaṁ jñānaṁ san-vācyaṁ icchāyāḥ karma.*
21. *brahma-vicāram-antareṇa taj-jñāna-janakatvā'yogat*
22. Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, *adhyāsa bhāṣya* : *anyasya anyadharmāvabhasaḥ.*
23. *Vimuktātman, Iṣṭa-siddhi* (Gaekward-Oriental Series, No. LXV), p. 39 : *bādhāyogād asat sataḥ.*
24. *Ibid* , p. 39 : *asataḥ khyāty-ayogāt sat.*
25. *Ibid.*, p 47 :
sattve na bhrānti-bādhau stāṁ
nāsattve khyāti-bādhakau,
sadasadbhāṁ, anirvācya
'vidyā vedyais saha bhramāḥ
26. *brahma satyam jagan mithyā jīvo brahmuva nā' paraḥ.*
27. The root "brha, brhi", meaning 'to increase', signifies greatness.
28. *Chāndogya*, VII, xxiv, 1
29. *Taitirīya-upaniṣad-bhāṣya* (Memorial Edition), Vol 6, p. 71
30. *Atareya-āranyaka*, III, ii 3
31. *Bhagavad-gītā*, ii, 22.
32. Commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, I, ii, 1 : *bhūtaṁ brahma vijñāsyam nitya-vṛttatvāt na puruṣa-uyāpāra-tantram*
33. *Brhaāāranyaka*, IV, iv, 7; *Kaṭha*, vi, 14.
34. *Mundaka*. II, ii. 8

Appendix

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Philosophizing in India has never been the function of an exclusive group, it is more generally widespread here than anywhere else in the world. Princes and peasants, industrial magnates and workers, literates and illiterates, those who make a living with their brains and those who labour with their bodies, all seem to have their philosophical moods. A serious nation such as ours cannot but love the abstract and the universal. It is true that we too have our own lighter moments, and take our pleasures in the concrete. But there is something in the native unconscious that keeps telling us that the procession of the particulars that we call the world is bound to pass away yielding no real happiness. Like a double-edged knife, this character may cut both ways. If it is interpreted wrongly, it will turn us into a nation of fatalists and life-haters; if its true and lofty significance is understood we will rise again on a fresh wave of culture and contribute our share to the survival and progress of man. When the great minds of India ask us to realize the transitoriness of the finite world, they do not mean to make us scorn the world or quit it in a hurry; on the contrary they want us to exalt the world by recognizing the reality behind it, which is infinite and eternal.

Whenever this truth was grasped, we had a renaiss-

sance in India. There are signs to show that we are awakening to this grand truth once again. The political independence we gained in 1947 was itself a consequence of this new awakening. Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayananda, Sri Ramakrishna, and Swami Vivekananda in the last century laid the foundation for a new age in our country. All of them roused India to a realization that slavish imitation of alien thought-patterns and modes of conduct meant spiritual suicide. All of them threw light on the ancient religio-philosophic ideas and ideals of India. It was clear from their teachings that Vedic religion and Vedāntic philosophy were designed not for the exclusive benefit of a few people who would seek their selfish salvation, but for the generality of mankind, so that it could evolve and pass into nobler realms of being. It was his application of these teachings to the affairs of our national life that made Gandhi the Mahātmā of our age, and led to our freedom from British domination. In the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence, we find reflected the reverence for life and the emphasis on right means for achieving legitimate ends that are characteristic of all shades of Indian thought. *Ahimsā* (non-violence) and *satya* (truth) constitute the common legacy of the Indian philosophical mind. The great contribution that Gandhi has made to Indian philosophy lies in the fact that he has shown the efficacy of these virtues even in the field of politics, and the need for making political action spring from them. He insisted that non-violence and truth should become the regulative principles in all public affairs.

It is significant that a feature which is distinctive of Indian philosophy—its practical aim—is observed to characterize the present Indian renaissance too. Philosophy in India has never been a mere view of life; it has always been regarded as a way of life as well. Since the goal of philosophy is transformed life, good conduct is believed to count far more than set doctrines. In all the schools of Indian philosophy, insistence is laid on the need for moral discipline as a prelude to profitable philosophic inquiry. It is true that in the academic halls of philosophy today, even in India, no such insistence is laid. But it is admitted, theoretically at least, by the present-day Indian philosophers in general that the purpose of philosophizing is not arm-chair theorizing, but realization of the highest value. They seem to accept the ancient Indian tradition in this regard, viz., that philosophy is *sādhana* (way to the ultimate Reality).

A section of the teachers of philosophy in India, however, would not endorse this tradition. These professors believe that we have had no genuine philosophy in India so far—philosophy in the modern Western sense. According to them, what we have had is religion, dogma, uncritical doctrine, and not a disinterested investigation into the nature of things. They would like to see Indian philosophy begin altogether a new career, effacing all that is past. Let us commence with universal doubt, they seem to say; even as Descartes is claimed to have done in Europe; let us start with the Year One in philosophy, for philosophy has had no history in our country.

Fortunately, the general philosophical opinion in

our country seems to be not in favour of cutting away altogether from the past heritage. Dr Radhakrishnan and others, who founded the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1925, elected Dr. Rabindranath Tagore—not an academic philosopher—as the president of the first session. The great poet set the tone of modern Indian philosophy, when he declared in his presidential address “The only thing which encourages me to overcome my diffidence, and give expression in a speech to my unsophisticated mind, is the fact that in India all the *vidyās* poesy as well as philosophy—live in a joint family. They never have the jealous sense of individualism maintaining the punitive regulation against trespass that seems to be so rife in the West.” A glance at the proceedings of the successive sessions of the Indian Philosophical Congress will reveal that the spirit of Indian philosophy has not only been maintained, but also has been enriched by critical considerations and evaluation of Western schools of philosophy.

Thanks to the introduction of the English system of higher education more than a century ago, our students of philosophy in the universities have been learning much more about Western philosophy than about Indian thought. Even today, Indian philosophy occupies only a small portion in the curricula of philosophical studies in most of our universities. Whenever an Indian teacher of philosophy goes to the West on a visiting appointment, his Western colleagues are astonished at the knowledge that he possesses of the details of Western metaphysics. Their astonishment is all the greater, because they do not seem to know much of

Indian philosophy. The histories of philosophy written by Western thinkers totally ignore Indian or Eastern philosophy. Some of these writers justify the title *History of Philosophy* on the ground that, east of the Suez, there never was genuine philosophy. It is only a few philosophical historians like Bertrand Russell that give to their work such an appropriate title as *A History of Western Philosophy*. Although over-emphasis on European philosophy in our universities has led to a comparative neglect of Indian thought-systems, the knowledge of the West that has thus been gained is serving the purpose of broadening the outlook of Indian thinkers and giving them a training in critical evaluation of rival views of reality.

Mention may be made here of the publication of *History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western*, in two volumes (1952), under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, Government of India. Most of the contributors to these volumes are Indian thinkers, and the *History* is so designed as to be 'truly representative of the growth of human thought in the different civilizations and cultures of the world.' What made the then Union Minister of Education, the late Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, take the steps that resulted in the publication of the *History* was the realization that Indian philosophy should be studied in the context of world philosophy. In his address to the All India Education Conference in 1948, the Minister observed. "No one can today deny the supreme achievements of the Indian mind in the realms of metaphysics and philosophy. It is true that recently Indian philosophy has been intro-

duced as one of the subjects in Indian universities, but it has not gained the position it deserves in the general history of the philosophy of the world." Proposing to appoint a committee, with Dr. Radhakrishnan as Chairman, for the purpose of writing a history of philosophy, he said in Parliament in the course of the budget discussions for 1948-49 "Honourable Members are also aware that Indian philosophy is one of the proudest possessions of human civilization. In our college histories of philosophy, Indian philosophy is, however, relegated to an obscure corner. In order to get a true perspective of philosophy, it is necessary that a student should know of the great contributions of India, along with the developments which took place in Greece and modern Europe."

The living forms of classical Indian philosophy are the main schools of Vedānta and some of the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava philosophies like the Śaiva-Siddhānta and the Pāñcarātra. Current Indian philosophy is influenced by one or the other of these forms. Most of the participants in the philosophical debates, both in and outside the Indian Philosophical Congress, belong to these several schools, either by inheritance or by adoption, and they expound their particular systems with zest and fervour. In the classical age each system had to contend with only the other indigenous systems. In the modern age, the Western modes of thought also have entered the field of contest. The result is that quite a few of the modern Indian philosophers are engaged in the study of problems relating to comparative philosophy. The West, too, is now getting increasingly convinced of the

need for world-philosophizing. A significant evidence of this is the fact that a series of East-West Philosophers' Conferences have been held at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu. The main purpose of these conferences has been "to explore the field of East-West comparative philosophy, and to suggest avenues of development toward the ideal of a synthesis of the philosophies of the Orient and the Occident." Besides editing and publishing the papers presented at these conferences, the architect of these meetings, the late Professor Charles A. Moore has also brought out a volume entitled *The Indian Mind* in which are reproduced selected papers contributed by the Indian participants at these conferences. "This volume", in the words of its learned editor, "presents a middle-of-the-road explanation of the fundamentals of the Indian mind as expressed in its great philosophies, religions, and social thought and practices."

Ever since Śankara came to consolidate Advaita-vedānta as the summit of the Upanisadic philosophy, he has occupied the centre of the Indian philosophical scene. After him, his followers, while accepting his central philosophy, have expounded it in several ways that range from subjective idealism to near-realism. Probably, to name them by these 'isms' is not quite correct. What deserves to be noted is that there are doctrinal differences among post-Śankara Advaitins, and these differences have become possible because of the spirit of accommodation that pervades Advaita. It is evident that even those thinkers of the theistic schools of Vedānta in the classical age who differed from Advaita

were profoundly influenced by Śaṅkara. The very fact that every major philosopher after Śaṅkara pays great and close attention to his teachings, either for expounding them or for refuting them, shows the pre-eminent place that is Śaṅkara's in the history of Indian philosophy.

The contemporary situation in the philosophical world in India is not much different. Many of the Indian philosophers are exponents of Advaita. Some are critical of Advaita, especially of the doctrine of *māyā*. Generally following Śrī Aurobindo, they interpret *māyā-vāda* as a doctrine of negation and reject Śaṅkara as an impossible ascetic. Sometimes, in the proceedings of the India Philosophical Congress and in the pages of learned journals, battles royal are waged between the supporters of *māyā-vāda* and the advocates of *līlā-vāda*. It is one of the problems of the future to determine how much Śrī Aurobindo has been influenced by Śaṅkara.

Many of the contemporary Indian philosophers would seem to have had contacts with some sage or other. Although spurious claimants to sainthood are not unknown, there are some genuine saints even today in India. One of the great sages of recent times was Śrī Rāmana Maharshi. In him, we had a contemporary *jīvanmukta*, a living commentary on the most sublime texts of the Vedānta. The simple and direct method of self-inquiry that he taught attracted aspirants from both the East and the West. Though not schooled in metaphysics, Eastern or Western, Śrī Rāmana Maharshi became, by virtue of his realization, the inspirer of the

highest type of metaphysical inquiry in many. Scattered all over the country, there are large and small groups of enthusiasts for some saint or other. Sometimes, there is the danger of these groups giving rise to closed cults. But on the whole, it must be stated that the *āśīamas* are playing their part well in popularizing the philosophical ideas of our ancient culture.

One of the better organized monastic institutions is the Ramakrishna Order, founded by Swami Vivekananda in the name of his Master. The Swami himself was a pioneer in spreading, both in this country and abroad, the neo-Vedānta movement characteristic of the present renaissance. Apart from the charitable, educational, and allied activities that go on at the different centres of the Order, there is a considerable volume of study and publication of significant texts. The main philosophical ideas disseminated by the members of this Order are those of Advaita-vedānta as confirmed by Sri Ramakrishna. But as there is no opposition between Advaita and the theistic approaches to Reality, these latter also are advocated by them.

Although the chief trends in contemporary Indian philosophy are to be traced to the Vedāntic traditions, it is not as if they contain nothing more than these traditions. The philosophical India has never worshipped time for the sake of time. Kālidāsa says, with reference to poetry, that not all that is old is good, nor all that is new, despicable. We have already referred to the new influence of Western thought on contemporary Indian philosophy. More and more attention is being paid today to the application of the philosophical ideas to

social problems. The ideal of *karma-yoga* as taught in the *Bhagavad-gītā* is increasingly sought to be pressed into service in all departments of corporate life. One of the possible developments of Indian thought is in the direction of a social philosophy that will meet the challenges of the present, while exploiting fully the riches of the past. As Dr. Radhakrishnan said in his presidential address to the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1950 "Indian philosophy can contribute to the restoration of a really human culture only by renewing itself, by transforming itself more radically than it has done. It will include all that is perennially valid in the ancient systems and express them in ways that are relevant to the contemporary situation. Let us realize that all life, including the intellectual, is perpetual rebirth."

GLOSSARY

- Abādhita* . uncontradicted, unsublated
Ābhāsa-vāda . theory of world-appearance in *Śaiva* and *Śākta* schools.
Abhāva : state of non-existence, absence.
Abhyudaya : prosperity.
Adharma : demerit; evil; unrighteousness, medium of rest, in Jainism.
Adhyāsa : superimposition.
Adhyāya : chapter.
Adr̥ṣṭa . unseen potency
Ahaṅkāra . egoity.
Ahiṃsā . non-violence; non-injury.
Ajīva . non-soul; what is inert or non-conscious
Ākāśa : ether, space.
Akhaṇḍākāravṛtti . direct knowledge of the self in *Advaita*.
Akhyāti . non-apprehension, a theory of error.
Akṣara . Imperishable.
Alaukika : super-normal
Ālocana : awareness, simple observation.
Alpa : what is small, finite.
Aṁśa : a part.
Amūrta-dravya . immaterial substance.
Ānanda : bliss, happiness
Ānandamaya : sheath of bliss.
Ananyatva : non-separateness
Anasti-kāya : non-extended real.
Anātman : not-self.

- Anekāntavāda* the doctrine that every object possesses a plurality of aspects
- Anga* : soul, part
- Anuvacunīya* . indeterminable
- Anna* . food, matter
- Annamaya, annaśamaya* . sheath made of food; the physical body
- Antahkarana* the internal organ, 'mind' in English language
- Antarātman* . inner self
- Anu* : elementary particle
- Anubhūti* . experience
- Anugraha* . grace
- Anumāna* inference; syllogism
- Anupalabdhi* . non-cognition, a *pramāṇa*
- Anu-vyavāsāya-jñāna* reflective cognition
- Anyathākhyāti* : apprehension otherwise, a theory of error
- Apāra Vidyā* . lower knowledge; knowledge relating to the phenomenal world.
- Apāṅgraha* . non-possession, non-grasping of empirical goods
- Apauruṣeya* : not a composition of any person; impersonal
- Apavarga* Release in Vaiśeṣika school, escape from pain
- Apīthak-siddhi* . the internal relation of inseparability
- Apūrvā* : unseen potency.
- Artha* wealth, one of ends sought by man, it stands for power that accrues from economics, politics, diplomacy, etc
- Arthāpatti* . presumption, postulation
- Āsana* : posture in Yoga—a posture that is stable and conducive to happiness.
- Asat-khyāti* . apprehension of the unreal, a theory of error
- Āsrava* . influx of *karma* particles into the soul
- Āsteya* . non-stealing.
- Asti-kāya* : extended real.

Asura : demon

Ātma-khyāti-. self-apprehension, a theory of error.

Ātman · the self; the reality which is the substrate of the individual soul

Avadhi-jñāna : knowledge through clairvoyance.

Āvaraṇa · the veiling power of *māyā*

Avatāra : incarnation of God; descent of God in tangible form.

Avayavāḥ : component parts, organs.

Avidyā · nescience.

Avijjā : Pāli for *avidyā*, nescience.

Aviveka : non-discrimination.

Baddha . the bound, the imprisoned.

Bandha : bondage

Bhakti loving devotion.

Bhāṣya commentary

Bhedābheda · relation of identity in difference

Bhikkū Pāli for *bhikṣu* meaning 'monk'

Bhoktā : the enjoyer

Bhūman . infinite

Bhūta the fundamental elements.

Brahmacarya : celibacy; continence, literally, the life-mode that leads to *Brahman*.

Brahman : from the root '*br̥h*'—'to burst forth'. 'to grow'; the source of all existence; the ultimate reality, the ground of the universe

Buddhi : intellect

Caitanya . consciousness, intelligence

Cetana-draṣya : consciousness-substance.

Cit : consciousness; same as *Caitanya*.

Dāna . charity

Darśana sight; vision, intuition, stand-point in philosophy

Deva deity, god, divine being

Devatā deity

Devayāna path of the gods

Dhamma : Pāli for *dharma*.

Dhāranā : fixed attention

Dharma righteousness, goodness, which is the moral end, it also signifies the merit that results from good acts, religious duty; medium of motion, in Jainism

Dharma-bhūta-ñāna . attributive consciousness.

Dhyāna . meditation

Dīksā . initiation

Dosa defect

Dravya substance.

Disti . speculative stand-point

Duḥkha . sorrow, misery

Duḥkha-nirodha . removal of sorrow

Duḥkha-samūdaya . cause of sorrow

Dvesa aversion, hatred

Guna . quality, attribute, characteristic; what is secondary

Guru teacher, guide

Gurūpasatti devotion to preceptor

Hetu *probans*, the reason in a syllogism

Icchā-sakti power of desire

Indriya sense organ

Jada the inert

Jāgrat Waking state

Jarā-marana old age and death

Jāti birth or generality

Jīva · the individual soul

Jīvanmukta . One who has been liberated while yet living

Jñāna : knowledge, wisdom

Jñāna-śakti · power of knowledge

Kāla · time

Kāma pleasure, one of the ends sought by man, desire, love

Kāmya-karma optional rites; hypothetical imperative.

Kāraṇa-śarīra causal body; this is ignorance, nescience
(*avidyā*), the same as *ānandamaya-kośa*

Karma action, fruit of action

Karma-yoga · path of dedicated action

Karma-yogi . one who pursues the path of dedicated action.

Kartā the agent

Karunā . compassion

Kevala-jñāna perfect knowledge, omniscience

Kevalin perfected soul, one who has become pure, and has
been liberated from bondage to matter

Kleśa : passion

Kriyā-śakti : power of action.

Kuśa : a kind of grass

Laukika secular, normal

Līlā . pleasure, sport

Loka-vyavahāra · empirical usage.

Mahat : the first evolute of prakṛti, according to Sāṅkhya; also
called *buddhi*, literally 'The Great'

Mala : the impurity of ignorance

Manahpariyaya-jñāna · telepathic knowledge

Manana : reflection

Prāmāṇika . one who seeks to establish his metaphysical view
on the evidence of *pramāṇas*.

Prāṇa . life; vital force; breath.

Prāṇamaya : sheath of vital air.

Prāṇāyāma : control of the breath.

Prapatti . self-surrender, utter submission.

Prātibhāsika : apparent.

Pratijñā : the statement that is to be proved in a syllogism

Pratiśīdha-karma prohibited deeds

Pratītya-samutpāda : in Pāli *pratīccasamuppāda*, dependent
origination

Pratyabhijñā . recognition

Pratyāhāra withdrawal of the senses.

Pratyakṣa . perception

Praurtti activity, going forth, involvement in the world-
process.

Pudgala : matter

Puṇya : merit

Pūrṇatva : completeness.

Puruṣa : spirit, soul.

Puruṣottama : the supreme person.

Pūrva-pakṣa : *prima facie* view; a view which is criticized and
rejected.

Rāga : attachment.

Rajas : energy-stuff; one of three *guṇas*.

Rasa : sentiment.

Rṣi : sage; seer-poet.

Ṛta : the eternal order, cosmic as well as moral; the growing
principle of even the gods; rectitude.

Śabda : sound; word; verbal testimony.

- Sādhana* : means; way to the ultimate reality.
- Sādhya* : probandum, that which is to be proved in a syllogism.
- Sādrśya* : similarity
- Saguṇa* : with attributes.
- Sāksi-caitanya* : witness-consciousness.
- Sāksin* : intuitive faculty, self's own sense-organ.
- Śakti* : power, capacity
- Samādhi* : Concentration, absorption
- Sāmānya* : generality
- Sāmānya-laksana* . the conceptual elements contributed by the mind in perception.
- Samhāra* : destruction.
- Samśāra* : transmigration; involvement of the individual soul in the process of repeated birth and death
- Samśaya* . doubt
- Samśkāra* : mental dispositions
- Samvara* : stoppage of fresh flow of *karma* particles
- Samvrti* . the relative, the empirical
- Samyag-darśana* . right faith
- Samyag-jñāna* . right knowledge.
- Samyak-caritra* : right conduct
- Samyoga* : conjunction.
- San̐khyā* : number, one of the six systems.
- Santosa* . contentment.
- Sannyāsin* . monk
- Saprapaṇca* : cosmic, literally, with-the-world.
- Saptabhaṅgī* . sevenfold judgment—formulation of the doctrine of standpoints, with the affirmative and the negative modes as the basic forms.
- Śarīra* : body.
- Śarīri* : the soul in Viśistādvaita.

Sarvajñatva . omniscience

Sarvakartṛtva . omnipotence

Śāstra . teaching; text expounding a doctrine

Sat . existence, being; from the root *as* 'to be'

Sattva . intelligence-stuff; one of the three *guṇas*.

Satya . truth, abstention from uttering falsehood

Śauca . purity.

Savikalpaka . the determinate

Sāyujya . union with God

Siddha : an accomplished one, a realised soul

Siddhānta . settled conclusion, final view.

Śīla . conduct.

Śiva : he who is auspicious he who attenuates sin (*aśubha*)

Skandha : complex; compound

Smṛti . memory.

Spanda . self-movement

Śravaṇa : hearing; study

Sṛṣṭi . evolution, creation.

Śruta-jñāna . knowledge through Scripture

Śruti : the heard, revealed scripture—the *Vedas*

Sthala . supreme reality in *Vīraśaivism*.

Sthāvara : stationary (soul)

Sthiti : preservation

Sthūla-śarīra : gross body.

Suddha-sattva : pure matter in *Viśiṣṭadvaita*

Sukha : happiness; same as *ananda*

Sūkṣma-śarīra : subtle body

Śūnyatā : Voidness.

Śuṣupti . deep sleep.

Sūtra : aphorism; cryptic statement, requiring commentary or explanation.

- Svagata-bheda* internal distinctions
- Sva-laksana* the bare particular in perception.
- Svapna* : dream
- Sva-prakāśa* : self-revealing.
- Svarga* . heaven.
- Svarūpa-jñāna* essential knowledge which is of the nature of the Self
- Svatantra* . independent.
- Syādvāda* . may be-ism, the doctrine of 'may be' based on the principle of stand-points
- Tamas* : mass-stuff, one of the three gunas
- Tanmātrā* the subtle essence of elements viz., sound, touch etc
- Tantrā* Pāli for *trṣṇā* meaning thirst, desire, craving
- Tapas* : austerity, penance, searching (or becoming) inquiry.
- Tarka-śāstra* . the science of logic
- Tattva* category of existence
- Tirodhāna* : obscuration
- Tīrthankara* . ford-maker title of the teachers of Jainism
- Trivrtkaraṇa* : triplication; mixture of the three elements, fire, water and food in different propositions to constitute various objects
- Turiya* : short for *Caturīya* meaning 'fourth', the transcendent self, the supreme reality.
- Tyāga* : renunciation
- Upamāna* : comparison.
- Upapatti* . intelligibility in the light of reasoning.
- Vairāgya* : renunciation.
- Varna* : letters, alphabets.
- Vārtika* : verse-commentary.
- Vāsanā* : latent potency.

Vedanā : feeling

Vibhrama : delusion.

Vibhūti . sacred ash.

Videha-mukti release without the body.

Vidhi . positive command; of the *Vedas* in *Mīmāṃsā*

Vidyā : knowledge; meditation.

Viññāna : intellect; also called *buddhi*

Viññānamaya : sheath of intellect.

Vikalpa : mental construct, imagination.

Viksepa . the projecting power of *māya*.

Vimoha : error

Viparyaya : erroneous cognition.

Vīra: heroic.

Visesa . particularity.

Visista : the qualified.

Vivarta : transfiguration; apparent change, illusory appearance

Vivarta-vāda : the doctrine of phenomenal appearance.

Viveka . discrimination

Vrata : vow; rule of conduct

Vṛtti : modification of the mind.

Vṛtti-ñāna : knowledge which results from the operation of a mental mode.

Vyāpakatva . all-pervasiveness.

Vyāpti : invariable concomitance, universal pervasion between *hetu* and *sādhya*.

Vyāvahārika : empirical.

Yama : abstentions.

Yathārtha-khyāti-vāda : the doctrine of the apprehension of what is real.

Yoga : path; discipline, process of meditation; one of the six systems.

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